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'Studio 9' Debates Bush-Gorbachev Malta Talks

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["Studio 9" program, presented by Prof Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio, with Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs; and Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. It seems to me that it would be more than worthwhile to devote our meeting today in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center to such an extraordinarily significant international event as the Soviet-American summit meeting [vstrecha na vysshem urovne] in Malta. Now in order for you to be able to hear opinions and receive information from the horse's mouth, as they say, we have invited to take part in our discussion those people who had an opportunity to take part directly in the work and to observe at first hand how the meeting progressed: Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department and doctor of historical sciences; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs; and Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

During the week that has passed since the Malta meeting—just one week, that is how time flies—the first-hand reports about the meeting were replaced by analytical articles and attempts to investigate in depth what had occurred and the significance of what took place. One must say that nearly all of the analysts are now coming to the conclusion this was one of the most important and fruitful Soviet-American summit meetings. I would like to begin our talk today by asking each of the participants to briefly outline what he sees as the peculiarities and significance of the Malta meeting in comparison to Soviet-American summit meetings of recent years. The peculiarities and significance. Let us begin with you, Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] I think that this meeting was characterized not only by the hurricane that, according to Maltese authorities, was unprecedented in the past 50 years, but also by the depth of the discussion of problems between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and George Bush, President of the United States. The depth, and at the same time the scale. If at previous meetings the topic of the talks dealt as a rule with the surface layer of relations, those topical questions that could not be further delayed, today they delved into the second and third layers, took a look behind the line of the visible horizon, and discussed how the great powers must live and cooperate in the near, intermediate, and long-range future in order to establish what, after all, every specific step today must lead to, and in order to have in view the aim—if it is shared—and the reference points of this cooperation, both in the interests of the two great powers as well as the interests of the international community as a whole.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, what do you see as the distinguishing feature?

[Bessmertnykh] I think that this Malta summit meeting should be measured—I agree here with Valentin Mikhaylovich—with a special ruler and a special measure. This meeting has a special status and a special meaning insofar as this time the success was measured and is being measured, in my opinion, not only by the specific progress that was achieved, although one must say that this specific progress could embellish any other meeting, but also by the fundamental quality of the discussion that took place between the two leaders in Malta.

Where does the fundamental aspect of this discussion lie? First of all, for the first time since World War II a leader of the Soviet Union and a leader of the United States have set themselves a task and began solving it in relation to what the world is like today, what place is occupied in this changing—this turbulently changing—world by the Soviet Union and the United States, and how the interests of our two countries relate or interact with each other and with the rest of the world, which, I repeat, is changing.

It is very important that in the context of these very profound juxtapositions an extremely delicate and difficult question was being solved, namely, how the two superpowers must behave in this changing situation.

Finally it was of no little importance that possibly for the first time the chemistry of personal relations between the two leaders began to work so actively, which is of no little significance in these turbulent times.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich.

[Arbatov] Well, if we talk about the peculiarities, I would begin with one symbolic and, to my mind, important point. This was the first meeting the topic of which was to have been peace, yet the venue was to be military ships. Due to the interference by the weather, this did not happen. I think this was very symbolic. It once again showed that military force cannot serve as a means or an instrument for achieving rational political aims, if you will. It proved its impotence, even in the face of the weather. I think that besides the two official participants in the meeting, there was a third active participant present, which was the times, our times, with its demands that forced everyone to behave correspondingly.

I would add here—I want to be objective—that this had a particular influence on the American side, and I think that its vacillation, which was quite strongly evident during the first half of the year of the new administration's rule, was somehow put into a framework by the times, forcing the adoption of some kind of line both before and during the meeting. The participation of this third factor seems to me to have had its effect on all the results of the meeting.

[Zorin] Thank you. Well, it is now a commonly known fact that the meeting was proposed by President Bush this past summer. I suspect, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, that in the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] from that moment on you engaged in preparatory work. In connection with this, I would like to ask you, did it turn out the way it was planned in summer after the proposal was made, or did it turn out differently?

[Bessmertnykh] The meeting was indeed proposed by President Bush, but it could be said that it was planned simultaneously both in Moscow and Washington. This was my sixth opportunity to attend a summit meeting. Maybe I am being too bold, but I would like to say that it always seemed to me Mikhail Sergeyevich always felt a need to have a profound, fundamental, and conceptual talk with the American leader. He tried to set out this doctrine of Soviet-American relations block by block. The first attempt was undertaken in Geneva. As you may recall, not unimportant statements were already made at that time, and in particular about the inadmissibility of starting a nuclear war, that there could be no winners in it, and that neither of the sides should strive for military supremacy. At present, this sounds somewhat axiomatic, yet how much effort there was at the time in order for this formula to be considered mutual.

Now, when Bush has come to power, we have noticed that the new U.S. leader is also striving to think somewhat differently. He stated in particular, and this drew attention, that the United States and the Soviet Union should apparently throw off the framework of deterrence. We understand what this leaving the framework of deterrence means. It means abandoning the cold war policy. Bush also spoke about the need for creating relations of particular closeness with the Soviet Union. So both sides have begun moving toward a broad understanding of things.

Here I would like to draw attention to a very important circumstance that in essence was at the center of the discussions but on which, unfortunately, insufficient attention was focused even by the most astute observers—I am not including the moderator of this program among those who did not pay attention to this. I am talking about the fact that Mikhail Sergeyevich proposed that the U.S. President reject stereotypes in mutual relations whereby both sides viewed one another as eternal enemies, in other words, repudiate the concept of enemy both in form and essence in mutual relations with one another. The Soviet side, as you know, expressed readiness not to view the United States as an enemy and to move toward cooperation in all spheres.

So both sides have arrived at this most important stage in the evolution of views on the nature of mutual relations between the two countries. This is a particularly important achievement and we have been striving for this. At this level I think the talks justified themselves.

As far as the specifics of the talks are concerned—and in fact they covered a lot of ground—during these eight hours we managed, through the intensity of the talks, to arrive at progress that will essentially ensure a platform for our actions in the near future and for the intermediate and long-range future. So I consider that the meeting justified the plans and in some ways it possibly even surpassed expectations....

[Arbatov, interrupting] You may recall, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, that I asked during the press conference: Well, did it turn out better than you [ty] thought or not? You said: Better.

[Bessmertnykh] Yes, in fact that is how it was. We were sitting next to one another and, ah, that is indeed how it was.

[Zorin] I just wanted....

[Bessmertnykh, interrupting] In some ways it was unexpected.

[Zorin] I just wanted to continue what you have begun, and to ask you, first of all, Valentin Mikhaylovich: The meeting has passed. In what ways did it live up to your expectations, in which ways did it surpass them, and were there any disappointments?

[Falin] If I consider my personal impressions, it primarily justified expectations that there would be continuity in U.S. policy— that is, we would not have to begin working all over again on everything that had already been discussed and that had been agreed upon with the previous administration—and that we would take the necessary steps, possibly only a few steps, forward as compared to what was already available, what we and the Americans can consider to be our joint achievement and our common capital.

Of course we could not expect that even after 8 hours of talks we would immediately discard the ideas that had accumulated over dozens of years, or at least over many years, and arrive at new concepts. There is a Russian saying: Illness enters us by the pound and exits by the ounce. It is the same way in politics. Stereotypes accumulate and become entrenched in enormous layers and heaps and it requires the enormous labor and efforts of all to clear these accumulations away.

Where did it not meet expectations? It appears to me that in commentaries after the meeting, particularly by people who either expressed or are thought to express and convey the official point of view—are considered to be or are expected to be giving an authentic view—it appears to me that on the American side they are allowing themselves extremely great liberties. Maybe the rolling of the ships is still being felt. Many became seasick in those weather conditions, and not everyone has recovered from this yet. One gets the impression that the President's appeal to put behind us and leave in the past the bad things brought into our bilateral relations and the world in general by the Cold War, that these appeals have not been heard or at least perceived in such a way as it would appear obvious that they should be perceived.

[Zorin] You have Vice President Quayle in mind, in particular?

[Falin] Well, to some extent I have him in mind, too, at least those expressions and those labels that he has used in characterizing our foreign policy and our role in international affairs. All of them were not from the future, and not even from the present. They were all from the gray and very cold past.

Now, as far as the meeting itself is concerned: Although it was a working meeting that was naturally planned primarily as a philosophical exchange and as a meeting of minds in order to clarify those positions that will later be presented at talks by corresponding delegations, it appeared to me that in the area of the quest for solution of those difficulties that have emerged both at the talks in Geneva and partly at the talks in Vienna, at the strategic and conventional arms talks respectively, our approach was more flexible. Our approach was programmed to achieve a good pace in the solution of these problems. I think, nevertheless, that this in no way belittles the significance of what was done. We cannot expect that at the first meeting at the presidential level—and this was the first meeting for Bush—we would immediately work out the necessary optimal technology for discussing questions.

But if what produced such results is now continued further, if it will be a meeting of intellects and not a meeting of force, then I believe that much can be expected from our future cooperation with the United States.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, how would you reply to the question: What justified your expectations, what did not justify them, and what disappointed you?

[Arbatov] I was in the United States for more than two weeks before the Malta meeting. I arrived in Malta directly from the United States, where I observed an interesting thing. It seems to me, as I understand the history of this meeting, that at some time in the middle of summer, after visiting Europe and holding talks with his people, Bush remembered that fall was coming. This meant that the end of the year was at hand and that possibly, insofar as the disarmament talks were not going anywhere, this would be the first year since 1985 during which no summit meeting was held. So the idea of this mini-summit, so to speak, was born, a meeting without an agenda, a short meeting on neutral territory.

I believe that the Americans really thought for some time that something would turn out here, at least the Bush entourage thought so, although I believe that he could have harbored different ideas. However, there are many traditional and conservative thinking people in the President's entourage who to my mind are afraid of the pace of developments, the pace of change in international life, and the disintegration of the Cold War which is occurring before their very eyes. There are many among them who do not know any other policy, who cannot imagine how to live without an enemy, how to justify their policy, how to justify the alliance. What is the reason for living, after all? An article by a State Department official entitled *"The End of History"* even appeared. It was a sensation and became a topic of discussion. The end of the Cold War....

[Bessmertnykh, interrupting] By (Fukuyama).

[Arbatov] Yes, (Fukuyama). The end of the Cold War was viewed as the end of history. The situation went on like this for some time and began to change only in the fall. Now, what did I witness? I visited Middle America, where I was invited to deliver some lectures. This included fairly conservative states such as Tennessee, Texas, and other places. You know, even when compared to what was happening a year ago, there have been amazing changes. Expectations have risen and the administration probably felt this. This explains why conscious efforts were exerted directly before the meeting to dampen expectations. But, in general, as the meeting demonstrated, these high expectations were justified, because here what Aleksandr Aleksandrovich spoke about really was important. It was like 1985, when it was affirmed that you cannot win in a nuclear war. This time it was affirmed that you cannot win in a cold war, and that, in general, it loses its meaning and the very idea of an enemy disappears.

What, in this meeting....

[Zorin, interrupting] Did not meet expectations?

[Arbatov] ...did not meet expectations? Well, you know, of course, that I cannot say that I expected a lot more from the meeting, even if only because of the time constraints and the lack of preparation on the American side. I am very dissatisfied by the very concept and type of talks we are holding on disarmament. This is a model that was created for controlling the arms race, not for ending it. Protracted talks that drag on over second-rate issues. Besides, they are so drawn out and so bureaucratic that we always are doomed and forced to discuss things there that already have lost their urgency. It is the agenda of the day before yesterday. For example, the treaty on nuclear arms would have been wonderful two years ago, but it hardly will be pertinent to anybody next year. The main thing that came out of the meeting is that it will open the way to a new stage in the talks that, I hope, will be more meaningful, although there were important aspects of these talks as well.

I believe that there was no great progress and it was difficult to expect it at this level. But something more important occurred. After all, the talks also express and are the end result of the sum of the policy of the two countries. Now it has begun to change very seriously.

The attitude even in America toward military expenditures and so forth began to change before the talks. So, I believe that there probably is no room for disappointment here. In general, and I agree with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, the meeting turned out not only optimally, but in some ways even surpassed, somewhat, those expectations that could be nourished by people privy to the sentiments. I believe that a great job was done in general, although you must understand that it was not done in two days, but was the significant result of the entire preceding policy.

[Bessmertnykh] Just one comment, please, about the administration rolling. What Valentin Mikhaylovich said, I think, is a very important idea. They are not rolling and pitching just because they experienced the high seas, so to speak. They are also rolling and pitching because of the very strong winds blowing on them from the sanctuaries of old thinking, and I think there are more of them in the United States than in any other country. Everything has been achieved with great difficulty, and the struggle is continuing. So the fact that the administration, say, has made advances in certain directions is not something it achieved with ease, and I think it is now experiencing winds from the right and in some ways even from the left. As far as the mechanism for talks is concerned, I agree with Georgiy Arkadyevich. We share this opinion and are trying to change it. The mechanism has, in fact, already been changed. The whole model of talks now is as follows....

[Arbatov interjects] It begins at the top.

[Bessmertnykh] The leaders give a powerful impetus and outline the parameters; the foreign affairs ministers move these talks along further, like locomotives; and then the legal formulation is then turned over to the delegations. Previously, it went only to the delegations....

[Zorin interrupts] My next question to you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich is related to this. Now generally, it is known that it was not intended for any official documents to be signed at this meeting. Nevertheless, we should say something about the so-called solid residue [sukhoy ostatok] of the meeting, about those specific results that were achieved there along with the generally conceptual things that were discussed. I would now like to begin our discussion of the concrete results by asking you about the problems of disarmament. What was achieved, if anything, in this sphere during the discussions that took place.

[Bessmertnykh] Of course the best solid residue of the talks on this topic was the specific agreements and accords. Nevertheless, I think that the most surprising thing in this round of summit meetings was the public realization of how detailed, specific, and broad the discussion of this problem was in Malta, although you may recall that on the eve of the meeting it was noted—and the American side stressed this in particular—that there would be no specific discussions. However, they did take place. Besides I must say that both the American and Soviet sides were equally prepared for this, and neither side prepared any surprises or pitfalls for the other. Therefore the discussions were very intellectually constructive.

Specifically, first of all, the problems of strategic offensive weapons were discussed including the state of affairs of the talks on a 50-percent reduction of these weapons. We outlined our understanding of the denouement of the question of air-launched cruise missiles at the expense of their heavy bombers. We talked about the question of linking the 50-percent reduction and observance of the ABM Treaty in the context of the new ideas coordinated in Wyoming by Comrade Shevardnadze and Baker, and of course we pointed out that agreement was impossible if a mutually acceptable understanding concerning shipborne cruise missiles is not found. This was precisely and clearly stated and the American side understood this. We have certain differences concerning questions that remain unsolved which I would simply call technical. The Americans see three unsolved questions while we see five or six to be solved. However, the main thing is, as a result of the understanding reached at the leadership level, we feel that an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms can be ready by mid-1990.

[Zorin interrupts] This is very pleasing.

[Bessmertnykh] There are two alternatives here. The first alternative is that all the remaining knots are untied by 1990, and in the next few months, the technical preparation for the agreement will be completed; or possibly, if efforts are applied—and we think this is possible—the agreement can even be signed in the middle of next year. However, this of course is an extremely complicated task.

On the question of conventional arms, the CPSU general secretary and the U.S. President provided a very strong impetus, primarily through a combination of Soviet and U.S. efforts, to help the general multifaceted process of talks achieve accord. The proposed task is quite realizable. More precisely, an agreement on reduction of conventional forces and arms in 1990 and signing of an agreement at the highest level can be reached. We indicated to the Americans those questions that must be solved first. If we had the time, I could describe them, but we probably do not have the time now.

On chemical weapons, the Americans have been talking about them a lot recently as a sphere in which they have shown a particularly constructive attitude. Indeed, chemical weapons have of late become a topic of very active consultations between the two countries, even at the highest level. As a matter of fact, before Malta, Mikhail Sergeyevich sent Bush a letter on chemical weapons in which he outlined a concept for accelerating the talks and achieving agreement primarily through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States, but in the framework of multilateral talks. Now, Bush arrived with positions that to some extent responded to ours while at the same time containing new elements. The essence lies in the fact that it is now possible, after the question was discussed by Comrade Gorbachev and President Bush, to also achieve bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement on chemical weapons next year. What are the possibilities? Well, primarily, to reduce the arsenals of chemical weapons of the two countries by 80 percent as early as next year before the signing of a multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons. The sides could then cut them a further 18 percent and then eliminate the arsenals altogether. A very important matter, by the way, something that we were very pleased with and attracted attention was the fact that the American side declared for the first time that within the context of these agreements it would abandon the production and modernization of binary chemical weapons.

[Zorin interrupts] This is something new.

[Bessmertnykh] This is a completely new position, and it is very important.

On naval weapons, we raised this issue very sharply. Mikhail Sergeyevich said that the Soviet Union feels that under conditions when reductions and a lowering of arms levels are underway across the board, so to speak, the naval threat becomes more tangible for the Soviet Union, and along with its allies, it must look after its security from the seas and oceans. We have proposed talks on naval arms. We put forward another new idea; namely, to eliminate naval nuclear tactical weapons altogether. Of course, the strategic weapons are being discussed at other talks.

As far as tests are concerned, I agree with Georgiy Arkadyevich that progress could have been achieved on this issue earlier. However, I think this question has now been decided on, and the protocols will be ready in a few months. Both the 1974 and 1976 agreements on underground nuclear weapons tests and tests for peaceful purposes will come into force after they are signed at the next summit meeting.

To sum up, it seems to me that 1990 will become an extremely important year from the viewpoint of achieving specific agreements on the reduction of arms. The year 1990 could well become a landmark in this entire, protracted, and at times drawn out history of agonizing talks on these questions.

[Zorin] Thank you.

[Falin interrupts] I would like to add one thing. It seems to me that what Aleksandr Aleksandrovich has said points precisely to the fact that a working meeting without an agenda can sometimes be more significant than talks with a specific agenda or talks that end with the signing of various documents.

[Zorin] Reykjavik also reminds us of this.

[Bessmertnykh] Freedom of discussion permits people to come to [words indistinct].

[Falin interrupts] Freedom of discussion permits a discussion in a different tone with other moral and political parameters.

[Arbatov] Without the pressure of having to sign something later, they can talk, right?

[Bessmertnykh] This is an interesting, original, and new format.

[Falin] The most important thing is that eventually the talks will show what the spoken word or statement is worth. You and I are witnesses in the case of the ABM and other treaties of how agreements are interpreted. They are often interpreted in such a way that nothing remains of the treaties. Consequently, the question of interpretation of a mutual understanding, even one that has not been formally drawn up, acquires particular significance in the relations between such giants as the United States and the Soviet Union.

[Bessmertnykh] Valentin Mikhaylovich, a definite form has emerged. In other words, our two leaders gave specific instructions to the two ministers on all disarmament issues, on how to proceed. They will meet at the end of January and I think this will be a meeting mainly devoted to disarmament questions.

[Falin] I am not saying that nothing was drawn up, naturally....

[Bessmertnykh, interrupting] Not in the old way.

[Falin] Not according to any old, traditional, or in some way dust-covered procedure. Another thing which I think is worth mentioning. The absence of any or a minimum of protocol formalities—and in this case the meeting was generally held without any protocol and there was even no rotation from one meeting place to another, all the meetings were held on the "Maksim Gorkiy"....

[Bessmertnykh, interrupting] I did not even see a chief of protocol. [laughs]

[Falin] Yes. This, too, was not an obstacle....

[Arbatov, interrupting] No, there was a chief of protocol, but it is interesting that on the *Maksim Gorkiy*— and as you know according to the history of our classical literature he was the founder of socialist realism—a joke was being passed around that the meeting had passed in a spirit of socialist realism. [laughter]

[Zorin] Well, apparently there was a chief of protocol and it is a pity that you did not notice this. It was the storm. The storm determined many things having to do with protocol.

[Falin] It was the master of ceremonies.

[Zorin] Yes.

[Bessmertnykh] Classically, if the protocol cannot be seen it is [words indistinct] perfectly well.

[Arbatov] Valentin Mikhaylovich. I would like to add to what Valentin Mikhaylovich has said, that eventually time will tell and it will cross the t's and dot the i's in our assessment of these talks. Not only in terms of what the agreements will be, but also in terms of what the policy will now be. I think that very much has already been done and generally the main questions relating to the arms race and even to security are being solved not only and not primarily through agreements. The agreements are drawn up later. They are solved by politics.

In the United States, for example, on the eve of the talks, speeches began to be delivered one after the other—and what speeches—by Secretary of Defense Cheney and other senior officials in the Defense Department—I would like to see Comrades Yazov, Moiseyev, Akhromeyev, and others making such speeches—in which they competed for attention in outlining plans for decreasing military appropriations. It was proposed that appropriations be cut by $180 billion over 5 years. That is what Cheney promised. To cut planned military appropriations by $180 billion. Specific programs were named and an active discussion began as to which programs would be dropped and what would be cancelled. There were many arguments and so forth. You know, I attach great significance to this.

It seems to me that this essence, the fact that attitudes are changing.... [changes thought] Every country has more than enough concerns, and the United States, too, as a matter of fact. They sometimes appear to us to be minor, but whether one or both shoes pinch is immaterial insofar as it is agonizing to the one who wears them. During this time it has accumulated numerous social and economic problems. There is no money to spare. So that is how things are going, and it should go that way here, too. I think it should proceed here, and we should not wait for talks. I do not understand why we are building aircraft carriers. We are not publishing figures yet. I hope.... [changes thought] As a matter of fact, this was also one of the questions at the meeting. The Americans provided detailed figures on their defense budget and expressed the hope that we, too, would provide them.

[Bessmertnykh, interrupting] They published them.

[Arbatov] Yes. Well, it was reported that we are building two or even three aircraft carriers. Well, in the United States an aircraft carrier costs $3 billion. The result is 15% of the cost of an aircraft carrier group which costs $18 billion. And $3 billion a year for maintenance. In order to imagine these sums, I must say that even if we take the old or previous official exchange rate—the new official exchange rate is 10 times greater—this is approximately 4 times more than we spend annually on health services. Now do we need this? Many questions of this sort arise. I think that today we can approach the solution of these issues much more boldly. This is a one-sided.... [changes thought] Take reasonable sufficiency, which has been proclaimed by us as a doctrine. Much greater scope is presented for reasonable sufficiency precisely when this kind of dismantling of the cold war, of false notions, and of fears begins, when we can correlate all of our expenditures wisely and reasonably and frankly talk about this and not believe blindly in those who intensify fears and so forth.

[Bessmertnykh] You know, I think we have arrived at a period when it is not the construction of arms and armed forces that must dictate strategy but strategy that must determine construction of the armed forces.

[Zorin] Correct.

[Bessmertnykh) And this will be the key to everything.

[Arbatov] Yes, yes.

[Bessmertnykh] Make this part of strategy.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich has expressed his view on a very important question. At the same time, Valentin Mikhaylovich, I must admit that I have prepared a question for you that is not among the most easy ones to answer. I would like to ask: It was obvious that during the discussions that took place in Malta, the situation that has presently taken shape in Europe, and particularly in the East European countries, which are experiencing an important moment in their history, could not remain in the background. How was this reflected in the talks?

[Falin] Indeed these questions occupied a fairly important place in the exchange of opinions. What gladdened me in particular was that the points of view and even attitudes toward these problems not only were not mutually exclusive, but even basically coincided. Both sides recognized the importance of what was happening as a component, necessary, and possibly inevitable part of the renewal of Europe and of the world as a whole, as overdue changes and reforms that had been suspended for a long time and which for long had been quite obvious to outside observers. But there was not always a readiness to recognize this truism and base conclusions on it.

Finally, there is the fact that these perceptions and changes fit in with our concept of a better Europe; better European law and order; better European security; better European cooperation in economics, politics, culture, and so forth. In other words, what was missing was what in previous years so characterized and burdened any exchange of opinions, a desire to gloat over difficulties and to use these difficulties, problems, and changes—because any changes entail problems and difficulties—in the interests of achieving some lopsided concessions, or in order to force the other side into a corner.

There is another point I must emphasize. Previously, recognition of the need not to destabilize the situation and recognition of the fact that destabilization today runs contrary to the long-term fundamental interests of the West and East in general, of the United States and the Soviet Union in particular, and of the world as a whole was considered to be the starting point for any analysis or assessment of what is desirable and worth striving for. If there is no desire to destabilize the situation, both in major and specific areas, then sufficiently warranted respect ought to be shown for those structures and institutions on which present stability rests.

It was pointed out in particular that the military-political alliances, NATO on the Western side and the Warsaw Pact on our side, remain such institutions and that presently and in the nearest future there are no and will not be any conditions for the disappearance of these institutions.

If this is so, and it was recognized as such, then, accordingly, a balanced and circumspect attitude is required, to the extent that this depends on the two powers, in order not to artificially intensify events that could put these fundamental values at risk or even in question. It seems to me that this is also one of the very important distinguishing points of the entire meeting, which characterizes not only the discussion of this specific package of European issues but also the overall philosophical approaches, if you will, and ideological attitudes taking place.

It was shown here on this specific European example that the sphere of coincidence of these long-term interests of ours is much broader and the interests themselves have far deeper roots than in previous years, particularly during the cold war. We admitted this openly.

As far as changes in the GDR are concerned specifically, I conclude from the exchange of opinions that took place that the United States.... [changes thought] The processes presently being observed in the GDR are enlisting not only the interest of partisan forces that can react to them in a more detached manner or more closely, but also an interest related to the role that the United States undertook in Europe during World War II and after the war, the role that to a great extent legitimizes the fact that the Unites States, together with Canada, became part of the European process. It not only became part of it but actively participates in everything that is happening in Europe.

I think that this allows us to expect here in the future a greater interaction, closer contacts, and possibly an understanding that it is necessary to promote those things that bring us closer, and if possible to bring into the open and articulate those things that divided us yesterday and should not divide us today and tomorrow.

[Arbatov] If I may, in connection with this I would like to say the following: I have often thought, what if everything had occurred in different circumstances? After all, there were things that could explode at any moment. They blew up in the past. If all of this had occurred under cold war conditions, what grave and dangerous consequences could this have had? I think that once more it was proved here how timely and essential were the new political thinking and all the changes that occurred in our foreign policy which brought about a change in the entire situation in Europe and the world arena as a whole. Under these conditions, even inevitable difficulties are no longer fraught with such catastrophic consequences as in the tense conditions of the cold war.

[Falin] I should probably add another important statement made by the President. He said that the West European allies of the United States think in much the same vein. It is precisely they that stress the need for observing certain rules of the game, roughly speaking. In other words the inadmissibility of actions, deeds, measures, or behavior that could once again turn Europe into a field of fierce struggle with all the consequences of such a confrontation in contemporary conditions, for it would be hard to find a comparable place in the world that is less adapted to and more fragile in the face of such battles.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I have a question for you. As far as I can tell, one of the peculiarities of the meeting on Malta was the fact that this time economic problems were included among the questions discussed. I think that this side of the matter will naturally be of particular interest to our people. What could you say about this question?

[Arbatov] They were also included previously, but this time they were raised more constructively here and more positively. Well, as you know, there is an agreement according to which the next summit meeting, in June of next year, will be marked by the signing of a trade agreement. As a matter of fact, a trade agreement was worked out back in 1973 and has still not been signed yet. Of course, this will be a new agreement and it will signify the elimination of at least the greater part of discriminatory measures that have hindered trade. I would put it as follows: At this meeting the Americans announced an end to the economic war against the Soviet Union, for the regime that was in place could not be called anything but an economic war.

What real significance will this have? Well, first of all, this is a signal to U.S. business that the government will not hinder and may even encourage economic relations with the Soviet Union. Does this open up opportunities for us? I think this opens extremely great opportunities. Of course, this does not remove the responsibility for solving our economic problems. No country will solve them for us. We will have to solve our economic problems. So far this is being done very slowly, but international economic ties must become a very important lever allowing us to achieve a genuinely high level, avoiding all the gradual steps in overcoming backwardness, dragging things out and losing time. This applies to the United States, of course, but there are also areas in which the United States could be particularly useful.

There have been many proposals, very interesting proposals for us. Recently I received one from (Marsey) of the well-known (Marmon) company, a major U.S. producer of feed, in which he proposes revamping a significant part of our meat livestock industry. You know, the pig fattening process in our country takes 11 months. His proposal would require 5 and ½ months. Three times less feed is used, the pork is lean, and so forth. There have been many proposals of this kind and on the introduction of new food products. In other words, there have been proposals for the solution of our most burning issue, the food problem. Of course, there will naturally be problems with raising the agricultural level and establishing a modern food processing industry, an area which is terribly backward. Relations with the United States could play a very big role in the output of consumer goods, medicines, medical equipment, and so forth.

But the U.S. side, one could say, has now to a considerable extent done its part of the work, although some things remain. We must do things, too, for we are not ready for this. Sometimes for us it is like grafting grapes to a telephone pole. Our economic apparatus, including the very top levels, and our economic mechanisms are awful partners, which absolutely dismays our overseas contracting companies. You understand that to do business with us can lead to bankruptcy. As partners, we show ourselves to be hesitant and unreliable. All of this must be changed—and changed urgently—during the very first stage of reform of our foreign economic relations. After all, you understand, we are only contemplating the change to cost accounting, whereas they have been using economic accountability for a long time. If it is unprofitable from the outset, that is, if things are unprofitable for them, they will not want to go bankrupt through trade with us. They do want to trade honestly. In summing up, I think that the opportunities are great, but we have a lot to do in order to realize them. This is a very important matter now.

[Zorin] In conclusion, I would like to ask you the following question: Serious analysts, who are already summing up the results of the Malta meeting, claim that this meeting will become a kind of landmark after all the postwar decades that were clouded by the Cold War and that a new period in international politics and international relations will follow the events in Malta. I would like to ask for your opinion. Could there be some exaggeration in this claim? Does this assessment of the Malta meeting correspond with reality? Valentin Mikhaylovich?

[Falin] I would say yes, without a doubt. This was not simply a step forward, it was a whole stage. We have called it new political thinking. The United States is just entering the process of reevaluating values, the process of forming and formulating its own new political thinking. One of the important factors in this new political thinking lies in the fact that we must restore the genuine role and mission of politics. At a certain stage, politics was turned into a servant of the cold war, of the arms race, and of strong-arm pressure on one and all.

We must put an end to the arms race, subordinate military factors to strategy, and subordinate strategy to big politics. The rearrangement of priorities, as I see it, began in Malta or, rather, advanced so far in Malta that it permits us to at least talk about such a rearrangement in the future. What are the practical consequences of this progress, these new philosophical attitudes, and other attitudes we will see in the near future. Specific instructions have already been given to the ministers. Time will go even faster in the future, and soon we will see what is working out and what is not working out too well, since today practically everything depends on the good will of both sides.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, you spent many hours directly at the conference table. How would you respond to this question?

[Bessmertnykh] I think that the Malta meeting provided a big chance for transferring Soviet-U.S. relations to a different and higher level. In order not to miss this chance, two things are required, in my opinion. First, this means continuing very active and intensive work in all directions; and second, it means exhibiting a high degree of responsibility that can be seen in daily actions. I have in mind the responsibility of both leaders and the responsibility of all those who are working in this major direction of world politics.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich.

[Arbatov] I think that the turning point came in 1985 with the appearance of the new political thinking. It began unilaterally in 1985. Later there was a natural involvement of the other side. For the United States, this was at first emotional involvement, which especially pertains to President Reagan. This did not yet entail a reappraisal of the entire policy or of some kind of new conceptual thinking. In this sense, it seems to me that Malta signifies the start of a new opportunity. To sum up, one could say that this is at the expense of efforts—it was due and it was nurtured by history—at the expense of the efforts of our country and our policy. Like many other countries, we, too, could not have done this at alone over all these years. Malta has consolidated this and given it shape. Maybe we are ending or writing the last page of one chapter of post-war history. With this comes the beginning of writing the first page of the next chapter of post-war history. The meaning of it is that the cold war has ended. It is falling apart before our eyes.

[Zorin] Well, it is quite obvious from what we have been discussing today that we have witnessed an event of enormous importance. Possibly its significance will become even clearer with the passage of time. It is an event that is not purely political, but concerns literally every family and every Soviet person. The discussion we have had today attests to this.

Our time on the air has run out. It remains for me to thank you for taking part in this discussion and to thank our television viewers for their attention. So until we meet again here in our Studio 9, thank you.

Petrovskiy UN Speech Urges End to Apartheid

LD1312083189 Moscow TASS in English 0810 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] New York December 13 TASS—USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has made a report at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on apartheid and its destructive consequences in Southern Africa.

"The United Nations General Assembly is holding its session on apartheid at a turning point. The cold war is passing away and mankind is starting to move to a new and peaceful period of its history. A qualitatively new world is emerging, the one that is characterized not only by non-violence, but, increasingly by more positive features: Emphasis on law, morality, and justice and on the leading role of the United Nations as a center for harmonizing efforts of the world community...," Petrovskiy said.

"The new thinking loathes a selective approach to any region, rejects double moral standards. It is characterized by political tolerance, yet it categorically rejects any form of domination, be it terrorism, colonialism, racism or apartheid."

"It should be emphasised that apartheid was not, and in fact could not, be acceptable yesterday when the clouds of mistrust and confrontation were hovering over the world. Nor can this odious manifestation of racist oppression be tolerated today, at a time of an improving international climate. There can be no co-existence with apartheid, which is incompatible with universal moral values, the U.N. charter purposes and principles, or the universal declaration of human rights," Petrovskiy went on to say.

"The system of apartheid in South Africa is the root cause of the conflict situation in the south of the African continent, and there can be no comprehensive solution in southern Africa without its removal. Unless apartheid is eradicated the conflict in the region will persist. This relationship, however, works two ways. The profound changes in the world, the ever-increasing recognition of community of mankind's destinies, and the awareness of the need for sound stability in the process of dynamic evolution of today's world have brought about a strong inclination toward political settlements of conflicts, based on the balance of interests of all parties involved. In today's Southern Africa, making obvious the benefits of settling conflicts by political means, where the realities are taken into account and the will and desire to seek the balance of interests exist, there is a movement ahead," Petrovskiy said.

Petrovskiy pointed out that a climate of moral rejection of apartheid and of world-wide condemnation of Pretoria's racist policies had been established and there were signs of finding a way out from the impasse in respect to several components concerning the conflict in the south of African continent in the recent year.

"...Pretoria under the international pressure has to revise its policy in the region and eventually begin negotiations."

At the same time, Petrovskiy said that it would be a mistake to over-estimate the significance of the steps taken by Pretoria. "...The South African Government must take effective measures that would contribute to the creation of a political climate conducive to seek the solution to all outstanding problems through negotiations.

"Such measures should include the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners, lifting of all bans and restrictions on all proscribed organisations, end of state of emergency and repeal of discriminatory laws.

"There is a growing conviction in the international community that while the system of apartheid continues to be a cruel reality, and Pretoria's policy has not rid itself from former dogmata, it is unacceptable to ease the struggle against the unjust system, to reduce international pressure on South African Government, including economic and other sanctions.... A significant part in further settlement of this conflict situation could be played by the Security Council and its permanent members, including the Soviet Union and the United States," Petrovskiy said.

"In southern Africa, like in other troubled areas of the world, only one way leads to a better future—the way from confrontation to cooperation through mutual understanding," Petrovskiy concluded.

Kashlev Describes Progress on Human Rights

PM1112164989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Yu. Kashlev article: "A Real Holiday With No Quotation Marks. Today Is Human Rights Day"]

[Text] Human Rights Day has been celebrated 10 December in all countries for almost 40 years now. For a long time we did not recognize it, at least officially, and the very words human rights were stubbornly placed in quotation marks. Then in later years ceremonial public sessions were held in the Hall of Columns with a report delivered by an All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions secretary and the text of a government telegram to the United Nations unanimously adopted.

At the same time, demonstrations were held abroad at which violations of citizens' rights in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were discussed along with local problems, lists of "prisoners of conscience," "refuseniks," and political prisoners were pasted on the walls of our embassies, and we Soviet diplomats did not know what to do. This year, for probably the first time, we have been able to talk about human rights without quotation marks. Why for the first time?

In the past few years great steps have been taken in democratizing our society. But, nonetheless, the greatest steps have been taken this year. The most important component of perestroyka—the formation of a rule-of-law state—has started to change from a slogan into reality. Unprecedented multicandidate elections of USSR people's deputies have been held. The first Congress of USSR People's Deputies has been held, a qualitatively new USSR Supreme Soviet has started work, and many laws are being discussed or have already been adopted on the most multifaceted questions. From the standpoint of attention to human rights our society is becoming unrecognizable. We are fundamentally changing our relationship in the traditional triangle of man-society-state. From our years-old slogan of "man for the state" we are switching to the slogan "the state for man."

All this stems from our own needs and from the laws of perestroyka's development. The human factor and the human dimension are increasingly becoming its yardstick and motive force.

But there is another aspect to this—the international aspect. The new political thinking implies an orientation toward common human values, the primacy of the law, and extensive humanitarian cooperation. This is unthinkable without full respect for human rights and without bringing domestic legislation and practice into line with international standards and obligations. The experience of the all-European Vienna meeting which ended last January reaffirmed that breakthroughs toward a new level of international relations are now only possible when progress in the military-political sphere goes hand in hand with progress in the human rights sphere and increased mutual trust and mutual openness between states. This is attested by the progress in Soviet-U.S. relations in recent years.

The past year has been a landmark in this sense, too. We were the first to state that we consider the Vienna accords, not least on the whole range of human rights, to be effective from the moment they were signed, and we embarked on multifaceted work to implement them. This applies to both legislation and practice. Thus, for instance, the draft laws on entry and exit of Soviet citizens and on the press which have already been approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on first reading are in line with the highest standards of international law and the Vienna accords. Next in line are draft laws on freedom of conscience, religious organizations, and public associations of citizens.

Voices are sometimes heard asking whether all these problems should be part of our priorities at a time when there are so many "burning" issues in the country. The one should not exclude the other. People need bread and freedom. Perestroyka and democratization are seen by them not only through "big-league politics," but also through concrete growth in their individual civil and political rights.

Our practice must consistently change as we wait for the aforesaid draft laws to be finally adopted. A great deal has been done in this area of late. In particular, practice has notably changed on the questions of private trips by citizens abroad, and the reunification of families. The "humanitarian cases" that have built up over the years have been cleared up with most countries. Here is one example: During an all-European conference of experts in contacts between people held in Bern in 1986 I, as head of the Soviet delegation, was handed a list by the Americans of 11,000 people who had been refused permission to leave the USSR for various reasons. At the Paris conference on the human dimension in June 1989 the Americans were talking about only hundreds of such cases.

As has been the case in our society, there has been a positive reaction abroad to such recent steps as the repealing in criminal legislation of previous articles about anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and on internal and external exile, the pardoning of hundreds of political prisoners, and the reduction of the categories of crime incurring the death penalty. The reform of the system of psychiatric treatment and the abandonment of the jamming of foreign radio stations have been widely commented upon. After Vienna the Soviet Union accepted binding UN International Court jurisdiction on a number of conventions concerning human rights, stated its readiness to take part in international control mechanisms in this sphere, and joined the Vienna convention on consular relations.

All this is rapidly changing the face of our country in the eyes of the world public, increasing the trust in and sympathy for perestroyka, and reaffirming that our lofty statements about adherence to democracy are in line with our actions.

However, we will not succumb to euphoria. Both in this country and abroad instances of the violation of Soviet people's rights are still cited, along with instances of bureaucratic callousness, and of failure to observe the standards which the Soviet Union has voluntarily adopted. We are implementing a number of the Vienna accords too timidly. The adoption of the aforesaid laws has been objectively delayed. One important demand—to publish all normative acts pertaining to human rights—has not been carried out. A great deal in this area is still regulated by closed instructions. This is impermissible in a rule-of-law state.

Incidentally, at the aforesaid Paris conference on the human dimension the Soviet delegation, together with the French, advocated the idea of setting up a common legal area [obshcheye pravovoye prostranstvo] in Europe. This envisages progress toward a single interpretation of human rights and the rapprochement of corresponding norms and practices. This is a very difficult and binding goal, but we state with full responsibility that we are prepared to achieve it.

Worldwide 'Wind of Change' Discussed, Welcomed

PM1212145989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Manki Ponomarev "Observer's Notes": "Winds of Change"]

[Text] The winds of change are blowing over the world. They are destroying the remnants of the "cold war" ice floes, breaking down the walls of alienation and isolation, smashing outmoded, ossified structures and systems, and demolishing the last bastions of colonialism.

The postwar period is drawing to a close in Europe. In Western Europe, although they are continuing to claim—reckoning on an audience—that the bloc approach and the gamble on force have proved their vitality, they are in fact beginning to abandon the course of confrontation. Without renouncing the integration of military effort, increasing emphasis is being laid on integrating and pooling economic effort. The desire for security and stability is gaining an increasingly firm hold on people.

In East Europe, the changes are even more striking. The revolutionary perestroyka in the USSR is changing the country's image in both our eyes and the eyes of people throughout the world. It was prepared by the very course of social development and spurred on the acceleration of social development in many other states.

Changes are also becoming increasingly tangible in other areas of the world. In the United States a change of course with regard to both the USSR and its own allies and partners took shape under Reagan—let us recall his evolution from rhetoric regarding the "evil empire" to strolling around Red Square. But this became even more marked—although not immediately—after G. Bush became established in the White House. People in Washington ultimately realized that Soviet perestroyka is a serious, long-term process.

I do not have an opportunity to describe the changes in other parts of the world, in other regions. But I can conclude that the world is at a turning point. The changes taking place are wide-ranging, and they are of fundamental significance both for the future of individual peoples and continents and also for the entire world.

At the crucial stage when the peoples of East Europe resolutely rejected the administrative-edict system which had distorted and discredited the appearance of socialism, along with stagnation and the lag behind world development trends, Western statesmen were faced with a dilemma: What was to be done? Exploit processes in the East for their own advantage, proceed to destabilize the situation, and seek transient advantages? This has been tried and is continuing. Nonetheless, by and large a different trend is emerging. Both sides—East and West—are pointing to the importance of ensuring stability, which would not only inspire a feeling of security and confidence in all European states without exception but would also guarantee the future of the emergent and therefore still-fragile common European structures.

The need for greater action in USSR-U.S. relations and dialogue has become obvious in the conditions of the tumultuous development of world events. This need brought the Soviet and U.S. leaders to the interim, unofficial meeting in Malta. The Malta dialogue centered its attention on bilateral relations, disarmament questions, the situation in the planet's hotspots, changes in the world and in Europe, and the possibility of giving powerful political impetus to USSR-U.S. economic cooperation.

A great deal of attention was devoted to discussing specific questions linked with disarmament problems. As for strategic offensive arms, the talks showed that it will certainly prove possible by the end of June—the time scheduled for the official meeting between the two powers' leaders—to coordinate the fundamental positions of a treaty, which may be ready for signing. Considerable difficulties still lie ahead on this path. Inter alia, the question of sea- and air-launched cruise missiles has still not been resolved. But the prospects are reassuring and there is every reason to expect work on this treaty to be completed and the treaty to be signed in the near future.

The sides intend to strive to speed up the processes of the talks on conventional armed forces which Warsaw Pact and NATO representatives are conducting in Vienna. It is hoped that the elaboration of a corresponding treaty will be completed next year and may be signed in the course of the meeting between the leaders of the states involved in the Helsinki process at their forum, already dubbed "Helsinki-2." Progress has also been made on the problem of eliminating chemical weapons and also on the question of halting nuclear tests.

There was also a great deal of discussion of other problems. This all enabled observers to conclude that it was partners in the common quest for peace and stability that met for the first time in the stormy waters of the Mediterranean rather than enemies and rivals. This was also manifest in the U.S. attitude to the changes in East Europe. Washington advocates preserving stability and the inviolability of postwar borders enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act—it is well known that the Soviet Union firmly and steadfastly cleaves to this position.

The implementation of the U.S. president's proposal to elaborate a new trade agreement between the two countries will also be of considerable significance for USSR-U.S. relations. It may be ready for signing at the next Soviet-U.S. summit next June. By that time, the U.S. Congress will obviously have rescinded the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment, which is one of the main obstacles today preventing the development of economic ties between our two countries.

The world reacted with delight to the results of the Malta meeting. The community saw them as a real step toward a new era. But a new era also requires new approaches. Well, such approaches are becoming a reality of our time.

This was shown in particular by the special session of the NATO Council which discussed the results of the Malta meeting. The session heard a report from President G. Bush on this meeting and expressed a positive opinion of it. According to the session's participants, broad opportunities are opening up for strengthening security and developing peaceful relations.

An information meeting between the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states in Moscow was devoted to the results of the Malta meeting. This was perhaps the first time that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact reached similar conclusions. Moreover, the participants in the Moscow meeting pointed out the need to preserve the current alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—for the foreseeable future since they could contribute to strengthening European security, acting as a political bridge for cooperation.

But it would be rash to say that the new approaches have received full rights of citizenship in the West. Not everyone there reacted unequivocally to the assessment of the results of the Malta meeting. For instance, the U.S. vice president submitted his own particular views on this score. In an attempt to discredit the results of the Malta meeting, Safire, the extremely conservative NEW YORK TIMES observer, asserted categorically: Bush "suffered a crushing defeat" while Gorbachev "won a brilliant victory." Of course, no one actually won and no one lost. Reason won, as did the realistic approach to highly important problems of the day.

That approach alone is needed in conditions where the wind of change is blowing over absolutely everything in the world.

Official Urges Change of Policy on Antarctic

PM1212091989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion: The Antarctic Must Be Saved!"]

[Excerpts] The 14th consultative conference of the states that are parties to the Treaty on the Antarctic was held in May-June of last year in the capital of New Zealand, Wellington. On 6 June they initialed the Convention on Regulating the Development of Mineral Resources in the Antarctic. The Convention was open for signature between 25 November 1988 and 25 November 1989. It will come into force when 16 countries which have the right to vote ratify it or join it. [Passage omitted]

Information has appeared in the press that a number of states supported the declaration of the Antarctic as a natural reserve, a "world park." However, mass pressure from industrial giants, particularly the United States, broke down the Antarctic "greens'" defenses. The Convention on the Development of Mineral Resources in the Antarctic was prepared and approved.

It cannot be denied that the convention stipulates stringent procedures for exploiting the mineral resources and the strictest monitoring of this process in the interests of the protection of the environment. In order to start exploiting a particular Antarctic region it will be necessary to obtain the agreement of all the parties to the treaty with consultative status, which form the Commission on Mineral Resources in the Antarctic. Its decisions will be brought into line with the recommendations of the Consultative Committee on scientific and technical questions of the environment. Finally, a 10-member Committee for Regulating Mineral Resources in each Antarctic region will make sure that license stipulations are observed.

It was easy on paper....

In order to say what is awaiting the Antarctic, we simply have to look at the existing situation. This, for example, is how the Italian periodical EUROPEO describes the results of the exclusively scientific activity with which a handful of people were concerned for around three decades. "Huge mountains of debris, arbitrary disposal of all kinds of materials, rusty cans leaking various combustible chemical substances, old huts, frames of old trucks and aircraft...." I believe that any unbiased observer could add some additional expressive strokes to this picture.

Now we are going to add "reconnaissance, prospecting, exploitation." We are going to add the traces left behind by people—debris and dirt. Yes, the Antarctic is big, very big, about 1 and ½ times as big as Europe. But people have become more proficient. After all it did not take at all long to inflict lasting wounds on Western Siberia and almost completely destroy the Aral Sea. How many years has the Amazon—called the planet's lungs—got left? It would be small consolation if the Antarctic was the last to disappear....

What is the USSR's stance? First of all, we spoke against any economic activity in the Antarctic and insisted that the southern continent be declared a nature reserve. But then we changed our stance and agreed to participate in elaborating the convention. What is this? Ecological short-sightedness? No, it turns out, it is governmental wisdom. Experienced comrades at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified it like this: We had to choose the lesser of two evils. If a convention was not adopted and rules for exploiting mineral resources in the Antarctic were not established, the monopolies of the United States and the FRG, and Japan and Britain, and the monopolies of other countries would start to plunder the Antarctic's wealth in an uncontrolled way. By signing the convention—and the Soviet delegation tried to make it as clear-cut and strict as possible—we significantly reduced the level of the ecological threat and at the same time made our competitors' activity more difficult.

It is possible that this is wisdom. But it is the kind of wisdom that saves a kopek today only to lose a ruble tomorrow. Ecology, and other things besides, demands the opposite.

In this connection some aspects of the Soviet Union's ecological policy (ecological strategy) put us on our guard. Around 140 nature conservation agreements have been registered within the framework of the UN Environmental Protection Program. Of these, the Soviet Union has signed 54. We refuse, for example, to participate in space-based monitoring of the state of the earth, we do not participate in the global data base for natural resources, and we do not participate in the convention for the protection of animal migration. Every time it is because of various versions of the same "wisdom" that is based on departmental interests. Someone does not want supervision. Someone is standing guard over secrecy. Someone is looking after that kopek. That's the way we go on.

The Soviet Union has proposed the idea of international ecological security. If this is not simply a phrase, the idea should be backed up by action, all ecological policy, including problems in the Antarctic, should be "brought into line" with it.

Such is the position today. In August, France and Australia published a joint declaration in which they renounce their previous positions and demand that the Antarctic be declared a nature reserve. They are supported by India, Italy, and Belgium. "Greenpeace" has become active. The famous oceanographer J.Y. Cousteau has collected over 1 million signatures on a petition for the protection of the Antarctic. The 15th consultative meeting, held in Paris in the middle of October, took place amid a certain amount of confusion and came to practically no conclusions.

The Soviet Union did not change its position.

But if we were to think again?

In 1991, 30 years after the Treaty on the Antarctic came into force, a conference will be convened which will sum up the results of the implementation of the treaty and decide whether it is necessary to amend the text, and if so, how. In 1992 an international conference on the environment and development will be held in line with a UN decision. If not at the former, then at the latter an alternative convention to regulate the exploitation of mineral resources in the Antarctic should be proposed. The alternative is very simple: To make an addition to the Treaty on the Antarctic forbidding not only military but any industrial, (commercial) activity on this continent. The state of world public opinion as well as public opinion in individual countries and pressure from the urgency of the ecological situation today is such that it is surely impossible for the United States, the FRG, or any other civilized country to hold onto its position much longer, insisting on the industrial exploitation of the Antarctic.

"We must be realistic," I was told at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Realism suggests that Western industrial powers will never hand the Antarctic over to the "greens." Realism votes for ratifying the convention and obtaining one's own share of the fleeting benefits for ruining the Antarctic.

I fear that realism is a poor adviser in ecological matters. When calling on people to give up further millions of tonnes of oil or coal in the name of nature conservation what is needed is less realism, if you like, and more, a great deal more, romanticism, obsession, and moral extremism.

"Be realistic and demand the impossible," were words you could hear in Paris in May 1968. Let's try it. The Antarctic is worth it.

United States & Canada

Reportage on Brent Scowcroft Visit to PRC

Received by Foreign Minister

LD0912172589 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 9 Dec 89

[Text] Beijing December 9 TASS—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen today held talks with U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

During the two-hour talks Scowcroft informed Qian Qichen on the results of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in Malta.

Having thanked the U.S. President representative for information on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting, the Chinese minister briefed him on China's position regarding some international issues.

The sides also discussed issues connected with the current state of Chinese-U.S. relations. It is expected that Scowcroft will be received by all senior leaders of China, including Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping.

IZVESTIYA Cited on Trip

OW1212132789 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Report on an 11 December IZVESTIYA dispatch from Washington]

[Excerpts] IZVESITYA says: Six months ago, the U.S. Government took a series of sanctions against China, prompting the Chinese Government to accuse Washington of trying to undermine China's socialist system. Sino-American relations were increasingly headed for a dead end.

IZVESTIYA quotes a Bush Administration spokesman as saying: "By visiting Beijing we have made a first step toward breaking the (?stalemate). This sudden initiative should elicit positive reaction from the public." [passage omitted]

The dispatch says that the U.S. press has questioned how the visit would improve bilateral relations and that influential Democratic Congressmen have criticized the visit. Solarz, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, said: "The visit is wrong. It is an impractical step taken at a time when the Chinese Government has not taken any concrete actions toward improving its human rights record." He added, "It seems the U.S. Government has made a concession to Beijing."

The U.S. press has also denounced Secretary of State Baker's remarks to reporters. Baker said: "The U.S. Government has not changed its assessment of the way the Chinese Government handled the Tiananmen incident. However, we should not compound the tragedy by trying to isolate China from the international community."

TASS Cites Baker on 'New Europe'

LD1212202489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1731 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] West Berlin, 12 Dec (TASS)—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, who is touring a number of European countries, made a speech in the West Berlin Press Club in which the Bush administration's approach toward the new situation in Europe was formulated and a few proposals to expand NATO'S role in these conditions were expounded.

As the secretary of state noted, the fact that "some of the strife-breeding problems which at one time provoked conflicts in Europe are arising again" was the result of the transformations now taking place on the European continent. He spoke in favor of the countries of the West, by their own efforts, "creating and gradually implementing a new structure" of Europe which is up to the new era. J. Baker stressed especially that this structure should "reflect U.S. security interests, which remain connected politically, economically, and militarily with Europe's security."

Touching on Europe's future, in which the United States, according to Baker, intends to play an "active role", the secretary of state stressed that "the time has come to start examining NATO's new tasks". As was clear from his statements, the aim of these proposals is to preserve the viability of the North Atlantic alliance in the conditions of the radical changes in Europe, which are transforming the continent.

J. Baker stated that NATO's immediate task should remain the conclusion of an agreeent on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, which will become the "cornerstone of the new security system." As the secretary of state stressed, the negotations on this agreement "have made considerable headway." He proposed that the multilateral talks on an "open sky", which are to be held in February in Ottawa, should be used to "discuss the status and the imparting of a new impetus to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armaments." J. Baker also made a proposal to create a special mechanism attached to NATO to verify agreements in the arms control sphere.

In the conditions where cooperation is developing instead of confrontation between East and West, "other challenges for Europe and Atlantic security will arise:" regional conflicts, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological armaments—all this "represents a growing danger", the secretary of state continued. "Stepping up consultations within NATO on these problems can play an important role in shaping the West's unified approach toward these threats," he said.

In the secretary of state's view, NATO should start studying further initiatives which the West could undertake in the process of the conference security and cooperation in Europe [CSCE], especially in the sphere of strengthening economic and political relations with the

East, ensuring human rights, and creating a more open atmosphere for trade between East and West. "The CSCE process could become the most important forum of cooperation between East and West," the secretary of state pointed out.

J. Baker touched on the question of the "reunification of Germany." According to him, "President Bush has confirmed the long-standing U.S. support for the aim of reunification of Germany." "This very positive course will not be easy and one should not hurry events. It should be peaceful and should take into account the legitimate fears of all participants" in the process of creating a "new Europe", the secretary of state said. He noted in particular that the U.S. allies in World War II, including the Soviet Union, have rights and obligations which should be taken into account.

Prior to his address in the Press Club, Secretary of State J. Baker met FRG Chancellor H. Kohl in West Berlin. J. Baker also held meetings with FRG Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and with West Berlin's governing mayor, W. Momper.

U.S. Admits to Not Representing All Afghans

LD1212194989 Moscow TASS in English 1927 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—By TASS Commentator Askold Biryukov:

According to reports from Peshawar, Pakistan, the U.S. "ambassador" to the "interim government" of Afghanistan, Peter Tomsen, has admitted that the government, to which he is accredited, does not represent all Afghan people and has not won international recognition due to this.

This statement sounds remarkable after many months of U.S. support and lavish military aid to that government formed of Pakistan-based Afghan opposition leaders.

One might expect some conclusions, following such an admission, concerning the need to stop the bloodshed, continuing through the fault of the oposition, and to begin searching for real ways to a political settlement in Afghanistan.

However, these were not drawn. Moreover, Ambassador Tomsen started lecturing Afghan opposition leader Burhanuddin Rabbani on how to find a way out of this situation and win international recognition for the Afghan opposition.

Washington's emissary proposed that the Afghan opposition convene a new Shura (Supreme Representative Assembly) to be attended not only by representatives of the "Alliance of Seven," the interests of which are represented by the "interim government" and which has discredited itself, but also by representatives of the Iran-based Afghan opposition, prominent field commanders and even former Afghan King Zahir Shah and his followers.

Tomsen said such a Shura could form a representative government able to receive international recognition.

Rabbani supported this idea, although he noted that it did not seem possible to elect deputies to the Shura, as a "communist government" is now in power in Kabul.

Apparently, the opposition leader was referring to the fact that the opposition has neither territory, nor power, nor popular support in Afghanistan.

Kabul has no objections to the invitation of former King Shah or other Moslem leaders, enjoying Afghans' confidence, to help settle the conflict.

The Afghan Government favours the termination of the civil war and resolutely opposes any foreign intervention in Afghan home affairs.

It favours a political solution meeting the sentiments of the majority of Afghans and the demands of the times.

The government welcomes peace talks with all political forces of the country without exception and offers a specific plan that takes into account both internal and international aspects of the settlement.

Any attempts at solving the Afghan conflict without Kabul's participation are doomed to failure. The forced admission of the U.S. ambassador in Peshawar confirms this.

Bush Remarks on E. Europe, Malta, PRC Cited

PM1312102789 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "'Spirit of Malta': From a Position of Optimism"]

[Text] "I am ending this year in a more optimistic mood than I began it and I am very reassured by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe," U.S. President George Bush said on Monday at a press conference for U.S. newspaper editors.

He repeated his previous high assessment of his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev off Malta, describing it as "very promising." "We agreed to hold a summit meeting in the United States next June," Bush said. "We are on the verge of new and thrilling U.S.-Soviet relations but some difficulties still remain here. Our secretary of state is now abroad, discussing some of these problems."

Bush also dwelled on the recent trip to the PRC by the U.S. delegation headed by Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser. This visit provoked criticism of the administration from those circles in the United States who advocate breaking off relations with China following the June events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The president said: "After my meeting with Gorbachev I thought it advisable to brief Chinese leaders. Before our meeting in Malta I clearly told them that I wanted to do this."

In response to questions about the administration's approach to the problem of German reunification, which is being vigorously discussed in the West, Bush recalled that the Helsinki Final Act, which the United States respects and supports, mentions European borders. "I consider it extremely important," the president stressed, "to prevent the impression that the United States is trying to speed up changes in Germany. We are not prescribing any timeframes and are not saying how rapidly the very difficult question of German reunification should develop."

Gorbachev-Bush Malta Meeting Praised

SK0812121389 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] A year ago, in December of 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations.

His speech was highly assessed by the social circles of the entire world. The speech was described as a declaration of new political thinking and as an action program for the peaceful future of mankind.

With regard to this, we will carry an article by our station commentator (Oleg Alekseyev).

Dear listeners: I would like in particular to note the part of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech stressing that matters between countries must be settled through political dialogue. It has been demonstrated that such an attitude is highly effective.

First of all, I would like to recall the events considered to be most important for 1989. I recall the complete normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC, which resulted from Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China in May.

I think you are aware that the course of that normalization had not been smooth.

The wisdom of the two sides, their sense of responsibility, and tenaciousness in overcoming the difficulties of the past were necessary.

In this respect, the Soviet Union and China have succeeded. I think this shows the effectiveness of political dialogue. During the course of the dialogue, the two countries tried to be fair and pursued the normalization of relations between the two countries as a goal.

The truth of this is also eloquently proven by the progress made in Soviet-U.S. relations.

Speaking at the United Nations a year ago, Gorbachev expressed satisfaction over the fact that mutual understanding and trust were being built up in Soviet-U.S. relations.

I think we can say that the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and long-range missiles, the first of its kind in history, which envisaged a practical reduction of the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, had already at that time begun to display its vitality. The treaty, of course, has established a foundation for the quest for a stable path toward peace and for constructive future relations between the two countries.

Recently, we have once again become convinced that the Soviet Union and the United States will advance along the same line in the future, too. The result of the working meeting held between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush in Malta leaves no doubt in our mind.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have demonstrated that they are sincere in holding political dialogue for the improvement of bilateral relations and for the improvement of the global situation.

Such an attitude has once again produced affirmative results.

In the statement released for the press, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush noted that an excellent foundation was provided in the course of the Malta meeting for making progress in handling a broad range of matters.

For instance, the two leaders concluded that a treaty could be signed already in the summer of next year, whereby U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals could be reduced by 50 percent.

The Malta meeting was another great turn in fulfilling the plan of new political thinking and in seeking new ways to settle international issues, not with the attitude of persisting in one's views or slandering and slinging mud at one another, but with the attitude of expanding the scope of mutual understanding.

As Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his UN speech a year ago, only such an attitude can demolish the barriers which alienate countries from one another and promise peace for contemporary generations and for the generations to come.

Commentary on U.S. Attitude to Naval Reductions

LD0812100789 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 8 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow and Washington agree there was a constructive discussion of arms reduction at the Malta meeting, though differences remain on certain aspects. Our commentary has been prepared by Vladyslav Kozyakov.

Since Malta it appeared more certain than ever that four agreements can be signed next year. One, for a 50 percent slash in the strategic arsenals of the two countries; another for a limitation on nuclear tests; a third for a cut back in troops and conventional weapons in Europe; and a fourth for a ban on chemical weapons. Next month Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker will meet in Moscow to consider the still outstanding aspects of these agreements. It is most important that President Gorbachev and President Bush were able to expand mutual trust and understanding at their meeting. Their talks and friendly conversations show that a new era in bilateral relations is about to begin. In this new atmosphere it will clearly be easier to iron out the differences that still exist.

One difference is over naval limitations. This problem is a carry over from the cold war, and now that practical steps to cut back all other types of weapons are on the agenda, it is urgent to reduce the military confrontation on the high seas. A White House spokesman touched on this problem just yesterday. But unfortunately he said the Soviet proposal to limit naval weaponry was unacceptable. He argued the case this way: The Soviet Union was a land-based power, whereas the United States was a naval power. It depended upon the seas for contact with all its allies and with other countries of the world. But a glance at the map will show you that the Soviet Union uses all the oceans and many seas, not only for contact with its allies and friends, but for contact between regions of its own territory.

The White House spokesman also said these words: It simply is so key and vital to our basic role in world military affairs, as well as commercial affairs, that we cannot consider that—meaning a limitation on naval weaponry. But this is an argument from the past, from the period of acute Soviet-American confrontation. We, too, reasoned along those lines. We used to think the Soviet Union must have a superiority of nearly 30,000 tanks in Europe, but thousands of these tanks have been melted down and under an agreement reached in Vienna East and West will have an equal number of tanks in Europe, and the security of all will only gain by it. So why not take a hard look at the naval forces built up during the cold war?

The United States has a superiority of 2 and ½ times in big naval vessels and almost 15 times in strike aircraft carriers. Perhaps our two countries could guarantee their security and shipping lines with much smaller naval forces. The new political thinking cannot be selective. The new era in Soviet-American relations proclaimed at the Malta meeting must signify security for all.

FBI, CIA Fueling of 'Spy Mania' Outdated

PM1112100789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Dec 89 Second Edition p 7

[Vladimir Chernyshev "Viewpoint": "A Paradox Indeed!"]

[Text] On the very day that the Soviet and U.S. leaders held their first conversation off Malta on board the Soviet diesel ship *Maksim Gorkiy*, U.S. ABC TV transmitted a report from Washington in which it announced that the FBI "is seeking a 100-percent increase in the number of its agents keeping an eye on the activity of Soviet bloc spies." "Apart from collecting such secret information as data about the 'Stealth' aircraft," the reporter warned, "according to our sources (you must understand that the reference is to the FBI—V. Ch.), the Russians have a list of goods they require reminiscent of a catalog of high-technology equipment."

If the U.S. TV report was the latest attack of spy mania of which there have been more than enough recorded in the "case history" of the FBI, you could overlook the attempts by Washington's propagandists to exploit once again a bogey of which even Americans themselves have tired. You cannot please everyone! To be honest, our press has also written so much about this that it is even awkward to return to a subject which one would have thought had been utterly exhausted. Life brings so many events that are notable for their newness, but once again we must listen to the same old tune!

It could indeed have been overlooked if we had not noticed the time the FBI decided to choose to put its warning into orbit. ABC (at the prompting of the FBI?) noted the following in a meaningful manner: "Paradoxical as it may seem, President Bush is making the Russians' intelligence work easier by considering the question of increasing Soviet diplomats in the United States and removing unpleasant restrictions on them."

It is not this which is paradoxical in my view, but the fact that the broadcast went on the air on the very day that the two states' leaders were talking about important problems concerning bilateral relations and disarmament questions and talking about changes in the world and in Europe—that is ultimately, as President G. Bush noted, about ensuring a lasting peace and transforming East-West relations on the basis of long-lasting cooperation. You can hardly assume that—even with its current staff—the FBI did not have the faintest idea of the nature of the dialogue.

Incidentally, literally on the eve of the Malta meeting, CIA Director Webster, speaking at the National Press Club, also complained that his department's work is increasing as mankind moves closer to a more lasting peace. "The need for intelligence has increased today," he said. "As controversies are ironed out in the world, the threats we face are becoming more numerous, more diverse, and hard to predict." That's right: Differences in the international arena are being ironed out but the threat is increasing!

Why have discussions about Russian spy intrigues suddenly surfaced once again? What is this—an attempt to revive the faded "enemy image"? I do not believe that the U.S. secret services have such naive people on their payroll as to try once again to play on the "Soviet threat," in which few people in the United States believe, as illustrated by public opinion polls, of which the CIA and FBI are undoubtedly well aware. I do not believe that Bush was being warned via the press—there are other more effective channels for that.

One hardly has to guess the strategy: That is what secret services are for—to have secrets. However, assessing the warnings voiced in Washington, one cannot fail to recognize that they do not accord in the least with the present-day spirit. Dragged out of the "cold war" arsenals into the light of day, they seem anachronistic now. Their emergence is indeed paradoxical.

U.S.-Soviet Petrochemical Deal Signed

90UI0174A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 30 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by V. Kremer "The Start Is in Tobolsk"]

[Text]**The first practical step has been taken toward creating chemical complexes in Western Siberia.**

Since the infamous "project of the century" aimed at turning north-flowing rivers to the south, no other large scale project has attracted as much public scrutiny as the construction of mighty petrochemical complexes in Western Siberia. Concerned people of Tyumen cities gathered in crowds at meetings. Appeals of protest collected thousands of signatures. The central newspapers published a series of articles on the subject.

The public concern is easy to understand: We are seeing too many examples of the fatal effect that various chemicals produce in our environment. But we also have to listen to the words of those who cite serious arguments in favor of the project. The considerable increase outlined for the production of modern chemicals will allow the satiation of our meager consumer market with goods and give a new thrust to the development of our entire economy. And if new technology is employed there should be practically no harmful leakages into the ground and atmosphere as has been convincingly proven by the experience of many developed countries.

The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee considered all the pros and cons of the problem as it was discussed at a recent meeting. It examined the concept of a combined use of the most valuable hydrocarbon resources in Western Siberia, beginning with the casinghead gas of which huge quantities are burning away for no reason. The Politburo expressed support for the governmental proposal to construct large chemical facilities within the next 5 years that would operate on local raw materials. It was noted that an important part of the proposed plans deals with ways of solving the social and environmental problems of the region.

And now, on 28 November, the first realistic step was made along the road toward realization of the plans. An agreement was signed in the Ministry of Petroleum Refining and the Petrochemical Industry. The agreement would allow establishment of a joint enterprise in Tobolsk for the production of petrochemicals. It would represent an international consortium consisting of the operational Tobolsk petrochemical combine, a well-known firm "Combustion Engineering" (U.S.), and the Finnish firm "Neste".

The partners hope the first stage of the enterprise will become functional as early as 1993. Frankly speaking, we are not used to such a pace. Especially so if one remembers that to date we have only the feasibility study ready. The detail designs and manufacturing of sophisticated equipment and systems of automation and control, not to mention the delivery and assembly of the plants—all this is still ahead.

Minister N. Lemayev thinks, however, that the enterprising spirit of the foreign firms combined with our experience of working in Siberia should provide for efficient construction and further operation of the new complex. It would help to expedite matters if the technological networks and lines of the Tobolsk petrochemical combine are used. Charles Hugel, the president of "Combustion Engineering", assured us that the project would be up to the highest world standards of petrochemical technology and would comply with the strictest ecology requirements.

The first stage of the joint enterprise would cost approximately $2 billion and should produce about 550,000 tons of polymer products a year. This production will become the foundation for the manufacturing of a wide range of goods starting with packaging and housewares and continuing with medical instruments, automobile spare parts, and household appliances.

China

Foreign Ministry Paper Touches on Ties With PRC

OW1212123289 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Excerpt] Dear listeners, the following material, Soviet Press on China, is prepared by station editor (Goris Abramov):

On 12 December the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened in Moscow. The autumn session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did a great deal of work to prepare for this meeting. Also submitted to the Supreme Soviet for deliberation are questions related to diplomatic activities of the Soviet Union from April 1985 to October 1989. A brief document prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry summarized the basic orientation of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the period of reform. This document was published in the December issue of INTERNATIONAL LIFE magazine. It also touches on Soviet-Chinese relations.

This document says: One tremendous achievement in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the period of reform was the ending of prolonged estrangement and hostilities in the relations between the two socialist countries. The first meeting of top leaders of the two countries in 30 years ushered in a new stage in the relations between the two countries, which are now founded on a stable and sound basis made up of three basic factors.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry's document says: The first is the generally acknowledged principle in international relations, that is, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The second is the effort to exploit all possible means to positively conduct political dialogues at all levels. The third is the readiness to coordinate with each other in solving urgent international issues, and to deepen mutual relations and trust, so that the two countries and the two peoples, including the younger generation, can concentrate their efforts on peaceful construction and make more resources available for solving the pressing issues faced by the Soviet Union and China in the course of reform. [passage omitted]

Li Peng on Peaceful Coexistence, PRC Stability

PM1112163789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On the Basis of Five Principles"]

[Text] Beijing, 8 Dec—China seeks to develop friendship and cooperation with foreign countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The newspaper RENMIN RIBAO reports today that Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, declared this at a meeting with a number of states' ambassadors in the House of People's Assemblies.

Touching on the situation in the PRC, the head of government particularly emphasized the political and economic stability in the country. According to him, appreciable results have been achieved in the economic sphere in the course of implementing the policy of "improving conditions and instilling order" since last fall. The pace of development of inflationary processes has slowed down, and market prices have stabilized. A good harvest was gathered this year. This is particularly important when you take account of the vital significance of agricultural production for a country with a population of more than 1 billion, Li Peng said.

Call for Taiwan Independence Noted

PM1212123989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Yu. Savenkov dispatch: "China—What the Taiwan Elections Showed"]

[Text] Beijing—In Taiwan elections have been held for the parliament and local organs of power at provincial, municipal, and district level. The ruling Kuomintang party received 70 percent of the votes, and the remaining 30 percent went to deputies from the opposition Democratic Progress Party (DPP) and other small parties and independent candidates. These were the final results.

As Hong Kong's SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST reports, the headquarters of the opposition DPP has stated that it considers the election results in two cities and two districts invalid because "in certain electoral districts, the number of votes has even exceeded the number of participants in the ballot." Hong Kong newspapers also report clashes between crowds of thousands of opposition supporters and the police. People have been injured. There have been seizures of official institutions...

The election campaign, too, was stormy. One candidate was killed, and after that many others demanded to be given bulletproof vests. There have been cases of assault both on deputies and those campaigning for them. During the election campaign, huge sums of money were spent on publishing millions of brochures, hiring loudspeaker trucks, and holding countless dinners. As the Taiwan Central Bank reports, 43 billion new Taiwan dollars were withdrawn from accounts—all of it spent on the election. "Money and violence dominate the election campaign in Taiwan," the XINHUA agency broadcast.

A passion for listing things by number is a Chinese characteristic. This time, too, one of the local publicists outlined "five features" of the elections in Taiwan. First, they are the most representative in the island's history. Second, they are the first since Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, lifted martial law in 1987. Third, it was the first time elections had been held since the departure from the political arena of the Chiang Kai-shek dynasty (after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Li Teng-hui, a native of Taiwan, became head of the Taiwan regime.). Fourth, the election was another step toward democracy. And fifth (evidently this is most important) it was the first time that the opposition had officially participated in elections since securing the right to campaign for its candidates.

How are the results of the elections being assessed? Opinion is divided. Some believe that it still means success for Kuomintang, which retained its position. Others (and they are the majority) see it differently: It is not possible to question the dominant role of Kuomintang in the present conditions, even though the opposition, the DPP, obtained 21 places in parliament and the right of legislative initiative for the first time.

And another of the election's features struck observers. Although propagandizing the slogan of "Taiwan's independence" was forbidden by law, this problem was the focus of attention in the elections. As the weekly ASIA WEEK writes, radicals advocating "a new constitution" have publicized their views all over the island. As RENMIN RIBAO writes, the "Taiwan independence" question is worrying political circles, since advocates of this idea have moved from propaganda to action. The struggle has intensified, and this does not promote stabilization of the situation on the island or the cause of China's unification.

Northeast Asia

Korean Aide on North's Unification Efforts

PM1212095789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Special correspondents B. Barakhta and S. Tikhomirov report: "Difficult Ascent"]

[Excerpts] Pyongyang, Moscow—[Passage omitted] ...The demilitarized zone. This is now not only one of

Asia's trouble spots but one of the world's main trouble spots, too. [Passage omitted]

The unnaturalness of the situation is obvious. The 20th century is on the wane. The peace movement is expanding powerfully in the world, but on the Korean peninsula the situation remains tense.

On the pretext of the "threat from the North," a mighty militarist fist is clenched in southern Korea. The U.S. Army Expeditionary Corps [as published] stationed there numbers around 50,000 officers and men. There are more than 1,000 items of nuclear munitions capable of destroying several times over all life on the peninsula and a considerable distance beyond it. You can't help wondering: To please the Pentagon's militarist aspirations will the industrious Korean people be doomed to remain divided, will the young men whose hands are weary from working for a united motherland continue to eye suspiciously through a gunsight everything that happens?

The loud talk about the threat from the North now has an anachronistic ring, to say the least.

Korean comrades have told us that the Soviet Union's foreign policy and the proposals put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk have helped to warm the political climate in Asia and the Pacific and have given support to the Korean people's struggle for the motherland's unification and the Korean peninsula's transformation into a nuclear-free zone.

Much is being done in that regard in People's Korea, as we saw for ourselves during numerous meetings and conversations in the DPRK. The republic is building a new life. And it isn't from choice that it has had to divert money and resources to defense for over 40 years now. Unlike South Korea, there isn't a single foreign military base on the DPRK's territory, nor are there any foreign military servicemen. It is also widely known that there are no nuclear weapons in the north of the peninsula.

"The basis of our foreign policy," DPRK vice foreign minister Chon In-chol said, "is independence, friendship, and peace. People's Korea, along with the other socialist states, is actively struggling to achieve lasting peace throughout the world and advocates the disbandment of all military blocs, the elimination of military bases on other people's territory, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Aside from the building of socialism, the most urgent national task for us is, of course, the unification of the motherland. So far our government has made over 200 proposals aimed at the independent peaceful unification of the country. Quite recently, for instance, we proposed a conference on questions of Korean unification, and we unilaterally reduced our armed forces by 100,000 men. The DPRK believes that both in the North and the South the armies should not exceed 100,000 men each. Furthermore a plan has been proposed to achieve that reduction by 1992."

In letters to PRAVDA many readers ask how the unification of Korea can be achieved if two different sociopolitical systems have already been formed there. We asked Comrade Chon Il-Chol about that.

"We take the prevailing reality into account in the initiatives we put forward," he answered. "In this connection we are also proposing the creation of a democratic confederative republic of Koryo. What kind of republic is that? It is a single confederative state which would include the North and the South while maintaining the social systems and ideologies existing in them. If you like, this proposal is somewhat akin to China's 'One country, two systems' principle. However, there are differences. A single national government will be formed to include representatives of Pyongyang and Seoul on equitable principles, under whose leadership the North and South, with equal powers and commitments, will each exercise regional self-government. As for foreign policy, we see the united Korea as a neutral state not belonging to any military-political alliance or bloc."

The DPRK's position meets with broad support throughout the world. Neither Seoul nor Washington openly oppose Pyongyang's initiatives. At the same time, they have channeled their efforts into maneuvers designed ultimately to prevent the country's unification and to legitimize the "two Koreas" setup in the international arena.

"Judge for yourselves," Chon In-Chol said in conclusion, "both Seoul and Washington strenuously urge that the North and South recognize each other and enter the United Nations at the same time. Only then are trade and cultural and tourist exchanges between the two parts of the peninsula to be developed. It isn't hard to guess that by this path the unification of Korea will be a very distant if not a completely unattainable goal. Nevertheless, the DPRK Government does not refuse talks and time and again seeks points of contact and compromise solutions to an acute present-day international problem."

...We left Kaesong in the evening. The city was plunged in darkness. There wasn't a single light on at the station. The only light came from the thin beams penetrating the curtains of the international train. Such is the reality of a city living half at peace, half at war. But this isn't the fault of its inhabitants, who would have gladly held out the hand of friendship to their South Korean fellow countrymen long ago.

In the Orient there is a saying: "To find good, climb the mountain; to find evil, go down into the abyss." For 40 years the Korean people have been accomplishing their difficult ascent of the mountain of unification away from the brink of the military abyss. We are sure that, ultimately, the aspirations of the entire Korean people—to be united—will become reality.

Soviet Koreans Revive National Identity

90US0211 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Professor S. Khan, chairman of the Organizational Committee for the Establishment of the Uzbekistan Soviet Korean Cultural Center, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Having the Right of a Deciding Vote"]

[Text] Tashkent—The USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration acknowledging all repressive acts against peoples who were subjected to forcible resettlement to be illegal and criminal, and guaranteeing their rights. One of the sad examples of this Stalinist era "national policy" is the fate of Soviet Koreans.

In 1937, our parents were forcibly resettled from the Far East to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan for absolutely groundless reasons. Thousands of party and government workers, representatives of the Korean intelligentsia, the working class, and the peasantry were subjected to Stalinist repression. The children of the resettled Koreans who grew up in the 1940's also endured a miserable lot. Having graduated from school, they were deprived of the opportunity to continue their educations at central educational institutions since a humiliating stamp had been entered in their passports which banned travel outside of the local area. Thus it was until 1953.

Under the influence of all of these processes, Soviet Koreans found that their national culture, traditions, customs, and native language were on the verge of extinction and were becoming increasingly foreign to them. The current young generation living in cities and regional centers (and this is up to 70 percent of all Koreans) does not know either national traditions or customs, the history of their people, and has not mastered conversational Korean. If the task is assigned to find someone who can speak and read the native language, then one needs to look for them among the 60 to 70 year olds. This situation is not an accident. If a pedagogical institute, technicum, and secondary schools with instruction in the Korean language existed prior to the end of the 1930's, they were subsequently eliminated. At the present time in Uzbekistan where more than 200,000 Koreans live, their native language is taught in only seven classes. Korean language teachers are being trained at the Pedagogical Institute Imeni Nizam but there is a drastic shortage of professors, teaching methodology textbooks, dictionaries, and technical teaching equipment. A Korean theater and newspaper in Alma-Ata exist on subsidies and the Uzgosfilarmoniya [Uzbekistan State Philharmonic] Che-Chun Ensemble has been living in misery in far off places for 20 years.

I have managed to meet with Koreans living in the U.S., Japan, Sweden, the PRC, and Canada. They have thoroughly mastered their native language while we are real outcasts in this regard. For example, a total of 600 Koreans reside in Sweden but their children are taught in their native language three times per week at the schools they normally attend. There is a Korean university in Japan. Dozens of magazines and newspapers are published in the Korean language in the U.S.

The assimilation of many minority peoples which is occurring in our nation had its "scientific" basis. For a long time the disappearance of various languages and cultures in literature and also in official documents was interpreted as a process of drawing nations together and as the internationalization of national relations.

Nationality, national interests, and a national culture—are realities that must be reckoned with. Each people inhabiting our multinational nation is characterized by a unique and distinctive culture. To think that one can form an international [state] without a national one means losing touch with real principles and depriving a people of its cultural foundation. We need to utilize the natural striving of national minorities toward development of their own language and culture to enrich universal [interethnic] values. To open up the range to free national development and to simultaneously increase and multiply socialist society's interethnic unity—this is the directive of the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Until recently, inter-republic national relations were practically outside the field of view. They have been neglected to such a degree that conflicts which arise on this level in a number of regions are causing apprehension. Under these conditions, we need to constantly and intently follow the development of inter-republic national processes and not trudge along at the tail of events. And we do not need to spot a manifestation of nationalism in each national movement and in a natural attempt to assert one's distinctiveness. Only the broadest democratism guided by a pluralism of interests of nations and peoples and by their creativity and initiative can provide a solution to the accumulated problems of interethnic relations and a real blossoming of national minority culture.

Representatives of the administrative-management apparatus who manifest indecisiveness, excessive caution, and also very often incompetence are often guilty of aggravating interethnic relations. As a result, many national movements meet barriers and good undertakings become overgrown with bureaucratic shackles. This is especially observed during establishment of national cultural centers, national associations, and friendly associations. We all know that V.I. Lenin considered it natural to establish conditions for freedom of any unions, also including a union of any communities of any nationality in this state. To eliminate any national oppression, Lenin proposed the establishment of national districts of even the smallest size with a single national composition. They could come into contact with people of this nationality who were dispersed throughout the nation and even throughout the world.

These provisions of Lenin's were consolidated in the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference on interethnic relations. Quite a bit of time has passed since the party conference. However, in Uzbekistan everything has remained, as it often happens here, at the level of speeches, reports, decisions, and resolutions.

Under these conditions, the local authorities must manifest greater independence and specifically resolve issues set forth by life. This primarily concerns formation and registration of national cultural centers and societies which the CPSU platform once again states the need for. But the stereotype of the old thinking is so strongly ingrained in the activities of bureaucrats and the habit of waiting for instructions from above so constrains the will of functionaries that work to establish cultural centers in the republic cannot move off of dead center. Thus, already in November 1988, an organizing committee for the establishment of a cultural center was elected at a meeting of the Korean Society of Tashkent and the Oblast. However, it has thus far been refused [permission] to conduct a founders' conference, although the appropriate work—organizing committees have been established and delegates have been elected—has been completed in the overwhelming majority of places where concentrations of Koreans live.

Once we have established a cultural center, we would be able to resolve the issues of restoring our language, culture, traditions, and customs and on this basis form a minority peoples' consciousness. This would emancipate the potential capabilities of these peoples and would increase their activities in economic, political, and spiritual spheres, and in social life.

It is proper to pose the question of granting national cultural centers and social organizations the right to support cultural ties with similar cultural and educational organizations in foreign countries.

I want to believe that the steps in the area of party national policy that were set forth in the CPSU platform will find their practical realization, will help to establish conditions for free and equal development of all peoples of our multi-ethnic Fatherland, and will remove tension in interethnic relations for the benefit of perestroyka.

ROK Participation in Cocom Criticized

SK1212053589 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Commentary by station commentator (Igor Levezev) from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] A report from Seoul goes: South Korea will join the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Area [Cocom] next year. The purpose of this organization led by the United States and other Western countries is to ban exports of strategic goods and state-of-the-art technology to the socialist countries. Our station commentator, (Igor Levezev), explains this report as follows:

I must point out that this decision by the Seoul authorities did not surprise me. Seoul is too excessively subjugated to Washington to independently formulate its own trade policies toward the socialist countries. The U.S. stand on this issue has been known. Even though it calls for promoting East-West trade in words, it frequently hinders such trade in reality. Two years ago South Korea suffered the first offensive from Cocom, in which the United States is playing a leading role. At that time, under pressure from Washington, a memorandum was signed between the United States and South Korea in which Seoul expressed a willingness to respect the spirit and [word indistinct] of the Cocom regulations. Since then, Washington has kept a close watch on the business activities of South Korea, which has paid great attention to the development of (?trade) ties with the socialist countries. We are now witnessing the result of this [word indistinct]. While yielding to U.S. demands, Seoul has strictly limited exports to the socialist countries. The list of banned items will include 170 types of goods. Seoul's decision on [words indistinct] the Cocom clearly runs counter to the northern diplomacy declared by the South Korean authorities. The northern diplomacy seeks to improve relations with the DPRK and other socialist countries. As you see, South Korea acts, while continuously looking up to Washington. Washington is trying to hinder its trade competitor.

Japan's Official Reaction to Malta Meeting Viewed

OW1012225289 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 8 Dec 89

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] We will now broadcast a commentary by Radio Moscow commentator Dmitriyev on reaction by the official Japanese source to the outcome of the talks held between Soviet Chairman Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush off the coast of Malta.

The official Japanese source seems to have repeated its adherence to its conservative position in its actual conclusion while welcoming, in words, positive events taking place in international relations. As is known to all, right after the recent Soviet-U.S. summit talks, Prime Minister Kaifu welcomed the outcome as a sign of the end of the cold war. The Japanese Foreign Ministry source has also disclosed the same view. However, the sources then continued to make remarks, indicating that Japan would continue to assume the attitude of an onlooker of the events related to easing tension in the Asian-Pacific region.

For instance, according to a YOMIURI SHIMBUN report, one of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's high-ranking officials stated that the situation in Asia continued to remain unstable, and that, it would be, accordingly, necessary to maintain a deterrent force. Vice Minister Nishihiro of the Defense Agency pointed out at a press conference that it would be necessary for Japan to continue its military efforts and stated his views that defense capability was built under the conditions of military confrontation and that it was not built for the purpose of losing to the enemy.

As is clear from the views mentioned above, the Japanese Government clearly intends to strengthen a military buildup at a great pace. For example, Japan's military expenditures will probably increase by 6 percent and exceed 4 trillion yen in the next fiscal year.

No matter how positive the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks, certainly no one would expect Japan and other nations to start reducing their military spending soon or, at least, check its growth rate. It certainly takes time to draw a conclusion from various events. However, the fact is that in response to various events, the Japanese Government source has answered, in the same key, that the situation in the Asian-Pacific region has not changed.

The Japanese official source reacted the same way following the signing of the INF between the Soviet Union and the United States, the treaty on the complete abolition of intermediate nuclear weapons; following the Soviet Union's announcement of reducing 120,000 Soviet troops in the Far East; and even now when the summit talks held off the coast of Malta have created a new possibility of overcoming the state of cold war. There is no sign so far that Japan will make any contribution to overcoming the state of cold war.

Who, then, should make such contributions? Even without the reduction, the Soviet military force in the Far East is inferior to that of the United States. Under such conditions, the Soviet Union cannot afford to carry on its unilateral reduction forever. As far as the United States is concerned, we have failed to make it understand the necessity of reducing its naval forces, and judging from various factors, no agreement was reached on this issue at the Malta talks.

If Japan should continue to look on with folded arms under such circumstances, beyond a doubt the state of cold war in Asia will never cease to exist of its own accord in the near future. With the development of easing tension in Europe, such an attitude will lead to a state in which the vast area surrounding the Japanese archipelago will continue to remain a so-called region of interaction [kogo kuiki] in East-West military confrontation.

Japan's Stand on Soviet GATT Role Regretted

OW0812104689 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 7 Dec 89

[Text] It is now a well-known fact that during the meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush in Malta, President Bush promised to support the Soviet request to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as observer. A few days later, French President Mitterand also expressed support for Soviet participation in GATT. GATT is a powerful international organization. Presently, it has 98 member nations and around 60 countries with the observer status. There are already a number of socialist countries who are regular GATT members and China also attained observer status. If the USSR can participate in this international organization, Soviet authority in international trade will be even higher. [as heard]

Japanese political and business circles reacted in different ways to this question. A Moscow Radio reporter interviewed Yuriy Ledentsov, official in charge of trade with Western countries, at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations on this matter. Ledentsov visited Japan recently as a member of the delegation led by Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Korolev and participated in negotiations on Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations.

Ledentsov said in the interview: During the negotiations held in Japan, Soviet participation in GATT was taken up as an independent issue. Our delegation requested the Japanese side to support the Soviet desire to participate in GATT. At that time, we cited the continuing improvement in the international situation, the growing importance of international trade, and the Soviet intention of not remaining within the bounds of narrow interests and of advancing into a broader international arena. We also pointed out that the conditions for this advance into the world are being created in the Soviet Union. We believe that all these will contribute to expanding Soviet export and import capability in the world market. Unfortunately, we were not able to win the understanding of the Japanese side at that time.

In view of the fact that substantial progress was achieved at the talks between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Bush, we truly regret the fact that we have not been able to win the Japanese side's understanding. We believe that the USSR is heading toward participation in GATT. A growing number of countries have come to take the same position as the United States on this issue. We hope that Japan will revise the its position.

In this connection, during the time we were conducting negotiations and talks, Japanese political and business figures showed keen interest in Soviet economic reforms and perestroyka as a whole. In particular, the responsible official of the Japanese panel, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs [as heard] Watanabe stressed this point. Moreover, Japanese companies are making efforts to overcome a number of obstacles to the further development of trade with the USSR above the existing level. However, we need more time. We agreed to continue with our activities, sign agreements, and seek solutions to existing problems.

The above was Ledentsov's remarks. Aside from Ledentsov's remarks, we would like to add that prices of stocks of Japanese companies trading with the USSR, including Marubeni, C. Itoh & Co, Nissho Iwai, and other trading firms, went up at the Tokyo Stock

Exchange on 4 December. Observers see this as the first concrete indication of the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks. This clearly shows that the Japanese business sector is in favor of Soviet participation in GATT. As is clear from Watanabe's remarks on 5 December, the Foreign Ministry is considering possible support of Soviet participation in GATT if the USSR makes certain political concessions. In connection with this issue, the Japanese Foreign Ministry intends to closely watch future U.S. moves.

NOVOE VREMYA on Northern Territory Issue

OW0412094889 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 1 Dec 89

["Excerpts" of a feature on the territorial issue pending in Soviet-Japanese relations carried in the "Forum" corner of the latest issue of NOVOE VREMYA, a political weekly published in Moscow]

[Text] At the beginning of the feature, the report introduced the views stated by (Brenin), a Soviet people's deputy elected from Sakhalin. Deputy (Brenin) wrote as follows:

The so-called northern territorial issue long obstructed the improvement of our relations with Japan and the conclusion of a peace treaty. The profits that can be gained from the occupation of these islands were wiped out by the enormous losses that will be brought about by the absence of normal good-neighborly relations with Japan. As residents of Sakhalin, we can say that we have earnest concerns over Japan's participation in the development of the Soviet Far East. While the Soviet Union has taken a flexible stance on the so-called northern territorial issue, Japan has remained, since 1985, one of the very few nations that have made no realistic progress in their relations with the Soviet Union. However, Japan is a great nation that holds the key to the Pacific region. And the paradox lies in the [words indistinct] for the territory that seems to have no major economic or strategic significance to either the Soviet Union or Japan. The major point at issue is the prestige [ishin] of the Soviet Union and of Japan, too.

After stating his views in this way, Deputy (Brenin) made the following compromise proposal: A declaration should be made for demilitarizing the 4 northern islands; a joint Soviet-Japanese administration organ should be established; and the [words indistinct] peninsula should be declared a free economic zone. A majority of voters support this proposal. If the Japanese Government should reject this proposal, it would perhaps be criticized by public opinion. In this connection, I feel that, at any rate, it will serve the purpose for the Soviet Union to take due initiative in diplomacy. This is what was written by People's Deputy (Brenin), who is elected from Sakhlin.

Then, the weekly introduces the views stated by Prof (Varentivik) of the National (Mo[illegible]ga) University who is from (Salntsk) City. Prof (Varentivik) reviews this issue from ethical and moral viewpoints. In other words, he discusses the issue by reviewing Japan's attitude toward Russia since the beginning of the 20th century and up to the present. In 1904, Japan waged war with Russia without issuing any declaration of war. And in 1918, Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok and occupied a vast area in the coastal oblasts, the (Kuri-amorie) district, and the Bykal district. Prof (Varentivik) then cited several other facts.

And Prof (Varentivik) also feels the following: At present, a large majority of Soviet residents take an indifferent attitude toward Japan's territorial claim for part of the Kuril islands. If the Soviet people were informed of Japan's policy in an honest way, they would unanimously have a negative view on this issue. Among the Soviet Union's neighboring nations, the Japanese have indicated the least understanding of the Soviet social system. In this connection, Japan has always remained in the group of nations that is unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. This is how Prof (Varentivik) feels.

Then, the professor adds as follows: If the islands should be transferred and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States should further deteriorate, these islands would be used as an unsinkable aircraft carrier against the Soviet Union. And following the demand for the southern Kuril islands, Japan would begin to claim the northern Kuril islands and southern Sakhalin. The Japanese have blindly aroused its national consciousness and such national conciousness has even been indicated in its arrogant relations with its neighboring nations, including the Soviet Union. In negotiations with the Japanese, if the other side should move toward compromise, it would indicate its weakness and would become the cause for arising further greater demands.

This is how Prof (Valentivik) feels and he further writes that concerning economic cooperation, it will be advisable for the Soviet Union to pay attention to South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other nations at present.

In the final part of the discussions on the territorial issue, we would like to introduce a report by (Rogacherov), master of history from Moscow. Mr (Rogacherov) states doubts about the idea that there is a possibility of achieving distinctive results in the process of Soviet leader General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Japan and brings up the need of creating a forward-looking stance on the normalization of Soviet relations with Japan. If this should be achieved, the Soviet side could at least have mental superiority.

Pointing out that there are grounds for the Soivet people to feel uneasy about the U.S. military strength that is using Japanese territories, Mr (Rogacherov) further states that Japan has not made clear its position on guaranteeing security in the Soviet Far East while demanding the return of the territories. In this connection, Mr (Rogacherov) feels that it will be necessary to adopt a policy of bringing up several solutions to this issue by taking various factors related to this issue into considration.

Coastal Mayoral Conference With Japan Lauded

OW0412133689 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 2 Dec 89

[From the "Soviet Far East News" program]

[Text] Here is a report from Khabarovsk City. We would like to introduce a report on the friendly exchanges between Soviet and Japanese cities that conform to the interests of our two nations.

A delegation of executive committees of various cities in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East visited Japan in the second half of November at the invitation of the Association of Mayors of Cities on the Coast of the Sea of Japan. The leader of this delegation was (Aleksandr Pamchinko), chairman of the Khabarovsk chapter of the Soviet Association of Promoting Exchanges with Foreign Cities [SAPEFC] and concurrently chairman of the Khabarovsk city executive committee, or mayor of the city.

[(Pamchinko) recording in Russian heard in background] Mayor (Pamchinko) states as follows:

It has now become a tradition to hold this conference of Soviet and Japanese coastal city mayors and the conference was held for the 12th time. High-level delegates from both sides attended the conference and the topics discussed at the session were of urgent and great importance. Among the topics discussed were the friendly exchanges between Soviet and Japanese cities that conform to the interests of the two nations and the changing world, the cooperation among various cities in settling environmental problems, and the expansion of youth exchanges within the framework of friendly relations.

As usual, the conference of coastal city mayors was held in an atmosphere of practical cooperation, friendship, and mutual understanding. The participants of the two sides stressed that the new approach toward international problems adopted since the last conference in 1987 has brought about major and positive changes in the world. While admitting that our two nations have differences in views, all of us, delegates of Soviet and Japanese cities, welcome the current efforts toward concluding a peace treaty.

Mayor (Pamchinko) continues that participants in the conference agreed on the following point:

With efforts to establish sisterhood relations between various cities and participation of Soviet and Japanese cities in various endeavors, and through development of friendly exchanges in various fields among city authorities and people, we have created objective conditions for strengthening mutual trust and understanding and promoted the smooth development of practical cooperation in such fields as cities' autonomy and undertaking, science, culture, education, medicine, and environmental preservation.

Friendly exchanges between cities constitute an important factor for the healthy and positive stabilization of the movement aimed at promoting bilaterial relations, solid peace, and security for the peoples of various nations. In their remarks at the conference on the communique issued, delegates of Soviet and Japanese cities stressed the vital importance of the issue on environmental safety in the contemporary world. Since the environmental problem concerns not only individual cities, nations, or regions but also interests of all mankind, it demands joint efforts and a concentration of efforts and funds on the basis of bilateral or multinational efforts to work out effective measures to solve the problem.

We, leaders of both Soviet and Japanese city authorities, are concerned with the future of the relations between our two nations. In this connection, we feel that we must hand over the baton of friendship to the youth of our sister cities and have thus made efforts to promote overall youth exchanges. The two sides have maintained that coastal trade and regional economic cooperation among eastern Siberia, the Soviet Far East, and Japanese coastal cities should be promoted and stressed that exchanges in these regions should be strengthened.

We would like to express our hearty gratitude to our Japanese friends, who have warmly, and in a friendly manner, received us and have efficiently organized the conference. In particular, we are very grateful to Mr Wakasugi, mayor of our sister city Niigata, and Mr Kanazawa, mayor of Yamagata City, where the conference was held. Through our common efforts and as a practical step to strengthen cooperation between Soviet and Japanese cities, we have studied and adopted the program for promoting cooperation between the SAPEFC Khabarovsk chapter and the Japanese Association of Mayors of Coastal Cities. It has been decided that the 13th conference of coastal city mayors will be held in the Soviet Union in 1991.

Illegal Japanese Fishing, Seamen's Plight Viewed

90UI0175A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 30 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent N. Artapukh, Kuril Islands: "Gentlemen or Border Guards?"]

[Text] Military subjects have frankly been presented on the pages of newspapers in a lopsided way for a long time. Afraid to "elucidate" the negative phenomena in our armed forces, the censors essentially permitted only positive material for publication.

I did not set it as my objective to gladden the average person or the spiteful critic with some kind of "cooked-up" facts from the life of the coast guards. They perform service under the most severe conditions. They are performing honorably and selflessly. I do not know seamen of any other country who would voluntarily jump into deep ice-strewn waters in order to get to the outstretched hands of a seriously sick comrade and take him back to shore. But senior seamen Ivan Krakhmalev, Rafiz Shakirov, and Lieutenant Semenyutin did this. And there are quite a few such examples...

In taking on the difficult task of describing in the newspaper the security of one of the maritime sectors of the USSR state border and the protection of natural national resources, I hope only to give food for thought, for pondering what was seen and heard, not so much for interested departments (they, as the saying goes, have the information) as for those managers on whom the achievement of this objective depends to a significant degree. There has been enough of fattening pirates and gangsters who use as a pretext the convenient revanchist slogan of the return of the "northern territories!"

"We have such a term as movie film and still photo documentation," explains Officer Yu.V. Chistyakov. "Taken during the pursuit and arrest of the trespassers, the materials serve as legal proof of the premeditated calls of foreign schooners and vessels in USSR territorial waters. There is another problem: What do you photograph with, if the inventory of the naval unit has only the old regulation FED [F.E. Dzerzhinskiy] camera? Not every camera enthusiast today will agree to work with such a camera, and we have to..."

Or this fact. The last schooner that was confiscated from Japanese poachers was sold by the Yuzhno-Kurilskiy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] to a local cooperative for R7,000. The naval unit did not get one kopeck of this money! And after a certain time, the cooperative owners resold the vessel to a new owner for R38,000. It turns out that the coast guards are enriching the profiteers with the blessing of the local authorities!

Still photo and movie cameras can hardly be called a small thing, and, nonetheless, in the last 10 years nobody from the superior command was able to resolve this problem, because of the strict regulation of monetary funds. Fine, we will agree that the state is not in a condition to provide naval units with the required equipment, but a substantial part of the foreign currency fines for violating the territorial waters and fishing rules in the economic zone are sitting in the safes of the Minrybkhoz [Ministry of the Fish Industry]. Is it really possible that such a relatively insignificant question as the redistribution of monetary means has to be decided in the parliament of the country and falls on the Central Committee of the party?! Why should not the Minrybkhoz itself take the initiative in distributing part of the currency honestly earned by the coast guard for the needs of their distant garrisons?

The relaxation of international tensions is a great blessing for humanity. Speaking of the principle of reasonable sufficiency, our party and government are for reducing the armed forces and military expenditures, calling on other states to follow the Soviet example. But does this mean that it is not necessary to strengthen the security of individual sectors of the border where gangsterism flourishes in the extraction of fish and sea products? It is necessary!

But if this is the case then how are we to understand the difficulties with supplying the coast guard with spare units and parts and the shortage of means to maintain ships at a high state of operational readiness? No, I will not say that the guards are experiencing an emergency situation on the docks, and they are performing their service as needed. But at what price?!

It is no secret to anyone (and this is known first and foremost by gangsters) that the radar equipment on PSKR's [border patrol boats] is unable to detect schooners of the pirates at long range. As a result, the poachers "take bearings" on our ships earlier than we can take a bearing on them. They are able to pull up their nets with a catch and depart for their own waters.

The situation could be corrected with aviation, particularly with helicopters. But it does not have the means of detection and equipment for movie or still photo documentation. We do not open fire on the violators because we have been trying for a long time to live in peace and friendship with our neighbors. But the bandits take advantage of this! Once, as I was told in the Pacific Ocean border district, gangsters gave an interview to correspondents after running off to their own waters. The following contented answer was given to the question of why the naval border guards did not open fire on them: "The Russian fellows are gentlemen, and, moreover, perestroyka is taking place there..."

The gangsters oppose our policy of good neighborliness with unprecedented effrontery. Running away from their pursuers, the bandits try to put the patrol boat out of commission. In what way? They drop a steel cable behind the stern in the hope that it will get entangled with the screw propeller of the pursuing ship. A knowledgeable person knows what the consequences of such an action are...

The total computerization of poachers's schooners and cutters makes it possible for them to take rich schools of fish in our waters and to "spot" ahead of time the coast guard ships that are closing in to detain them.

And even in the event that the violating ships are blockaded, their owners are not very upset. Why not? Because "the Russian fellows are gentlemen," and this means that they will not open fire.

"The only way to resolve the problem is political dialogue," says Lieutenant General M.A. Barybin, the chief of the troops of the Pacific Border District. The forthcoming visit to Japan by the leaders of our party and the head of government, M.S. Gorbachev, gives us the hope that the Soviet-Japanese maritime border will become a border only of friendship and good neighborliness.

"The path to a political dialogue of the leaders of the two countries is not easy. It seems to me that the tense situation in the territorial waters of the USSR, in our 200-mile economic zone, is advantageous to the gangsters, and they encourage this tension in every way possible. Under revanchism and on the quiet, they conveniently, as the saying goes, "fish in troubled waters."

Once, an inspecting group of coast guard personnel boarded a large ship in the economic zone. The captain graciously received the guests, and he showed them a diagram of the floating equipment. There were no forbidden sea products and fish in the holds. After he had left the Japanese ship, our officer turned our attention to the cover of the fuel hatchway, which was covered with condensation. The thought came through: "A refrigeration chamber!"

We once again asked for the diagram, and we descended into the compartment, taking appropriate measures. In the bottom, as the officer supposed, there were crabs, shrimp, and types of fish that were forbidden to catch. As we see, by order of gangster firms that trade in piracy, shipbuilding companies at the plant level install secret compartments that are indicated on diagrams with other markings. And a large number of ships had to be detained that appeared to be equipped for the extraction of edible seaweed, but which were actually for red salmon and other delicacies!

Hoping for a positive solution of problems existing between our countries and an improvement in the climate of mutual relations, it should be remembered that any sector of the USSR state border must always be protected reliably. For this, naturally, first class specialists are needed. Dozens of confiscated and hundreds of fined ships point to the high level of preparation of our coast guard personnel. However, in my view, the preparation is still not being conducted rationally. In particular, until now no decision has been made on the question of reopening the coast guard school that was closed in the 1960's.

We talked about a lot of things on the bridge and in the deckhouse of the patrol ship, in the office of the commander of the naval unit, and on the streets of the military compound. I recall, when having lunch in the wardroom, that they joked about the fact that during a storm it was a big problem trying to raise a spoon to the mouth. Despite a lunch under extreme ocean conditions, I noted the specific smell of potatoes. The thought came to mind: "Are they really powdered?" Yes, Ye. M. Glotov, the commander, confirmed, the very same.

The life of seamen is something that has been talked about for many decades. Powdered potatoes, canned stewed meat, powdered eggs, and caloric concentrates, of course, meet established standards, but a chronic shortage of vitamins continues to lead to toothaches and peridontosis. The officers spoke about this openly—it became unbearable! In the border district, they again cited nice figures on supplies in the Kurils of fresh potatoes, cabbage, and other vegetables. But, you see, they unload almost half of those same potatoes from the piers onto the garbage dump: completely rotten!

At the small local market, a kilogram of watermelon at the end of September (!) cost 6 rubles, and tomatoes cost 7-8 rubles. With the approach of permanent cold weather, prices will double. Can an officer's family, especially a young one, afford such expenditures?

The rear services of the district was satisfied with the work of the commissary, although I did not see in the little local stores either fruit, or vegetables, or those same potatoes! Why are the cooperative owners (more accurately the profiteers) able to get to the most remote islands with high quality watermelons, cantaloupes, and tomatoes, and the military commissaries are not able to? Incidentally, on Sakhalin and in the neighboring Primorye there is an abundance of vegetable products. There were especially a lot of tomatoes this year, and in a number of sovkhozes [state farms] of the kray, they were taken out to farms and even to dumps.

In all times, psychological pressures were inherent at a border. As they say, like the service here. But why does a contractor build guard posts in a complex way, with all facilities, but the naval unit has to be content with using the direct labor method? In the border district, half (!) of the families of the seagoing personnel do not have an apartment. Frequently, a seaman who returns to shore from the border does not find his wife and children in their previous location, because for some reason or other they had to find other shelter. Is such an officer able to serve calmly and confidently on the next voyage? I doubt it...

The Kuril Islands are justifiably called the weather "galley." Many typhoons and cyclones move between Sakhalin, the continent, and the Kuril ridge toward Kamchatka. The testing of the seamen's fortitude is 10 times more difficult here. It seems that our task is not to add artificial difficulties to the natural ones.

In conclusion, I would like to puncture the pride of those eminent departments whose fault it is that the coast guardsmen, fulfilling their sacred duty, are forced to settle for an FED, while even an ordinary cooperative takes pictures of a wedding ceremony in a ZAGS [civil registrar's office] with a modern videocamera, earning fabulous money besides. And for how long will our native electronics experts enjoy the successes of space exploration and not develop more advanced equipment for the defense of our borders? And on what basis do the suppliers and financiers restrict the supply of spare units and parts and allocate scanty sums of money for the repair of coast guard ships?!

We can for a time reconcile ourselves with the inadequacies caused by the perestroyka of the economy and the economic management mechanism. But sooner or later we will institute order. However, we must not forget even now that the state border, and everything that is related to it, is a sacred concept! Regardless of whatever difficulties there are!

Then even V.S. Velkhovetskiy, the secretary of the raykom [rayon party committee], will not need to help the coast guard with such a trifle as chairs, a television set, and fictional literature. You cannot go far on a pittance, and you can barely seal the border with a strong lock, even against feeble efforts.

Mongolian Central Committee Plenum Reported

PM1212150389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent: "Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 11 Dec—The Seventh Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee Plenum held here has discussed the report by J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the presidium of the Mongolian People's Great Hural, "Implementing the Party's Economic and Social Policy More Vigorously."

This way of raising the question, the report notes, stems from the need to make a specific analysis of the progress in implementing the tasks for the country's economic and social reform put forward by the party's 19th congress and to lend dynamism to perestroyka in all spheres of social life.

The main tasks relating to the problems under discussion are not new. They were examined at previous party Central Committee plenums. Thorough decisions were adopted connected with satisfying society's requirements and improving the people's living standard.

But their implementation is proceeding only slowly. The pace which has been set for labor productivity growth is not being successfully ensured. The return on investment is continuing to decline and the quality of the output produced is not up to the mark. Many unresolved problems have also accumulated in the social sphere, especially in agriculture.

The overall picture looks like this: Expenditure in the country is greater than revenue. The raw material orientation of the republic's economy remains, as does the imbalance between exports and imports. And that is the result of the lack of initiative and sometimes superficial attitude toward the elaboration of plans, especially at the level of the sectorial ministries, the plenum noted. Nor is the demand made by the Politburo, the party Central Committee, and the Mongolian Council of Ministers during the plans' definitive examination distinguished by its exactingness.

The resolution which was adopted points to specific ways of overcoming the lag. The aim of the planned measures is to accelerate the growth of economic potential and the processes of structural perestroyka in the national economy.

The plenum decided to convene the regular, 20th, MPRP Congress in November 1990.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Foreign Ministry's Rogachev Visits SRV, Cambodia

9 December Meetings Noted

PM1112125189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Consultations Held"]

[Text] Hanoi, 9 Dec—Soviet-Vietnamese political consultations have been held here, ending in a meeting between USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev and Nguyen Co Thach, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and foreign minister of the SRV. The discussion centered on questions connected with the prospects for a comprehensive political settlement around Cambodia, the prevention of civil war in that country, and the continuation of the negotiating process. The Soviet side rated highly the efforts which Vietnam and Cambodia are making to these ends.

Participating in the consultations were SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co and A.S. Voronin, USSR charge d'affaires ad interim in the SRV.

A plan of cooperation between the USSR and SRV Foreign Ministries for 1990-1991 was signed.

Received by Prime Minister Do Muoi

LD1012145989 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 10 Dec 89

[Text] Hanoi December 10 TASS—Vietnamese Prime Minister Do Muoi today received Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev who informed the Vietnamese leader of the results of the Soviet-American summit off Malta.

Do Muoi welcomed the Gorbachev-Bush talks and described them as an event of world importance which would positively influence the situation in various regions.

He expressed confidence that the constructive Soviet-American dialogue on the most important problems of our times would help achieve a lasting peace.

During the meeting, Do Muoi asked about perestroyka in the USSR and wished the Soviet people great success in implementing their plans. On his part, he informed the visitor of the starting work to renew all spheres of public life in Vietnam.

The meeting was attended by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Tran Huan Back, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee.

11-12 Dec Phnom Penh Consultations

LD1212172789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1205 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Phnom Penh, 12 Dec (TASS)—Soviet-Cambodian consultations were held here on 11-12 December. They were conducted by I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs and Dit Munti, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the State of Cambodia. Taking part in the consultations was the USSR ambassador to the State of Cambodia, R.L. Khamidulin.

All aspects of a Cambodian settlement were considered in detail. It was noted that it is now important to apply the maximum effort toward averting an escalation of the civil war in the country, which the introduciton of a moratorium on military supplies to the Cambodian belligerent sides would assist. The Soviet Union and Cambodia consider it necessary to support the uninterrupted nature and the dynamics of the talks process.

A Soviet-Cambodian intergovernmental protocol on the founding of a USSR general consulate in the city of Kompong Som (Cambodia) and a plan for cooperation between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year 1990-1991 were signed.

Today, Hun Sen, member of the Politburo of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, chairman of the Council of Ministers, minister of foreign affairs of the State of Cambodia received I.A. Rogachev. During a friendly conversation, significant attention was devoted to a discussion of the Cambodian question. Hun Sen spoke of the plans of the leadership of Cambodia, directed at averting an escalation of the civil war in the country and at getting out of the conflict by way of talks to attain national reconciliation.

The Soviet side gave a high appraisal of the flexibility of the Cambodian Government in seeking compromise solutions. The recent statement by Hun Sen on willingness to consider new proposals from Thailand and Australia, and the possibility of a more active UN role in a Cambodian settlement, was clear proof of this. It is now vitally important that all interested parties show political realism, which would facilitate the speedy attainment of an all- embracing political settlement in the country. R.L. Khamidulin and Dit Munti took part in the conversation.

VNA Denies SRV Troops in Cambodia

PM1212151189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Statement Issued"]

[Text] Hanoi, 11 Dec—The Vietnam News Agency (VNA) has issued a denial of a XINHUA report dated 9 December this year claiming that the SRV has brought its troops back into Cambodia.

"This information is nothing but a cynical distortion of reality. The agency is authorized to deny these slanderous fabrications," VNA emphasizes.

Thai Premier's Approach on Cambodia Favored

BK0912081289 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 8 Dec 89

[Text] In Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said although all Cambodian parties have agreed to take part in new unofficial talks on the Cambodian issue, they still have not expressed a desire to make concessions to one another; they still stick to their previous positions. Our commentator Oleg Alekseyev writes.

On this issue, one can ask this question: Should a new meeting of warring Cambodian parties, with the participation of the states, be convened? In my opinion, this kind of meeting is necessary. This is another possibility for advancing toward normalizing the situation in Cambodia and around this country, a process which has slackened off in the past few months due to the insistence by Phnom Penh and the opposition group on sticking to their previous attitudes. This means that no new formula would be found at this new meeting and through direct negotiations. Experience of past unofficial talks has shown that one can make this prediction.

Now a new situation has arisen in Cambodia. Following the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from the country, one can talk about a new phase of conflict. Everyone agrees that Cambodian parties themselves should express their decisions. In this sense, the sooner the talks start the better for the situation to be fully restored. Adopting an attitude on the Cambodian issue by relying on words or on nothing may be improper. It seems that one should take one step at a time to achieve concrete results. In my view, one should pay attention to the idea recently expressed by Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan: If you want to get to the 10th floor, you cannot do it in one jump; you should go step by step.

The new unofficial talks on the Cambodia issue should proceed along this path toward the final goal, namely a complete solution to the Cambodian problem.

Soviet-Cambodian Trade Session Held

PM0512123589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] The sixth session of the Soviet-Cambodian Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation was held 23 through 28 November 1989.

The results of Soviet-Cambodian cooperation over the past year were summed up and questions of its further improvement taking account of the restructuring of national economic management in the two countries were examined.

The results of the fulfillment of mutual commitments for goods shipments in 1989 were also summed up, and questions of the gradual transition to balanced commodity exchange were examined.

Issues linked with the holding of consultations between the sides' planning organs on questions of developing trade and economic cooperation in 1991-1995 were examined. Questions of scientific and technical cooperation were discussed and specific measures were outlined aimed at improving its effectiveness and bringing the subject matter of the research work being carried out by the sides' organizations as closely into line as possible with the tasks facing the Soviet and Cambodian national economies.

A corresponding protocol was signed on the results of the session, which was held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

The Soviet delegation was headed by V.K. Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and the Cambodian delegation by Chea Soth, member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo and vice chairman of the Cambodian Council of Ministers.

Cambodian Official Cited on PRC Experts' Visit

PM1112144989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent P. Tsvetov dispatch under the general headline "Dialogue": "Did Chinese Citizens Go to Cambodia?"]

[Text] Phnom Penh—The article "Under a New Flag" (PRAVDA 19 September) stated that specialists from the PRC recently visited Cambodia. Yet it is well known that China adopts a negative position with regard to the Hun Sen government. Isn't there a mistake here?—readers ask.

However paradoxical it may seem, this event did indeed occur. A few explanations about the matter were given to your correspondent by Bun Uy [name as published], deputy chief of the Cambodian Council of Ministers Chancellery. "Three specialists from the PRC came to Cambodia as part of a delegation of Thai businessmen. In inviting this delegation we particularly expressed an interest in renovating the cement plant in Kampot, which was originally built with Chinese aid. The Chinese specialists were able to familiarize themselves with the plant.

"One would like to hope that the first visit of PRC citizens to Cambodia since the fall of the Pol Pot regime indicates a new attitude to Phnom Penh on the part of Beijing. We now cannot fail to take account of the fact that, despite all difficulties—including difficulties created by those who support the Cambodian opposition—the future lies with a peaceful creative country, cooperation with which can only be advantageous."

U.S. Interest Seen in Philippines Turmoil

PM1212121189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[I. Kovalev article: "The Philippines: So What Happened?"]

[Text] Corazon Aquino's government has experienced the most serious attempt by military personnel dissatisfied with her regime to overthrow the president and occupy the leading positions in the state establishment of the Philippines. The rebellion which began 1 December, and in which about 6,000 officers and soldiers and 5 generals took part, failed.

I recall the very reasonable analysis made by the French newspaper LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE of the situation which took shape in the Philippines after a military revolt in August 1987 similar to the present one. "This was not even a putsch—that is, a limited action—but a profound wave of protest within the Armed Forces," the newspaper wrote. The present rebellion, the sixth since 1986, when C. Aquino came to power, is also seen as a surge from the next wave of discontent. This wave was higher than the previous ones, and the next may be fatal, many commentators believe. As T. Benigno, former press secretary to the president, claims, the moment may come when the United States, which supported Corazon Aquino during the present putsch, will decide to support the military in order to overthrow her: whether it be the organizers of the present rebellion or the generals who, having so far have remained loyal to the president, finally decide to go for broke.

Six attempted military coups in just under 4 years cannot be explained just by a thirst for power. The first such manifestations of discontent were meant to shift Aquino's government from its initially centrist and, to a certain degree, democratic positions to the right—particularly as regards tolerance of left-wing democratic forces and attempts at dialogue with the insurgent movement acting for the interests of the poorest sections of the population.

This pressure—by these same known to be hopeless "putsches" or the threat of such—was successful. There was a shift to the right. Aquino removed the "liberals" from her entourage, abandoned any radical socioeconomic reforms, and declared total war against the rebels.

In the last 12-18 months new factors have entered the smoldering conflict between the government and the Army. These are: the corruption within Aquino's closest entourage which is worsening from year to year, the favoritism and nepotism, the unchecked rise in prices, the hopeless unemployment, the failure of agrarian reform, and the general weakness and incompetence of the administration. It was precisely these realities that were exploited in their populist demagoguery by the organizers of the latest revolt from the radical army organization Reform the Armed Forces movement (RAM). They themselves are mainly of middle-class origin, but they played on the feelings of 150,000 soldiers from the lower strata of the population.

It is no secret that both during the operation to overthrow the former president, Marcos, and now U.S. special services have maintained links with the RAM in order that, at the required moment, this movement could be utilized to overthrow authorities which—if Washington so considers—are becoming hopelessly bankrupt. A most serious moment in Philippine-U.S. relations is imminent. The temporarily deferred talks on the future of the U.S. military bases on the Philippines—the governing treaty which expires in 1991—are to begin shortly. According to the current disposition of votes the Philippine Senate will create many difficulties along the path to a new bases agreement. Internal upheavals in the Philippines which would cancel out the country's Constitution are clearly in U.S. interests...

The internal political shifts in the Philippines are complex and ambiguous. But it is perfectly obvious that the latest outburst from the military has weakened the Aquino regime—and a weakened regime is more susceptible to outside pressure. It is also clear that henceforth the Aquino government will act more circumspectly with regard to the military. And this can mean only one thing—a further shift to the right.

Near East & South Asia

Soviet Envoy Promises Support to Afghanistan

LD1312102289 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0506 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Excerpt] Kabul, Dec 12, BAKHTAR—The Afghan problem has had and will have for us the priority significance until the bloodshed in this long-suffering land of our good friend and neighbour stops, and the stable and guaranted peace is established, stated Boris Pastukhov in his statement in a press conference held in the hall of Science and Culture House of USSR in Kabul today in which Afghan and foreign journalists, including of West European countries, were present.

While examining the situation in Afghanistan in off the Malta [as received] an unofficial working meeting between general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush on Dec 2 and 3 1989 the Soviet side has stressed that it is necessary to proceed to practical steps towards settlement of the Afghan problem. In this connection the main emphasis has been made on the need for intra-Afghan dialogue, holding of nationwide conference, convocation of international conference on Afghanistan—that is—on the ideas favoured by the Afghan leadership, President Najibullah, he said.

The American leader's attention was drawn to the continued violation of the Geneva agreements. The idea that there is a linkage between halting weapons supplies to opposite sides, wherever it comes from and achieving the cease-fire was clearly expressed.

The American side once again spoke in favour of the so-called "transitional period" in the process settlement, which provokes no substantial objections from our side. The Soviet side plainly confirmed its support to President Najibullah and also drew attention of the other party to the fact that after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the Afghan Government positions have been consolidated even more. On the whole, talks on Afghanistan issue permitted to draw American side's attention to the present realities of Afghanistan. It was agreed to continue discussing Afghan settlement issue on ministers' and experts' level, Pastukhov stressed. [passage omitted]

Says Moscow To Stick by Najibullah

BK1212120089 Hong Kong AFP in English 1134 GMT 12 Dec 89

[By Leo Dobbs]

[Text] Kabul, Dec 12 (AFP)—Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Boris Pastukhov stressed here Tuesday [12 December] that Moscow will stick by the government of President Najibullah and said the United States has refused to budge on its refusal to include him in a settlement of the Afghan conflict.

He said that U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had run up against serious differences on several regional issues, including Afghanistan, during their first summit meeting which took place December 2 and 3 off Malta.

He said the two sides had discussed all aspects of the conflict, adding that the Soviet Union emphasized "the need for intra-Afghan dialogue, holding of a nationwide conference, convocation of an international conference on Afghanistan—that is on the ideas favoured by... President Najibullah."

Mr. Pastukhov, giving his first news conference here since arriving in October to replace Yuliy Vorontsov, said: "We couldn't convince the Americans that Najibullah's programme for settling the conflict was a good one with good perspectives."

He added that "all in all, we hope that the Americans will eventually understand that the way to peace goes through political discussions" including Mr. Najibullah.

"The Soviet side plainly confirmed its support to President Najibullah and also drew the attention of the other party to the fact that after the withdrawal (in February) of Soviet troops, Afghan Government positions have been consolidated even more."

Mr. Pastukhov did not elaborate on military aspects or discuss the negative symmetry concept whereby the two superpowers would cut aid to the warring parties in tandem.

Soviet deputies have called for an end to assistance to Afghanistan, citing severe economic problems at home.

But Mr. Pastukhov said that Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had stated Moscow's position clearly before the second session of the Supreme Soviet in October when he said that Moscow would continue economic aid to Afghanistan.

He said the two countries were tied together by treaties which Moscow would always implement to the letter.

The diplomat added that Moscow saw former King Zahir Shah as an important player in the Afghan drama, noting his "authority, ... his patriotic feelings and his resoluteness in order to find a way out of the deadlock."

Mr. Shevardnadze met with the deposed monarch in Rome on the eve of the summit and informed him, with Kabul's blessing, about Mr. Najibullah's proposals for peace.

"The aim of this meeting was to work out a very special Afghan way to solve the problems," he said.

The United States has also sent representatives to meet with the former king, who has lived in Rome since his ouster in 1973, but the Soviet envoy did not say if anything had been decided between the summit parties on a role for the king.

Mr. Pastukhov said the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on Afghanistan would continue and added that Mr. Shevardnadze was due to meet in Moscow next month with his U.S. counterpart James Baker.

Afgan Paper Criticizes Soviet Journalists' Reports

LD1212224889 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0421 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Kabul, Dec. 11, BAKHTAR—It is natural if different views are given on the continuation of assistance to Afghanistan but the efforts of some Soviet journalists which show hesitation on the need of the continuation of Soviet assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan and call on the Soviet states to put an end to its assistance is a matter of concern, reads an article written by the Presidium of the Union of Journalists of the Republic of Afghanistan, published here today in daily PAYAN.

In this connection, the activities of Mikhail Leshchinskiy, journalist of Moscow Television, who has served in Afghanistan several years to be noted that he used to speak three years ago about the victories of Afghan and Soviet troops in eliminating the counter-revolution but since the beginning of the return of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, his reportages lost their initial enthusiasm. M. Leshchinskiy in his recent reportages showed hesitation about the survival of the sovereignty of Afghanistan as if the enemy's propaganda have intimidated him as well. Even his wife in one of her reportages had stated that we handed over the army central hospital no. 40, to the Afghan side in Kabul but we do not know whether it would be at the hand of the Government or the opposition.

Recently, he has appeared on the TV screen and has made irresponsible and unrealistic utterances about the irrationality of the continuation of the Soviet's assistance to Afghanistan. Probably, this journalist see internationalism merely in its military form. He also considers it futile if assistance is given to a nation which is fighting for real peace and for its national sovereignty and independence and is heroically resisting against foreign interference and aggressions.

This juggler tried to show his bravery, but we journalists know the artificial heroism and showness of him. He in his reportage repeatedly made jugglery with a boiled water teapot. He showed that. He was the hero who have occupied this place and the boiled water of extremists now put at his disposal to make tea from it, but in fact, the stronghold was occupied by the Afghan Armed Forces three days ago. Even we remember his awareness from traditions of our Islamic country.

Some years ago another Soviet journalist, Artiom Boravik [name as received], wrote articles in daily SOVIET RUSSIA which was later compiled in a book paying respect to the Soviet internationalist soldiers and their Afghan comrade-in-arms. But Boravik by writing some articles in the magazines of OGONEK and "SOBSIDNIK" [name as received] lost his realism. Especially, his recent article in OGONEK magazine was an harash. [as received] Inhuman and far from truth. He writes in this article that we could not think it over what effect Afghanistan leaves on us. He added that Brezhnev with his sick hand sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers, officers, diplomats journalists and party and state advisers to a country where bribery, drug-smuggling and corruption were common phenomenon.

He, after all, gives to himself the right to forget neighbourliness and entitles his writing as "documented Roman".

The adoption of such positions by these journalists cannot be interpreted as anything else but political pragmatism of the individuals.

Perhaps. Both of them used to love Afghanistan in the past because the subject of Afghanistan was in the service of their personal interests. They were actually opportunists who revealed their real faces now.

They are aware of the fact that after the return of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan the assassination of civilians and rocket attacks on residential areas were intensified by the extremists and their international supporters. The scope of which is 100 times higher than it was in the presence of the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. Why they do not show their concern about the crimes of the extremists which is a full-fledged war against the people of Afghanistan. Whereas the civilised mankind are severely condemning the crimes of the extremists ranging from rocket attacks to economic blockade.

We are realising that the Soviet Union is bearing a grave psychological, political and material burden because of Afghanistan. For this reason, the leadership of Afghanistan is seeking the new possibilities in order to change the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to a mutually-beneficial relations and to get out from one-way traffic to be merely in the interest of Afghanistan.

As we know that both of these Soviet journalists have possessed orders of battlefields and state prizes. Leshchinskiy had got the prize of the Union of Journalists as well as Red Star Order because of his reportages from the activities of the Soviet limited military contingents in Afghanistan and his wife got the Banner of War Honours. If they consider all that happened in Afghanistan as mistakes and crimes, then why they are not ready to conceal the orders and why are not apologizing in the field.

The utilization of new Afghan-Soviet economic projects will clearly show that Afghanistan can give useful things to its northern neighbour. The present instances of such cooperation is the export of gas to the Soviet Union and other items and the establishment of joint agricultural institutions.

The Afghan present to its northern neighbour is being demonstrated in the fact that the southern borders of the two countries will remain as border of peace and friendship.

We are confident that the Soviet people will continue to give their support as in the past to the moral obligations which is planned by the country's leadership in assisting Afghanistan. We are also confident that the Soviet people will not leave the Afghan people alone in their struggles against the intervention of aggressors and the pressure of poverty arisen from war.

Those who are endeavouring to make political capital at the cost of Afghanistan will not be able to gain any thing in their unprincipled doubled efforts and double-faces, the article concludes.

Bessmertnykh, Iran Envoy Discuss Regional Issues

LD1212173289 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has received the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the USSR, Naser Heirani-Nobari, at his request.

They discussed bilateral Soviet-Iranian relations and international and regional issues, including the Iran-Iraq settlement and the situation in Afghanistan.

Commentary Views Iranian Naval Maneuvers

NC1212135389 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Iran is staging naval maneuvers codenamed "Zolfeqar-5" from 9 to 16 December in the Persian Gulf and the northern sector of the Arabian Sea. The country's warships and naval units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] are participating in these maneuvers.

Explaining the reasons for staging these maneuvers, the commander of the Iranian Navy, 'Ali Shamkhani, listed the causes of tension in the Persian Gulf. According to him, this tension results from the unresolved condition of the Iran-Iraq conflict and the presence of foreign warships, factors which prompt Iran to boost its naval strength.

If we take Shamkhani's remarks as the criterion, the present maneuvers are a continuation of the Iranian leadership's policy of military confrontation with NATO on the basis of the principle of tit-for-tat. This same policy resulted in a military clash between U.S. and Iranian vessels and losses of men and materiel on both sides during the Iran-Iraq war.

Most observers believe that the "Zolfeqar-5" maneuvers are a display of strength aimed at Iran's Arab neighbors, and perhaps this is so. However, there are certain features of the current Iranian maneuvers which were not evident in the past. First of all, the Iranian command insists that the Persian Gulf is open to civilian shipping. Second, it has been announced that one of the basic objectives of the maneuvers is to coordinate the actions of the IRGC's naval units with those of the country's navy.

Everyone is aware that the IRGC naval units recently proved a serious threat to international navigation in the Persian Gulf, presumably acting without the permission of the Iranian authorities. Conditions are now being created for eliminating any possibility of further unauthorized actions. This is a sign of a new era, an era of positive developments in the conditions in the region following the cease-fire on the Iran-Iraq fronts and the start of direct peace talks between the two sides. Most of the fears and worries have now evaporated. Calls for peace and the expansion of commercial exchanges between the leaders of Iran and the Arab littoral states resound in our ears.

Iran has enthusiastically welcomed the decision by the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which unites most of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, to convene a session in December to review ways and means of improving Arab-Iranian relations. These countries believe that assistance in ensuring the success of Iran-Iraq peace talks and the consolidation of security and stability in the Persian Gulf are also necessary.

Positive progress in creating such conditions in the Persian Gulf region will make the international atmosphere a healthier one. Once again this would assist in forging reciprocal relations between regional and international issues. This is an outcome of the trend of the new political thinking in various countries and continents.

In any case, positive tendencies seem to have emerged in the Persian Gulf region in parallel with trends (?rooted) in the era of suspicion and confrontation. The particular characteristics of the trend of confrontation in the region have already exacerbated the situation in general. The Arab countries' sensitivity to Iran's display of military strength, such as the the"Zolfeqar-5" maneuvers, and the general anxiety of the Persian Gulf countries over the presence of NATO warships are proof of the latter statement.

The way out of the present state of affairs is the optimum utilization of political means for resolving issues which may be the source of differences among the Persian Gulf countries, while the speedy implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 by Iran and Iraq will provide the foundation for resolving their mutual dispute. In any case, it is necessary to rule out efforts to resolve mutual differences by resorting to force.

'Arafat Sends Message to Gorbachev

LD0612201889 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT 6 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 6 TASS—Gratitude to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for greetings on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People was expressed by President of the State of Palestine, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee Yasir 'Arafat.

In a message addressed to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Arafat stressed the Soviet Union's principled position in support of Palestinians and their national uprising against the Israeli occupation for freedom, independence and sovereignty on their native soil. The support had met with profound gratitude and sincere respect on the part of the Palestine Liberation Organisation's Executive Committee and the entire Palestinian people.

The confirmation of this support at the present fateful state, the message stressed, adds strength and determination to the Palestinian people in their continuing struggle. It fuels Palestinian efforts to implement the peaceful initiative worked out at the 19th Session of the Palestine National Council to establish, with the help of the convocation of an international conference on the Middle East, durable peace in the region and win Palestinians the opportunity to exercise their inalienable national rights.

Soviet Firm Wins Iraq Gas Pipeline Contract

WA1212205489 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by I. Mizhen: "Russian Plan for Iraqi Gas Pipeline"]

[Text] Kiev—Unusual bargaining took place recently for the first time in the "Zarubezhneftegazstroy" All-Union Production Association. The subject thereof was a contract for the construction of a gas pipeline in Iraq.

Few people are surprised today that facilities in Moscow or the Far East are being erected by construction workers from Finland and Sweden, Turkey and China, and other countries. They "take" because of the rapid pace, high quality and low costs of the work, of which, unfortunately, our construction workers may far from always boast. One of the few pleasant exceptions is the "Zarubezhneftegazstroy" All-Union Production Association, which has gained relatively strong positions in such countries as Iraq, Cuba, Finland, Algeria, Nigeria and others.

"Our competitors are not sleeping, and in order to hold on in such strong company and not yield our positions we need to strive constantly for the maximum efficiency, implementing such concepts as pace, cost, quality," V. Kopyshevskiy, chief of the "Zarubezhneftegazstroy" All-Union Production Association, says. "But for this we need powerful stimulants, and a sense of proprietorship should operate primarily, which has not always been the case in the practice that has existed hitherto.

"A profitable contract obtained by a specific construction organization on the competitive basis commonly accepted in world practice is another matter. The winner assumes particular, quite strict commitments, sends his own workers to the project, provides it with resources, and operates within a framework of economic liberty here."

The arguments of the "Zarubezhneftegazstroy" chief are convincing. But there involuntarily arises the question: Why are not the construction organizations themselves availing themselves of the right of outlet onto the foreign market and themselves finding clients, concluding contracts, and having more earned foreign currency remain at their disposal here?

"In principle," V. Kopyshevskiy believes, "this version also has a right to exist. But are our construction workers yet ready for such independence? Thus we sent out to all 14 participants in the competition so-called documents of tender incorporating a description of the facility, the basic extent of the work, the client's technical requirements, market conditions, the level of the wages of Soviet and local specialists, and the cost of local materials and services. And this is a far from complete list of the information which at times simply cannot be obtained by the leaders of our construction organizations and which "Zarubezhneftegazstroy" specialists know thoroughly. This is borne out also by the estimates submitted by the participants, and the spread was striking: They determined the estimated construction cost to range from R3 million to R15 million!

It remains to add that a sufficiently technically competent and economically preferable proposal was submitted by the "Kuybyshevtruboprovodstroy" Trust. It was the first competitive tender winner.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Threat to Ethiopia From Tigre Separatists Seen

PM1112163189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Demidov dispatch: "At the Danger Line"]

[Excerpts] Alarm has long been an uninvited guest in Addis-Ababa, in the city's villas and the countless simple peasant huts in the suburbs of the Ethiopian capital. Recently, short films about violence and destruction in the country's provinces where the "Uoyane" [name as published] grouping ("The Insurgents"), as the Tigre People's Liberation Front [TPLF] is called here, is active, have been shown with increasing frequency on television screens. [passage omitted]

At an extraordinary plenum of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee and an extraordinary session of the National Assembly convened in the last days of October, it was announced that the people had expressed their readiness to crush the TPLF. Deputies from the National assembly voted to "mobilize the people's forces to take part in the war unleashed by the Uoyane grouping against the fatherland and called on the population of Tigre to stand shoulder to shoulder with all the patriots and stand up against the TPLF."

However, at the same time it was stressed both at the plenum and at the session of the Ethiopian Parliament that the government does not desire a continuation of this fratricidal carnage and would like to put an end to it as quickly as possible. A demand was made to the TPLF to stop undermining the unity of the republic and to withdraw armed formations from North Welo and North Gonder and to agree to contacts with the central authorities.

Such contacts were established through Italian mediation in London. And then the first preliminary talks were held between the Ethiopian Government and the TPLF. Judging by reports from the Italian capital, their participants concentrated on procedural aspects. An agreement was reached to continue the dialogue 12 December.

Talks have begun. However, the whole question now depends on whether a responsible attitude prevails in the spirit of the new political thinking, thanks to which it has been possible to improve the international climate as a whole. The danger which the TPLF poses to the republic also lies in the fact that over the years its ranks have increasingly come to include both leftist and openly reactionary elements, whose aim is to divert Ethiopia from the path of progressive changes chosen by its people after the national democratic revolution of 1974.

Is it possible to neutralize this threat?

In my view, the tight knot of problems in northern Ethiopia cannot be resolved by force. It can only be unraveled by the joint efforts of all the parties that have been drawn into the conflict.

The continuation of the war is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the country. You only have to recall that the republic's economy is already going through a crisis. The unbearable burden of excessive military expenditure—up to 50 percent of budget resources—is crushing it. Moreover, another misfortune is hanging over the republic: Because of another drought in the north, particularly in Eritrea and Tigre, the specter of famine is looming again.

Ethiopia has again entered a period of terrible ordeals. And a great deal depends on whether the problem of the north of the republic is solved. Maybe even the future of the country itself.

Sudan, Ethiopia Peace Talks Viewed

EA1212163189 Moscow International Service
in Somali 1600 GMT 10 Dec 89

[Vladimir Borisov commentary]

[Text] Last Tuesday, 5 December the talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, which represents the southern Christian and animist guerrillas, ended in Nairobi. The two sides agreed on one point of the nine on the agenda, which was their support for the proposal put forward in October by the national reconciliation committee in the country. The guerrillas, led by John Garang, did not participate in the activities of that committee in Khartoum. They rejected it. That committee was organized by the military administration led by General 'Umar al-Bashir.

However, the guerrillas acknowledged the significance of the proposal of the committee. The leader of the military administration immediately supported this proposal after it was announced. This proposal calls for the creation of a federal system in Sudan so that every side will have the right to implement the shari'a or secular laws. But the snag at the Nairobi meeting was the lifting of the shari'a laws from southern Sudan, which the guerrillas demand. As stated by Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. president, the Sudanese Government delegation that participated in the talks did not have the power to decide on this central issue in the Sudan conflict.

It cannot be said so far that the agreement on the national reconciliation committee's proposal for the country's affairs has forged closer ties between the two sides. The guerrillas described this proposal as capable of forming the basis for preparations for a conference to draft the country's constitution. Nevertheless, the Khartoum regime does not agree with the method of organizing this conference. In fact, the little hope there was for progress in the Sudanese negotiations, as far as the Nairobi meeting was concerned, did not bear fruit.

However, it may be recalled that a few days ago the talks between the delegates from the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] succeeded. They agreed on all the questions related to the form of the broad-based talks to be held, concerning that region of northern Ethiopia. Last Thursday, 7 December Ashagre Yigletu, deputy prime minister of Ethiopia, who headed the government delegation that held talks with the Eritreans, announced that the Ethiopian Government would be ready within a period of 2 months to start the broad-based talks.

These peace talks and their success are great consolation to the government led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, whose conflict with the Tigrayans and the Oromos is getting closer to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, with fighting about 100 to 150 km to the north and south. The Nairobi meeting opened the door for immediate discussion on the holding of substantive talks on the Eritrean problem. The question is how will the EPLF leadership approach them, since they can see the difficult situation the government is in? If we go deeper, how will they exploit this situation? Ashagre Yigletu quickly blamed the Eritreans for hampering the start of the talks, and their progress.

'Litle Hope' for Peace in Sudan Seen

EA0812122789 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 7 Dec 89

[From "The Day's Major Events" program; Vladimir Borisov commentary]

[Text] The Nairobi talks between representatives of the Khartoum military government and those of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA], on the [word indistinct] of the conditions of the Sudanese people, have ended without reaching [word indistinct] results. Vladimir Borisov elaborates further:

The talks were a second leg of the talks between rebel Christians in southern Sudan and the military leadership of General 'Umar al-Bashir, who seized power in Khartoum more than 5 months ago. Just as happened during the Addis Abbaba talks in August this year, the obstacle that came up in the talks just ended in Nairobi concerns the Islamic laws that have been extended to the whole of Sudan (?as) under the former leadership of Al-Numayri.

Even long before the convening of the Nairobi meeting, many observers did not have much hope about the success of such talks. They expected the talks to be tough, for both the sides were prepared for either talks or war. [words indistinct] as evidenced by the (?second) military confrontation which took place in October and November on a very large scale. The casualties on both sides during the clashes involved thousands of people.

It is a pity to say that the terrible military clashes, just like the old times, were accompanied by divisive [words indistinct] on ways of stopping the 6-year-old bloody war. During the just ended talks, the army [words indistinct] of the Sudanese people wanted Islamic laws and Islamic [word indistinct] to be applied in the country. And then military accords with Libya and Egypt should be (?passed) in order to pave the way to lifting the state of emergency. It is not difficult to see that if the very first of the issues was [word indistinct], then to reach an agreement on all the other issues would not have been a problem.

But Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. President, who was the mediator in the talks, said that the delegation sent by the Sudanese Government did not have full authority to decide on the basic question of the Islamic laws in the country. In my view, this is the main obstacle. [words indistinct]. Nevertheless, a meeting between Al-Bashir and the rebel leader, John Garang, did not take place. It seems that it would be such a meeting which would make it possible for the problems to be swept [words indistinct].

However, some of the analysts who followed the situation after the failure of the talks say that there has been some progress. Here they consider there has been agreement on one of the points on the agenda.

Both sides described as useful the recommendations from the conference on political [word indistinct]. The conference took place between September and October and was called by the Sudanese Government. The delegates to the conference recommended that Sudan be transformed into a federal country in which people in every area would be allowed to pass their own civil or religious laws.

The current Sudanese leader has described the talks as useful. On the other hand, the SPLA, which (?sabotaged) the proceedings of the talks, is fighting for national unity and the formation of a new government under a new national constitution. This is the only step that (?could) bring about any development. [words indistinct].

During a meeting with the press in Nairobi, each delegation blamed the failure on the other [words indistinct], although each of the delegations desired future talks. This seems to be the end of the (?Nairobi) talks. There is very little hope of bringing peace to the Sudan.

Commentary on UN Apartheid Debate, RSA Reform

MB1312112989 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Commentary by (Vladislav Chenova) on the special UN General Assembly session on apartheid]

[Text] The session is prompted by the continuing existence in South Africa of the apartheid system, which (?exercises) all civil and political rights to 5 million descendants of the country's white settlers, while denying them to three-fourths of the indigenous population, who have no representation in parliament.

Such a situation has more than once been stated and condemned, at the UN included. But at the present moment the situation in South Africa proper, and in the region as a whole, requires a different approach. The transformations in South Africa have been recognized by many. They are realistic, and nobody nowadays will take it upon themselves to maintain that these changes are purely cosmetic measures.

Over the period President De Klerk has been in power, he has changed quite a lot in the country. Several communist political prisoners have been released, the norms of petty apartheid have been abolished, and a ban of the activities of political organizations have been significantly weakened. It has not been listed formally, but a practically legal meeting of the ANC [African National Congress] was held in Soweto recently for the first time in 30 years, and a conference of the opposition forces for a democratic future was (?communicated) late last week. The government (?voices) a desire for talks with the African leaders of the country.

On the whole, the situation in the country has become unusually mobile. However, the prospects are still vague, and before the problem lies the fact that the government and the democratic organizations understand essence of democracy in a different way. The opposition democratic organizations insist on a nonracial election and a constituent assembly which is to work out a constitution on the principle of one-man, one-vote. The government is against that. It is ready for talks on a new constitution linking them to a further transitional period, which would be drafted under the supervision of the current government.

The practical results of all that are serious differences regarding the terms of the talks. The ANC has defined them, and they include such provisions as the lifting of the state of emergency, removing the ban on the activities of political organizations and releasing Nelson Mandela. These provisions, approved by the Organization of African Unity, have been named the Harare Declaration. It is this declaration that has been submitted for discussion to a special session of the UN General Assembly.

Can the declaration become a basis for talks? What should be done so that these conditions are accepted by the South African Government? What are the prospects of sanctions against Pretoria? The special session is to give answers to all these questions. Today there are no more serious problems facing not only South Africa, but all the southern continent [word indistinct] apartheid its implications are posing a threat both internally and externally [words indistinct] that the apartheid regime unleashed against next door free countries badly damaged the economy.

True, South Africa's policies are undergoing change, and one indication is the peace agreement on Southwest Africa it signed together with Angola and Cuba. However, tensions in the region [words indistinct] once and for all when a democratic state emerges in South Africa, and that's why the international community can, and must, bring its final say.

Benin Renunciation of Marxism Viewed

LD1112110689 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 9 Dec 89

[Text] Benin Radio on 7 December announced that the members of the Cabinet, the Central Committee of the Benin People's Revolution, and the Permanent Committee of the National Revolutionary Assembly held a joint session to denounce Marxism as the official ideology. Aleksey Grigoryev comments.

I believe that there will be quite a few people who would exclaim: Didn't I tell you that socialism in Africa didn't have a future! I, too, believe that in Africa there is no place for socialism based on dogmas and mechanical copying of others' experience. There is no such place for such socialism also in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. We pin our future on democratic socialism that makes the individual and his or her daily concerns and problems the center of attention, a society that guarantees social justice. This is exactly the goal the Soviet Union has been moving to in the course of perestroyka, a policy of fundamental reform suggested by the ruling Communist Party. Similar changes have been underway in most East European socialist countries. The renewal and expansion of socialism is the common feature of these changes.

Now let's get back to Benin. AFP has remarked that the wind of reforms blowing over Eastern Europe for the past few weeks has now reached Benin. I believe this is not exactly what happened. The leaders of Benin have simply changed their course with amazing ease, abandoning Marxism overnight. Apparently that happened because there were only formal signs of socialism in the country—slogans, banners, and socialist rhetoric. It is common knowledge that President Kerekou at the beginning of this year said that he would abandon Marxism if attempts to improve the situation in the country by November would fail.

True, the economic situation in Benin is serious. Social tension has been on the ascent. Mass protests by students and teachers of the Cotonou University are evidence to this. In these conditions the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund put forward their ultimatum to the Benin Government, threatening to stop financing the economy. The time has come and the decision to abandon Marxism was taken. The question is what bearing all that has on the future of socialism in Africa in general. Naturally, the West would like to put paid to it. However, it's more likely that the people of African countries themselves haven't voiced their opinion yet. It is quite significant that when Nigeria, Africa's largest country, held a national debate on its future development most of those who took part called for the socialist way. They said they wanted democratic, humane socialism. I believe it's too early to consider the subject of socialism in Africa as closed.

CPSU Delegation Leaves for Benin, Mali

PM1212141589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 11 December a CPSU delegation headed by Ye.M. Zolotarev, first secretary of the Aktyubinsk Kazakhstan Communist Party Oblast Committee, left Moscow for the People's Republic of Benin. The delegation will also visit the Republic of Mali.

East Europe

Reportage on Meeting of Allied Powers in Berlin

Berlin Initiative, Stability Discussed

PM1212113189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Ambassadors' Meeting"]

[Text] West Berlin, 11 Dec—A meeting of the ambassadors of France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union lasting 2 and ½ hours was held here today in the building of the former Allied Control Council. The official announcement on the meeting's results indicates that the Western ambassadors set forth their proposals in accordance with the "Berlin initiative." The USSR ambassador expressed a favorable attitude and interest.

During the meeting a common understanding was revealed of the importance of ensuring stability and the certainty was expressed that the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union will be able to promote this on the basis of the 1971 quadripartite agreement.

Effort To Stabilize FRG-GDR Ties

LD1212183589 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—By TASS news analyst Albert Balebanov:

The ambassadors of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France met in the building of the former Allied Control Council in West Berlin on Monday.

The meeting marks the beginning of restoration of the mechanism of consultations of the former allies of the anti-Hitler coalition set up under the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

The current consultations are the result of the recent Soviet-American Mediterranean summit. They should be regarded as another positive step in international relations because they reflect the general improvement of the political climate and the deepening of mutual understanding between East and West.

Of course, the meeting of ambassadors should be regarded not only as a desire to restore lost contacts, but also as a striving to contribute to stabilising the situation in and around West Berlin and develop constructive relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and West Germany. This coincides with the spirit of letters sent by President Mikhail Gorbachev to Western leaders in connection with the events in the German Democratic Republic.

One can only welcome the fact that the ambassadors discussed issues concerning West Berlin, including the proposals of former U.S. President Ronald Reagan on West Berlin's relations with the outside world.

At the same time, the current rapprochement between the GDR and West Germany which is increasing as a result of rapid changes in the GDR and Helmut Kohl's "ten-point plan" was the reason for the meeting.

Like many countries, the great powers believe that the idea of the reunification of the two Germanys advanced by the West German federal chancellor is not on the agenda.

French and British leaders are particularly concerned about Kohl's idea because it may destabilise the situation in Europe.

It is noteworthy that this opinion is shared in Berlin and Bonn. Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Gregor Gysi has recently said that the creation of a new German state at a time when everybody is talking about the weakening of state structures would simply be anachronistic.

According to him, it is much more important now to deepen economic and cultural cooperation between the two Germanies which would do a lot of good for the people of the two countries.

Influential political circles in West Germany consider hasty unification to be a bad idea, said minister-president of the Schleswig-Holstein Land Bjoern Engholm.

Against such a background the consultations of the ambassadors of the former allied states are a major forum for coordinating the positions on the German issue.

The meeting brought out the common understanding of the need to ensure stability in Europe.

Soviet Ambassador Comments

LD1112205989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Dec 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A meeting of the ambassadors of the four powers has been held in West Berlin.

[Unidentified correspondent] A meeting has been held here between the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union in the building of the former Control Council set up by the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition immediately after the war. After an interval of 18 years, the doors to the main entrance of this building have been opened for the first time. The new political thinking, the rapid changes in Europe have made this meeting possible and necessary.

[Begin recording] [Soviet Ambassador V.I. Kochemasov] The reason for the meeting was the need to examine certain issues relating to West Berlin and the situation around it. During the meeting our side stressed the importance of preserving stability in the center of Europe, in this very sensitive region.

[Correspondent] Was this viewpoint understood by the ambassadors of the three Western powers?

[Kochemasov] Yes, one could say they understood it. Strictly speaking, this understanding was expressed during the meeting between the heads of governments and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, which was held just recently. [sentence as heard] We stressed our adherence to the quadripartite agreement, and the need to include West Berlin in the European process to ensure that the population of West Berlin can feel to the full extent the fruits of detente and the new political thinking, which so distinguishes our foreign policy and foreign political principles. [end recording]

German Unification Part of Larger European Issue

LD1112214989 Moscow World Service in English 1910 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] How pressing is the problem of Germany's reunification? What is the Soviet Union's attitude to it? You might have heard differing viewpoints on this in our programs. Here is the outlook of our commentator Yuriy Solton:

My colleague Viktor Glazunov expressed his viewpoint in a recent edition of our "News and Views" program. He is a leading expert on the Germany question. Nevertheless, I disagree with some of his statements. Viktor Glazunov claimed, in particular, that until recently Moscow rejected the notion that the German issue remained open. That assertion seemed to me too categoric. I think that Moscow has always realized that the issue does exist, and that it might get aggravated even if Soviet officials believe that to include it in today's agenda was unwise and even dangerous. It was the right attitude, particularly considering the degree of suspicion that prevailed in international relations in Europe and the high level of military danger there.

Indeed, a reunification of the two German states is no illusion. It is being discussed by the Germans and by other Europeans. It stirs many people. Some are even trying to use public emotions and give priority to this problem, and even encroach on borders fixed in Europe. Although recognizing that the problem is there, Moscow doesn't view it as urgent. A different approach, said President Mikhail Gorbachev, would create a situation fraught with complicating the process of European security and cooperation and the relationship between the two German states. Any artificial acceleration of the developments is dangerous. This question can be settled only in the framework of building a new Europe and developing new relations on the continent.

The future will show how to achieve this. It is noteworthy that the U.S. President, George Bush, also calls for caution. His French counterpart, Francois Mitterrand, speaking on behalf of the leaders of the 12 countries of the European Economic Community, who held a conference in Strasbourg recently, has pointed out that unity can be acquired by the German people only by peaceful and democratic means. All principles determined by the Final Act of the Helsinki accords should be respected in this process, said President Mitterrand. The most important of them is the inviolability of borders. One cannot fail to agree with the West German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, who has said that a solution to the German question cannot involve the Germans alone. The citizens of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic bear particular responsibility for maintaining stability on the continent.

Relations between the GDR and West Germany cannot remain unchanged, of course. Peaceful cooperation between them can and must develop. As for how the German question will be settled, let this be determined by the course of history in the framework of promoting the process of European security and cooperation.

Congress Seen Starting SED 'Overhaul'

PM1212164389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

[Report "for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" by APN correspondent Yu. Shpakov: "Renewal Begins. The First Stage of the Extraordinary Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Ends"]

[Text] Berlin—There were no flowers at the congress held in the "Dynamo" sports hall in Berlin (contrary to the tradition whereby GDR Communist forums have always been held in the Palace of the Republic). Also lacking were the formal speeches and the formal smiles and the formal clothes: Most of the delegates had gone to Berlin straight from work. This is another new feature of the party: All party work, regardless of the level, will henceforth be done outside working hours.

But these are only the outward signs of an overhaul of the party, whose name will not become known until the end of next week. The congress delegates agreed that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] would remain as a socialist-oriented party, but its name must be changed. In his speech the party chairman-elect, 41-year-old lawyer Gregor Gysi, offered the delegates a choice of three names—Party of Democratic Socialism, German Socialist Party, or Socialist People's Party.

But no matter what the SED is called in the immediate future, it is already evident that the first stage of the extraordinary congress has adopted what I consider a very important decision that draws a clear line between its past and future.

Many observers here have been saying that the foundations of a new political culture are essentially being laid in Berlin at the moment. The first shoots sprouted at the SED congress, which was distinguished by flexibility and tolerance of pluralism of opinions within the actual party and of the numerous opponents among the 15 or so opposition political parties and groupings which have now formed in the GDR. Typically, they are all by nature representatives of the republic's left-wing forces.

The communists' task today, party chairman Gregor Gysi said in his concluding speech, is to overcome the old thinking. In the future the SED will abandon its monopoly representation at enterprises and in the army, and its territorial activities will be much more prominent.

Gregor Gysi also described "party general lines" passed down from on high and the numerous ostentatious events in which SED party life has abounded in the past as concepts redolent of old thinking. In the broad sense of the word, party democracy must be based primarily on the views of ordinary SED members.

It should be noted that last Saturday, in addition to the extraordinary congress, the GDR Government held a meeting in Berlin with the leaders of 290 major GDR industrial combines at which there was a discussion of the normal functioning of the national economy in conditions of a radical change in the political model of society. The abandonment of the command-and-administer methods, which had caused a deep crisis in the national economy, GDR Council of Ministers Chairman Hans Modrow noted, must not lead to industrial chaos.

Next Saturday and Sunday the congress of the GDR party of communists will continue its work. It will hear the accountability report of the former Central Committee, now resigned, and discuss principles for preparing a new party program and party rules. All these matters are currently being discussed in primary organizations all over the country.

A brief note on the congress session: After Gregor Gysi was elected party chairman he was presented with an enormous broom instead of the traditional bouquet of flowers. The SED has started its purge...

CSSR's Havel Cited on Relations With USSR

LD1212162489 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Prague December 12 TASS—The Czechoslovak people are now faced with the task of choosing a new president. If this choice satisfies the main political forces and all Czechoslovak society, then there is real hope that Czechoslovakia will peacefully advance to free elections and genuine democracy, opposition leader and presidential candidate playwright Vaclav Havel told a Czechoslovak journalist.

In answer to questions concerning future relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the country's Warsaw Treaty membership as well as the possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country's territory, Havel said:

We favour good relations with all countries and primarily with those that have a decisive impact on the development of the world process, i.e. the Soviet Union and the United States.

Our ideal is Europe as a community of equal peoples and countries, he said. The blocs disbandment idea, which we naturally support, also corresponds to this. At the same time we remain realists and are aware that we shall not approach this ideal by withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty organisation.

This comprehensive process should take place in Europe as a whole. I feel that it is more up to the West than the East to decide on the disbandment issue.

Touching upon the question of Soviet troop withdrawal, Havel said that all sober-minded people, and there are a majority of them in the country, are aware that troops cannot be just expelled from the country.

This should be the subject of bilateral talks between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union as well as talks within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty organisation, Havel said.

Youth Paper Interviews Czechoslovakia's Havel

PM1212133589 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Vaclav Havel, Civic Forum leader, by own special correspondent A. Kupriyanov: "Presidency Vacant"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Vaclav Havel, one of the leaders of Czechoslovakia's Civic Forum, is a potential candidate for the presidency of the republic. Our special correspondent A. Kupriyanov met with him.

[Kupriyanov] Mr Havel, how do you see Czechoslovakia's future?

[Havel] I think Czechoslovakia should be a democratic, pluralist, and peace-loving country. This means it could have different forms of ownership. That is, the kind of country which first and foremost would secure working people's social confidence to a much greater extent than the former totalitarian system.

[Kupriyanov] Do you see parallels between the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Prague Fall of 1989?

[Havel] There are, of course, similarities and differences. In 1968 no one questioned the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's leading role. The whole development of those events was aimed at bringing about reforms in socialism. Twenty years have since elapsed in the history of the entire world, the history of civilization, and the history of the countries of the socialist community. Now the working people of those countries and even the officially existing political forces are inclined toward the prospect of the kind of society I spoke about in response to your first question. The official recognition of the Communist Party's leading role in Czechoslovakia has been constitutionally revoked. But we are counting on the Communist Party as an equitable partner.

[Kupriyanov] What is your view of the Warsaw Pact countries' future?

[Havel] In my opinion, friendly cooperation among the countries of Europe, a Europe of independent peoples and states with democratic systems, would be ideal. Czechoslovakia will be part of that community. In my opinion, the ideal Europe will have independent security and will at the same time be neutral. I would stress: It will be a Europe that has guaranteed security and is neutral. I think that renunciation of the two pacts—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—will form part of such a policy of friendly cooperation. It is clear to us that this process should proceed in a comprehensive fashion. Is that possible if a particular Warsaw Pact country starts to withdraw from the pact on its own? And then to proclaim a neutrality which no one could guarantee?

[Kupriyanov] Many observers comment on the great activeness of students and of working and creative young people in the current events, which are described in Czechoslovakia as a peaceful revolution... The newspaper I represent is a youth newspaper, and we would like to know your opinion on this.

[Havel] Young people have played a large role in this peaceful revolution. Students, indignant at the brutal suppression of the 17 November demonstration, went on strike. They were joined by cultural workers and then by both our peoples—the Czechs and the Slovaks. It is also to young people's great credit that they gave the revolution a human face from its outset. Their slogan was "No to all violence!"

[Kupriyanov] You are are a writer well-known in the West. Do you see your future as bound up with a political career or the work of a writer?

[Havel] I am, of course, a writer. But I do not serve my society only by my writing. As a citizen of my country I have always placed the interests of society above personal ones. If as Civic Forum's candidate I am elected to the presidency, that duty will leave me very little time to write. But my term in that high office will be temporary—a few months. The National Assembly, representing the will of the entire people, will then elect its president for 5 years.

CPCZ Deputies Propose General Presidential Poll

PM1312120489 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov report: "Communist Deputies' Initiative"]

[Text] Prague—The Communist Deputies' Club in the CSSR Federal Assembly has put forward an important political initiative: to recommend to parliament that the election of the president of Czechoslovakia take the form of a nationwide ballot. This will require a corresponding amendment to the CSSR Constitution.

The Federal Assembly began work in the morning of 12 December. In the evening a joint session of the two chambers opened. It is to elect the new chairman of parliament. Apparently it will also resolve questions of relinquishing deputies' powers (in particular, the previous day L. Strougal had published a statement to that effect, and on his resignation from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee, in RUDE PRAVO) and on all the circumstances connected with the election of the president.

The new initiative movement within the CPCZ, the Democratic Forum of Communists, also came out in favor of direct general presidential elections, believing that given the present composition of parliament that is the only correct solution.

C. Cisar, a member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium in 1968 but now not a party member, who was proposed for the presidential post by the Socialist Youth League Central Committee, came out in favor of granting all candidates equal conditions "in an honest fight, from which all forms of discrimination, pressure, or slander would be excluded."

Many district conferences of the CPCZ, as already reported, are nominating L. Adamec for president. The Civic Forum and certain parties and social organizations have launched a wide campaign for the election as head of state of the writer V. Havel, until recently a dissident and leader of "Charter-77," whose Soviet television interview was greeted with particular attention here.

The CPCZ has not always been in the front line in the events of recent days, and has given ground to others. In this respect, one feels, the initiative about nationwide presidential elections, which is very democratic and takes account of the masses' mood, could play a positive role for the CPCZ.

Changes in CSSR Government, Union Leadership

PM1212162389 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 3

[A. Repin dispatch: "Coalition Government"]

[Text] Prague, 11 December—The president of the CSSR swore in the new ministers of the federal government on 10 December in a carpeted ceremonial hall at Prague Castle. At the end of this ritual President Gustav Husak immediately handed in his resignation to the Federal Assembly.

The direct result of "roundtable" talks between various sociopolitical forces, the formation of a government of national consensus instantaneously brought down the temperature in the country. In particular, the general strike planned for 11 December, in which the trade unions were prepared to participate in principle, was called off. The student strike is admittedly continuing, but the formation of the coalition government, the new prime minister's statement that his main tasks will be to hold free elections and carry out economic reform, the president's resignation, and other events, including the introduction of unrestricted travel abroad for CSSR citizens, have struck almost all of the numerous slogans off the student's list, with the exception of one: The students are refusing to return to the lecture halls until the culprits of the breakup of the 17 November demonstration are brought to account.

The spirit of national consensus could be felt at the mass rally to mark Human Rights Day held 10 December in Wenceslas Square. Thus, Vaclav Havel, leader of "Civic Forum," wished the Communists success in the upcoming Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Congress. At the meeting the question of candidacy for the post of president of the republic was raised. Judging by the reaction of the participants in the rally, who for the most part were from "Civic Forum," it was clear that they favored V. Havel. In an interview broadcast on television and radio, A. Dubcek also made allusions in this connection. By law the Federal Assembly must elect a president within 14 days after the resignation of the head of state.

Today the newspaper PRACE published material from the Ninth Plenum of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Central Council, which was held Saturday. A total of 38 members and 2 candidates (including the former Central Council chairman, his deputy, Central Council secretaries, chiefs of central organ departments, chairmen of kraj trade union councils, and others) were removed from the Central Council. The plenum formed a Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Action Committee headed by Karel Henes, chairman of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Central Council. This body was given the authority of the Central Council Presidium and Secretariat in preparing and holding an extraordinary congress of Czechoslovak trade unions.

In the list of 12 members of the action committee named at the plenum, the majority are representatives of factory trade union committees. Jaroslav Kosnar, chairman of the West Bohemian Trade Union Council, was also named. As PRACE reports, the committee will later be complemented by representatives of sector trade union associations.

The address of the Revolutionary Trade Union Council Action Committee to all trade union members contains an appeal to defend the principle of the independence of trade unions from political parties and state and economic organs, and to regard the protection of working people's interests and their trade union rights as of paramount importance in trade union organizations' work.

CSSR Trade Unions Must Earn Workers' Allegiance

WA1212203289 Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 3

[Report by TRUD correspondent N. Shevtsov: "A Time of Trials"]

[Text] Prague, 5 December—The Libushin mine is well known in the Kladno coal basin. It is one of the best in the sector. Since 27 November its name has appeared very often on the pages of the newspapers in connection with the appointment of Karel Henes as chairman of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Central Council. He has worked there for more than 20 years, first as an electrician, then as a coal combine operator and brigade leader and chairman of the plant trade union committee. He has been awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor. His former comrades in the brigade—chairman of the plant trade union committee J. Palka and shift chief I. Novotny—talked with me for a long time and said he is not only a fine mine worker, but also an excellent organizer who has always been able to find a common language with the young workers. Appointed chairman of the trade union council in the Central Bohemian District in the eighties, K. Henes often traveled to the mine and had an interest in how things were going with the collective. The last time he visited there was 3 days before the general strike.

"On 27 November many enterprises joined the strike in Kladno," says J. Palka. "Our miners took a purely symbolic part in it by halting work for 1 minute. True, the next workshifts had to go to the mine on foot because the drivers of the city buses were on a general strike. But we could not allow ourselves to stop production; it is winter."

During my work in Czechoslovakia I have had occasion to be on various plant committees. And I make no secret of the fact that I have often heard stories from leaders that everything was going well, that the workers were satisfied with the work of the trade unions, that there were no special problems. But on this visit to the Libushin mine they told me something quite different. That the workers are expressing dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country, that their standard of living is not rising. They are also making justified claims against the plant trade union committee in connection with the everyday social disorder.

"But one cause of particular dissatisfaction," the trade union committee chairman continued, "is the unresolved housing problem. This year none of our miners has received new housing. And there are 230 people on the waiting list. If they are not provided with apartments, how will we keep people at the mine?"

All of these claims against the trade unions must be taken into account today, when at many enterprises, including the Libushin mine, a serious rival has emerged in the form of the strike committees, which are exerting a major influence on the labor collectives. And it is no secret that at the mines voices are being increasingly heard saying that the trade unions are not necessary, that they can be totally replaced by the new organizations of workers springing up on the base of the strike committees. The workers are listening to these voices because up to now they have repeatedly been convinced of the inability of the trade unions to satisfy their interests, and have repeatedly seen how the leaders of the trade union organizations obediently carried out any instructions issued by the party committee secretary or director.

The trade unions must therefore now prove that they really can safeguard the interests of the workers and act quickly and independently. But to be honest, the impression has been created that this will hardly be possible without new people. Many former trade union leaders at the local level have already become too accustomed just to taking orders from above.

The present accountability-and-election meetings and conferences in the primary organizations are designed to change the make-up of the present trade union organizations. However, the course of those meetings and conferences indicates certain difficulties. On the one hand it is difficult to count on help from the central trade union organs for up to now no new make-up has been formed for the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Central Council. It will be chosen only during the first half of December at a plenum of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Central Council. On the other hand, opposition to holding elections is becoming increasingly obvious and active from the "Civic Forum," which continues to increase its influence not only among the student youth and intelligentsia, but also among the labor collectives. At a mine neighboring the Libushin mine, a "Civic Forum" committee has already been set up numbering several dozen people.

Centrifugal trends can be seen within the leading organs of the trade unions. Thus, a group of workers from the central organs along with activists from some of the primary organizations have decided to form a "Democratic Initiative of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement," which will try to achieve changes in the present situation in the trade unions. The "Democratic Initiative" has announced its support for the "Democratic Forum."

The Czechoslovak trade unions are living through hard times. The future of the country's trade union movement will depend largely on its ability in this present situation to attract the workers to its side and offer them a specific program for action, and their ability to maintain unity and pursue an independent policy.

On Monday the "Civic Forum" announced a new series of meetings and demonstrations. Among the demands being made is the creation of new independent trade unions based on the strike committees.

Official Discusses CPCZ's Future, Opposition

PM1212114589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Rudolf Hegenbart, chief of a Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) Central Committee department, by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kornilov and TASS correspondent V. Yaroshevskiy: "Czechoslovak Communist Party: Back to the People"; date of interview not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Prague—"In the Heart of Europe, or Why Does Czechoslovakia Need Perestroyka?" was the title of the conversation with Rudolf Hegenbart, chief of a CPCZ Central Committee department, published in issue 220 of IZVESTIYA this year. The times, as we know, were completely different then. But, for example, the verdict that "unless we can conduct a restructuring in Czechoslovak society we shall find ourselves in a deep historical crisis, and that is very dangerous" acquires a deep new meaning when you read it now.

Furthermore, very many people, including Communists of course, thought that way back then. However, to express such thoughts publicly took civic courage. Hegenbart, it seems, doesn't lack that quality. He spoke out, and immediately experienced in a real way the grave displeasure of many of those above him on the party ladder. When talking with him today, at the height of the tumultuous events in Czechoslovakia, we noticed neither euphoria nor dismay in him—just a businesslike, analytical approach. On the eve of the party's extraordinary congress we were given the important ideas of a Communist who has earned the reputation here of being a supporter of the radical renewal of the CPCZ and of society. He began like this:

[Hegenbart] The former CPCZ leadership's reaction to events in the country was the result of a failure to understand the philosophy of restructuring and democratization. This was a mistaken and ruinous position. What were people demanding of us? Primarily that the talk of restructuring and democratization should not serve as a cover for an anti-people policy. At that time we tried to explain that the changes in the USSR are not a one-off action and that the whole world, the socialist world first and foremost, has a deep interest in seeing the Soviet Union become a prosperous, democratic country.

[Correspondent] On 23 November, when events reached a high pitch, you wrote a fundamental article in RUDE PRAVO entitled "Keeping One's Word, Respecting Other People's Views." There still hadn't been any radical changes in the CPCZ leadership at that time. At such a moment a public utterance could be called a desperate move. Who knew how it would all turn out? In effect, this was the only constructive reaction by a high-ranking CPCZ figure to the events taking place. That was how the article was perceived by ordinary Communists in Prague. Perhaps the time has come to speak out again on the acute problems?

[Hegenbart] Pardon me for being so banal, but it isn't words that are needed now but concrete deeds. The party is in disarray, it is disoriented, many rank and file party members do not know which job to do first. The fact is that we are wasting time and thereby giving the other side more and more opportunities to launch an offensive. There must be a common platform. Some aspects are reflected in the CPCZ's draft action program. It may be a basis on which to rally the Communists. We must repudiate once and for all the old habit of making policy behind closed doors, and we must repudiate inertia in our thinking. Communists must heed the restructuring process not as the "commanders" [nachalstvo] but as real leaders. Take the economy. The reinforced-concrete concept of the economy in the direct sense of that word utterly fails to meet life's requirements. But the problem is that we have been talking about this since the 14th party congress and the people are still waiting. They have finally grown tired of waiting. It is necessary to quickly get new bearings and renounce the priority development of heavy industry, with which we have always had problems, and rely on high-technology sectors of the national economy.

[Correspondent] But doesn't it seem to you that people have simply lost the knack of working well in past years?

[Hegenbart] No, it does not. Not for nothing do we say "golden Czech hands," although admittedly those hands have been tied, I think. We have rich traditions of and a respect for the artisan's trade. Under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the Czech lands contained 70 percent of its industrial potential. In the last 2 decades an absurd situation developed: You could work badly and yet live well. On the other hand, the one who "excelled" bitterly regretted it. There are quite a few examples of that. An unspoken form of blackmail existed: "Look after number one. Think about yourself and your own family. Otherwise you'll suffer."

[Correspondent] You said that the party can only restore people's trust by action. The opposition, which was illegal for 21 years, has a greater wealth of experience in that respect. No wonder, then, that it has assumed its full height and formed a powerful political movement—a nationwide movement, to give it its proper name. For 20 years the CPCZ has lived in relative calm and comfort. It indulged in wishful thinking... In your view, after 20 years' slumber how long will it take to mobilize the Communists and on whom can they rely?

[Hegenbart] I am deeply convinced that there are healthy forces in the party. I pin my main hope on the grass-roots organizations. The party's future depends on how well Communists get to the heart of problems at the local level and what showing they make. We are beginning a struggle not for power but for our position in society. We shall have to compete with other political forces, the existing and newly emerging parties. Therefore, the need is for capable, intelligent people who know life well—and it is a dire need.

[Correspondent] A democratic communist forum has formed within the CPCZ. Its ideas are supported by 50,000 people, which is quite a lot if you consider the short period that this intraparty tendency has been in existence. What is your attitude to it?

[Hegenbart] Sympathetic. I support its initiatives. My personal view is that the democratic communist forum is the intellectual potential of the party. Without such a potential the CPCZ cannot have a meaningful life. In past years we completely wasted it. That meant tragedy for the party. Today, rank-and-file Communists can distinguish between politicking and policy and they want to see highly educated people in the party leadership.

[Correspondent] It is no secret that many sensible suggestions and ideas were not simply ignored by the CPCZ's former leaders. Communists who saw an abnormal situation and were not afraid to speak aloud about this became outcasts. How does this mechanism operate, why is it that a group of people say "no" to the promptings of logic, the experience of other communist parties, ultimately, of honor and conscience?

[Hegenbart] At one time I was first secretary of a party district committee in the city of Zdiar nad Sazavou. We decided to restore a fine tradition there—the tradition of "opening up the water sources." In spring the children clear forest springs, streams, and sources of garbage and mud and give nature a helping hand. This is an ancient tradition, and we thought it necessary to revive it. Some people didn't like this venture. What they saw in it that was antiparty, antipeople, and antisocialist one can only guess. Be that as it may, I was inundated with anonymous letters—primitive ones, like any lie—but they worked perfectly. I was accused of having a weakness for alcohol and a fondness for women. Then I was summoned to appear before a superior. He smiled, as if to say: I know the score, but I've got to do something; and he offered me a transfer. That mechanism had a vertical structure and worked upward and downward at all levels of power. In that way the implementation of other ideas more important than "opening up water sources" was slowed down as well.

The impression was that the powers-that-be did nothing but think of ways of stopping and anticipating "sedition." But nevertheless, there have always been bold and resourceful people in the party. In March this year an action group in the Central Committee elaborated and presented to the plenum a package of measures to improve the party and the CSSR National Front. This was a political platform. We proposed starting a dialogue with the students then and even compiled a list of departments where, we thought, CPCZ leaders ought to go for a frank discussion; and we proposed resolving the delicate question of the tenure in high office by certain people who were not popular with the people and were slowing restructuring down. We suggested that the party be reinforced with new people not burdened by the past and with representatives of other political parties, and we proposed an analysis of the events in Prague in January when the forces of law and order broke up a peaceful demonstration on Wenceslas Square. We even proposed the publication of "Forum," a journal which could be a public rostrum for political pluralism. It all ended when J. Fojtik (then ideology secretary) stamped our draft resolution with the words "unnecessary." That did not appease us; in the summer we presented a new document. But the result was the same.

[Correspondent] Wenceslas Square in Prague witnessed the brutal suppression of peaceful demonstrations in January, August, and October this year. Clearly the authorities were convinced that they would get away with it in November, too. A striking faith in the power of the policeman's nightstick! How much they must have feared their own people to have been so nervous and irritable and flared up in that way.

[Hegenbart] The point is that our former leaders believed that it was simply a question of groups of "antisocialist criminal elements." They simply refused to see that this protest by a few was gradually turning into a mass movement of civil disobedience. Moreover, at the Central Committee plenum in October this year M. Jakes stated that the situation in the country had stabilized! Yet as general secretary he received the fullest information on the real state of affairs. We had at most one-third of that information. But clearly you can make yourself disbelieve objective facts.

[Correspondent] The uncontrolled forces of power are a terrible threat to any society. What is the guarantee, do you think, that nothing like this will ever happen again?

[Hegenbart] The only guarantee is control by society.

[Correspondent] Parliament has repealed the article in the CSSR Constitution on the party's leading role in society. Will it be harder or somehow easier for the party to work in the new conditions?

[Hegenbart] Undoubtedly harder. The party must go back to its roots. It must be among the people and serve the people.

[Correspondent] "Civic Forum" is insisting on free elections no later than July next year. The next question has to do with predictions, but politics is the art of foresight, after all. What do you think the result of the elections will be for the CPCZ?

[Hegenbart] I do not think they will be a complete disaster for the party. Of course, it will not have the number of seats in the parliament and the republic and local organs that it has now. But it will not lose its influence on political life. This on condition, however, that society does not take the course of fueling passions. And there are some signs that this has already begun in places.

[Correspondent] A simple, concrete question to end with. You worked as party district committee first secretary in Gottwaldov. If you were in that post now, how would you react to the appeals to restore the city's old name of Zlin?

[Hegenbart] The answer would be a simple one, too: I would let the people decide.

Polish Army Disarmament Efforts Reported

PM1312111589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Starukhin: "One Disarmament Day"]

[Text] Warsaw-Opole, 11 Dec—Some 300 km southwest is less than an hour in the seats of the military aircraft provided for us journalists of the socialist countries by the Polish Defense Ministry. A further 100 km by bus from Wroclaw to Opole along the river Odra, the selfsame border river perhaps better known in our country by its German name of Oder. And now we are on the territory of the Silesian Military District in the "Opole" garrison which, like the entire Polish Army, is parting with some of its weapons. It must soon dismantle 212 tanks and dispatch them for remelting and for use for absolutely opposite, peaceful purposes.

Colonel Krzysztof Szymanski, holding an orange megaphone, is vigorously leading us along the entire "dismantling conveyor."

Some components are going straight to the furnaces of the Katowice metallurgical combine, others are going to enterprises which have ordered them in advance and paid their cost, while others are going to the neatly arranged shelves of storehouses as though to an exhibition, and tomorrow these shelves will become counters and a fair will open...

We learned the next day that peasants had come to the fair from nearby and even remote villages, as had representatives of cooperatives, plants, and factories. This is understandable; after all, a tank engine is an almost ready-made diesel generator [podstantsiya] and the same tanks without their turrets can transport heavy freight and are needed on construction sites when laying roads, and on reclaimed land. The purchasers, the new owners have taken the military equipment and materiel to the parishes and voivodships...

"The money will mainly go into the state coffers," it is announced from the megaphone. "Some will go to improving the soldiers' daily living conditions."

We are witnessing just one disarmament day. But here is how the previous month looked in the Polish Army. On the 20th in Slubice the soldiers of Medium Tank Regiment Number 23 assembled for their last ceremonial line-up, while in Kosno Odrzanskie the soldiers of the 11th mechanized regiment did the same thing. Some 2 days later the Number 3 armored regiment in Zagan was disbanded, while a day later the Dresden armored regiment in Stargard Szczecinski was disbanded.

"Disarmament is being implemented in accordance with the planned and firm peace-loving policy of the Warsaw Pact countries aimed at reducing the level of military confrontation, which was also confirmed at the last meeting of heads of state in Moscow," Colonel Roman Jozwik, spokesman for the Polish Army General Staff, informs the correspondents. "Our army's personnel only recently numbered 367,000 soldiers and officers, but by the end of the year its numerical strength will be reduced by 33,000, and in the new year by a further 7,000."

Incidentally, at present Poland's Armed Forces are the seventh largest in Europe. But Poland will greet the new year in ninth place. In the past 2 years the republic has reduced defense appropriations 22 percent.

The wheels are being removed from the howitzers and are being piled up like "gambling chips" under the awnings, The barrels of large-caliber machineguns are lined up on the stand and are being slowly "crossed" by the blue light of an autogenous welder, and the barrels are breaking in two. Suddenly all attention is riveted on a table on a rise next to the storehouse. A "cannonade" of camera flashes. They are demonstrating hunting rifles which will go "under the hammer" tomorrow at Z800,000 each. They are yesterday's carbines, skillfully modified.

Orzechowski Urges PZPR of 'Left-Wing Forces'

PM1212124389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent under the rubric "Socialist Countries. Events, Facts, Commentaries": "Time for Comprehension"]

[Text] Warsaw, 11 Dec—The Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] is called upon to be a living movement of left-wing forces and to unite and rally them on the traditions of the Polish socialist revolutionary movement. And so, it is time for comprehension.

Meeting recently with deputies of Gdansk Voivodship Council and with lecturers of the local party committee, Politburo Member M. Orzechowski expressed this viewpoint in particular: What is needed is a new party of left-wing forces which must distinguish itself qualitatively in all aspects of activity, and in this connection cadre changes are needed too.

Let us recall that the 11th party congress will be held in January, and a debate is now continuing throughout the country for the purpose of answering the chief question: What sort of party? Ways to transform Poland's major political organization are being actively comprehended right now, and the forms and methods of its activity are being renewed. It is necessary to eliminate all structures which served as the tool of centralist, directive actions on the part of the apparatus.

These are just some of the opinions and suggestions voiced during a poll in party organizations. Primary cells are concerned about the PZPR's future fate. They believe that it is necessary to support the initiatives of the "8 July Movement," which is very popular in intelligentsia circles, and the "Agreement of Party Organizations of Krakow Higher Educational Institutions," which can be the start of unification and elaboration of the pluralist platform of a new type of party.

Lenin Monument in Poland's Nowa Huta Dismantled

PM1212124189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Decision of Authorities in Krakow"]

[Text] Warsaw, 11 Dec—Late on Sunday evening specialized teams of riggers dismantled the monument to V.I. Lenin in Krakow's Nowa Huta region. The statue has been removed unharmed from its pedestal and moved to the little spot of Wroblewice, near Krakow, where the necessary restoration work will be carried out. When the work has been completed the presidiums of the Krakow City People's Council and the Nowa Huta regional people's council will jointly decide on the resiting of the monument.

As is well known, on three occasions in recent weeks the monument to V.I. Lenin in Nowa Huta has been the target for provocative attacks under antisocialist and anti-Soviet slogans. The extremists' actions have led to riots involving police intervention. The decision to move the monument elsewhere in order to prevent further provocative incidents was taken by the Nowa Huta Region People's Council Presidium.

In turn the presidium of the Krakow people's council commission for culture and art has approved the decision to abolish the V.I. Lenin Museum in Krakow. The museum's main building will be presented to the musical academy while the branch of the museum—the apartment in the block on Krolowej Jadwigi Street, where V.I. Lenin lived during his years in exile—together with its exhibits is being passed on to the Krakow Historical Museum.

BCP To Eliminate Party's Leading Role

PM1312114189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report under the rubric "Stop Press" and under general heading "How To Live in the Future?": "Bulgaria"]

[Text] A plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee began its work in Sofia Monday [11 December]. A report "On the State of the Country and Party and the Immediate Tasks" was delivered by Petur Mladenov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee, who analyzed Bulgaria's current problems, their origins, and the ways to solve them.

The speaker pointed out that the social, economic, and spiritual progress which followed the socialist revolution in the country was of great importance for the Bulgarian People's Republic. Any attempt to diminish these achievements would be at variance with historical truth, he said. In the last few years, however, the country entered a period of serious crisis and growing social tension. The main causes are rooted in the Stalinist model of society and the establishment of virtually total control of production and distribution. A small group of people headed by Todor Zhivkov took shape, and it usurped power.

The previous leadership left behind a legacy of progressive economic decline, acute imbalances in the economy, and inflationary tendencies. The country's convertible currency debt is rocketing. The absence of economic democracy was accompanied by an absence of political democracy. As a result of the virtual fusion of party organs and state organs, the latter lost their character. There developed a real alienation of the people from the government.

There is need for a genuine and radical economic reform to ensure the dismantling of the administrative edict system, the speaker noted. It is necessary to resolutely pursue the line of creating a socialist market economy and ensuring conditions for equal development of all forms of ownership. The supremacy of the National Assembly must be fully restored. Bulgaria's further development is possible only on the basis of socialism's democratization. All the main questions of society's life must be solved on a fundamentally new basis, and this ought to be reflected in the draft of the country's new constitution. In view of this, it is obviously necessary to tackle the current Constitution's article about the BCP's leading role. The party's role in a democratic society cannot be regulated by edict.

The speaker noted that the profound changes in socialist countries, and primarily in the Soviet Union, and the collaboration between the CPSU and the BCP and between the USSR and the Bulgarian People's Republic are of fundamental importance for the Bulgarian People's Republic. We consider Bulgaria's membership in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, P. Mladenov pointed out, necessary from the viewpoint of national interests.

Touching on questions of restructuring sociopolitical life, and primarily of restructuring the BCP, the speaker indicated the need to separate the functions of party and state. On the Politburo's behalf, P. Mladenov proposed that tenure of leading party positions be limited to two terms. The Politburo, he went on to say, proposes that the Central Committee adopt a decision to convene an extraordinary BCP congress on 26 March 1990. It was also proposed to raise in the National Assembly the question of holding free and democratic elections ahead of time before the end of next year, elaborating and adopting a new constitution, and setting up a National Assembly representative commission to investigate cases of corruption and abuse of power.

Political Demands at Sofia Rally Reported

PM1212165589 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 3

[Own correspondent V. Khrustalev dispatch: "Rally in Sofia"]

[Text] The relative calm of recent days in the turbulent flood of events in Bulgaria was deceptive. On Sunday a demonstration involving thousands of people took place, summoned by the newly formed Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces. Nineteen independent associations and organizations led the people onto the square in front of Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, to demonstrate their unified platform.

The changes of the previous month, it was noted at the rally, give us grounds for believing that the democratic process in Bulgaria will not stop or falter. But too much dissatisfaction with the previous authoritarian methods of leadership has accumulated. Therefore, it was proposed that preparations be started for a national "roundtable" where dialogue between the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and independent associations would take place.

The resolution adopted at the rally contains a number of other demands: to abolish the article governing the leading role of the BCP at the next session of the National Assembly; to dissolve primary party organizations at places of work; to present a report on the finances of the BCP and other official organizations; to quickly dissolve party organizations in law courts, the prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the aim of establishing public monitoring of all archives and documents that compromise important officials and groups.

During the days of the Central Committee plenum's work, which will start today, and the National Assembly session which will follow it, "silent rallies" will be held in Sofia in accordance with an appeal from the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces.

Talks in Hungary Mull Future of Government

PM1212122989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Dec 89 Single Edition p 5

[Report "for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" by TASS correspondent A. Kuklin: "Hungary: Passionate Debate About The Future"]

[Text] Budapest—"Hungarian-Hungarian summit" is the label pinned by journalists on the series of talks that began last Saturday in the Hungarian parliament between the country's government and representatives of political parties, public organizations, and commissions of the Hungarian National Assembly. The talks are taking place on the initiative of the Hungarian Council of Ministers and the parliament in the interests of reaching a consensus on questions of the government of the country.

There is a deeply felt need at the moment for consultations between the government and various political parties in the interests of a stable future for the country, NEPSZABADSAG wrote. The Hungarian Council of Ministers is faced with an unusual dilemma: Whereas most political parties have unprecedented freedom to maneuver, the government's freedom to maneuver is extremely limited, for economic reasons. NEPSZAVA notes in a commentary that during the talks the government and the representatives of parties and public organizations must discuss the date of parliamentary elections and the political timetable for the current period of the country's life. The paper cites Hungarian Council of Ministers Chairman M. Nemeth to the effect that the main question at the moment is whether it will be possible to hold elections in the country by legal, constitutional means. In order to attain this goal, the parliament and the government need assistance from various parties.

Consultations are planned for today with representatives of public organizations and for Sunday with members of Hungarian parliamentary commissions. The government delegation at the talks is headed by Council of Ministers Chairman M. Nemeth.

The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the opposition roundtable parties have been invited to the talks. Last Friday's meeting was attended in an observer capacity by leaders of parliamentary factions: the group of independent deputies, the group of opposition deoputies, the parliamentary factions of the Hungarian Socialist Party and Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], and also a delegation from the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society.

The talks took place behind closed doors. Afterwards government spokesman B. Zsolt and parliamentary press office chief A. Farago held a press conference. They supplied information on the domestic political and economic situation and on the possibility of tension occurring in society.

The participants in the talks agreed that the most important task at the moment is to create conditions for a peaceful transition and preserve the country's economic potential. An accord was also reached on the discussion of economic policy matters at the expert level.

There was also a discussion about what legislative functions the country's parliament will have until, possibly, it announces at its December session that it is dissolving itself. It was the common opinion of the talks participants that the parliament should make decisions only on urgent matters, for example, approving the laws on the press, on the protection of property, on private enterprise, and on freedom of conscience.

In the discussion of the date for parliamentary elections opinion was divided. Some of the parties, who constituted a majority, were of the opinion that the elections must be held in the second half of next March. The other parties wanted the elections to be held at the beginning of next summer or in the fall.

During the talks the parties' representatives assured the government of their support for measures adopted in the economic sphere that are unpopular with the population but essential for the improvement of the economy.

West Europe

EC Readiness To Support E. Bloc Reforms Noted

PM1212122589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "EEC: Summit Meeting Results"]

[Text] Strasbourg—The meeting of heads of state and government of the 12 EEC countries held in Strasbourg is noteworthy in two respects.

First, it took decisions which give a strong impetus to the EC's political and socioeconomic integration. Second, the participants in the session reached accords on a new approach to developing relations with the socialist states, deepening cooperation with them, and providing them with assistance without any provisos or prior conditions attached.

The changes taking place in the socialist countries, the summit conference final document stresses, mark an important event in postwar history. They inspire the hope that the division of Europe will be overcome in accordance with the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act and that new relations can be established among European states in the sphere of security, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, and the human dimension.

Along with its desire to intensify political dialogue with the East and expand cooperation in all spheres, the EC stated in Strasbourg its readiness to support the economic reforms in socialist countries and help "create a healthy and flourishing economy."

The Strasbourg conference paid special attention to the German question, which was not officially on the agenda. What stance did the European Council adopt? "The German people," the final document points out, "will attain their unity through free self-determination. This process should be peaceful and democratic in character, with observance of all existing treaties and agreements as well as the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act in the context of East-West dialogue and cooperation."

As far as West German integration processes are concerned, the decisions taken in the Alsatian capital make them irreversible, according to commentators. Thus, an intergovernmental conference will take place at the end of 1990 which will introduce amendments to the Treaty of Rome, which established the Common Market.

FRG Reaction to EEC Strasbourg Summit Viewed

PM1212133189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by unnamed own correspondent: "Echo of Strasbourg"]

[Text] Bonn, 11 Dec—Two questions are highlighted in the West German press commentaries in connection with the Strasbourg meeting of the EEC heads of state and government. Above all, it is a case of the passage included in their statement regarding the possibility of German unity. And second, they have in mind the deferment until the very end of next year of the convening of an EEC intergovernmental conference on questions of creating a currency union. In both cases, it is noted here, Bonn's approaches prevailed.

In Strasbourg, Federal Chancellor H. Kohl and Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher displayed all their diplomatic art to alleviate the concern of West Germany's partners regarding Bonn's policy. They gave assurances that West European integration remains one of the main guidelines of the West German course. The FRG leaders tried to "plaster over" cosmetically the cracks that have appeared in the "special" Franco-West German relations of partnership and concord. After all, the fact that H. Kohl has made public his 10-point plan on the acute German issue without any consultations with Paris or his other allies in no way tallies with these relations.

Bonn's interest in deferring work on advancing toward a currency union is formally explained here by the desire to avoid this subject during the election campaign scheduled for the end of next year and to avoid giving extreme right-wing circles a pretext for propaganda in "defense of the Deutsche Mark." But it looks as though official Bonn itself is also in no hurry at all to part with the dominant and therefore advantageous position of its currency.

As KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER writes, the stipulations which the heads of the governments included in the passage on the problem of German reunification, include the following: This process should be included in the prospect of EEC integration. "Kohl," DIE WELT says, "has made it clear that Bonn will make the pace of this development dependent on the partners' 'understanding' of German interests."

But FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE totally dismisses the Strasbourg outcome. "Papers of this kind cannot halt the course of events," it says. In the newspaper's opinion, "if tomorrow the Germans gradually set about consolidating their ties and follow the precept of the Fundamental Law (on German unity), then no one will be able to hinder them." And there follows a summing up: "The community has no choice but to create the necessary prerequisites for this."

And so are there really some people on the Rhine who think of the EEC as a submissive instrument for steering Bonn's line?

Official on Vatican Ties, Religious Freedom

PM1212121689 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
30 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with Y.N. Khristoradnov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Religious Affairs Council, by Alceste Santini; date, place of interview not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—With a view to Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to John Paul II in the Vatican tomorrow, I wanted to ask Y.N. Khristoradnov—since July chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Religious Affairs Council—his opinion concerning an event universally described as historic and to take stock of perestroyka in the religious field. "We hope," he said, "that this visit will facilitate a better acquaintance with each other's positions, and I believe that the dialogue that will develop at various levels will help to improve mutual understanding." He stressed that "the desire to understand more thoroughly the partners in the dialogue and to take fuller account of existing factors, including the Vatican and its world role, is typical of the new thinking that is winning over more and more people. This will permit an optimistic approach even to the most complex tasks in the creation of a common European home."

With these remarks Minister Khristoradnov conveyed the importance that the Soviet Government now attaches to the "role of a rapprochement between the two Europes" that John Paul II has performed for some time and that he formulated theoretically when he spoke to the Strasbourg Parliament a year ago about a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Pope Wojtyla returned to this theme on his October visit to the Far East when, while overflying the USSR for the first time, talking with journalists on the aircraft, he described perestroyka as "a great comfort, a great hope." This, not only because it has opened up new prospects for relations between the Vatican and the USSR, between the state and the churches active on Soviet territory, but also because of the new approach that is becoming established thanks to religion being considered a social phenomenon that must no longer be persecuted.

The minister, confirming this climate by citing Gorbachev's remarks to Patriarch Pimen when he received him at the Kremlin—"Believers are Soviet citizens, workers and patriots fully entitled to express their beliefs properly"—said that "in the years 1988-89 over 3,000 religious associations were registered and over 2,500 applications were received from believers for premises for their religious and prayer meetings." He stressed that "an important event in the life of religious organizations in the past 2 years has been their authorization to concern themselves with charity work. This has enabled them to extend their social activity, to implement one of the fundamental principles of Christianity—concern for one's neighbor—once the existing restrictions were removed." In Vilnius, he said, following the constituent congress of "Caritas," "initiatives were taken by the Catholic Church for the care of the elderly, orphans, and the sick and for a drive against alcoholism, drug addiction, and prostitution. One of the congress' sessions was devoted to aspects of the family and parenthood." The Russian Orthodox Church "has opened four new ecclesiastical seminaries and a number of schools for the education of the clergy. Measures have been adopted to extend opportunities for the education of Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant clerics." More "liberality" is being practised to "facilitate churches' publishing activities, pending the new law on freedom of conscience and on religious organizations."

According to Khristoradnov, the new law "will recognize religious organizations as legal entities and their right of ownership over assets purchased by them." With regard to religious education, "it will be allowed in religious communities, at home, and in church schools, but not in state schools." In other words, citizens will be able to decide autonomously on matters of religious education without interference from state bodies and social organizations. [passage omitted]

Lombardy Nominates Gorbachev for Nobel Prize

PM1312102989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Lombardy's Decision"]

[Text] Rome, 8 Dec—The Government of the Italian region of Lombardy has decided to nominate M.S. Gorbachev for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Announcing this to journalists, Fabio Semenza, premier of the regional government, stressed that this decision was adopted in connection with the Soviet leader's vigorous, dynamic activities in the international arena in the interests of peace and democracy. Semenza noted the exceptionally warm and cordial reception accorded to M.S. Gorbachev during his recent visit to Italy and his stay in Milan, the administrative center of Lombardy. He said the proposal to nominate the Soviet leader had the support of all the political parties represented in the regional government.

An official memorandum from the regional government was submitted to the Norwegian Consulate in Milan since, according to A.B. Nobel's will, the Nobel Prizes are bestowed by a committee of the Norwegian Parliament specially appointed for this purpose.

Armenia's Voskanyan Replies to Thatcher's Cable

NC1212124389 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0200 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Telegram from Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium, to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; date not given]

[Text] Esteemed Madame Prime Minister: The good wishes conveyed by you on the occasion of the anniversary of the destructive earthquake were received in Armenia with deep gratitute. At this moment of grave trials, the Armenian people, who have experienced many other trials throughout their history, are continuing to heal the deep wounds of their own soil with a firmness and unflinching will unique to them. We are confident that Armenia's villages and cities will be revived through the joint efforts of all peoples of good will in our own country and around the world and will become a symbol of universal human fellowship.

Allow me, esteemed Madame Prime Minister, to express my hope of seeing you in Armenia next summer. I would like to take this opportunity to ask you to convey to the people of Great Britain our sincere thanks for the invaluable assistance shown to Armenia.

Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev, Others at 12 Dec Morning Session

LD1212142489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0658 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text of remarks by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Estonian People's Deputy Marju Y. Lauristin; Ukrainian People's Deputy Yevgeniy A. Yevtushenko; Latvian People's Deputy Arnold P. Klautsen; and Moscow City People's Deputy Andrey D. Sakharov at the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputy in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow—Live]

[Excerpts] [Gorbachev] Comrade deputies. We are to approve the agenda and working procedure of the congress. Permit me to say a few words in this connection. I would say that the preparations for the Second Congress have taken place in an atmosphere of perhaps unprecedented, exceptional activity and openness and with the maximum degree of consideration for opinions and proposals on this. A special commission to prepare for the congress was formed to organize this work. It was made up of more than 80 people's deputies—members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, representatives of all the union republics, the chairmen of all the committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the standing commissions of the chambers, the deputies from various professional regional and interregional groups which had proposed alternative approaches and their own ideas.

I must say that our approach to the optimal solution on agenda issues was not an easy one. There was a great deal of discussion about them at the Supreme Soviet Session. Evidently, deputies remember this well. These issues were discussed preliminarily in committees and commissions with many people's deputies. As I have already said, yesterday at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and then at a gathering of representatives of groups of people's deputies, we came to the conclusion—I should say in an atmosphere of constructive exchange and harmony on the part of the overwhelming majority of deputies—that the agenda issues which you now have should be recommended for your consideration.

It is proposed, first of all, to discuss the report by the congress credentials commission on the results of verification of the credentials of USSR people's deputies who were elected after the First Congress. This is our organizational issue, so to speak. We are putting it first so that the comrades can start work at once. Then there are the following eight issues, all of them are aimed at advancing the restructuring processes which are causing concern among Soviet people and should be tackled. A key issue on the agenda, of which I have already spoken, is the government report on measures for the recovery of the economy, stages of economic reform, and principled approaches to the development of the 13th 5-Year Plan. In order to discuss this most important question comprehensively and to give the maximum number of deputies the chance to express their opinions, in addition to the general discussion, it is proposed to set aside one day for work in sections. It is planned to form three sections: on the problems of measures to improve the economy; on the stages of economic reform; and on principled approaches to working out the 13th 5-Year Plan. According to his own choice each deputy can register for any one of them the day before the sections go to work. The introduction of changes and addenda to the USSR Constitution on issues of the electoral system is also an urgent task, taking into account the campaign now taking place for the elections to the higher local bodies of power of the Union and autonomous republics.

Yesterday, in connection with the fact that the question arose of including on the agenda other questions relative to changes in the Constitution, the problem was raised concerning discussing at this congress the question of the apportionment of competencies between the Union and the republics, in connection with the fact that the process of perestroyka and of political reform is constantly, in one way or another, leading on to this important subject. It was settled, nevertheless, insofar as proposals have been prepared by the Supreme Soviet on this question and they are in a form such that they can be introduced already. But they have not been introduced because one of the main questions, sections, of this document has not yet been decided. This is the economic autarky of the republics and regional financial economy. On this subject, as you know, the government has presented a document, but so far on the first reading it was not adopted. Given this, to include...[changes thought] yes, and taking into account the fact that the question of land and property has been put forward for nationwide discussion and afterwards must be considered by the Supreme Soviet, and in one way or another the problem of the assignment of competencies again affects these draft laws.

So yesterday we came to the conclusion that it is not possible to include it on its own. We must complete this preliminary work. But the whole group of deputies was united, it seems to me, on the understanding that in the report on the questions of changing the Constitution, Chapter 13 dealing with the electoral system, this subject, should be likewise illuminated. Obviously it must deal with the fact that we must introduce some sort of precedent, namely, to make use of, to create a precedent, and in fact it has really been created, when at the Supreme Soviet we adopted the law on changes in the electoral system and gave the republics the chance to act, with the intention that we would confirm this at the congress.

So you see, the group of deputies was in actual fact unanimous. I think that I am not exaggerating here or distorting anything about the fact that, in order not to hold up the process of perestroyka, we must stipulate at the congress that the congress should make it possible, when the laws on land, on property, on financial autonomy, and on the draft on the assignment of competencies as a whole are adopted, that on these three questions the Supreme Soviet—I am saying this for your information since the questions might arise now, so that it will be clear—the Supreme Soviet can say clearly that it is giving its agreement that even before the endorsement of these three main points, after getting the go-ahead from the Supreme Soviet, the republics can proceed and act guided by the draft laws adopted at the Supreme Soviet, provided of course, that the final endorsement of this question is not dragged out at the Congress of People's Deputies.

Strictly speaking, we apprise you of it so that you will have a full picture.

A number of items on the agenda are connected with the fulfillment of a direct instruction from the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet. A draft of the regulations for USSR people's deputies congresses and for the USSR Supreme Soviet, draft of legislative acts defining the status of USSR people's deputies, and other matters connected with deputies are submitted for your examination. The commission formed by the First Congress to prepare a draft USSR law on constitutional supervision in the USSR has carried out the instruction of that congress. It has proposed to include an examination of that draft in the congress agenda. In addition, we must elect a Constitutional Supervision Committee in accordance with the USSR Constitution.

I want to return you to the work of the First Congress of People's Deputies in order to remind you that after a discussion at that time, we arrived at the conclusion that we would not form a Constitutional Supervision Committee until a law on constitutional supervision in the USSR had been adopted. Now, since the commission ... [changes thought] and we then set up that commission. The commission submitted a draft law on constitutional supervision, and in this connection it is proposed that the following item, on the election of a USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee, should also be included in the agenda, in a natural way, proceeding from the discussion and understanding that took place at the First Congress.

The next point on the agenda, which was supported by the overwhelming majority of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet and met with the understanding of all deputies, is that of intensifying the struggle against organized crime. Its growth is giving rise to acute concern on the part of the whole of society. We need to investigate this painstakingly. We need to take all measures for a resolute struggle against this social evil. In this context, the congress plans to discuss a report by the minister of internal affairs on this issue. I will say that proposals arose throughout the stage when this issue was being discussed. These are not unfounded proposals. It is worth hearing about the struggle against crime as a whole. Nevertheless, this decision has been consciously adopted in this formulation on organized crime. The deputies considered it necessary to single this out, because it is a new phenomenon, and one which is proliferating and hitting our entire society and also the perestroyka processes. A more painstaking, in-depth discussion of the problem is needed in front of the whole society in order for us to lend a state-level nature to this work. I think that this does not rule out—and it is the right of every deputy—the raising of issues related to crime in general which give rise to concern.

After that it is proposed to hear reports by three commissions formed by the First Congress on a number of issues which called for in-depth study and investigation. You know that they are named on the agenda. The only thing that arose at the group of deputies yesterday was that the representatives of the deputies' groups began to sense that, based on the procedure that has been circulated—and you too have it in unchanged form, incidentally, and I thus consider it necessary to clarify this right away—to hear the commissions over about half a day, and naturally questions will clearly arise, and naturally deputies will probably also have views then that not enough time is being assigned for this. For this reason, at the meeting of representatives of the deputies' groups yesterday, we unanimously arrived at the opinion that one day must be specially allocated to this point on the agenda, by making certain changes in the regulations. The mood was nevertheless in favor of keeping to the 10 days. Initially there was a term of 1 week, and then 10 days, although there were proposals to even prolong it. Nevertheless, the prevailing mood—and it was laid down—was for 10 days.

This is the agenda which, in the opinion of the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the participants in the meeting of representatives of groups of people's deputies, will make it possible to carefully examine and resolve the most urgent, and important issues in the country's life within the optimal period which we have.

It is natural that a great deal of what worries us and could legitimately be a subject for discussion remains outside the framework of these matters. However, we had to stop and make a choice and I have to say that a mark on that choice—I could feel it at the Supreme Soviet and yesterday when we spent the whole day debating to work out proposals for you... We could feel the serious pressure of the actual situation that exists in the country. It is connected above all to the social and economic complex and matters of life in our society. Therefore, I would say that a typical feature of this congress is its maximum attention to these problems. I believe we will be responding to the expectations of the people if we devote the main part of the time of this congress precisely to examining these issues. I have been through these matters and have greatly expanded my commentary, relying on all the discussions that have taken place at the Supreme Soviet, at the Supreme Soviet Presidium and at the meeting of the representatives of the groups of deputies. These are the ideas that are being submitted for your consideration.

Now, we have to start the debates. I'll just find out what you've got. Perhaps we'll do it like this: Yesterday we did have debates on this matter but then perhaps we could proceed like this, if you agree with me. Here, we have the following possibility: We could take it point by point, not just as a thought or proposal by someone, but taking a point and seeing what proposals there are. We'll listen, determine our position, and move one. Well, Comrades? Is that what we'll do then? [sounds from auditorium] For the moment, I'm not telling you to vote or to look at it overall. We'll proceed point by point. So then, open the agenda.

Point one concerns the recognition of the powers of the USSR people's deputy. This, apparently, does not give rise to any questions. Isn't that so, Comrades? [agreement from auditorium] Is there any need for a vote? [No, from the auditorium] No. Let's leave it on the agenda. That's right, isn't it [Yes heard from deputies]

If anyone wants to declare that he wants to have his say or put forward any objections or reasoning, I ask that you come to the microphone and express your wishes a little louder. Maybe it would be even better to come to the rostrum.

The second question: on measures for improving the economy, the stages of economic reform, and principled approaches to developing the 13th 5-year plan—a report by the USSR Council of Ministers.

What observations are there on point two? [voices of deputies: none]

Let's leave it, let's leave it. There are no other proposals?

[Voices of deputies: no]

No. Please. On this question, the second? Ah, no, but we will go on, Comrade Igityan, and then we will give everyone a chance to put forward their proposals or have their say. So there are no observations on the second question?

The third point: on introducing amendments and addenda to the constitution—the USSR basic law—as regards the old system. Does anyone want to speak? Comrade Lauristin, come here. Those who want to, comrades...[Gorbachev and Lukyanov discuss briefly procedural matter sotto voce]

[Lauristin] Esteemed deputies, yesterday at the session of representatives the third point on amendments to the Constitution was considered and discussed for a very long time, and a vote was held on addenda, but in this regard it was very clear that all addenda were voted on together there. More than once, a number of deputies raised the question of addenda to this point of discusion, Article 6 of the Constitution, and yesterday a group of Baltic deputies, having discussed the results of the meeting of representatives, decided nevertheless to raise this question once again, because this question is ripe for discussion. In our republics the opinion in the supreme soviets and in party organizations is that this point should be amended, that it is now obsolete for our political system, for the rapid changes, it represents an obstacle, and we propose to vote seperately at the congress, to add to the third point discussion of Article 6 of the Constitution in order to put forward the amendment of this point for discussion by the whole people, and in the Supreme Soviet prepare a law on parties, or on a political system, or something like this.

[Gorbachev] Okay. Please come here.

[Tolpezhnikov] Deputy Tolpezhnikov, national-territorial constituency No 293, Latvia. I support the proposal of the Estonian delegation and the Baltic group as a whole, and I want to explain why this is so important. I worked in the Tbilisi commission. The work of the Tbilisi commission showed me that power in this country does not belong to us deputies. It went this way: On 7 April this year there was a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Ligachev; Comrade Yazov, Politburo member, was present there. A decision was made to help our Tbilisi comrades. A [word indistinct] decision was not made, no verbatim record was made, Comrade yazov gave instructions orally, and you know how it ended. I am not convinced that if the activities of our deputies who are in session here, maybe does not please someone in the Politburo, they can meet in the lobbies, have a word with Comrade Yazov, and we will be left without our mandates as deputies. Thank you for your attention.

[Gorbachev] Comrade Yevtushenko. This way, please, Comrade Yevtushenko. [voices discuss procedural matters sotto voce]

[Yevtushenko] Comrade Deputies, while respecting the party as the initiator of perestroyka, I nevertheless support the proposal to include on the agenda a discussion by deputies of the question of Article 6. I am nonparty, but I know that many secretaries and rank-and-file party members and secretaries of primary organizations, and many secretaries of rayon committees, including Kharkov, the town which I represent, and also at the plenum which has just taken placae in Moscow, are putting forward the question of including this question on the agenda. I consider that party members, deputies, USSR People's deputies must support this—the inclusion of this article, at last, on the agenda, because the party itself, it seems to me, must fight for the inclusion of this question. For authority must not be prescribed by some kind of paragraph; authority must be fought for every day. I consider this question very important for the prestige of perestroyka, of the party, and of those nonparty people who believe in the ideals of socialism. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] Perhaps that's how we'll proceed. The first proposal is clear: to include point three for discussion on the agenda and point six which relates to the leading role of the party. Are there any other proposals on this? Perhaps this is how we'll proceed? [Yes heard from the auditorium] So now it's clear. It has emerged that there's one feeling. Does anyone have any other proposals? Please. We'll also give them some space and start our conversation, I think.

[Unidentified deputy] Comrades, I support the proposal to examine Article 6 and I would also like to propose the examination of those provisions in the Constitution which hinder us...

[Gorbachev, interrupting] And you [words indistinct] [Unidentified deputy continues] ... Which hinder us in solving economic problems, particularly the adoption of a law on ownership, on the enterprise, on the land and also of those problems that are linked to the national and state structure of the USSR. The proposal that was made today to look at all this, so to speak, at the Supreme Soviet, first, and in essence to give the Supreme Soviet the opportunity of violating the Constitution seems totally unacceptable to me. We lay claims against certain Union republics in connection with their violation of this or that article of the Constitution but the congress should not set an example of its own of disdain for our basic law. If we do this, we will thereby legitimitize the constant violation of the Constitution. I think this is a complete deadend. The Constitution must be respected in our society and for this reason I move that all the issues of which I have spoken be put forward.

[Gorbachev] Deputy Katilevskiy has to wait.

[Klautsen] My name is Klautsen.

[Gorbachev] And what have you to say.

[Klautsen] Klautsen, from constituency 221 of the city of Riga.

[Gorbachev] Just a minute. I'll have a look if you're on the list.

[Klautsen] I am [word indistinct]. I represent the Baltic but, without wanting to talk about the fact that there... I do not agree with those comrades who have already spoken here. I'd like to put forward the other point of view and this is why: As the comrades are aware, on Sunday we conducted the first stage of elections to local soviets in Latvia and Estonia. I had to go yet again through the crucible of a pre-election contest for the [word indistinct] Riga city soviet. No doubt, I was able to sense the mood that determines the life and activity of the voters, particularly in the city of Riga. Taking this as the starting point, I would like to give my view on the issues proposed, the alteration of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

What causes most concern today? What concerns the voters most of all is the situation that has developed in the country, the difficulties and above all the economic ones, that our people are experiencing. People are following the events in the different areas of our country and they're worried and ask: Just how long can this serious situation go on? Four years have passed, the fifth is coming to an end and the economic situation is not improving. In a number of areas in the country, politics, the economy and interethnic relations have gotten tangled up into a tight knot. Yes, that's what it's like. On the other hand, proceeding from this, it is expected of us that at our congress today we deal above all with economic affairs, the problems that are directly to determine today and tomorrow for us. Therefore, leading the congress in the direction of other affairs would, I think, be wrong. This refers directly to Article 6. I think and ask myself and you: Can anything written into the Constitution or anywhere else change the position of the Communist Party of Latvia or that of Lithuania, however strong, however precise it is, if we ourselves, the communists of Latvia, Lithuania, Etonia and other republics, don't ensure that leading role? I don't think so. On the other hand, adopting a decision today to change the Constitution and the debates around this, would be to respond to those forces that want to attack the party at the moment, that want to attack its leadership today. [enthusiastic applause] In my opinion, everything should take its course. We must address this but not especially in order to tear out a part of our Constitution and put it to discussion.

And finally, attempts to use a strike and on a countrywide scale at that, to attain political aims, has puzzled many people here. In spite of the leadership's decision in my own republic, of the People's Front which supported the strike [disturbances in the auditorium]. I am coming to the end—it was a failure in Riga. I believe and propose the adoption on the part of our congress of a special statement containing a condemnation of the group of deputies which put forward the proposal, taking advantage of their rights, to hold a general strike in the country, as erroneous and harmful. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] Here we have Article 6. It has been raised here. There are comrades who consider that it should be included for discussion within the framework of the third question and others who are against that. It has become clear that there are two points of view. Does that mean we will be expanding our discussion further? [muffled voice from floor] So now, within the framework of this point concerning the Constitution there are already other proposals. This is what I will ask. It is quite clear that we have various opinions on the question of Article 6 on the agenda. There is a second question that has come up here, although I have already explained it, but Comrades, the following proposal has been put forward: to include on the agenda for discussion the law on property, land and our national state organization. I would ask you to speak out on this matter. Are there other opinions? Because one way or another we should examine this question. Are there other opinions? Please go ahead.

[Sharayev] Deputy Sharayev, constituency 495. Comrades, everyone understands that people are expecting fundamental changes and social and economic transformations in the country from us and probably it is primarily with that that they link the work of the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

What is now being proposed by certain comrades is to include a number of additional questions, including the matter of Article 6 of the Constitution and the question of land and ownership. Well, first, several laws have been submitted for nationwide discussion and for us to decide for the people now without waiting for their opinion, when the results have not been reviewed and when the general opinions have not been analyzed would, in my view, be simply immodest.

As for Article 6, Comrades, you have all read Comrade Gorbachev's speech at the last plenum. It clearly states the position of the Politburo and the party as a whole, and in my view, let us understand nonetheless what is the essence of the matter. Comrade Yakovlev said this to his audience at a Komsomol school and to extract Article 6 separately today or to examine questions which have not been studied by the Supreme Soviet would seem to me to be unethical. [bell rings] And then if we are calling for a consensus let us support the decisions of the Supreme Soviet.

I propose voting for the agenda put forward by the Supreme Soviet without any additions.[Passage Omitted]

[Gorbachev] Good. That's all? We move on to the considering of issues...that's all?...[Sakharov heard indistinctly asking for the floor. Lukyanov says no] that's all. Andrey Dmitriyevich please, a new proposal.

[Sakharov] I propose this formulation—to discuss property, the enterprise and the land—to discuss the matters of the removal from the Constitution of those articles which are obstructing the adoption of these laws by the Supreme Soviet. That is, this does not require the specification of these laws which are now under national discussion. This can be done at this congress and by so doing, express...clear a path for the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of these—without violating the Constitution—of these laws.

[Gorbachev] I have the impression that you neither know how to implement your proposal, nor do we know how to implement it... to remove the articles which...who should define these?

[Sakharov] A list of these articles will be presented.

[Gorbachev] No. I don't think that is any use...well, alright. We will consider this.

[Sakharov] Well, I propose to present this.

[Gorbachev] Good, good.

[Sakharov] And as far as Article 6 is concerned, then I...

[Gorbachev] Thank you, thank you...

[Sakharov]...Then I... there are now new proposals but [bell rings] I will get telegrams which I have received.

[Gorbachev] Come to me and I'll give you three files containing thousands of telegrams.

[Sakharov] There are (?still) 60,000.

[Gorbachev] That's all...[bustle in hall]

[Sakharov]...60,000 signatures...[clapping, bell rings]

[Gorbachev] So let's not press each other resting on and manipulating the view of the people, let's not.

[Gorbachev] Yesterday Deputy Lauristin said that something had happened at a meeting of a group of deputies, that can, in general, only be considered a flouting, a violation of democratic norms. That's approximately how it looks. But those who took part in this meeting know, in the first place, that the chairman had submitted 16 points on this score, on deputies' speeches, and you examined all of them. That's in the first place. In the second place, the inter-regional group had instructed a representative to speak, and he submitted a formula, directly, on what should be included on the agenda. As this proposal had been formulated, it included points on ownership, on land, on Article 6, and I don't know what else, that's the way this formula was submitted to this deputies' forum, meeting of representatives, and that's how it was voted on. If you failed to complete your work at the session of the interregional group, then I wish you more fruitful work there, but don't dump the blame that someone here wants to manipulate things. That's a very serious accusation, comrades. That's a very serious accusation.

To prevent what happened yesterday from happening again, I am placing in order the submission of proposals for examination by the congress. But first I'll cite them, so that you can note them for memory. It is being proposed that point 3 on our agenda, together with the examination of matters connected with altering the electoral system, be supplemented, and that on the agenda be included for examination the matter of Article 6—[voices heard from the floor]—one moment, I'll remind you, we'll address it in a moment—[more voices from the floor]—one moment, I'm talking about additions. All the same, we'll have to vote. The order will be different, and I'll remind you what has been submitted, so that you can bear it in mind: on Article 6, first. Apart from that to include for examination matters relating to changes touching on matters of ownership, land, and the national-state structure. Further, Article 3, on the principle of democratic centralism; Article 7—that's on public organizations, and in particular a deputy has made a proposal concerning the exclusion of the Komsomol.

Deputy Sakharov has proposed excluding from the Constitution those articles which are holding up perestroyka. And finally, Article 51, which concerns citizens of the USSR being able to unite in public organizations. I am just singling out the essence, so to speak. Well, that seems to be all of them.

Moscow TV Carries 12 Dec Afternoon Session

1451 GMT

LD1212160289

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1451 GMT on 12 December begins its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies afternoon session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

At 1452 GMT Gorbachev mentions Deputy Lopatin's remarks before the break on changes in the Constitution. Gorbachev asks for time to make a few remarks before the main debate. Everything was thoroughly discussed beforehand regarding the agenda. People must approach the constitutional process with great responsibility. Otherwise there may be problems.

At 1455 GMT Gorbachev says that people's deputies must be concerned about such matters. If not they, then who else will be concerned? The deputies should realize that all the points on the agenda have been thoroughly considered. If changes are needed, they must be brought about in a normal constitutional process. This applies to Article 6, too. That article did not exist in the three previous constitutions. The party has to be a serious party which answers for its actions and deeds.

At 1458 GMT he notes it is wrong to rush into any decision. One cannot just take Article 6 and annul it and think that all will be well. Gorbachev agrees with Deputy Andreyev's remarks which were made earlier about not allowing political speculation to take place. Society must not be drawn into confrontation. The party is being subjected to reform at the same time as the country is being subjected to reform.

At 1500 GMT Gorbachev says that all must be changed in the country. As for the issue of ownership, if this issues is allowed to drag out, then this will hold back the entire country. Can the congress call for sovereignty of the people and then say that it is not interested in the people's opinion? If the deputies do this, they will lose people's respect. There are no fundamental differences between him and the deputies on these issues. If there is much mutual suspicion, perestroyka will lose out. Perestroyka needs oxygen. We are for renewal and that is the basis for action. So we must all display responsibility.

At 1504 GMT Gorbachev says that first the representatives of deputy groups should be allowed to speak. A deputy asks if enquiries can be made. Gorbachev calls for a vote on this issue.

At 1506 GMT Deputy Shelkhanov makes a short speech about previous voting results.

At 1507 GMT Gorbachev says that there is not time for applause.

At 1508 GMT Gorbachev calls for a vote on Article 3 on changes in the electoral system. Video shows deputies using the new voting system, inserting their cards in a machine.

At 1510 GMT tellers shown busily studying the screen. 1,675 for, 373 against, and 33 abstained.

At 1515 GMT Gorbachev asks if there is any need to discuss procedure. Will all the points be voted for individually?

At 1512 GMT Deputy Gabros at the microphone makes proposal on voting for individual voting on each point. A vote is called—1,071 for, 894 against, 31 abstain. The voting will be individually by name. Gorbachev calls for a separate vote about Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, on including it in the agenda. The results: 839 for, 1,138 against, 56 abstain.

At 1521 GMT Gorbachev says that the next issue is ownership and land. A vote is called about including in Article 3 the issues of ownership and the land.

At 1522 GMT Deputy (Chevashev) says that the issue had been somewhat different. Gorbachev says no: Everything has been clearly expressed. The vote is 537 for, 1,387 against, 86 abstain.

At 1526 GMT Deputy Osipov complains that the voting machine is not working properly. Deputies must have a right to vote. Let the voting be done by hand. Gorbachev says that all is well, as specialists have explained. The deputy is allowed to explain the situation. The voting machines by him and his colleagues are not working. So let them have tellers to do a manual count. Gorbachev agrees to this for that section, upon prompting from Lukyanov.

At 1529 GMT Gorbachev raises the issue of distribution of power between the center and the republics. Who favors including this point? The results are 566 for, 1,377 against, 59 abstain.

1532 GMT

LD1212165189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1532 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies afternoon session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

At 1532 GMT Gorbachev says that all the machines were working, but a manual count in Osipov's sector can still be held.

At 1533 GMT it is noted that there have been proposals about changes in democratic centralism. Deputies are asked to vote on this issue as well.

At 1535 GMT 513 deputies vote for the issue, 1407 vote against, 74 abstain.

At 1536 GMT a vote is called on Article 7 regarding the Komsomol. It is asked whether this should be included under point 3?

At 1539 GMT 523 deputies vote for this issue, 1396 vote against, 64 abstain.

At 1540 GMT Gorbachev says that Sakharov's point should also be voted on. The proposal is to exclude all articles which today contradict perestroyka. Gorbachev says that Sakharov apparently means excluding articles which contadict economic restructuring.

At 1542 GMT 477 deputies vote for, 1415 vote against, 80 abstain. Sakharov's proposal is rejected.

At 1544 GMT Gorbachev mentions, Krayko's proposal of the previous session. He asks Krayko if he understood him right. Gorbachev suggests leaving Krayko's proposal until later during the debate. Krayko is shown shouting something from the hall. Gorbachev says that Krayko wants the vote to take place now. However, point 3 is under discussion now, and Krayko's proposal can be discussed later. Krayko assents.

At 1547 GMT Deputy Lopatin repeats his proposal. He proposes making changes and addenda to the USSR Constitution.

At 1549 GMT Lukyanov explains that his commission discussed all these issues thoroughly. It was decided that first significant laws should be passed, and then the changes in the constitution should be made.

At 1550 GMT Deputy Lopatin says that he is proposing studying constitutional issues after passing major laws.

At 1553 GMT a vote is taken on Lopatin's proposal. A deputy says that the voting machine is not working properly in the Belorussian deputies' section. Another deputy says that over 100 votes are being lost every time a vote is taken. 398 deputies vote for, 1440 vote against, and 155 abstain in the vote on Lopatin's proposal.

At 1554 GMT Gorbachev asks for all the deputies to register, so that the machine can be checked. There is discussion as to which buttons need to be pressed to do this.

At 1557 GMT it is decided that the third point on the agenda is to be left as it stands. The test registration on the voting machine is now taken, with the deputies all pressing the "for" button. It shows 1973 deputies to be present. Then the deputies are asked to all press the "against" button. A deputy says that his card does not work in any of the machines.

At 1605 GMT Gorbachev says that the defects are not having a serious bearing on the result. However, clearly the engineers will have to solve the problems.

At 1607 GMT Deputy Goncharov says that he is a teller and that this problem can be solved by ocunting all those whose voting cards are not working. Then their votes can be counted manually.

At 1608 GMT Gorbachev agrees that deputies can vote by show of hands if their cards are not working. Gorbachev asks if point 4 can be left intact. It is.

At 1610 GMT remarks about point 5 are requested.

At 1611 GMT Deputy Zaslavskiy says that the 9 June decision about provisional rights of deputies should be incorporated in point 5. For instance, his letters to Nenashev, head of Gosteleradio, have gone unanswered. Other deputies have also faced such problems.

At 1612 GMT Deputy Davituliani protests that his point has been ignored.

At 1613 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy says that the deputies are being asked to approve a law on recall of deputies when there still is no law on the status of deputies.

At 1614 GMT Lukyanov says that the Supreme Soviet examined this, and that the law on status was given precedence there.

At 1615 GMT Deputy Travkin says that the law should be passed immediately—presumably the law on deputies' status. This law is a basis for legislation by the republics.

At 1616 GMT Deputy Grishchuk says that the law on deputies' status and recall should probably be examined in parallel.

1617 GMT

LD1212181789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1617 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies afternoon session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

An unidentified deputy says that a draft law on deputies' status already exists, so the May session of the Supreme Soviet should examine it. An Uzbek deputy says that this is a most important issue, because many deputies had their rights impinged upon in the past. A different deputy says that the law on recall should not be passed until the law on deputies' status is passed.

At 1621 GMT Deputy Zubkov from Rostov says that the deputies must make sure that a law on deputies' status is passed immediately, especially if a draft law already exists. Another deputy agrees, adding that separate laws for deputies in lower-ranking soviets could be passed by union republics. Deputy Solovlev says deputies must be free to decide how they work. Deputy Burbulis from Sverdlovsk says that many Supreme Soviet deputies are not involved in committees and commissions which have been working on the draft law on the status of peoples' deputies.

At 1628 GMT Deputy Martirosyan raises the issue of military deputies. He proposed reducing the number of generals, and now there are proposals that he should be forced to resign from the army.

An unidentified deputy says that the Supreme Soviet has already discussed the issue for 1 and ½ days without result. No more time should be wasted.

At 1632 GMT Gorbachev calls a vote on point 5 of the agenda, as originally proposed. An unidentified deputy says that the two issues of deputies' status and recall should be voted on at the same time to avoid duplication. So only one law should be created to cover both matters.

At 1635 GMT there is a vote on point 5 as originally proposed: 1658 for, 296 against and 33 abstain.

At 1638 GMT there is a vote on including deputies' status in point 5 of agenda: 1750 for, 181 against, 17 abstain. So deputies' status is included in the agenda.

Gorbachev says the issue of recall is also automatically included in the agenda. One issue remains—Travkin's proposal. At 1644 GMT a vote is taken: 869 for, 955 against.

At 1645 GMT after an interval, Gorbachev says that it is 1600 local time (1300 GMT). Gorbachev asks about point 6 of agenda.

Deputy Plotnieks from Baltics, proposes to exclude point 6 and 7 because they infringe on republican rights.

Deputy Bichkauskas from Vilnius says the law on constitutional supervision has not been passed at the Supreme Soviet so the issue should be removed from the agenda. Deputy Levashev says he also believes that points 6 and 7 should be excluded from agenda.

At 1655 GMT deputy Golik from the RSFSR says the Committee for Constitutional Supervision must be discussed here.

But deputy Shekhovtsov believes that republican laws on constitutional supervision should be subordinated to the union law, as this would be in line with international experience.

Deputy Aksnis retorts that the Committee for Constitutional Supervision is vi[illegible] and should be set up; republican sovereignty must be limited anyway.

At 1700 GMT Uoka from Lithuania says the following: We regard ourselves as a sovereign state and will not give up our sovereignty. Astrauskas is not ill, it is a lie, rather the Lithuanian delegation did not want to trust him. Our delegation will not take part in electing a constitutional supervision committee.

1703 GMT

LD1212184189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1703 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

Gorbacahev proceeds to give explanations about this misunderstanding. An unidentified deputy reprimands Deputy Uoka for bad behavior.

At 1708 GMT another deputy suggests that the functions of the committee should be specified more precisely. First, the Brezhnev constitution must be rewritten and a constitutional mechanism for protecting minorities should be developed too, he believes.

At 1712 GMT Deputy Yorga from Moldavia says: I support the Baltic delegation. What is the point in having duplicate constitutions in republics simulating the union constitution? Republics and the union should coexist on the basis of accords. Those in the hall applaud.

Deputy Dzharimov adds that whatever constitution they have, it is their constitution and it needs supervision.

At 1717 GMT Gorbachev says that Deputy Semenov wants to know whether committees of constitutional supervision are being set up in the Baltics.

Deputy Palm from Estonia speaks from the rostrum answering the question. In Estonia such a committee is being set up. He clarifies procedural matters. In general, the Baltic peoples think that their status has not been definitively determined. Palm believes that the law may be used as a weapon in political struggle but if the republics had a right to veto, any abuses would be ruled out.

At 1723 GMT Roy Medvedev says that voting on this issue should require three-quarters quorum.

Deputy Burlatskiy says the idea of the Committee for Supervision has been distorted. He speaks about the corresponding structure in the United States. He adds: We know who included Article 6 in our constitution and one day that name will be named. Why should we have a committee for supervising an obsolete constitution? The voting should be postponed.

At 1729 GMT a deputy from Chita says such a committee should be set up for the sake of the RSFSR.

Deputy Blokhin from Moldavia notes that one should not forget that there are national minorities in republics, too, such as Russians, and they need protection.

Then Deputy Yarovoy from Tallin speaks about the election laws in Estonia which discriminate against minorities, along with other laws. He believes that constitutional supervision is required.

At 1734 GMT deputy Kogan from Tallin states that a committee should have been set up at the First Congress, because the Baltics have lost even those few civil rights they had earlier. They seem to be giving in to blackmail again. The Russian polulation in Tallinn boycotted the elections he explains. Are you waiting for another Karabakh, he asks? Do you want more refugees? We must adopt the law on constitutional supervision, he concludes.

1738 GMT

LD1212192989

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1738 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow. Gorbachev calls on the audience to calm down. He asks whether they should stop the discussion? A vote by show of hands supports this idea.

At 1740 GMT Gorbachev sums up the options regarding the law on supervision. There is some discussion concerning Medvedev's proposal on voting by large majority.

At 1743 GMT the recorded relay becomes unmonitorable for 8 minutes.

At 1751 GMT Gorbachev gives clarifications about Astrauskas, who is simply ill. He says Comrade Uoka should be more careful when accusing anybody of lying. This remark causes a commotion in the hall. Deputy Bobrin says that Uoka has insulted all deputies and should apologize. Deputy Uoka from the rostrum gives an explanation. He says he saw Astrauskas here today, he was not ill. Various deputies condemn Uoka for his remarks about Astruskas.

At 1800 GMT there is a vote on including the draft law on constitutional supervision in the agenda: for 1595, against 437, abstained 42.

At 1805 GMT there is a vote on including point 6 in the agenda: for 474, against 1511, abstained 54.

Point 7 is included too, without voting.

At 1808 GMT Deputy Demidov from Leningrad speaks on point 8 and nominates Lukyanov as coreporter on organized crime. Deputy Gubin seconds Lykyanov's nomination. Deputy Solntsev says the shadow economy should also be discussed. Another deputy wants the issue of cooperatives to be discussed. Deputy Shchelkanov wants crime among the military to be included in point 8. Another unidentified deputy suggests that the situation in the militia should be examined.

At 1814 GMT Deputy Korniyenko says that discipline and crime in general need examination. Deputy Sorokin suggests the idea of reports by procurator general and internal affairs minister.

At 1816 GMT Sakharov says that because corruption is an integral part of crime, it should also be discussed.

Deputy Umarkhodzhayev from Uzbekistan complains about procedural matters.

At 1821 GMT an unidentified deputy says that leaders who have tolerated the highest crime rate in their republics should give explanations. Gorbachev agrees that crime is a very serious issue.

At 1823 GMT there is a vote on point 8: for 1918, against 95, abstained 26.

At 1828 GMT Gorbachev comments on the proposals voiced. He says most issues will be debated anyway, such as the shadow economy.

At 1830 GMT Sorokin from Kuybyshev insists that his proposal (on reports by procurator general and interior minister) be put to a vote. For 1785, against 185, abstained 32.

At 1835 GMT Gorbachev reads out a note from the audience criticizing Uoka. Then he reads Uoka's memorandum which is very defiant.

At 1837 GMT Landsbergis gives more detail on the case. Astrauskas was not a people's deputy, he lost elections. Yesterday Astrauskas was not ill and it appears that Gorbachev was misled. Gorbachev asks why he did not protest in the morning? Landsbergis does not understand the question.

Akhromeyev suggests that any honest man should apologize for bad behavior.

At 1842 GMT Brazauskas says Astrauskas in not ill. He called Lukyanov last week although he did not have the right to be among the presidium. However, Lukyanov said it did not matter. So the issue could have been solved earlier; Mikhail Sergeyevich was misinformed.

Shapovalenko says Uoka used too harsh words.

At 1845 GMT Gorbachev announces a 20-minute break.

1847 GMT

LD1212214489

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1847 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

After the break Kirillov says that yesterday he overheard a conversation in which Gorbachev was misinformed about Astrauskas. This causes a commotion in the hall.

At 1848 GMT Baranov from Leningrad says that the status of commissions should be determined.

At 1850 GMT deputy Alksnis says that Procurator Katushev should be listened to on the Tbilisi events as the investigation has been completed. A film by Leningrad television should be shown to deputies, he says.

At 1851 GMT Deputy Igityan from Armenia recaps the adoption of the decision on Nagorno-Karabakh which has not been recognized by the Armenian people. He says the decision has aggravated the situation and the siege is continuing. Armenian deputies demand a clarification of this undemocratic decision, he says.

At 1853 GMT Maltsev says: we were instructed by the chairman to give a political evaluation of the Afghan events. We are ready, he says.

At 1854 GMT Shapovalenko says the issue of privileges should be not only listened to but discussed as well.

At 1857 GMT deputy Buachidze from Georgia says some members of the military are telling lies about the Tbilisi events. We need to look into things in a quiet atmosphere, he maintains.

Deputy Sychev from Leningrad says the Tbilisi events have been represented in a biased way. Investigators should speak, too, he says.

At 1900 GMT Gromov suggests that after Sobchak's report representatives of the Military Procuracy should speak.

At 1901 GMT Sobchak says the status of parliamentary commissions should be included on the agenda. He says that the Supreme Soviet decision on eliminating the siege in trans-Caucasus and its implementation should be checked. Representatives of the Military Procuracy should be given the floor. A KGB film on the Tbilisi events should be shown, he says.

Deputy Adzhiyev says a report on Afghanistan should be included.

At 1905 GMT deputy Ismailov says the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh need not be included, it has already been examined. Such a proposal is an attempt to deflect the discussion from its proper course. The Armenian decision on including Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia's composition is a scandal. He says deputy Igitayn is bent on provocations and insulting the Azeri people. He should offer a public apology.

An unidentified deputy proposes an examination of the issue of rallies, demonstrations and the use of internal troops.

At 1909 GMT Gorbachev proposes closing discussion on point 9. Voting is done by show of hands.

At 1912 GMT an unidentified deputy says the Gdlyan commission is not prepared to discuss its conclusions.

Gorbachev then sums up the proposals. A deputy from the commission on international affairs on Afghan matters says they have received all the documents. Shevardnadze spoke at the sessions of the commission twice and his speeches were published. However, the subject is so enormous that they still need about 2 weeks to complete the work.

At 1919 GMT Gorbachev reiterates the proposals and voting on point 9 in its original form takes place: for 1983, against 41, abstained 6.

At 1924 GMT Gorbachev reads out written proposals to point 9. There is discussion on whether the military procurator should give a report on the Tbilisi events, although such a report would be illegal. Sobchak says that legally the case has not been closed and no lawyer should make any statements about it. Moiseyev retorts that Sobchak gave interviews on Leningrad where he made accusations, so he has already acted illegally. A Baltic deputy from the Tbilisi commission says a military procuracy should not speak.

At 1932 GMT there is a vote on a military procuracy report: for 1467, against 504, abstained 44.

At 1937 GMT Gorbachev tries to clarify the situation with the Afghan commission. Maltsev says the commission is ready. Another deputy says the commission is not ready. There follows a vote on including the report on the political evaluation of the Afghanistan events in the agenda: for 1175, against 792, abstained 54.

1944 GMT

LD1212215389

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1944 GMT on 12 December continues its recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies session from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow. There is voting on including the report on the commission for privileges in the agenda: for 1665, against 272, abstained 56.

At 1950 GMT Gorbachev reads out a note from lawyers saying that legal matters cannot be solved by voting.

At 1951 GMT Deputy Semenko from the floor says that any discussion of the Tbilisi events prior to court trial is illegal. Sukharev disagrees saying that the investigator and procurator can decide on whether the issue can be debated.

An unidentified deputy from the floor insists that the report on the Gdlyan commission should be discussed. There were mass repressions in Uzbekistan.

At 1956 GMT Kogan asks why live relays from the congress have been discontinued? Gorbachev explains that this was done to maintain labor discipline. He says there are to be 2 hours live every day, then recordings, between 1800 and 2400 hours every day for the stipulated 10 days.

At 1959 GMT Gorbachev reads written proposals on the commission on Meskhetian Turks and the commission in Moldavian events. A deputy speaks about the commission's work. Another deputy suggests Procurator

Sukharev ought to investigate the Moldavian strikes. Gorbachev says that deputies ought to vote on whether to hear the report of the commission on Moldavia: for 268, against 1581, abstained 80.

At 2008 GMT Gorbachev asks whether an account of the work of the constitutional commission ought to be heard by deputies. The commission is getting down to serious work now and it is not timely yet to hear an account of what it has been done to date. He says some time ought to be set aside every day to discuss urgent questions.

Deputies then vote on whether Ryzhkov's report, yet to be heard, can be held to compensate for the fact that there will be no report by the Constitutional Commission. For 365, against 1518, abstained 31.

At 2018 GMT Gorbachev gives an account of three proposals: to have time set aside every day to discuss urgent questions; to work every day till 1900 hours and to set one day aside for the work of the commissions. He says that all three are accepted. Bichkauskas suggests the Ribbentrop-Molotov commission report ought to be heard before reports due to be given by other commissions.

Deputy Lazarenko suggests an ethics commission ought to be set up.

An unidentified deputy says that even though Article 6 will not be debated, there ought to be a nationwide referendum on this article. Another deputy suggests it would be good to have a list of deputies' proposals made during the congress; it would show which were acted on and which were rejected and why.

At 2025 GMT a female deputy wants to read out an appeal from women, by way of procedure concerning the deliberations of the congress. All issues on the agenda are important, but the most important thing to do is to work out measures to improve the economy. This is what women deputies want, she says.

Kugultinov says that deputies should be more disciplined and not go over the time alloted. He suggests beginning at 0900 and ending at 1800 so that they can go to the theater listen to music and be cultural.

Gorbunov proposed that every day congress ought to work till all matters are resolved, no matter how long it takes every day. Let us not decide this in advance, replies Gorbachev. The matter is put to a vote: for 1631, against 172, abstained 36. Deputies then vote on whether the question of standing orders ought to be heard immediately after the report by the Credentials' Commission: for 1265, against 464, abstained 58.

Gorbachev says that if Gorbunov's proposal is to be acted on then they ought now think a bit whether to hear the Credentials' Commission, Ryzhkov's report and the secretariat's report today after a small break.

Deputies vote on what to hear first—the Credentials' Commission or the report on organized crime. Those in favor of hearing the organized crime report before the Credentials' Commission report: 553, against 1195, 50 abstentions.

Deputies then vote on Bichkauskas' proposal that the report of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Commission ought to be heard prior to the report of the Constitutional Supervision Commission. For 353, against 1364—Bichkauskas' proposal is thrown out.

Deputies then vote on whether standing orders should be discussed right after the report of the Credentials' Commission? for 780, against 979, abstained: 12.

Kugultinov's amendment is then put to the vote—to start at 0900 and end at 1800 hours local time. Preference is given to 1000 hours starting time and 1900 hours finishing time. Kugultinov withdraws his proposal and there is no result.

The recorded relay ends.

Excerpts of Afternoon Debates

LD1312030189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1451 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Proceedings of the Second Congress of People's Deputies afternoon session in the Kremlin on 12 December—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Gorbachev] I will ask the congress for its opinion now.

I think that you and I will do this. We should, moreover, start with what the meeting of representatives, of deputies' groups submitted, and then examine all the amendments, comrades, as well. We should do this. You and I are obliged to do this. And so, I ask people to get ready.

[Shchelkanov] Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like to raise a point of information.

[Gorbachev] No, no points of information. If the Congress agrees to it, we shall allow points of information in accordance with the procedures, or we shall... just a minute. Well, a deputy is asking... shall we give him the floor for points of information? All right, there has been a request. I shall put it to a vote as to whether the opportunity should be given to the deputy to speak, on a point of information.

[Deputy] Shchelkanov, Leningrad.

[Gorbachev] I am asking you to vote who is in favor of satisfying his request. Hands up. Put them down. Who is against? Comrades, should we count or use the machine? I can tell you that I cannot definitely say. Thus, I am asking you to vote on the request of Deputy Shchelkanov to take the floor on a point of information. Perhaps we will give him a minute rather than putting it to the vote. It's up to you. Well, you've been saved by the machine, Comrade Shchelkanov. [voice heard asking time allocated] One minute.

[Shchelkanov] One minute is enough to give all the information. Comrade deputies, I have been granted 1 minute. This is all about political speculation, overhastiness, and so on. Statistical sociological data in the course of 1 minute.

Moscow, on 1 Dec, 1989, in favor of abolishing Article 6: 70 percent; 46 percent of these in favor of doing it immediately; 23 against. This is in accordance with the facts of a special information bulletin.

Leningrad, 10 Dec, 1989, from a poll selected from constituencies' electoral rolls: 71.9 percent for immediate abolition; 14.7 against. Among the 14.7 against, only 2.6 percent of the total number are in favor of preserving the existing one.

And the final point of information, comrade deputies of the Supreme Soviet. When the Supreme Soviet voted to submit this question to the Congress, the voting was 198 to 173. You should know this. And there was only three votes short of a quorum. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] We agreed that there would be no applause. Because this section of members of congress began to applaud when loud applause was heard from the other side. Comrade Shchelkanov, that is all. That is all. When aplause rang out from the other side there were requests from here to cease the applause. And so, we put an end to the applause and we should not put pressure on another... That is all, that is all, sit down please. The Congress is in session here and it determines the standing orders here.

Comrades, I put to a vote the proposal submitted by the meeting of representatives of deputies' groups on the inclusion on the agenda of the question, point three, with the following wording: on making changes and additions to the USSR Constitution, the Basic Law of the USSR, on questions of the electoral system. [passage omitted]

[Deputy Ucka] Esteemed deputies, I shall speak in moral categories.

[Gorbachev] Introduce yourself.

[Uoka] Deputy Uoka, Kazimeras, from Lithuania. It was said at the assembly and conferences of representatives yeserday that we must wait, that the federation will yet reveal its advantages and that, ultimately, all republics will be satisfied. But we in Lithuania think that we acceded—the conditions of the accession are still being studied, the commission on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact has yet to clarify whether it was an accession or an occupation—but let us assume that Lithuania acceded to the USSR. Then, at the assembly and conference of representatives yesterday there was obviously an attempt to substitute the union for the state, an attempt to substitute the federation [for the state]. The federation and the union are not it: We consider ourselves a soverign state and reserve that right for ourselves. And if we are talking about trust, then that trust does not exist, forgive me. How can we bring it here? The Lithuanian delegation represents the culture of millennia of one of the peoples of this large union, and we cannot put that culture at risk. One such small lie has happened right now, here in this hall—over a trifle, but we cannot show trust, because of that lie as well.

It was reported today that, because of the illness of Lithuanian President Astrauskas, he could not be present here, and that I was sitting in the presidium in his place because of that. No, he was present; he was sitting here in the hall until lunch; he wasn't ill at all. Comrade Gorbachev was simply too modest to state that the Lithuanian Government at present is not democratically elected; and the Lithuanian delegation, which was elected democratically, now stands between it and Moscow; and the delegation simply did not trust the Lithuanian president—he lost at the elections, he was not elected democratically. If there are lies over such trifles, how can we be trusting over big matters? The Lithuanian delegation will not participate in any way in the elections of this constitutional committee and will, probably, not recognize it.

[Gorbachev] Fine. I think that the question regarding how we used the information concerning comrade Astrauskas' illness—incidentally, that cause was given at the conference of representatives yesterday, and there...

[Lukyanov—interrupting] It was given.

[Gorbachev] It was given. No, no, no, comrades! I received that yesterday. It was heard yesterday, and nobody refuted it, nor did they today, and nobody sent anything. Well, in general, let us look into who gave the information to us—to us. Incidentally, he wasn't in the presidium. Yes, there is something here. If I were in Comrade Uoka's place, I wouldn't be in a hurry to make such accusations of lying. That is too much, and I think he should think a bit about his conclusions and assessments. [passage omitted]

[Kogan] Esteemed comrade deputies, esteemed colleagues, I have decided to take up some more of our precious time by addressing you, although to my mind the issue was clear. I have to remind you that the first congress already voted on the issue of setting up a Committee of Constitutional Compliance [komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora] and at that time it expressed itself unequivocally in favor of it. A boycott by 90 deputies, who at that moment very ostentatiously left the room, and—forgive me—the softness of our chairman who yielded to that blackmail prevented us from setting up the committee already then. [applause]

In the meantime we attained great successes in the cause of democratization of our country. If we used to call one constitution Stalin's and another one Brezhnev's, then in creating—forgive me—Gorbachev's constitution we have lost even those civil rights we already had. [voice in halls says, "not true."]

No, it is true. If some comrades who have spoken here say they have not lost anything, that concerns only them. Unfortunately, we have.

Furthermore, we have examples of many laws which flout equally Soviet Union's international obligations and the international human rights treaty. We have gained fame, in a manner of speaking, in Western Europe by adopting residence requirements and taking a step back toward the Middle Ages. Finally, we are yet again yielding to blackmail and preparing to again wreck the adoption of a law on Committee of Constitutional Compliance. It is urgently needed.

I would remind you again that the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic's law on elections has been twice ruled, contrary to the Constitution on the first occasion and invalid on the second [as heard]. Nevertheless, elections under this invalid law—which at the Presidium Comrade Ryuytel had promised to put in order but then did not do so and did not even attempt to do so—under this law elections have been held which were boycotted by the Russian-speaking population in the city of Tallinn, since this population saw no way of complying with the Constitution other than not taking part in unconstitutional elections which, by the way, were also full of all manner of violations. Out of 190,000 Russian-speaking voters in the city of Tallinn, some 160,000 did not take part in these elections.

You want to drag this issue out even further? You want the situation to become even more critical? Forgive me, dear comrades, but does it take the Karabakh option every time before you start thinking about things? Why do you start thinking only after blood begins to run, after we get hundreds of thousands of refugees and hundreds of people killed? Are the demonstrations in Moscow by Meskhetian Turks left without roofs over their heads not enough for you? Are the refugees who roam all around the union without work, without food and without roofs over their heads not enough for you? Why are you dragging this out? Allright, I am letting off steam, if this has offended someone I can apologize to them, but I would like to tell you one more time. Draging these issues out is inadmissible. If we are being told we are building a law-governed state and at the same time everyone wrecks the Constitution any way he likes and does whatever suits him, that is no good at all and that way we will build nothing.

I propose that we support the agenda and vote in favor of electing the Committee for Constitutional Compliance and in favor of adopting a law on constitutional compliance in the USSR. Thank you for you attention. [applause] [passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] The decision is adopted. In other words, we shall vote by name. Comrade Rubtsov, chief of the secretariat of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has reported to me now that Comrade Astrauskas rang up Comrade Yanovich, head of department at the Soviet, on the eve of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session to say that because of his state of health, he would not be at the presidium session or at the congress. It is on this that our information was built, and it was on this basis that the matter was discussed at the conference of representatives, and that is how it was decided. Therefore, Comrade Uoka—I want to draw his attention to it once more—must look into things before making accusations of lying; and I consider it my duty to answer this, for such acts, so to speak, must not be ignored. [indistinct commotion in hall] That is his business. That is a matter for his conscience and decency.

Okay, let us continue our work. So, comrades, we have two proposals. The first Supreme Soviet proposal and of the assembly of representatives of groups of deputies, which consists of including the matter of the draft law...

[Deputy Bobrik—interrupting] It's for him to apoligize. After all, it isn't just you that he's insulted. Please, switch on the microphone.

[Gorbachev] One moment, comrades. You have the information. Everything else is a matter for Comrade Uoka, but we shall stay sitting. Okay, please switch on the third microphone. What do you want to say? Go ahead.

[Bobrik] Constituency 353, Deputy Bobrik. Such a statement by the comrade in this hall does not insult you: it insults the whole body of deputies.

[Gorbachev] That's what I think.

[Bobrik] Therefore, we demand that he apologizes before making a statement which implies that each of us bears responsibility. Therefore, I request an official apology, and I am supported by other deputies.

[Gorbachev] Be seated, be seated.

[Uoka] Esteemed comrades, yesterday, when I was told that I would have to sit in this presidium. they told me that it was just because the Lithuanian delegation does not trust Astrauskas; and I saw Astrauskas here up to lunchtime, he was sitting. [indistinct voice from hall] I don't know. Nobody said anything of his illness until my speech today. Please, let the senior member of the Lithuanian delegation provide information. [indistinct commotion in hall]

[Gorbachev] One moment, one moment, senior member, I'll let him go first, then you; go ahead. [passage omitted: Mylinkov from Leningrad criticizes Uoka]

[Unnamed senior member of Lithuanian delegation] Comrades, I ask you not to complicate the issue. When we were preparing for the first congress, our group of deputies was told that we needed to discuss who from each delegation—meaning from our Lithuanian delegation—would be in the presidium. At that time we elected people's deputy Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Central Committee.

But now, there were no indications. [as heard] We proposed people for committees and commissions, the editorial commission, and so on. I even asked Supreme Soviet staff how it was regarding the presidium, because it would be difficult to get together afterwards, so we also needed to decide something. Nobody knew anything. Therefore, we voted and elected Uoka.

Then, yesterday, at the assembly of reprsentatives, somebody, not from our delegation—either from the Ukraine or somebody else, I can't remember now—said that there would be a man in the presidium who was not a people's deputy, although he is a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Then Deputy Bickauskas spoke and expressed the view that we had had elections—I said the same thing—and Sergey Mikhaylovich [surname not given] confirmed that Uoka had been elected from our delegation. Mikhail Sergeyevich even asked whehter Uoka was present in the hall. Uoka got up to speak—I know him. That is how it all ended yesterday, and I think that Uoka was included in a normal manner at the assembly of representatives. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] One moment, they are demanding that you give an answer on how you assess what has happened today.

[Lithuanian senior deputy] This I [indistinct interjection from hall] No, no, not at all, because yesterday evening...

[Gorbachev—interupts] Do you know that your chairman of presidium is ill?

[Lithuanian senior deputy] No, I don't know. I rang up first secretary Brazauskas yesterday evening and said that although the initial plan had been that Astrauskas should be included, our group of deputies had voted for Uoka and it had also been decided at the assembly of representatives to substitute Uoka. Brazauskas promised me that it was certainly a little bit awkward, but he would warn Astrauskas and reassure him. He thought that everything was normal.

[Gorbachev] Again you're trying to get away from the platform early. How do you assess all of that?

[Lithuanian senior deputy] I think that, perhaps, Uoka got a little bit exicited, but we elected, we were present—the Lithuanian delegation, there was a quorum, we voted twice, and we elected Uoka. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] That's all, comrades, that's enough, that's enough. [passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] I have still some information to give you since deputies are feeling dissatisfaction from an incident which has happened here: [reading from a note] To the Congress Presidium. USSR People's Deputy Uoka used the term "lie" in describing an action by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That puts the chairman in a position which is defined as impeachment [previous word in English] in the United States. We do not have such a constitutional category, but this does not lessen Comrade Uoka's moral responsibility for his statement. I propose that responsibility for Comrade Uoka's statement be put to the vote. Deputy Kozyrev.

At the same time, Comrade Uoka has come up and handed me this memorandum: If anybody can explain to me for what I should apologize, I will gladly do so. But then you too, esteemed Chairman, must explain why yesterday, at the assembly of representatives, you recognized me as a member of the Congress Presidium, not because of Astrauskas' illness, but as a result of the choice by the Lithuanian delegation. Now, I simply do not understand for what I am supposed to apologize. [indistinct murmuring in hall]

In other words...[changes mind] Go ahead.

[Landsbergis] Deputy Landsbergis, constituency 245. Esteemed Chairman, esteemed deputies! There have been several attempts to explain the real cause of this incident, but it is, in my opinion, not totally complete. That is why it is, indeed, dragging on like this. I want to clarify once more the chain of events.

We elected Uoka from the Lithuanian delegation long ago. It was all clear and obvious to us. Yesterday, at the assembly of representatives, it emerged that there was another proposal on who should be on the Presidium from Lithuania. Our deputy, Professor Genzyalis I think, if I am not mistaken, asked, on this point of constitutional procedure, whether a person who has not been elected can sit in the presidium of an elective body. He was given the answer that, of course no, he cannot. Then he explained more precisely why he had asked that question. Because Comrade Astrauskas, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, is not a people's deputy; he lost in the elections. Therefore, they recalled that we had a decision on that point; that it was proposed that Deputy Uoka sit on the Presidium from Lithuania—incidentally, he is chairman of the Union of Workers of Lithuania, also a chairman. And on that point everything was clear. Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich simply asked whether Uoka was there. He was. That meant it was all clear. There was no illness of Comrade Astrauskas' yesterday.

Therefore, today's explanation was unexpected for all of us. Evidently, somebody misled Mikhail Sergeyevich—either this morning or last night, we don't know which. None the less, an untruth—a non-correspondence to the truth, was heard from his lips; especially as we could see Comrade Astrauskas here today.

Of course, our colleague, Deputy Uoka, expressed himself crudely, and I think that he should not have done it. However, the actual fact that the reason given did not correspond to the truth is a fact. Thank you for your attention.

[Gorbachev] One moment, [word indistinct] You say that I said all that in the morning, at the opening, relying on what was known to me. But, no questions or protests of any kind followed from you. At the same time, you didn't clarify it, but used a suitable moment to make an accusation of lying against the chairman. How do you view that? To what extent are you principled? Doesn't it happen here that when something affects or offends us, we are not completely sincere; that if something is not quite right, we do not feel at home here?

[Landsbergis] I don't completely understand your question.

[Gorbachev] Okay, you don't understand, fine. [passage omitted: Akhromeyev on the virtues of an honest man]

[Gorbachev] Listen, maybe we will close the incident, all the same? I think we must give Comrade Brazauskas the floor.

[Brazauskas] Esteemed deputies! Permit me to speak as well, because it concerns our republic, and our delegation directly. At present, both yesterday and today, Comrade Astrauskas has not been ill. However, since he is not here, I have to say, probably the words which he would say himself if he were in this hall. Last week Comrade Astrauskas called Comrade Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, and, as a decent man, foreseeing the possibility of such an incident, said that he was not a deputy, a people's deputy of the Union—of course, the Presidium knows all this—and that he hardly had the right to be in the Presidium, where all the chairmen of presidiums of supreme soviets of the republics are present. Anatoliy Ivanovich—I'm conveying his words—Anatoliy Ivanovich said that it was not important. As far as I know, he telephoned twice on this point and asked and put that question. Yesterday evening we flew in, together with Astrauskas. He is healthy, of course. However, I imagine that this is purely a mistake, and Mikhail Sergeyevich was given incorrect information. True, he was ill for a time last week, but that was last week, and on Monday, yesterday, he was completely healthy. I would ask all deputies to end this discussion. Comrade Astrauskas raised the question in time, and I think it should have been settled before the assembly of representatives of people's deputies, and the man should not have been placed in such an awkward position (?of conscience). [indistinct voices from hall]

[Gorbachev] The conversation is about something else. Can't you notice?

[Brazauskas] No. Well, I notice. Of course, for Deputy Uoka, when he speaks, he will probably say it himself, but since the question is being discussed, I should like simply to say, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that you were incorrectly informed on that point. That is what I wanted to say. Simply, Mikhail Sergeyevich was incorrectly informed, probably by somebody in the apparatus, about Comrade Astrauskas' illness.

Gorbachev Address on Article 6

LD1212191989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1451 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Speech by President Mikhail Gorbachev at the afternoon session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 12 December—recorded]

[Text] Comrade deputies: Let us get on with our work. Certain deputies took advantage of the interval to remind me that I, when stating the proposals that had been introduced, omitted Deputy Lopatin's proposal to return to the formula of the First Congress. The formula of the First Congress, as you remember, goes like this...or rather, it was the Supreme Soviet's decision on the results of the First Congress, and it said: To submit a proposal on amending the Constitution. Well, as a matter of fact, I think that what Comrade Lopatin reminds us covers precisely the whole discussion in general, one way or another.

Let me say a couple of words on this, and we will start adopting a decision. Yesterday, we devoted perhaps half, if not more, of our working time to this part of the agenda, at the meeting of representatives of deputies' groups, and we discussed everything very thoroughly and carefully. However, the opinion that triumphed —and I think I a not exaggerating that that was the prevailing view of those attending the meeting—was that we must approach the constitutional process very responsibly, very responsibly.

Of course, life, perestroyka, and the changes in all the spheres of life that are taking place will be, and already are, confronting us all the time with new questions that touch upon some or other constitutional provisions. In other words, life, practice, and entering into new forms of life lead to contradictions with certain constitutional provisions. Is this a drama or a tragedy? No, this is a normal process. We are advancing from one state of society and from one system of social and state institutions toward another. It is natural that this process should be accompanied by the necessary changes in the Basic Law, in the Constitution.

Therefore, we tried to find an answer to the issue of how we could combine a respectful attitude to the Constitution and support for the prestige and authority of the Basic Law; for if we, USSR people's deputies, do not care about this, then one can hardly expect others to care more. At the same time, we must act in such a way that this does not become an obstacle or create difficulties for perestroyka processes which are gaining speed and developing, and the pace of events is accelerating.

Properly speaking, our discussions stem from here, and I asked comrades at yesterday's meeting and today not to suspect one another of anything different. These are, perhaps, the contradictions that we must remove by our activity, that of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress. But this should indeed unfold within the framework of a normal constitutional process. In this connection, we had a discussion, and comrades asked me, during the interval they approached me, to bring this thesis to the notice of people's deputies, so that it does not sound formal, so to speak. We have discussed all this very substantially. There was the following approach: If life poses some problems and questions, and they need be solved within the framework of the perestroyka process, including cases when decisions need to be made on some sections or articles, and some amendments should be introduced, then this should be done.

In this sense, it is legitimate to raise any matter, since life is putting these matters forward, and they can be examined within the framework of the normal constitutional process, including Article 6. All those who, one way or another, present their arguments on why they are opposed to doing this, today, at this Congress, including it on the agenda, have one motive: The positions of our party neither spring from nor are supported by this Article. This Article did not exist in the three preceding constitutions. But the party did exist both before the present Constitution and during all the preceding constitutions, and it tackled the tasks which faced it.

Another matter, concerning an assessment, is not now being raised, although we have assessed this activity, and what the party bears responsibility for. All of this has been done by the Central Committee and the whole party. I think society has made a proper assessment. And this courage, this whole process, has shown that this is a mature party, capable of serious conclusions, of criticism, and of answering for the policy which it has proposed and is proposing at the present time. In this manner, the point at issue is that the authority of the party is real, and everyone agrees on this, and its positions and prestige are not supported by this Article.

Therefore, it is another matter whether we can do things in a slapdash way, with a pealing of bells. Let us rather tackle it and create the impression that we shall resolve Article 6 today; that is all, splendid! Tomorrow everything will be clear and fine! I think, when I heard the speech by Comrade Andreyeva, at the Supreme Soviet when we discussed the agenda, she took the floor, and, by the way, our non-party deputy, too. But she was shocked by the discussion and the tone and the concealed text which can be heard during discussion of this matter. I share her position 100 percent that we should not unfold political speculations around this. That is all. But what has come to a head must be tackled, including matters concerning Article 6.

I think it will be voiced, we are approaching the Congress, and the Central Committee and the whole party will find a way for this to correspond to the party's positions, its new functions, as the political vanguard and all that, and for it to reflect the process of dividing functions, which is taking place in the state and of which we are witnesses. So there is no need for us here to draw society into a conflict. Does this remove the question that the party is responsible, that it has to restructure itself, and primarily itself prior to other public and state institutions, if it intends to be the political vanguard, and enjoy authority and support? No! Is this all proceeding normally, or well? Not everything is going well, by a long way!

The party is restructuring itself and is generating policies whose main components, so to speak, society has accepted and adopted at this crucial historical stage. But there still remains much for the party to do so that it can successfully carry out its new functions and enjoy total support from our society. And I think that this does not relieve the party of its responsibilities. But, as everywhere, everything must take place in all aspects of restructuring. After all, We must change everything. At this meeting We said that we must rid this problem of all kinds of speculation. This point of view was heard then and it also prevailed at the Supreme Soviet when we discussed the agenda.

As for matters of ownership—I should like to repeat yet again, comrades—of land, of the division of the functions and powers of the republics and the center, etc. I am not going to say all this again; these matters are so important that if we hold up decisions on these fundamental issues, it would delay restructuring; it is already doing so, comrades. We can say whether or not we are successful in our work, whether or not we are on time, all that can be discussed, but the question should be put like this, that these fundamental issues which affect the fate of the entire country and will determine the general direction we will go—ownership, land, the center, and the republics, the destiny of all our ethnic peoples—all this will be determined by these provisions.

Tell me, can we, the Congress of People's Deputies, say from the rostrum that we are in favor of popular power and that we will do everything to have the people's will present here, both on the rostrum and in making decisions, and then suddenly, on such fundamental issues, pretend that the people's opinion no longer interests us, and that all we have done is put these issues to debate? What kind of position is that? I think that if we follow the path of those proposals—and I am not accusing now, I am reasoning—of putting these issues to the debate without enlisting people's opinions or support or gathering information in society, I think we will make the very greatest mistake in our work, and as a result will lose any respect, which, I think, will grow the more businesslike our attitude is in solving issues. There are no other, we have no differences of principle with you, after all. I said at yesterday's meeting when I reached this point that Gorbachev was starting to propose his arbitration services again to society and to us here.

Well, not arbitration services, but a point of view. Because if we act in that way, we shall unite around the main thing, we shall combine and consolidate all our efforts on the main, the central direction, and get the entire process moving, speed up everything. If we shake things up like that, you understand, and accuse one another, suspect one another, and even stop saying hello to one another, what good is to be expected of that? A medium is needed for perestroyka. Perestroyka needs oxygen, a medium in which those processes will develop normally. That does not mean that we should give to the reactionary or the adventurer, you know. In my opinion we do have a basis. I said that in my introductory speech. We are devoted to the policy of perestroyka, we are in favor of fundamental renewal. And that basis for consolidation exists.

Therefore, comrades, I think that we should simply manifest this sense of responsibility. I am doing this at the request of the deputies who came up and asked that I should convey the gist of the conversations with regard to this section when we got to the amendments to the Constitution. We discussed all that very heatedly. I shall be brief because hours were devoted to that and there were dozens of speeches. Well, now it would seem that I have done everything in order to start upon the decision stage.

Gorbachev Afternoon Remarks at Congress

LD1212153289

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 gmt on 12 December carries a report on the Second Congress of People's Deputies by Igor Zorin. He gives a round-up of proceedings so far at the session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, in which there was discussion of whether to include Article 6 of the USS Constitution in the congress agenda.

Zorin says: "By midday the turn had come to a vote on the third point of the agenda. A short break was called and during the break many deputies came up to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and it was evidently for this reason that he decided to preface the second part of the afternoon with this speech:"

[Gorbachev] "Of course, life, perestroyka and changes in all spheres of life are leading to contradictions with certain constitutional provisions. This is a normal process, for we are proceeding from one condition of society, from one system of social and state institutions to another, and this process will naturally be accompanied by essential changes in the basic law, in th Constitution. We must act in such a way that this is not an obstacle and does not create difficulties for the restructuring processes which are gathering pace, which are unfolding. The course of events is accelerating.

Here, properly speaking, are the roots of our discussion. We have discussed all of this very thoroughly. The positions of our party neither spring from nor are supported by this Article. This Article did not exist in the three preceding constitutions. But the party did exist both before the Constitution and during all the preceding constitutions, and it tackled the tasks which faced it. In this manner, the point at issue is that the authority of the party is real and its positions and prestige are not supported by this Article. It is another matter whether we can therefore do things in a slapdash way, with a banging of drums.

Let us rather tackle it and create the impression that we will resolve Article 6 today, that's all, splendid. Tomorrow everything will be clear and fine. I don't think that we need to unfold political speculations around this. That's all. But what has come to a head must be tackled, including matters concerning Article 6. We are approaching the congress, and the Central Committee and the whole party will find a way for this to correspond to the party's positions, its new functions, as the political vanguard and all that, and for it to reflect the process of dividing functions which is taking place in the state and of which we are witnesses.

The party is restructuring itself and it is generating policies whose main component elements, so to speak, society has equipped itself with at this crucial historic stage. But there remains much for the party to do in order for it to...so that it can successfully carry out its new functions and enjoy total support from our society. But, as everywhere, everything must take place in all aspects of perestroyka. We must change everything. We were saying at this meeting that we must rid this problem of all kinds of speculation. This point of view was heard then and it prevailed at the Supreme Soviet when we were discussing the agenda."

Zorin recalled that the first two points on the agenda were adopted quickly, but "the third became a particular bone of contention. At first 1,071 deputies came out in favor of voting by name on the inclusion of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution in the congress agenda. Then Comrade Gorbachev submitted for a vote the issue of including this article in the agenda. There were 839 deputies who voted in favor of including it; 1,138 against; 56 abstained. Therefore, this issue was not included in the agenda. Although, I will note, Deputy Shchelkanov cited beforehand the results of some sociological surveys and investigations among the electorate in which more than 70 percent favored including this issue on the agenda. Thus, as a result, 1,675 deputies voted for the third point on the agenda. I recall the title of this point: On the introduction of amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution on issues of the electoral system."

Zorin pointed out that two further points on the agenda were discussed and approved by the end of the afternoon session: on the regulations of the congress and the Supreme Soviet and on legisaltive acts concerning the status of a deputy, and of a people's deputy of the USSR in particular. A break was then called.

Congress Debate on Agenda Reported

LD1212154189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1330 GMT on 12 December carries a 6-minute report on the Second Congress of People's Deputies by correspondent Ludmila Semina from the Kremlin. She states that the first day of the congress already shows that the preliminary plan for conducting the congress will not be strictly adhered to, that the discussion on the first issue lasted till lunchtime so that the deputies did not manage to confirm the agenda. She speaks about the draft legislation specifying the status of USSR people's deputies and other issues connected with deputies' activities. During the interval in this discussion Semina interviews Aleksey Ivanovich Kazannik, a deputy from Omsk, a lawyer, who speaks about the importance of establishing a deputy's status, especially for their work on the spot and to ensure a deputy's right to speak. Semina refers to the heated discussion of paragraphs 6 and 7 on the congress agenda, on the draft law on constitutional supervision in the USSR, the election of the committee of constitutional supervision of the USSR. "The deputies from the Baltic republics object to the discussion of that issue at the congress, considering that this is in contradiction to the articles in the Constitution proclaiming the sovereignty of the republic." The voting still has to take place, to be followed by a report by Ryzhkov on measures to make the economy more healthy, the stages in economic reform, and the fundamental approaches in drawing up the 13th 5-Year Plan.

Constitutional Compliance To Be Discussed

LD1212174689 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Appeals for calm were repeatedly made by President Mikhail Gorbachev, who is chairing today's sitting of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, as deputies debated whether to include matters connected with the bill on constitutional compliance and the election of a Committee for Constitutional Compliance on the congress agenda.

The setting-up of the committee was initially raised at the first Congress of People's Deputies (held from May 25-June 5).

At that time, however, the deputies decided to discuss the issue at the second congress out of respect for the stance of the minority, mainly Baltic deputies, who opposed the election of the committee.

Today the Baltic deputies again strongly objected to the inclusion of the bill on constitutional compliance and the election of the committee for constitutional compliance by asserting that they would infringe upon their sovereignty.

Representatives of the non-native population in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, on the contrary, insisted on the inclusion of these issues on the congress agenda. They believe that the committee would be able to prevent encroachments on their rights, something that they say have already taken place precisely because no such committee previously existed.

Deputies referred to republican laws which largely contradict the Soviet constitution as well as international conventions on human rights.

These republics have introduced residence qualifications and norms endorsing discrimination along language lines.

This view was backed by many other deputies. During a roll-call vote, 1595 deputies favoured discussing the law on constitutional compliance, 437 deputies voted against and 42 abstained.

It was also decided to discuss the issue of electing members to the Committee for Constitutional Compliance.

Lukyanov Comments on Pace of Reform

LD1212214289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Dec 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, by unidentified correspondent, in the foyer of the Palace of Congresses on 12 December—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, excuse me, please. What comment would you make on Mikhail Sergeyevich's phrase about the fact that today he agrees that perestroyka—he agrees with the worker from the program "Seven Days" who said that perestroyka in our country is under way, but more decisive measures are needed? So what would you...

[Lukyanov—interrupting] I've actually answered that question. I myself would subscribe to what that worker said. The only way of deepening perestroyka is a decisive onslaught of reform, to quickly, aggressively, but circumspectly carry reform forward.

[Correspondent] But that's just rhetoric.

[Lukyanov] It's not rhetoric at all.

[Correspondent] But where's the specific direction?

[Lukyanov] I can...I want to tell you again, for instance: the decisive and fast adoption of the law on property, on the land, on leasing, on socialist enterprise—these are decisive acts.

[Correspondent] Won't you be too late with the law on leasing if it's only adopted in the spring session, during the period of hard work in the countryside?

[Lukyanov] The law on leasing has been adopted.

[Correspondent] Sorry, I meant the law on land.

[Lukyanov] The law on land could be adopted sooner were it not for the alternative drafts, if it were all completely clear, and so on—maybe in the near future at the session. But the people must voice their opinion on this matter, including the kolkhozniks, the peasants—the peasant who is to shoulder the heavy burden of being a farmer, a lessee and so on. It's no joke!

Ryzhkov Report to Congress Cancelled for 12 Dec

LD1212171189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] We've just received a TASS announcement. Owing to the protracted discussion of the agenda at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the report of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers will not be delivered today.

TASS Reviews Congress' First Day

LD1212193389 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Second Congress of People's Deputies, the Soviet Union's supreme body of power, opened in the Kremlin today.

More than 2,100 deputies and a great many guests gathered in the hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

Opening the congress, President Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised that its main task should be to decide on measures to help rebuild the economy and advance economic reform more successfully.

The entire first day was taken by debates on the Congress agenda. Many items were included without particular objections.

There were arguments, however, on the issue of whether to discuss Article Six of the Soviet Constitution which endorses the Soviet Communist Party's leading role in the Soviet political system.

Those who favoured the discussion said this constitutional provision hinders changes in the political system.

Others argued that Article Six should not be considered separately from other provisions of the fundamental law that also need to be changed.

Summing up the debate, Gorbachev opposed hasty congressional discussion of the issue and the accompanying political speculation.

All amendments to the nation's fundamental law should be introduced within the framework of a normal constitutional process, he said.

By a majority of votes the Congress chose not to discuss Article Six.

Representatives of the three Baltic republics objected to the inclusion of matters connected with the bill on constitutional compliance and the election of a committee for constitutional compliance on the agenda, regarding the bill as a threat to their sovereignty.

This viewpoint, however, was not supported by the majority. Many speakers emphasised that building a rule-of-law state in the USSR is unthinkable without such an important body as the Committee for Constitutional Compliance.

As a result of a roll-call vote, these items were put on the agenda.

It was decided to discuss the results of the work of the commissions set up at the previous congress—on the legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German treaty, assessment of the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan and developments in Tbilisi, and several other issues.

As a result, the following agenda was adopted:

1. On the recognition of the credentials of People's Deputies of the USSR elected after the First Congress of People's Deputies. Report by the Credentials Commission.

2. On measures to rebuild the economy, stages of economic reform and principled approaches to the elaboration of the 13th five-year plan. Report by the USSR Council of Ministers.

3. On introducing changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution on issues of the electoral system.

4. On the status of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

5. On bills determining the status of deputies and other issues connected with activity of deputies.

6. On a bill on constitutional compliance in the USSR.

7. Election of a Committee for Constitutional Compliance of the USSR.

8. On enhancing struggle against organised crime.

9. Reports by commissions formed by the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

The Congress, to remain in session for ten days, will continue work tomorrow morning with a report by the Credentials Commission. Then, as expected, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov will deliver a report on the second item of the agenda.

The recorded proceedings of the Congress will be shown on television after working hours. This decision was prompted by the deplorable experience when the live airing of the First Congress lured people away from their work places and caused substantial damage to the economy.

Congress Resumes Work 13 Dec

LD1312072189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0700 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] At this moment the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies has resumed its work. Reports by the Credentials Commission and the Commission for Regulations, as well as a report by the country's Council of Ministers on measures to improve the economy, will be heard today.

Ryzhkov on Economic Reforms

LD1312103189 Moscow TASS in English 0934 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov described the basis for the normalisation of the Soviet economy to be reform, efficiency and consolidation.

Speaking today at the second Congress of People's Deputies that opened here on Tuesday Ryzhkov delivered a report on the main stages of economic reform and a principled approach to the drawing-up of the 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995).

The prime minister's report is the key item on the agenda of the Congress, which is expected to continue until December 22.

The Congress is attended by more than 2,100 deputies.

Analysing the situation in the Soviet economy, Ryzhkov pointed out that, despite a number of positive economic changes, dissatisfaction with the pace of perestroyka and social tensions are growing in the country. Some people want to speed up the pace of social and economic reforms.

Citing reasons for the current situation, he mentioned that the legal, economic and financial bases lag behind the transition to a new system of economic management. He also noted mistakes and miscalculations that were made during the preparation of serious nationwide measures, specifically during the anti-alcohol campaign.

Commenting on the main provisions of the government's report, Ryzhkov said that after the discussion of various options for economic reform, the government chose a plan offering energetic, but at the same time well-balanced, measures to deepen the reform.

The plan provides for an acccelerated social re-orientation of the economy. Specifically, the share of the national income used for consumption and non-production construction is planned to increase to 89-90 per cent during the first years of the 13th five- year period.

Ryzhkov said some of plans to improve the economy that were discussed by the government were disputable and the government could not agree with them.

These included proposals on the introduction of private property —including land ownership, the large-scale denationalisation of state property, the transition to a rationing system, monetary reform, a six-day workweek, the establishment of a special administrative status in a number of regions and industries, and limitations on the duration of holidays.

Ryzhkov divided the government's economic reform programme into two stages.

The first stage (until 1992), which will combine rigid directive measures and increasing economic levers, will be marked by a set of urgent measures to overcome the budget deficit and the imbalance of the consumer market.

The second stage (1993-1995) will be based on a variety of property ownership forms, their equality and competition, as well as the development of market-oriented relations.

Ryzhkov stressed that although the government does not reject planning and state regulation of the economy, it will rely to an ever greater extent on economic methods—prices, taxes, credit and investment.

Ryzhkov described the adoption of laws on property, land, a single taxation system and on socialist enterprise as a major condition for implmenting the economic reform.

He said the heads of state-run enterprises should be appointed, rather than elected, whereas cooperative and leased enterprises and joint-stock companies may use other methods to resolve personnel issues.

Discussing urgent measures to be taken in 1990, Ryzhkov noted that industrial production would rise by 2.6 per cent, if consumer goods production is included—by 7.6 per cent, and that of the means of production will increase by a mere 0.8 per cent.

The plan for next year envisages considerable growth in consumer goods production—66 billion roubles as against the average annual 17 billion roubles during the last five-year period.

Ryzhkov said this figure is based on structural changes in industry to benefit the people and on the conversion of the military production.

Due to this, the output of goods over the next three years will grow by more than 140 billion roubles, or by 38 per cent, reaching 510 billion roubles in 1992.

Ryzhkov spoke in detail about the supply of foodstuffs to the population.

If no real changes take place in the agro-industrial complex, we cannot expect any improvement in the situation, he said.

He said the Soviet Union will consistently pursue a policy dedicated to overcoming the unprofitability of farms, above all by encouraging contemporary forms of management: lease-holding, cooperative and collective, family and individual contracts by them.

To encourage these new organisational forms, the state will write off the debts of such collective and state farms.

The normalisation of state finance was described by the prime minister as one of the principal conditions for the normal functioning of the economy and the development of economic reform.

He said the task has been set to reduce the state budget deficit, which now amounts to 10 per cent of gross national product, to 2-5.5 per cent of the GNP by 1993.

Ryzhkov said a transition to a single taxation system for enterprises is planned to begin in 1991 and emphasised the important anti-inflation and structural role of the new system.

He also suggested the advisability of introducing the progressive taxation of people's incomes in 1990.

The speaker pointed to the need to carry out a comprehensive pricing reform. The Soviet Government proposes carrying it out stage-by-stage in 1991 and 1992.

Over the same period, the government plans to resolve the issue involving new purchase prices of farm produce.

Speaking about pricing reform, Ryzhkov proposed submitting this issue for nationwide discussion in 1990.

The report emphasised the need for profound changes in the country's credit system. Ryzhkov said that the new conditions will promote the growth of the role of commercial, specialized and industrial banks, change the USSR State Bank's role and increase the activity of the interest policy.

The government proposed creating a new financial control system, with wide powers, to combat the "shadow" economy.

The improvement of the country's currency situation was described by Ryzhkov as basic to normalisation of the economy in 1990, 1991 and 1992.

To this end, he said, the Soviet Union needs to develop exports and overcome the orientation on raw materials, as well as to take steps to sharply reduce importing of products that could be produced domestically.

In his view, the ever increasing external loans could increase the country's economic and political dependence on creditor countries.

Ryzhkov called for the creation of a single market among member-countries of the council for mutual economic assistance.

The Government proposed using current world prices and a freely convertible currency in all trade with these countries starting in 1991.

Ryzhkov dwelt on new approaches to the drawing-up of the 13th five-year plan, specificially a social orientation.

The production of consumer goods is planned to be increased by 100 billion roubles, or 39 percent, by 1995 as compared with 1990.

The sale of foodstuffs to the population in the same year will reach 205-210 billion roubles as against 142 billion in 1989.

The report envisages measures on additional financing for the health system, culture, education, sports and other social programmes.

On the whole, it is planned to increase the national income by 25 per cent over the next five years, Ryzhkov said.

The implementation of the government-proposed measures depends on the social and political atmosphere in society, Ryzhkov said.

He called for the creation of an "atmosphere of confidence, a favourable moral climate and a creative mood."

Further on Ryzhkov Report

LD1312121389 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which opened in Moscow on Tuesday, concentrated today on the main item on the agenda—the government programme to improve the economy. It was presented by Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The government believes that the existing difficulties can be surmounted by the consistent implementation of a two-stage economic reform. The first stage (up to 1992) provides for several emergency measures to do away with the budget deficit and remedy the unbalanced consumer market. The second stage (1993-1995) envisages various forms of ownership, their equality and competition, and the development of market relations. However, the government denounces "recommendations" to denationalise the industry and to revive private ownership.

Improvement of the country's currency situation is part and parcel of the overall programme to improve the economy for the period from 1990 to 1992. Steps will be taken to expand export trade, to overcome its raw materials orientation, and to cut drastically the purchases of goods that can be domestically produced.

The government does not renounce planning and state economic regulation, which will rely increasingly on economic methods: prices, taxes, credits and investments. This is the approach stipulated in the 1991-1995 plan. It provides for the primary satisfaction of Soviet people's material and spiritual requirements. national income is to grow 25 per cent.

As to foreign economic relations, the government intends to use new forms of cooperation, in addition to joint enterprises, to attract foreign capital and set up zones of joint enterprise. The government calls for the formation of a "common market" of socialist member-states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Nikolay Ryzhkov's report will be discussed at congress plenary meetings and in panels.

Boris Gidaspov, chairman of the Credentials Commission, addressed the congress this morning. He informed it on the results of the elections of five new deputies to fill vacancies. The congress ruled the elections valid. Gidaspov also said that six more seats were vacant and that elections have been scheduled to fill them.

According to the Soviet Constitution there should be 2,250 congress deputies.

Journalist: 'Main Event' Is Ryzhkov

LD1312113389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] [Announcer, Vinogradova] Hello, esteemed comrades. Today's "Soyuz" program is presented by Galina Vinogradova. Now we are going to link up with the Kremlin where, as you of course know, the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies is working. Parliamentary correspondent Marina Novitskaya is going to speak with us. Marina, do you read us?

[Novitskaya] Yes, hello, I am ready to tell you about what took place this morning.

[Vinogradova] Yes, please, we are looking forward to this.

[Novitskaya] The session was opened by the Credentials Commission's report. It was made by deputy Gidaspov, the Commission's chairman. He spoke about the recognition of the plenary powers of people's deputies elected after the First Congress. Five people fall into this category, and the Congress adopted a decision endorsing the plenary powers of these deputies.

But of course the main event today and, perhaps, on the entire agenda of the Congress is Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's report. As you perhaps know, it concerns measures aimed at improving the economy, stages of the economic reform, and fundamental approaches to the development of the 13th 5-year plan. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov started with a honest and frank analysis of today's situation in the country and named the causes that had brought it about. They include chronic negative factors which we have inherited, so to speak, shortcomings in the implementation of economic reform and poor adjustment of the economic mechanism.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov did not fail to mention such omissions as the hasty and poorly thought-out anti-alcohol campaign, the inconsistent struggle against non-labor income. It was with a singular sadness that he said that, of late, such sorrowful phenomena as strikes, transport blockades, and other extreme forms had emerged. Here is a figure that he gave: 7.5 million man-days have been lost through strikes alone, this year. But where is a way out of the situation that has arisen? The report was devoted, mainly, to this goal. This is, of course, a serious and voluminous document; the report lasted more than 90 minutes, and I cannot cover in a short report all the aspects of the measures proposed by the government. But I will try to speak about the main points.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov said that after a thorough and profound analysis of many versions of the implementation of the economic reform such a version has been chosen which will make it possible, without returning to the administrative forms of managing the economy, to advance the reform considerably, while making it easier for people to adjust to the new conditions. Ryzhkov stressed that extreme alternatives have been examined, too. The first of them—to give up the reform and return to the administrative system of management. Such a version has been deemed absolutely unacceptable. According to the speaker, that would mean going back, and there is no alternative to the economic reform. A radical version—an immediate and comprehensive transition to market relations—has been examined, too. But, in the government's view, that will bring about an extreme exacerbation of the difficulties facing the country now. The speaker's view is that a decision should be adopted on the basis of the real state of the economy and our social sphere. The version chosen by the government envisages an accelerated social reorientation of the economy.

Its first stage—a stage of improvement and the implementation of the concept of the economic reform—encompasses 1990-92, the second stage falls on 1993-95; 6 years altogether, as you see. And the year 1990 has been singled out especially, because foundations for overcoming crisis phenomena are to be created during this year. The chosen path envisages the urgent implementation of large-scale measures aimed at cardinally improving the state of affairs in the social sphere.

All resources are to be channelled toward providng the population with food and industrial goods, services, housing, developing health care, improving working conditions and protecting environment. Such measures will prepare and will help to advance seriously the formation of the market, and also to create a mechanism for controlling this process. Naturally, it means that by the second stage a variety of forms of property and economic levers for guiding the national economy will already have taken root. The creation of an effective system of social support for the population will make it possible to alleviate the difficulties of the transitional period. Our listeners would like to know, perhaps, how our government views the proposals that have been fairly actively discussed in the press of late: on the introduction of a single ration card system of providing for the population and on a possibility of a money reform.

[Vinogradova] This was mentioned in the report too?

[Novitskaya] Yes, and I must say straight away that the government has rejected both proposals. According to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, a single ration card system will necessitate full concentration of all the resources of products to be rationed in the hands of the center, and this, of course, will absolutely contradict the principles of economic reform, for example, regional and union republican independence, whereas speculation, in his view, will not stop but may even escalate. And a money reform may bring only a temporary effect but it can harm those people who have truly labor savings. And it is not excluded that confidence in the government, if it cannot adopt other measures, will be undermined.

[Vinogradova] I see. Marina, does it mean that comrade Ryzhkov's report is going to be discussed all day long?

[Novitskaya] Yes, of course.

[Vinogradova] Thank you very much.

Ryzhkov: Key Problem is Land, Ownership Laws

LD1212195989 Moscow World Service in English
1810 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] The discussion of a government report on economic recovery, moves and stages of the economic reform, is the key issue on the agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies that has begun in Moscow. The report is to be delivered by the prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov. Radio Moscow's Boris Markovnikov interviewed the prime minister before the congress. He began by asking how Premier Ryzhkov felt as he was going to the congress.

[Ryzhkov in Russian fading into Markovnikov English report] (?Great and perky) said the prime minister. I understand it's going to be difficult but I've got a stand of mine—the worst thing is not to have any. I know some groups will dislike my position, but I will uphold it. If there are constructive proposals, I'm ready to correct something, but they have to be constructive indeed. I'm flatly opposed to sweeping criticism, said the prime minister.

Which of the problems the government report raises do you expect to draw the heaviest objections?

The key problem is the far-reaching laws on land and ownership. Although we didn't set ourselves the task of discussing them in the report we do take these laws into account and we build (?our) concept on them. Economic recovery stages too may draw questions. We've divided this process into two parts. Each is to last for 3 years. Some may tell us the stages must be different. Others will insist on moving faster, and still others slower. We've tried to adopt a down-to-earth approch to the problem and promise nothing of what cannot be fulfilled, said the prime minister.

Is the government prepared to compromise, was (?a) question. If it is, then on what issues? And what can you forego and on what do you intend to stand firm?

I'm ready for a reasonable compromise. I am prepared to forego economic recovery rates and economic development proportions, but I cannot give up socialist values. I cannot and will not abandon them. This doesn't mean that we'd like to see socialism unchanged. It must be humane and democratic. This is what we're going to uphold. Private ownership, I believe, will command a great many questions. The congress is not going to have before it a law on private ownership. It would be difficult for an audience as great as that to discuss it. The law must be discussed in parliament. But I expect extreme views on this matter. My position is firm. First we've got to understand what private ownership is and what is individual ownership. We've mixed everything up. Second, people, I believe, will hardly support the idea of private factories, said the premier.

Don't you believe it would be reasonable to submit some alternative program to the top government body? The one and only program is coming from the government; what do you think?

(?One has objected to this idea) but it's not my business. Under the constitution all those who would like to submit a proposal to the congress must do so at least 2 weeks in advance, and that's what the government did. The others could have done the same, said Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov in an interview to Radio Moscow.

Komsomol Deputies Attack Ryzhkov Economy Report

PM1312112189 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 1

[Item carried under the "We Beg Leave To Speak" rubric: "Why the Reform Is Marking Time. Appeal by a Group of USSR People's Deputies From the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League Concerning the Report by N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich,

Discussion of the concept of economic reform and the economic recovery program is the key question on the agenda of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The country's future is at stake: Will a way out of the crisis be found or will economic and political catastrophe erupt? We are particularly anxious about the state of society and the economy because we represent the generation which will bear the brunt of the consequences of the decisions now being taken.

Along with experts and scientific consultants we have carefully studied the report prepared by the government for the congress. In our view, the report still leaves unmentioned the true causes of the difficulties—the nonmarket character of the economy and the lack of interest for people and collectives in the results of their labor. Instead, secondary factors are put to the fore. The goals set in the report and the measures outlined are therefore aimed at treating the symptoms rather than the actual disease.

Two independent lines can be picked out in the report. On the one hand, a general description of the future market mechanism is presented, but no specific mechanisms for transferring to it are proposed. On the other hand, an array of multidimensional administrative and economic measures are proposed which not only fail to bring us closer to the market but, on the contrary, consolidate the command system.

It is claimed that these measures will help restore the country's economy and create favorable conditions for transfer to a market-based organization of the economy. At first glance, they are aimed at filling the gap in the consumer market by, first, sharply increasing the output of goods and, second, limiting the amount of cash the population has.

But it remains unclear why industry and agriculture should suddenly start swamping us with their products from next year if no immediate transfer to the new economic mechanism is proposed and there are still no incentives for efficient work.

There is no point in pinning one's hopes on the magic power of the plan figures. It is well known that not one directive plan has been met in the country's entire history. There are grounds for suspecting that the program to boost the output of consumer goods by R66 billion will fail too. The statistics indicate this: For example, the number of unconcluded contracts [nezaklyuchennyye dogovory] to supply goods is 50 percent up on last year.

Moreover, the measures of an administrative order designed to check the growth in incomes are, as the facts show, leading to stagnation of production. How can one seriously expect a sharp increase in the number of goods if the growth in the output of raw and semifinished materials for their manufacture is hampered by the wages fund tax?

If, however, we do not stabilize the consumer market our last chance of avoiding failure will very soon be lost and we can forget about carrying out further stages of reform.

Nor can we be certain that we will choose the right way out of the crisis, because deputies have been offered only one economic reform scenario. A monopoly on developing the concept of economic recovery has come about, many topics are essentially declared off limits for discussion, and alternative proposals are suppressed. Neither the anonymous authors of sole options nor the government have hitherto borne responsibility for the consequences of the measures they have taken. And that, maybe, is precisely why the economic reform has been marking time for so long?

Common sense suggests that from the outset the reform should itself promote financial recovery and fill the consumer market. It should develop naturally and independently, without administrative prompting. We are sure that such a concept of reform does exist, and maybe more than one. Such ideas should be discussed without fail. We are ready to submit our own specific proposals at the Congress of People's Deputies.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputies S.N. Biyushkin, A.D. Trubin, V.M. Minin, A.L. Plotnikov, S.Ye. Sleptsov, Yu.N. Shatrovenko, N.P. Denisov, Yu.M. Chemodanov, G.F. Belyakova, S.Yu. Karpenko, S.A. Rotar, K.Zh. Barbolova, M.R. Gibadullin, K.G. Gezhin, T.P. Zhukov, V.I. Glazunov, Sh.A. Abutalipov, A.A. Kazarin, I.V. Ablameyko, V.A. Sysoyev, S.V. Batrachenko, S.V. Belyayev, and S.Kh. Rakhimova.

Ryzhkov, Other Deputies Cited on Congress Issues

PM1312130389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 Single Edition p 2

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondents V. Abramov, A. Gamov, S. Karkhanin, and Yu. Nikolayev report under the rubric "Our Correspondents Report From Congress Lobbies": "Rough Start"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Naturally, concern for the fate of perestroyka voiced in ordinary Soviet people's appeals to their deputies determined in many respects the atmosphere of the Second Congress and the desire of the people's elected representatives to elaborate the kind of decisions which must bring positive changes in the economic and social spheres in the near future. We saw this for ourselves when we met deputies before the congress opened. [Passage omitted].

How does N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, feel? It is his report that people are awaiting with particular impatience. We also spoke to some deputies who intend to criticize this programmatic document. We told Nikolay Ivanovich about this and inquired about his mood...

"I am in a good mood, fighting mood, if you like," N.I. Ryzhkov said with a smile. "As for criticism... I am not afraid of it because I have a firm position which I am prepared to uphold. I would just like the criticism to be constructive—then I am willing to hear it out and argue with my opponents. That will be beneficial..."

"What is your attitude to the proposal put by a number of deputies that this congress adopt new laws—on land and on ownership in particular," we asked our next question.

"I believe that they should be adopted a little more rapidly, that's right," N.I. Ryzhkov replied. "But it is hardly worth tackling them at the present congress—that is quite unfeasible. The Laws on Land and Ownership require in-depth study. The people must also express their opinion of them. Otherwise how can we vote for these laws if the people have not expressed an opinion. Then what are we to—begin this debate and leave all the other equally important questions scheduled for discussion?"

It must be said that this viewpoint was shared by many peoples' deputies with whom we spoke. [Passage omitted]

During the discussion of the agenda the third and fifth points provoked many disputes. A number of deputies insisted that a discussion of proposals to remove or change several articles of the Fundamental Law be included in the third point, which proposes changes and addenda to the USSR Constitution on questions of the electoral system. And above all—Article 6, which enshrines the CPSU's leading role in our society. The proposals are quite explicable: They reflect definite trends of thought today. A considerable number of opinions, which sometimes contrasted sharply with one another, was voiced on this score. A roll call vote concluded the discussion: Most deputies opposed discussing Article 6 at this congress. What brought about this decision? We asked USSR people's deputies themselves about this during a recess.

"I believe there was no point embarking on a discussion of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution at this congress," Deputy B.V. Gromov said. "Eliminating Article 6 from the Constitution would bring the country to the point of disintegration, disorder, and instability. Especially if you consider that new elections lie ahead. I believe that those forces which are forcing through the question of eliminating Article 6 are pursuing far-reaching aims. Deputies must be on the alert here."

V.A. Pavlov, a blacksmith and stamp operator from the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Construction Plant, thinks quite differently about this:

"I believe the question of Article 6 must be included on the agenda. It is hard to tell what the decision will be, but I am sure that the party's prestige will not suffer as a result of this."

"I assumed there would definitely be deputies who would try to earn themselves some kind of prestige with fine-sounding words from the very first day," V.A. Yarin voiced his viewpoint. "Is this really a constructive approach? The people are on tenterhooks today to see how we will resolve economic questions. We've already lost virtually half a day. And I'm afraid our losses won't end there. Deputies must realize that we have not gotten together for empty chatter. The country expects concrete actions of us."

Incidentally, jurists also have a quite different opinion of constitutional amendments. Can they be adopted in principle even at such a representative meeting as the Congress of People's Deputies without consultation with the people themselves? It is after all a question of the country's Fundamental Law... [Passage omitted]

Lukyanov Addresses Journalists

LD1312121189 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The key issue of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which started on Tuesday, is how to normalise the economic situation within the next two years, Soviet First Vice President Anatoliy Lukyanov said.

Speaking to journalists after the Soviet prime minister completed his report, Lukyanov described the next two years as crucial in the development of the economy.

Arguing with critics of the slow pace of reform, the vice president said that changes should be in line with the possibilities of Soviet society. He recalled that Romans advised "to make haste slowly."

"We must act in a responsible way. There is no other way," he said.

Gorbachev Cited on Congress Agenda

PM1312122989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Dec 89 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Special correspondents A. Golovenko, N. Krivomazov, O. Losoto, S. Oganyan, S. Pastukhov, Ye. Sorokin, and Yu. Ursov report on 12 December proceedings at Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "Broad Range of Opinions"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Speaking about various items on the agenda, M.S. Gorbachev noted that several of them are associated with the fulfillment of direct instructions given by the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Draft Standing Orders of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, draft legislative acts defining the status of people's deputies in the USSR, and other questions associated with deputies' activity are being submitted for examination. The First Congress' instructions were fulfilled by the commission it set up to prepare a draft USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR. It is proposed to include examination of this draft in the Congress agenda. Furthermore, in conformity with the USSR Constitution, we must elect a Constitutional Oversight Committee. I would like to turn your attention back to the work of our First Congress of People's Deputies and remind you that at that time, following a debate, we arrived at the conclusion that the Constitutional Oversight Committee should not be formed prior to the adoption of the Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR, and we then set up this commission. The commission submitted a draft Law on Constitutional Oversight and in this context it is proposed—naturally, proceeding from that debate and the understanding reached at the First Congress—to include in the agenda the following item on the election of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The next item on the agenda, supported by the overwhelming majority of USSR Supreme Soviet members and received with understanding by all deputies, concerns the stepping up of the struggle against crime. Rising crime causes acute concern among the whole of society. We need to thoroughly investigate this and adopt all measures to resolutely combat this social evil. In this context it is planned that the Congress should discuss a report on this question by the minister of internal affairs. Let me say that proposals were made at all stages of the discussion of this question, they are not groundless, and it is worth discussing the question of combating crime as a whole. Nonetheless, it was deliberately decided to adopt the following formulation: organized crime. Deputies deemed it necessary to single this out because it is a new phenomenon, a phenomenon which is spreading and dealing a blow against the whole of our society and the perestroyka processes, and it is necessary to conduct a more thorough and deeper discussion of this problem before the eyes of the whole of society in order to give this work a state character. I think that this does not rule out—and this is the right of every deputy—the raising of questions which are worrying as regards crime in general.

It is then proposed to hear a report by the three commissions set up by the First Congress on a series of questions demanding in-depth study and investigation. You know, and they are listed on the agenda, at yesterday's meeting of representatives of deputies' groups we unanimously arrived at the opinion that this item on the agenda should be given 1 day especially to deal with changes laid down in the Standing Orders.

The debate continued after M.S. Gorbachev's speech. Applause was heard again, and the chairman again asked for it to stop—"not to pressure each other." As a result of a roll-call vote, the Congress refused to discuss "Article 6" and did not include it in the agenda. [passage omitted]

Communist Deputies Preview Congress

PM1212161189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

["PRAVDA Quick Questionnaire" compiled by G. Ovcharenko and V. Shirokov: "Communist at Congress"]

[Text] The topic for our latest quick questionnaire was again suggested by the editorial mailbag. On the eve of the opening of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies there has been a sharp increase in the flood of letters whose writers recall the speeches made by Communist deputies at the first congress and the two Supreme Soviet sessions, inquire about their stance on the pressing problems submitted for the second forum of people's elected representatives, and pose the question of the party's role in present-day society. Readers' letters formed the basis for compiling the questionnaire to people's deputies, whose answers we publish.

[Question] Many readers note the passiveness of party-worker deputies at the first congress and Supreme Soviet sessions. They cite as proof the fact that the new leaders who have emerged ahead of the second congress there are no deputies in precisely this category.

Valeriy Maksimov, tunneler at the "Severnaya" mine in Vorkuta:

True, we did not hear a single vivid speech by party workers either at the First Congress of People's Deputies or at the Supreme Soviet sessions. Why? Because, I believe, their authority today has been undermined and they need courage to restore it and defend the interests of the party as a whole. Sometimes party workers lack such courage and they are therefore reluctant to take the floor.

Yevgeniy Kogan, chief of laboratory at the "Estrybprom" association:

I recall that at a meeting with one of the party leaders at our association we asked him: Why in August 1987, when the future national independence party held a meeting in Hirve Park in Tallinn, did no party leader have the courage to speak out against the nationalist slogans which were occasionally to be heard that day? And do you know what he replied? The audience might allegedly have given their speeches an unsympathetic reaction; indeed, party workers are accustomed to speaking to the accompaniment of "tumultuous applause taking a long time to die down." And another reason why they didn't speak was allegedly that informal leaders are superior to them in terms of their... knowledge of history. Do the same factors not explain the silence of party apparatus workers at the congress and the Supreme Soviet sessions?

Garri Shtoyk, combine director from the "Kazpolimetall" association:

The party's past mistakes and various excesses in our history cast a shadow over party workers who are deputies from the CPSU. The "new names" did not feel the weight of this burden, which explains their lack of inhibition. Furthermore a deputy's work is like an iceberg. Readers and viewers are virtually ignorant of a large proportion of it—activity in commissions and committees. Yet it is precisely there, believe me, that deputies from the party display their fighting qualities. Although I would agree that they also need to be more active in speaking from the congress rostrum.

Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev, first secretary of the Issyk-Kul Oblast Party Committee:
Why have party workers not plunged into battle from the parliamentary rostrum? There is a very simple reason—the effect of years of "education" and the heavy weight on their shoulders of the tradition of "keeping a low profile." No, party leaders—many of them, in any event—are not more stupid than informal leaders, but they are crippled by the habit of looking over their shoulder—to make sure that they are not misunderstood, that a speech they deliver which has not been agreed with anyone else is not interpreted as a violation of party discipline.

[Question] Many readers' letters about perestroyka and its present and future include a question about the party. What, in your view, should the party be like at the present and upcoming stages of the transformation of our society? What role should it play in public life and in its mutual relations with the state, soviets, and informal and other political or social institutions? And in this connection how do you see Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which is giving rise to so many disputes today?

Garri Shtoyk:
In my view, the party must retain the role of leader in society. Primarily because only the party, which initiated this colossal perestroyka, can determine the sequence of this process, closely supervise the course of renewal, and act as the force which will see the concept through to completion. But the very concept of the party's leadership must change, and indeed it is changing: The CPSU itself is posing the question of the separation of functions and is increasingly closely listening to the opinion of the masses and relying on it.

Vladimir Volkov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:
As a former party committee secretary at the M.I. Kalinin Machine-Building Plant in Sverdlovsk I am also concerned by these questions. I believe that the party's role in our society must be rethought. First and foremost the CPSU must become more democratic, it must conduct a dialogue, not a monologue, with the soviets and all democratic informal movements, and the right to have a vanguard role must be achieved by concrete actions rather than constitutional guarantees.

Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev:
There is no way that Article 6 can be removed from the constitution at this time since at present the CPSU is the backbone of a stable state and its political and social setup. It alone is capable of carrying perestroyka though to victorious completion. Today I can see no other political organization capable of this. As yet nobody else is capable of taking on this difficult mission. I therefore consider that the people campaigning for Article 6 to be removed from the constitution are antirestructurers. This topic can be discussed later, when the situation in the country has improved. Or at least this problem can be addressed simultaneously with work on a new constitution...

[Question] Readers write that the party, having initiated perestroyka, is itself being left behind in this process. Is this assertion correction, and if so what, in your view, is the way out of the situation?

Yevgeniy Kogan:
What is the situation in the party today? If Communists have some possibility of influencing their primary party organization secretary, a rayon committee [raykom] secretary is beyond their reach. The top echelon of the party is beyond the influence of grass-roots party members. For example, I believe that in our Estonian Communist Party Central Committee many questions are decided by a narrow circle of people and it is impossible to influence these decisions.

For the party to work the party "grass roots" have to find channels for influencing its top echelons. Until their opinion is heeded the party will remain ossified. The organization must be structured in such a way that people are indeed elected, not appointed, to all elective party posts. We do not have a ready-made mechanism here, but it is important that the party's leaders do not lose a sense of reality, and for this they must definitely go through an election campaign.

Valeriy Maksimov:
If we manage to renew the party (but not by shuffling people from one office to another—we have already been through that umpteen times), and renew it in such a way that not only, say, a raykom secretary can bring pressure to bear on party committee secretaries but himself gets powerful input from rank-and-file party members and heeds their wishes, only then will the CPSU be able to rightfully occupy the vanguard place in Soviet society.

[Question] What mood, problems, hopes, and predictions have you brought to the congress with you?

Garri Shtoyk:
A working mood. In my view the congress will approve the fundamental draft laws and decisions adopted by the Supreme Soviet at the two sessions. But the main thing is that it must define an action program for the 13th 5-Year Plan period. And the objective of this program must definitely be an active social policy and also the solution in the foreseeable future of the housing, health care, education, and supply questions. This is what all those who elected us expect.

Rizoali Odzhiyev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:
The congress faces difficult work, a serious struggle of opinions, a clash of standpoints. Possibly there will be attempts to break away from the agenda, although personally I believe that the questions submitted for examination by the congress are fundamental for the people and the state at this time. I therefore hope that the deputies will be responsible and their approaches to decisionmaking will be well-considered.

This is not always the case, unfortunately. For example, a number of deputies recently urged a 2-hour general political strike to force the congress to adopt laws on ownership, the socialist enterprise, and land. I also regard these laws as essential, but two of them have already been submitted for nationwide discussion, so how can people's deputies fail to heed the people's opinion? Furthermore even a call for a strike in the present situation smacks of provocation or adventurism...

Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev:
We reckon that there will be a long and detailed discussion of deputies' status. A people's elected representative must have powers not only at a congress or at sessions but also in his everyday deputy's work. The range of his responsibilities must be clearly delineated. In a word, I will vote for the proposed agenda for the congress since it raises most important, fundamental questions. We have the experience of the First Congress behind us, and this time we have no intention of remaining silent and handing the initiative to our political opponents. This time we are going to fight!

Journalist on Mood at Congress, Agenda Issues

PM1312120089 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Valeriy Vyzhutovich article under the rubric "A Journalist's View": "Working Days at the Palace of Congresses: The Power of New Ideas"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] It is true that our life is not changing as quickly and decisively as one would wish. Hence the impatient desire to speed up the changes. How? That is the question. No one is denying that the laws on ownership and the land are extremely urgent. But the Supreme Soviet decided by a majority of votes not to include them on the Congress agenda, and submitted the draft laws for nationwide discussion. One may agree or disagree with this decision. But what one cannot do is to determine the Congress agenda by unparliamentary means—by calling for a general strike. And it is well known that such a call was made, though fortunately it did not meet with a broad response, nor could it have done.

There were also attempts to influence the course of the forthcoming Congress from another direction. For instance, from the platform of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that was held the other day, voices could be heard demanding insistently that we "make up our minds" at last and decide "where we are going." Is it really not clear yet? After nearly 5 years in motion, do they still not realize where they are going? No, everyone realized long ago—both those speakers and many of those who speak from oblast and rayon platforms and stand up at rallies to call for the preservation of loyalty to socialist ideals. True, it would not be a bad idea to clarify precisely what ideals they have in mind. "Developed socialism," with its empty stores, administrative diktat, and persecution of dissidence? Or true socialism, which offers scope for a healthy economy, a multiplicity of forms of ownership, freedom of speech, and the creative development of the individual and society? That is basically the main question of the day: What kind of socialism do we want? This question, which we thought had finally been clarified, has once again become acute and contentious, as recent events (for instance, the rallies in Leningrad) show. [passage omitted]

Baltic Deputies Discuss Positions Before Congress

LD1312131589 Vilnius Domestic Service
in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Excerpts] [Lionginas Vasiliauskas, Sajudis-accredited correspondent in Moscow] A meeting of deputies from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia took place on Monday afternoon. The meeting was chaired by A. Gorbunovs, the Latvian president, Academicians Lipma and Statulevicius. It was stressed at the meeting that only issues of vital interest to the Baltic states should be accentuated at the Congress. And this is first of all the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

There are indications at the meeting of representatives of deputies which took place on the same day in the Kremlin that Gorbachev will try to merely restrict himself while proposing to listen to conclusions of the Commission and take them into consideration. This should not be allowed to happen. Deputies must work hard to ensure that a decision is adopted. When the decision is adopted further steps could be made while setting up a commission to assess the events of 1940 in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Another very important question is the Committee of Constitutional Supervison. [passage omitted] As far as the republics are concerned it cannot be permitted that some high-ranking organ will decide the matters of the republics. Passing the law is illegal if it is passed without the consent of specific republics.

Another problem arose concerning the personal composition of the committee which will be proposed by President Gorbachev. Therefore, candidates and not representatives of republics will be proposed. Following this the USSR people's deputies from Lithuania believe that if we reject the possibility of the existence of such a committee not a single citizen of sovereign but presently occupied Lithuania will agree to become a member of the commission.

The third pressing issue concerns the discussion on the perspective of the economic development of the USSR. This issue will be used by representatives of the Baltic states to reveal how double-dealing is the law on economic sovereignty of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Gorbunovs was very active during the sitting. He is determined to raise the question concerning the armed forces. This issue should be discussed inn three aspects: alternatives to military service, national-territorial army units, and permament establishment in the republics by reserve officers. This proposition was supplemented by one more point by the Lithuanian delegation and this was the status of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Baltic states.

The issue of the armed forces should be discussed in parallel with the conclusions of the commission to investigate into the events in Tbilisi. [passage omitted]

Members of the meeting decided to render support to the Moscow interregional group which is making attempts to have Article Six of the USSR constitution amended.

The news that Kazimieras Uoka has been included in the composition of the Presidium was met with delight by all deputies although Gorbachev proposed that all chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the union republics should form the Presidium. During the sitting Gobrachev explained that as a result of illness of Vytautas Astrauskas [chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuanian SSR], therefore, his place was taken by Kazimieras Uoka. However, the real reason is not this: as far as we can remember, the esteemed comrade Astrauskas did not manage to win the elections. He did not receive the confidence of his electors and therefore, today, he participates in the Congress with the rights of a guest. Somebody who is not a USSR people's deputy cannot sit in the Presidium during the Congress.

And in conclusion here are some more interesting details: the space for party membership was filled in by Kazimieras Antanavicius and Kazimieras Uoka as social democrats: the questionaire was filled in on the arrival of deputies for registration.

An idea was araised at the meeting of the people's deputies from the Baltic countries that the three delegations should enter the hall of the Congress only after the USSR anthem has been sung. Marju Lauristin solved the problem saying that real gentlemen raised their hats at a funeral even if someone they disliked is being buried.

Political & Social

Deputy Confirms Gorbachev Threatened To Resign

AU1312121789 Paris AFP in English 1148 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, Dec 13 (AFP)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told the Communist Party Central Committee plenum Saturday he was ready to resign because he was "disturbed" by conservative attacks on his leadership, a Soviet deputy said in an article in Wednesday's edition of The News of Moscow.

Daniil Granin, a writer and deputy who said he was a guest at the Central Committee plenum, described what he called this "difficult moment" during a stormy session.

It has prompted much speculation over whether Mr. Gorbachev actually proffered his resignation.

Mr. Granin said he "heard senior party leaders hurl direct accusations at Gorbachev" and what they considered his "erroneous" policies, while they "wanted to go back to the way it used to be".

"These statements deeply disturbed Gorbachev. He answered that if that was how people viewed the results of all these years of work, he was ready to resign," Mr. Granin said.

His comments, in the progressive weekly, were the latest in the debate over what transpired.

The sharp exchange was disclosed by the prime minister of the Estonian republic, Indrek Toome, Monday when he said Mr. Gorbachev shot back at his critics that he was "not holding on to power" at any price.

On Tuesday, Ivan Frolov, the editor of the party paper PRAVDA who is a new Central Committee secretary, strongly denied that Mr. Gorbachev had offered to step down.

He told a news conference that the Soviet leader "defended the unshakable side of his policies and his insistance on revolutionary perestroika", or reform.

Mr. Granin said in his article that it was known that "in the provinces, the new thought has met with opposition from conservatives and hardline dogmatists". But he said it was the "first time" this has been voiced in a Central Committee plenum.

He also questioned whether this was an isolated incident or "more serious".

Mr. Granin gave unequivocal support for Mr. Gorbachev. He said there were those in the Soviet Union "who want to go back to the past" and others who want to move ahead faster, acknowledging it was "difficult to move forward when you are attacked on both sides".

Brazauskas Rejects Allegations

LD1312130289 Moscow TASS in English 1253 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Lithuanian Communist Party Chief Algirdas Brazauskas has rejected allegations that the current make-up of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee is a brake on perestroyka.

Speaking to journalists at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies today, he said "there are many people in the Central Committee who think in a new way."

Brazauskas also rejected rumours that there were attempts at the recent plenum to relieve Mikhail Gorbachev of his duties as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

"I did not notice this," he said. "Gorbachev enjoyed full support."

Estonian Communist Party Chief Vayno Vyalyas had earlier repudiated a report by the REUTERS News Agency, which quoted him as saying that Gorbachev offered to resign during the December plenum.

Speaking about the place of the Lithuanian Communist Party in the life of the republic, Brazauskas recalled that Lithuania had already endorsed a new wording of the article of the Constitution on the party's leading role. This means that the Communist Party enjoys the same rights as other public organisations and must win popularity by its practical deeds.

Brazauskas also said that a law on parties and public organisations would probably be endorsed in the republic within the next few months.

Most Readers Reject Anti-Gorbachev Slogans

PM1312105589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Yuriy Orlik, editor of IZVESTIYA's Letters Department, under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "Echo of Rallies"]

[Text] I should explain immediately that this roundup will be primarily about the reaction to the rally in Leningrad 22 November. A second rally was held just a few days ago—responses to that one are still on their way to the editorial office. But the letters received so far make it possible to judge quite accurately what the general assessment of the second rally will be, with allowance made for differences of opinion on the details, and to determine the breakdown of those in favor and those against. Because, despite being held at different times, on the initiative of different organizations, and under slogans that conflict with one another the two rallies nevertheless form a single whole and represent a broad range of political forces and social moods characteristic of our times. Real politics is impossible if they are not taken into account.

So we come to the citywide party rally on 22 November. This was surely the first time that a rally on this scale was organized not by members of the informal organizations but by Communists. The fact that they took to the street and the square is remarkable in itself. Clearly, the era of closed party meetings and of "party reclusiveness," as one reader put it, is ending. The rally was also unprecedented for the unusually sharp criticism of the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo, and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the demands to call an extraordinary party congress. All this also caused heightened interest in the rally—something borne out by the editorial mailbag. The first wave of responses to it contained 128 letters. The readers' opinions divided like this: 98 express bewilderment (indignation) at the slogans and speeches heard on the square in front of the sports and concert complex; 30 support the rally's ideas.

Here are a few typical letters from the first batch.

"There has long been an urgent need to step up the party's activity and enhance its role in the perestroyka processes," N. Petrov, a senior electrical engineer on the Leningrad subway, writes. "And in this sense the Leningrad party organization's initiative deserves support. But I cannot accept the content of many of the slogans and speeches heard at the rally. I do not accept the fierce attacks on USSR people's deputies, on M.S. Gorbachev, and on the mass media... The enthusiastic unanimity of the speakers in criticizing perestroyka's main democratic gains is alarming."

"The impression of the rally is a depressing one," Doctor of Technical Sciences N. Gorskiy, a CPSU member (for 36 years) from Leningrad, states. "It made me want to look at the calendar: What year are we living in?... The participants in the rally see crisis in the economy and the social sphere. So do I. But they tend to seek the source of that crisis in the processes of the past 5 years whereas I see it in the processes of the past 70 years. Oblast party committee secretary Yu.A. Denisov demands that 'certain Politburo members and party leaders account for their actions and comments.' I agree. The only thing is that we have different people in mind. They tell us: The whole point is: Who wants to reverse perestroyka, and in which precise direction? Quite right. It is just that the rally participants want to reverse the processes of renewal and democratization which have begun whereas I support their continuation and development."

I have been dealing with the mailbag for several years now, every day I read letters and follow the variations in public sentiments, and I can say with complete justification that I haven't had as many letters as this on my desk supporting the Central Committee and Gorbachev in a long time. The issue here clearly is the standpoint from which the country's political leadership was criticized at the rally. It is not the criticism itself but its immediate and long-term targets that readers rebuffed. "We won't give Gorbachev up," the Filippov family ("five adults") from Moscow state. "However many shortcomings and weaknesses Mikhail Sergeyevich may have, he has one undisputed merit: He is a sincere and honest politician, which is an absolute disadvantage to a politician who is personally and entirely essential to society (after so many years of lies!). We have been experiencing the hardships of the transitional period just as much as Leningraders. But we aren't going to yield even an inch of the ground won by democracy. People must be and must remain the measure of all things. There can be no 'principles' higher than individual freedom."

Now for a few letters written by people who welcome the rally. It would be an oversimplification to present their position as especially defensive or "Nina Andreyeva-ist," as it would be to consider the crowd on the sports and culture complex square to be "dissenters who should be called to account" (V. Shurygin from Pskov). It cannot be overlooked that many of the slogans displayed at the rally are reasonable. It is on that point that S.

Izotov, a Leningrad lawyer and CPSU member since 1984, tried to base his rebuttal of the IZVESTIYA correspondent who covered the rally. "Communists," he wrote, "want the Central Committee and the Politburo to be formed on the basis of direct elections, not multi-tier elections. Where is the threat to perestroyka in that? The correspondent saw ferocious attacks on the initiators of perestroyka in the slogan 'Call the Politburo to account!' Had that slogan appeared, say, 2 years earlier, our country would probably not be on the brink of disaster now. The IZVESTIYA journalist was reduced to panic-stricken horror by a question addressed to people's deputies: 'Communist of the Supreme Soviet! What color is your party card?' However, a Communist has to be a Communist everywhere, including in the Supreme Soviet, and not become a mere socialist, ready to agree with whatever forces come along..."

At first glance the author is speaking against the party's administrative and bureaucratic structures, in favor of the accountability of elective organs, and for loyalty to the color red, but in fact he is accusing Supreme Soviet Communists, and others also, of sliding into appeasement and revisionism. It is no coincidence that some of the rally's defenders urge people to "look at what is going on in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and other East European countries: That is where undue liberalization gets you!" (S. Kozhevatyy, Irkutsk).

"The rally participants do not like the socialism proclaimed by perestroyka," A. Ivanov from Bryansk believes. "They propose that we return to the 'true values'. But what values? Those of the times of Stalin and Brezhnev? There is no answer to that, just the orchestra thundering: 'Terrible storms are raging around us'..."

The suspicion created at the rally that people's deputies intended to "restore capitalism" and demand a political assessment of the law on ownership was particularly close to the attitude of the rally's supporters. Here is the opinion of N. Poleshchikov from Serpukhov: "The laws on ownership, the lease, and land are, figuratively speaking, nails in socialism's coffin." "Our leadership is preparing the country for a sellout," is how G. Burkhay, an electrical engineer from Kiev, expresses his thoughts no less figuratively. He is echoed by fellow Ukrainian V. Veselov: "Our esteemed deputies have confused the words 'forward' and 'backward.' To listen to them, Stalin's socialism is backward, the private ownership under Nicholas II is forward." "Haven't we had enough of this hocus-pocus: Soviet people do not need an ordinary sausage but one that is ideologically pure," A. Morozova from Moscow notes with reason. "How long can people live in thrall to stereotypes and dogmas?" exclaims A. Korzh, a worker from Kiev Oblast's Vishnevoye city. "USSR people's deputies are trying to free our society from those dogmas, so let's not get in their way."

Here is another important point brought to our attention by L. Nikitenko from Volgograd. "It is no accident that they try to convince us that the country is moving toward the restoration of capitalism and that the informals, radicals, and turncoats are lusting after power. That lobbies are being formed in various management organs using money provided by the wheeler-dealers in the 'shadow' economy. There can only be one conclusion here: vigilance and more vigilance. The enemy is vigilant. What is the center looking at, why isn't it doing anything? Isn't it time to instill order?"

This fueling of passions and attempts to put social consciousness into a state of heightened combat readiness can hardly help the cause. Peace isn't to be found through confrontation. Meanwhile, the rallies should be subjected to further detailed analysis. I. Filatov from Gatchina is right: "Everything that happened in Leningrad during those days should be carefully analyzed and considered in depth. After all, this was a clash between different principles, concepts, and views of perestroyka and socialism."

'Several State Flags' Burned at Moscow Rally

LD1312111589 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] On 10 December, an unsanctioned rally organized by the Union of Democrats began at 1500 in Gorky Street in Moscow. A crowd of about 500 people gathered opposite the fenced-in Pushkin Square. They broke down the fencing, made their way into the square, and started the rally.

Several state flags of the USSR were burned and portraits of Lenin and Gorbachev were torn by the demonstrators. Twenty-four people have been detained; 20 of those detained have been fined and arrested and four are in prison.

(Valeriya Novodvorskaya), member of the Union of Democrats, went on a hunger strike and will continue it until independent journalist Sergey Kuznetsov has been released.

Plans to Prevent Demonstrations During Congress

LD1212205689 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] At a briefing at the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, General Maksimov has announced that to prevent possible disturbances by advocates of what has become known as meeting-time democracy, the law enforcement regime has been tightened up in Moscow for the time of the Congress of People's Deputies. The crime rate has gone down considerably, he said, but if something happens we'll act resolutely.

Obminskiy Appointed Deputy Foreign Minister

LD1312140189 Moscow TASS English 1352 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—The USSR Council of Ministers has appointed Ernest Obminskiy a deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

Third Armenian Victim of Border Fighting Reported

NC1312114689 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Radik Grigoryan report from Udzhan: "Yet Another Victim"]

[Excerpt] At the entrance of the road leading to Udzhan the Armenian tricolor flag framed in black ribbons flies from the power pole. The [word indistinct] and people were passing under that drooping flag, paying their last respects to 28-year-old Udzhanian fighter Norayr Arutyunyan. Yesterday, the day itself seemed sad, just like the victim's mourning mother, sister, brother, widow and children, and others.

Norayr was martyred by a bullet of the members of the so-called Azerbaijan National Front in an (?undeclared) war (?against us) near the Kornidzor village of Gorisskiy rayon while defending the Armenian border. This is the third victim and in a sovereign country which is just turning into a law-based, democratic, and restructuring country—in the land of the Soviets where ostensibly all the peoples are equal [word indistinct]. We are already aware of the price of that equality, there is no need to talk about it. [passage omitted]

Yerevan Says NKAO Under 'Press Blockade'

NC1212122689 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] It is said that man does not live by bread alone. Apparently this truth has been well learned by the Communications Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic, which has decided to contribute its share in bringing pressure against the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. For more than 5 months now, the NKAO has not received the central newspapers and periodicals on time. Since 10 November, the dispatch from Azerbaijan of such papers as ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, SOBESEDNIK, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, such periodicals as OGONYEK and KROKODIL, and other renowned publications has come to a virtual halt.

Understandably, this is causing justified discontent among the subscribers who are cut off from the developments taking place in the country and abroad. The local office of Soyuzpechat is suffering heavy losses. Shaen Agadzhanyan, head of the Soyuzpechat's Stepanakert city office, told ARMENPRES that the communications ministers of the USSR and Azerbaijan had been informed about these illegalities as far back as October. However, there has been no response. Agadzhanyan asked: Is it now possible for us to have bad feelings against our subscribers, most of whom are demanding the return of their subscription fees? In my 23 years of service in the communications sector, for the first time I am coming face to face with a press blockade and, moreover, this is happening in an age of openness and democratization in our society.

Azerbaijan Names Chairman of Committee on Refugees

NC1212102989 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has issued a decree appointing Tonguz Radzhab Oglu Mustafayev as deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee on Refugee Affairs, which deals with matters concerning those individuals who have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence.

Agdzhabedi Raykom Plenum Elects First Secretary

NC1212102589 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Text] The Agdzhabedi Rayon Party Committee [raykom] held a plenum to examine organizational questions. Prior to the plenum, the members of the raykom, secretaries of the primary party organizations, leading officials of establishments, and representatives of society held an in-depth debate on the individuals who had applied to be appointed Agdzhabedi Raykom first secretary. (?Kasumedov) was elected first secretary of the Agdzhabedi Raykom and member of the raykom bureau.

Gasanov, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; [name indistinct], member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; and (?Avdenov), chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party Work and Cadre Affairs Department, participated in the work of the plenum.

Armenian Quake Reconstruction Effort Described

PM1112101789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 89 Second Edition p6

[Own correspondent A. Sarkisyan report: "When Aragats Turned Grey..."]

[Excerpts] Armenia—[Passage omitted] ...We went back to the disaster area. Its wounds have yet to heal. The piled remains of collapsed buildings have not all been cleared away yet and residential areas are being fashioned out of barns, one-time trading premises, warm little houses and not-so-warm little houses, and prefabricated wooden constructions.... These are the scenes of life today in Leninakan, Spitak, Kirovakan, Gugark, and Stepanavan....

In Spitak, construction workers have failed to commission a single residential building on a turnkey basis. Buildings erected by envoys from Uzbekistan seem finished from the outside, but the basic utilities have not been completed.

Leninakan still has no comprehensive plan for rebuilding the city. People are still arguing over the sites of the main projects.

Despite all this, thousands of construction workers from the union republics are going ahead with construction work, using their own resources.

... Leninakan. Before our meeting with G. Kurin, chief of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Main Administration for Construction under the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers, we drove around the city. Dozens of people had come to the City Party Committee to speak to Secretary L. Kakosyan.

"I want nothing other than to go back to Leninakan," an elderly person was begging the secretary. "When I go to sleep I always dream about my city."

"We are still in no position to provide you with housing, Comrade Akopyan," the secretary wearily repeated. [Passage omitted]

No more classes are being held under canvas in the city. Some of the old school buildings have been restored. Friends from Hungary have managed to build a single-story school with its own, independent heating system; the school is called "Balaton." [Passage omitted]

Our conversation with G. Kurin began with the question of how long it is going to take construction workers to rebuild Leninakan.

"Quite a lot has been done already," Georgiy Vasilyevich said. "We have spent R500 million. We are carrying out construction and assembly work worth R1 million every 24 hours. We have built two new railroad stations—Bayandur and Arevik, which can handle 190 cars per day. We have laid main road networks, water supply lines, a sewage system, and some heating supply lines. We can transfer 10 heating centers to a temporary boiler system. We will be producing our own asphalt by spring, by the time we start work on providing amenities. The blockade has held us up, of course. It was the middle of November before we were able to gather momentum again. Now we have a new problem: The freight has stopped coming again."

"Does that mean that housing projects will not be commissioned?"

"The year's target is that we build 400,000 square meters of housing. Being realistic, we are going to have 150-160,000 square meters. I would like to appeal to everyone on whom the fate of restoration work in Armenia depends. Do not be so wrapped up in your own concerns that you forget the disaster zone, where only one-third of the work has been done."

"We will never tire of repeating," V. Markaryants, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, said, "our gratitude to everyone in the land of the soviets and all over the world who helped our people in their time of trial. Largely thanks to the Ukrainian builders who met the year's target ahead of schedule; Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek construction subdivisions; the 'Uralsibstroy,' the former Ministry of Construction in the Northern and Western Regions of the USSR, and others, some 550-600,000 square meters of housing will be commissioned by the end of the year. However, there are a fair number of problems. Approximately 200,000 construction workers should be working in the zone, but at the moment there are only 113,000; and what is more, half of them are local workers." [Passage omitted]

Working hard and with aching hearts, thousands of people in the disaster zone are trying to restore life to normality. Caught up in the bustle of everyday matters, we do not have the right to forget the disaster that struck a year ago. We must all remember and help in any way we can.

Diaspora Armenians Discuss Relations With Natives

NC1212191889 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Lida Kazaryan report]

[Excerpt] The expanded meeting of the presidium of the committee for cultural relations with diaspora Armenians continued from 8 to 11 December. The plenipotentiary representatives of the diaspora cultural associations participated. The conferees examined future development of relations between the diaspora and the fatherland. Karlen Dallakyan, chairman of the committee for cultural relations with the diaspora Armenians, delivered a report. Committee Presidium members Silva Kaputikyan, Edward Mirzoyan, Varazat Arutyunyan, (?Papken) Grigoryan and others exchanged views.

The conferees spoke highly of the importance of ties between the diaspora and Armenia for the survival of the diaspora Armenians, the strengthening of Armenia, the pursuit of the Armenian cause, and for consolidating the Armenian people's unity. It was pointed out that Armenia-diaspora relations must be based on principles of coequal mutual understanding, further developing relations between the fatherland and the diaspora, enhancing Armenian culture in the fatherland and diaspora, and on the goal of furthering the Armenian people's unity.

The conferees agreed that the representatives of the diaspora cultural, charity, ecclesiastical and [word indistinct] organizations could be elected as members of the administration board of the committee for cultural relations with the diaspora Armenians as well as be invited to the full meetings and conferences of the committee's administrative board. The committee, in handling diaspora-Armenia relations, must treat all the diaspora cultural, charity, educational, and other organizations equally. The conferees concluded that the pan-national interest must be the determining factor in diaspora-fatherland relations. The conferees consider the time as ripe for the committee to have representatives in a number of large Armenian communities. It was decided to study the possibilities at hand on location. A number of concrete problems related to fatherland-diaspora ties were also examined. [passage omitted]

Economic Ties Discussed

NC1212130789 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 12 Dec 89

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] According to an ARMENPRES report published on the (?fourth page) of the paper, a group of representatives of Armenian diaspora business and scientific circles was received at the Armenian Council of Ministers. They have been in the republic for more than 1 week. During the friendly conversation, Vladimir Markaryants, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, briefed the guests on the condition of the republic's economy, the earthquake relief effort, and the [word indistinct] problems related to the immigration of Armenians from Azerbaijan. Markaryants stressed that R100 million has been allocated to the rural sector for the development of dairy and other production branches. In the new year, 150 small firms will be operating in the republic; the private business activities of rural residents will be bolstered. Work is under way to create new production relations between urban and rural areas, to improve conditions in villages, and to utilize their inherent resources.

In their statements the guests underlined that they had come to Armenia not merely to see its present situation, but also to determine the prospects for participating in the revival of the ruined economy of the republic, helping to extricate Armenia from the prevailing grave situation, and contributing more closely to economic ties.

Slow Progress on South Osetia Settlement

PM0812154589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report: "Georgia: Path to Agreement"]

[Text] The bad weather has brought chaos to Georgia. On the eve of winter a hurricane has struck Sukhumi. Zemo-Imereti has been hit by snowfalls. Torrential rain has produced an emergency situation in Tsagerskiy Rayon. Staffs trying to eliminate the aftereffects of the weather are working day and night.

But although we have learned at least to some extent to predict the vicissitudes of the weather, when it comes to the elemental force of interethnic conflicts we sometimes totally lack the gift of foresight. This is again true of the situation in Georgia, which recently erupted in the newspapers. However, this is somewhat surprising. For many centuries the Georgians and Osetians have lived side by side, fought common enemies together, raised their children together, married without regard for nationality, and respected each other's traditions and customs.

Now, however, you just can't get into Tskhinvali, the administrative center of the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast. Neither for weddings nor for official assignments. You only have to take the road from Gori to South Osetia and you find a picket. And beyond that another picket. There are equally stern and resolute border posts if you approach from the other direction.

It is difficult now to reconstitute in detail the deep causes of the conflict or separate the truth from rumors. All you can do is lament the fact that the growth of distrust and interethnic hostility which has recently robbed us all of our peace of mind and self-confidence has penetrated the worthy homes of formerly close neighbors. But everyone I managed to talk with these days agreed on one thing: Events began snowballing after the extraordinary session of the oblast soviet adopted a decision to transform the South Osetian Oblast into an autonomous republic. The Georgian Supreme Soviet session rescinded that decision on the grounds that it was unconstitutional.

Initially there was a wave of rallies on whose crest the leaders of informal organizations on both sides assailed each other with mutual recriminations and accusations. On 23 November the verbal barrages took on the form of a many-thousand-strong mass of people which set off toward the South Osetian administrative center in cars, buses, (the more energetic ones went on foot), carrying flags and placards.

As the organizers of the action confirmed, their aims were entirely peaceful: They wanted a rally to discuss the problems that had accumulated, certainly not to wage a "battle of Tskhinvali"... There is just one detail: The rally itself was initially planned for outside the city. But that condition was not met. Attempts to enter Tskhinvali aroused a counteraction from the city residents. And one human stream was opposed by another in whose eyes the peaceful intentions of their neighbors looked highly problematic.

To be blunt, the conflict has gone on a long time. Rumors, like a brake, slow down the pace of negotiations. It only needed the internal troops to be removed from Tskhinvali for the hotheads to declare that in view of the threat of a Georgian invasion it was important to urgently organize the city's defense. Or, conversely, that it had suddenly become known from "reliable" sources that a large number of troops were being transferred to Tskhinvali. And if that is the case, a threat to the other side can be confidently predicted.

According to a report from the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] press group, there have been cases of physical injury, hooliganism, and the unlawful bearing and keeping of weapons. The situation is also complicated by serious disruptions to the pace of work of enterprises, institutions, and transport. And of course by rallies, of which there has been no shortage either in Tbilisi or South Osetia.

The difficult dialogue now in progress in Georgia is like a multistory building, with discussions being held at each level into the problems that have accumulated in relations between the two people. The question of the situation in South Osetia was submitted to a session of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and a conference involving Central Committee Bureau members and leaders of the law-enforcement organs.

The floors of this dialogue are represented by meetings of scientists, social figures, journalists, and other representatives of the intelligentsia—Georgian and Osetian—on local television. They are also people's letters to the local newspapers. Letters calling on people to understand and listen to one another, to stay their anger, and look at the years that they have lived together.

"We fought together without wondering who were Georgians or Osetians, Russians or Armenians. While the tired, exhausted soldiers slept, one kept watch, protecting the lives of the others. Shouldn't we support each other now? Shouldn't we act according to common sense rather than to someone's diktat?...."

Those lines come from the republic's newspaper, ZARYA VOSTOKA. Essentially they show the direction of the efforts of people's diplomacy, which indeed rejects diktat. Yet there is diktat here. Not from Moscow, as they tried to persuade me at a rally. I tend to accept a different opinion that I heard from a rally participant—that the ones trying to dictate are those who want to destroy the very idea of dialogue and who have already tasted the sweet intoxication of wielding power over the crowd....

But let us return to the official statistics. During the conflict 40 people have received injuries, including gunshot wounds. Most of them have been of Osetian nationality. More than 50 guns have been confiscated. The situation is now being monitored by forces of the operations groups of the internal affairs organs and subdivisions of the internal troops temporarily stationed in Tskhinvali.

And here is how A. Logvinov, chief of the USSR MVD's Maintenance of Public Order Main Administration, who is in Georgia, assessed the situation in conversation with me:

"Undoubtedly, those guilty of unlawful actions must be held accountable. Criminal proceedings have already been instituted in 23 cases which are being examined by investigators from the prosecutor's office and internal affairs organs. However, it is clearly not enough to adopt a criminal approach alone to the situation. Talks are now in progress with representatives of the informal organizations. I do not hide the fact that a section of the population is skeptical of those talks...."

...In the Tbilisi newspapers I have seen alarming reports again. There is torrential rain in Tsageri and landslides continue to isolate neighboring villages. It is vitally important for people that the barometer show "fair" at last. Not only in the meteorological sense.

Gumbaridze Speaks on Tension in Georgia

90US0235A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Nov 89 pp 1, 3

[Text] A meeting with the participation of members of the Central Committee Bureau, secretaries of obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms [oblast, city and rayon party committees] and chairmen of ispolkoms [executive committees] of soviets of people's deputies, leaders of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers, ministries and departments, union and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] authorities and the media and secretaries of a number of party organizations of enterprises and establishments which discussed the social and political situation in the republic and measures to stabilize it was held on 10 November in the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

A report at the meeting was delivered by G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

It was observed that the situation in the republic remains tense, and in a number of regions, quite complex. There are palpable difficulties in the socioeconomic sphere, and problems in interethnic relations have not been overcome as yet. The political situation has entered a phase where the most assertive position of the party and soviet authorities on all issues is required. And this presupposes the high efficiency and the improved knowledgeability of the activists, swift response, adroit orientation in difficult situations and possession of the skills of analysis of the situation and fundamental party documents. It is necessary to cultivate more persistently new forms of the intercommunication of the primary party organizations and party committees of all levels.

This will help the party authorities' interact with a broad strata of society, the working class, the peasantry and the scientific and artistic intelligentsia of the republic, which are seeking ways to consolidate and cultivating a constructive attitude toward the problems.

However, there are forces which clearly dislike such a development of processes and which are interested in thwarting the steps toward cooperation which have been mapped out, which is impeding the solution of specific problems of fundamental significance for the republic and its all-around development, in the national sphere included.

In this connection the republic leadership is adopting all measures to find the right solutions for surmounting the tension. This was the case at the time of the events in Abkhazia, Kvemo Kartli, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and certain other regions, when it was possible by the concerted actions of the leadership, without outside assistance, to stabilize the situation, and in certain cases, avoid bloodshed. The practice of social and political dialogue established following the tragic April events, the search for mutually acceptable solutions and the emphasis on political methods of influence and control with the integration in this process of various alternative associations played a positive part here. The nationwide discussion of the draft Concept of Georgia's National Development, which encompassed the entire spectrum of the republic's fundamental problems with regard for the CPSU platform on nationality policy, was a good form of dialogue.

At the same time it needs to be understood that social and political dialogue is by no means a policy of concessions but an effective, modern form of organizing and political work in which all the republic's party, soviet and industrial activists should participate. It is necessary to find non-stereotyped approaches to a solution of specific questions, as was done, for example, in respect of the draft into the armed forces from the republic. We need to have more confidence in one another and not complicate the solution of questions by peremptory pressure and a variety of actions which harm the cause. This applies particularly to the progress of the investigation of criminal cases and personnel changes, in the Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] and in other regions included, where active efforts are being made to speed up the investigations fully in accordance with the law, replace cadres with regard for public opinion and promote to executive office energetic people who have not exhausted their credit of trust and who are capable of introducing new political methods of work. Only such a scrupulous approach will make it possible to consolidate the public forces.

There will be no return to confrontation and opposition under any conditions. Whoever ventures this must assume full responsibility. The events of recent days, at the time of celebration of the October anniversary included, provide serious food for thought. They were clouded by unlawful actions which pursued the goal of destabilizing the situation and frustrating the constructive dialogue between the leadership and the public movements.

Questions with a real basis for discussion were discussed and the firm position of the republic leadership in connection with questions in respect of which there can be no legitimate solution was expressed in the course of this dialogue, as is known.

Vandalism, abuse of official symbols and other excesses do not contribute to a normal dialogue and are dangerous in their severe consequences. This must be understood by all, including the representatives of the forces which have begun to supercharge the atmosphere in South Ossetian Oblast. The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee has made a scrupulous evaluation of the processes which are taking place. There will for each instance of a disturbance of public order and illegal actions be an appropriate response.

A most important demand of the present day is the supremacy of the law and political, ideological methods of work. Displaying decisiveness and militancy at all levels, the party and soviet authorities must evaluate all phenomena from clear-cut party standpoints and make the maximum use here of the possibilities of democratization and glasnost, live contacts with people and meetings and discussions in the work force. Via the media, which must be guided by a sole criterion—truth, objectiveness and genuine pluralism of opinions—included.

The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee is persistently extending the range of dialogue, primarily with the public, the working class, the intelligentsia and the youth. There are up to 1,000 persons monthly at meetings in the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee alone. There have recently been frank discussions in the work force and research outfits and educational institutions in Tbilisi, Rustavi, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Goriyskiy, Bolnisskiy, Dmanisskiy, Marneulskiy, Telavskiy, Akhmetskiy, Gurdzhaanskiy, Signakhskiy, Sagaredzhoyskiy and Gardabanskiy rayons and in mountainous Dzhavakhetia and Adzharia. All rational proposals expressed in the course of such meetings are being supported.

In order to restore to themselves everywhere the political initiative the party authorities and each communist must finally emerge from the state of indifference, apathy and passiveness and operate assertively and independently within the limits of his authority and jurisdiction, overcoming timidity and indecisiveness where it is a question of the people's interests.

The participants in the meetings were comprehensively informed as to the social and political situation in various regions of the republic and the steps which the republic political leadership intends taking to stabilize the situation on the basis of a plan of priority organizational and ideological measures drawn up in accordance with the Central Committee Bureau decision in connection with the negative manifestations at the time of the October anniversary. It was emphasized that the task of the party organizations today is the continuation and broadening of dialogue, solution of people's paramount problems of life and an acceleration of economic and social progress. All this should be combined with profound respect for the law and a condemnation of unlawful actions and breaches of public order.

All the conditions have now been created for progress constitutionally and for the defense and extension of perestroyka by political means. The republic's party organizations and communists must act thus and assume full responsibility for the practical accomplishment of the tasks of a renewal of the socialist society.

The following participated in the exchange of opinions: B. Makharashvili, first secretary of the Tbilisi Gorkom, N. Dumbadze, secretary of the Adzhar Obkom, R. Tushurashvili, chief of the Tbilisi Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] Internal Affairs Administration, T. Giorgadze, first secretary of the Chiatura Gorkom, R. Muladze, first secretary of the Khashurskiy Raykom, V. Razmadze, prosecutor of the republic, T. Shashiashvili, chairman of the Kutaisi Gorispolkom, G. Dolidze, secretary of the party committee of the "Elektrovozostroitel" Production Association, G. Pipiya, first secretary of the Zugdidi Gorkom, and N. Chitanava, chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers.

The results of the meeting were summed up by G. Gumbaridze.

Anti-Nuclear Groups Meet in Alma-Ata

LD1112222689 Moscow TASS in English 2202 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Text] Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, December 12 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Pleshakov:

Kazakh environmentalists and anti-nuclear activists, grouped in the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, held a conference here on Monday.

The conference summed up results of the ten-month anti-nuclear campaign in the republic.

It was pointed out at the conference that the movement's branches were now operating also in Yakutiya, an autonomous republic in the country's northeast, in Moscow and several regions of the Russian Federation and several constituent republics.

People's diplomacy helped achieve a radical reduction in the number of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk range, speakers said. Movement activists now also control the environmental situation in the region.

Participants in the conference called on parliaments, governments and peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries to take immediate measures to stop nuclear testing and eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

They proposed making the solution of environmental problems a state policy.

Uzbek Official Jailed for Corruption

LD1212191589 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Tashkent December 12 TASS—By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kruzhilin:

Vasiliy Yesin, former first secretary of the Navoyisk Regional Party Committee of Uzbekistan, Soviet Central Asia, has been convicted of receiving and giving bribes and sentenced to six years of imprisonment in penitentiary and to property confiscation.

Yesin was convicted of receiving 68,000 roubles in bribes from his subordinates, as well as of giving a 30,960 rouble bribe to Yuriy Churbanov, former Soviet first deputy interior minister, who is now in jail.

Several charges were not confirmed in the court, as the defendant and some witnesses recanted their testimonies given during preliminary investigations. They cited "investigating officer's pressure" as a reason for their earlier allegedly false statements.

Churbanov also recanted earlier statements concerning the case.

However, the court, having sufficient evidence of Churbanov's receiving a bribe from Yesin, considered the crime proven. The fact that Yesin received 15,000 roubles in bribes was proven as well.

After the sentence was announced, the court instituted criminal proceedings against a witness in connection with his deliberately false testimony.

Former secretary of a regional party committee Khayri Zainiyev, who previously voluntarily testifed on giving a bribe to Yesin and described the whole thing in detail, recanted his testimony, also citing "investigating officer's pressure".

Having established that no one pressured Zainiyev to make his statement and that he was not taken into custody at all, the court instituted criminal proceedings against him.

Tajik Supreme Soviet on 1990 Plan, Elections

90US0237A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by A. Karpov (Dushanbe): "Sessions of Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics: Tajik SSR"]

[Text] The 20th Session of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the 11th term began with a discussion of two traditional questions: the state plan and the budget for next year. It was noted in the deputies' speeches that a tense situation had developed in the republic's economy. Industry is regularly failing to fulfill its contractual commitments for deliveries of products to the consumers and the rate of production is dropping. The plan for profit is not being fulfilled, which is having a negative effect on the republic's financial situation. There has been sharp criticism of manifestations of group self-centeredness of labor collectives of a number of enterprises and associations which, having created the best possible conditions for themselves, are accepting obviously low assignments for producing consumer goods. Moreover, despite the measures that have been applied to provide for the production of products in the given assortment, the enterprises are continuing to increase the output of costly items. And with the limited capacities and resources this fully eliminated inexpensive goods and leads to an unjustified growth of wages. As a result, the republic today has an active increase in the amount of money in circulation.

The state plan for 1990 earmarks measures for overcoming the negative tendencies in the economy and strengthening its social direction, and special attention is being devoted to the process of financial improvement.

The deputies summed up the results of the preceding session for nationwide discussion of the draft law on elections of Tajik SSR people's deputies. In keeping with the legislation that was adopted, the elections of representatives to the highest organ of authority in the country will be conducted only in the electoral okrugs. It will be necessary to form 230 okrugs and to elect a deputy in each of them on an alternative basis. The work of preparing for and conducting the elections is the responsibility of the election commissions. The law does not stipulate that okrug pre-election meetings are to be held.

At the session an election commission was formed for elections of Tajik SSR people's deputies. I.F. Dedov, who previously worked as deputy chairman of the presidium of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, was elected chairman of the republic election commission. The deputies elected U.G. Usmanov to fill the vacant position and relieved him of the duties of deputy chairman of the republic council of ministers. O. Latifi, former PRAVDA staff correspondent for the Tajik SSR, was elected deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

Glasnost Within Ukrainian KGB Discussed

90UN0383A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 16 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by the Press Bureau of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) KGB: "In the Ukrainian SSR Committee for State Security"]

[Text] The issue of the status and ways to further assert glasnost in the activities of the republic's KGB and its organs in the field was reviewed at a meeting of the Collegium of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Committee for State Security .

Taking into account the experience gained and a critical analysis of shortcomings in actual compliance with the requirements of the USSR KGB occurring in a number of subdivisions of the committee and KGB oblast administrations, the collegium confirmed the conclusion that at the current stage glasnost is the main political principle, the most important condition for perestroyka in the KGB organs. Glasnost ensures maximum compliance in the activities of the KGB organs with the party line toward democratization and radical changes in the economy and sociopolitical life of the Soviet state and society.

At the same time, it was stressed that glasnost as a principle for the activities of the Chekists was set forth by V.I. Lenin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy in their time and was extensively practiced in the initial years of Soviet power. Our histyory has seen orders by the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission], VUChK [All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission], GPU-OGPU [State Political Administration—United Political Administration] published in newspapers and reports by the Chekist organs to the people's authorities. Glasnost was an important premise for the bond between the Chekists and the people.

As those taking the floor stressed, glasnost is a guarantee of the strict compliance by the personnel of KGB organs with socialist legislation and ethical and moral norms in resolving issues affecting the interests of Soviet citizens. This is also a guarantee against distortions in the actions of the organs of power and management based on public control. Also, a complete restoration and further development of the principle of glasnost in the operation of the KGB organs is a premise for their qualitative improvement. This will make it possible to clearly define their role, place, and tasks at the current level of development of the socialist state.

The collegium stressed that the Chekists have nothing to hide from the people. Objective information on the history and current activities of the KGB organs offered to the broad circles of the public facilitates makes the political situation healthier, reinforcing ties with the toilers and all strata of society, and enlisting their active involvement in ensuring the security of the socialist state. Enhancing the creative initiative of the Chekists in developing traditional ways and seeking new forms and methods of implementing the principles of glasnost was set as a task. It was noted that statements in the press by the leaders of the committee and the UKGB [Administration of the Committee for State Security] of oblasts, their interviews given to the correspondents of newspapers, and meetings of the employees with labor collectives, young people, and intellectuals have made it possible to make the public aware of many problems. Increasing the practice of having young Chekists make reports to the collectives which have recommended them for work in the organs of state security was proposed.

It was stressed that the Chekists of the republic have lifted the veil of secrecy to a considerable degree and have given greater opportunity to the creative arts intellectuals to familiarize themselves with archival materials. Assistance has been rendered to the film studio

Ukrkinokhronika, to the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, and oblast TV studios in producing the movies "Death Was Certain For Me," "Drafted By the Revolution," "You Have the Assignment," the TV production "Destiny of a Chekist," and many other films of current interest. The collections of memoirs by Chekists "Protecting the Security of the Motherland," "The Paths of Chekist Destiny," "With the Shield and the Sword," "It Was Not to Be Divulged," "Declassify and Publish," and others published in close cooperation with writers and journalists which describe the struggle of the state security organs against the enemies of the Soviet state were received by the readers with interest.

Through the mass media, the heroic deeds of the Chekists V. Mantsev, A. Trepalov, D. Medvedev, Ya. Livshits, and S. Karin-Danilenko were brought to the attention of the public. The names of these and others of Dzerzhinskiy's people who were subjected to repressions but did not yield to degeneration and opposed lawlessness to the very end were cleared. Little-known facts from the history of the VUChK and KGB organs of the Ukrainian SSR were released to the public. Thus, materials of historical significance on the graduates of NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] special schools, heroes of the Young Guard L. Shevtsova, the Levashov brothers, and V. Zagoruyko were located in the archives of the Committee for State Security of the Ukraine. A number of documents from their files were transferred to the Young Guard Museum (city of Krasnodon); corresponding information on this period of their heroic lives was published in the republic and local press ("The String Quartet," "Why the 'Dnepr' Was Silent," "'Tempest' Made No Contact").

Participants in the meeting noted the further reinforcement of cooperation between the KGB organs and the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, creative arts collectives; joint work with them on publishing a series of documentary materials on Chekist topics is in progress.

The collegium emphasized the great importance of work on rehabilitating the victims of illegal repressions and the coverage of its results in the periodicals. Unfortunately, thus far no documentary information on the locations of burial sites of the victims of Stalinist repressions has been found thus far in the committee and oblast administrations of the KGB. This is why those who are trying to accuse the employees of state security organs of attempting to conceal such data are not right. Nonetheless, a number of burial sites of those who perished in the time of the personality cult have been located with the participation of Chekists, mainly by debriefing witnesses. Information on this has been transmitted to the government commission, deputy groups, and the mass media. Studying the archival materials of the past years, the Chekists pay homage to the outstanding functionaries of the party and state of the republic V.P. Zatonskiy, S.V. Kosior, A.Ya. Shumskiy, M.M. Khatayevich, and S.I. Andreyev; representatives of the creative arts intellectuals S.A. Yefremov, M.I. Yavorskiy, M.L. Boychuk, and V. Polishchuk; and many other honest Soviet people dedicated to the cause of Lenin who were called "enemies of the people" and subjected to repressions unlawfully.

In their statements, members of the collegium and those taking part in discussing this issue severely criticized existing shortcomings in the work of a number of leaders of the subdivisions of the committee and oblast UKGBs in developing glasnost in intradepartmental activities, in working with the personnel, and in resolving social and domestic issues.

The resolution adopted by the collegium refers to practical measures aimed at invigorating perestroyka in the operation of the KGB organs of the republic on the basis of developing glasnost. In particular, it was resolved to inform the toilers, public organizations, and the mass media more completely about the activities of the republic KGB in defending the Soviet constitutional system and state secrets; combating organized crime, smuggling, and violations of regulations on hard-currency operations; guarding of the frontier; rehabilitation of the unlawfully repressed; and other issues.

The resolution points out that the reinforcement of contacts with the people's deputies, local soviet organs, further improvements in the work on receiving citizens and considering their petitions are an important segment of the development of glasnost at present. The conclusion was drawn that this is not a one-time campaign but a long-term, politically grounded program. It was stressed that it is impossible to protect democracy without subordinating one's work to the principles of law-governed state, without expanding glasnost in the work of Chekists, and without reinforcing ties with the people.

Serhiyenko Against Public Groups' Registration

LD1112202989 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 10 Dec 89

[Text] The meeting called by the All-Ukrainian Society of Repressed People, held in Kiev, was addressed by Oles Serhiyenko, who spent many years in prison for his political convictions:

[Begin Serhiyenko recording] Comrades, I come out strongly against this humiliating system of registration of public organizations. If we are advocating the building of a law-governed state, then we must grant the people the right to control whether the rules and attitudes of organizations correspond with the Constitution's demands. Our Constitution is saturated with declarations on human rights. I consider that a program containing—don't interrupt me!—a program containing a demand for dictatorship and which permits this dictatorship to resort to weapons and recognizes that it should have extraordinary powers through Article 6 of the Constitution—an organization with such program cannot be registered. [end recording]

[Presenter] Speeches were delivered at the meeting by representatives of other associations and also by guests from Moscow, Lithuania and foreign countries.

Belorussian Resolution on Chernobyl

90UN0358A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Oct 89 pp 1-2

[Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic "On the State Program for the Cleanup in the Belorussian SSR of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station for the Period 1990-1995"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR notes that the Council of Ministers of the BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic], the BSSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the BSSR ministries and departments, and the executive committees of the oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies have done considerable work to improve the draft state plan for the cleanup in the BSSR of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] during the period 1990-1995. In the version that was further worked out, due consideration was given to the comments and proposals of USSR people's deputies and BSSR people's deputies, the standing commissions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, the public organizations, labor collectives, and individual citizens.

A total of R700 million in capital investments has been allocated to the republic for the cleanup following the accident, which is almost three times more than this year. More than 4,000 prefabricated shielded houses have been provided for the construction of housing. An additional 253,000 tons of asphalt and tar oil, 25,000 tons of cement, 10,000 tons of steel pipes, and 6,000 tons of rolled metal have been allocated for engineering decontamination and gasification. It is planned to complete the construction of the Rechitsa-Slavgorod section of main gas pipeline and start the construction of a series of gas branch pipelines. Construction organizations of the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, the USSR Ministry of Water Resources Construction, the USSR Ministry of Transport Construction, and the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification are being recruited to carry out this work. Plans have been reduced for deliveries of milk and meat to all-union stocks by 360,000 tons and 72,000, respectively.

At the same time the BSSR Council of Ministers, the BSSR Gosplan a number of ministries and departments, and the corresponding executive committees of oblast soviets of people's deputies have not fully resolved in all-union organs questions connected with allocation of the funding and material-technical resources needed to implement the measures planned by the state program for the 13th 5-Year Plan. The USSR Ministry of Defense has not entirely accepted the republic proposal to carry out engineering decontamination of contaminated populated points using the personnel of military subunits.

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves as follows:

1. To adopt the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995 and to submit it for approval to the USSR Supreme Soviet and ask it to assign the USSR Council of Ministers to allocate the necessary material-technical and financial resources to implement it.

2. The BSSR Council of Ministers, BSSR Gosplan, BSSR ministries and departments, and the executive committees of oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies will ensure practical realization of the tasks in the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995 and provide that these tasks are set in a separate section in the draft 5-year and annual plans for economic and social development, paying priority attention to matters connected with the resettlement of people and ensuring safe living conditions for them.

3. To entrust the BSSR Council of Ministers with the task of resolving the question of recalling all republic construction organizations doing work in other parts of the country.

4. The BSSR Council of Ministers jointly with interested ministries and departments and the executive committees of the oblast soviets of people's deputies will prepare and submit to the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium draft legislative enactments regulating matters of ensuring safe living conditions for the population on territory contaminated with radionuclides.

5. The BSSR Supreme Soviet standing commission for matters relating to the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl AES shall, together with the BSSR Public Foundations Council, establish systematic control over the effectiveness and correctness of funds spent from accounts opened in republic banks to collect funds to provide assistance for the inhabitants of areas stricken by the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

6. The BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the BSSR Supreme Soviet standing commission will establish systemic control over compliance with the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995.

7. The BSSR Council of Ministers will annually report at a session of the BSSR Supreme Soviet on the course of implementation of the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995.

8. To take under advisement that by their 20 October 1989 resolution No 886 "On Additional Measures To Intensify Health Protection and Improve the Material Position of the Population Living on Territory Subjected to Contamination with Radionuclides as a Result of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES" the USSR Council of

Ministers and the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] have done the following:

8.1. Assigned the following tasks:

—to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and the USSR Ministry of Health, with the participation of the AUCCTU, to draw up a program of measures to improve medical services and improve the health of the population living in regions affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, and with the agreement of the USSR Gosplan to make provision in the draft plans for the 13th 5-Year Plan for the development of a network of hospitals, polyclinics, outpatient facilities, and branches of specialized scientific research institutes, and to provide them with special equipment and drugs, and of measures to reinforce medical personnel in these regions, and also tasks in building specialized sanatoria and health maintenance facilities, rest homes, and other essential projects;

—to the ministries and departments and the central trade union committees, jointly with the labor collectives at enterprises, organizations, establishments, and kolkhozes [collective farms], the task of annually allocating at least 5 percent of the places available at departmental health resorts and rest homes for children and pregnant women living in the areas affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES until completion of the sanatoria and health maintenance facilities, rest homes, and other projects.

Procedure for the allocation of such places shall be determined by the AUCCTU.

—to the USSR Gosplan and USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations the task of insuring in 1990 the purchase, in addition to the order of the USSR Ministry of Health, of medical equipment to equip public health establishments located in areas affected by radioactive contamination to the value of R4 million in convertible currency, including R2 million for medical establishments located in such regions in the Belorussian SSR;

Proceeding from the special living conditions in areas affected by radioactive contamination resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl AES, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will provide for supplies of foodstuffs for this population in accordance with the rational norms for the consumption of foodstuffs, and also provide it with industrial durables on a priority basis;

The USSR Gosplan, USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], USSR Ministry of Trade, and Tsentrosoyuz [Central Union of Consumer Societies] have been assigned the task of taking those conditions into account when determining market allocations of these goods;

—to the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Procurements, the task of drawing up and implementing in 1990-1993 a set of measures, including economic incentive measures, to introduce scientific developments extensively in agriculture that will insure that milk, meat, and other foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots fit for consumption are obtained on agricultural land affected by radioactive contamination;

—in order to improve the effectiveness of work to protect the population from radiation effects, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Academy of Sciences will devise and implement in 1990-1991 measures to decontaminate populated points affected by radioactive contamination as part of a complex involving the provision of services and amenities and land-improvement work on adjacent land, making provision in the measures for the development of progressive means and methods to carry out decontamination work and equipment for military subunits used for this work, together with the necessary machines and mechanisms;

—the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry jointly with the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers shall agree during 1990-1991 on lists of priority needs for the population living in areas affected by radioactive contamination and of the personnel of military subunits employed in decontamination work, and individual dosimeters, and also on supplying organizations and enterprises in those areas with instruments to monitor contamination in agricultural produce and the environment, and on organizing a system to service this apparatus during its useful life;

—to the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers the task of devising during the first quarter of 1990 and implementing in 1990-1995 a program to provide gas facilities for populated points located in regions affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES;

the USSR Gosplan, the "Gazprom" State Gas Concern, and the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises are assigned the task of making provision in the draft plans for 1990-1995 for specific targets insuring realization of these programs;

—the "Gazprom" State Gas Concern and the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises have been assigned the task of building during 1989-1993 a main gas pipeline from Torzhok to Dolina and branches from it to the populated points located in regions affected by radioactive contamination, including bringing the Slavgorod-Rechitsa section of this pipeline with its appropriate branches on line in 1990;

—the USSR Gosplan and the "Gazprom" State Gas Concern should make provision for this by allocating the necessary capital investment funds.

8.2. Decided to establish from 1 November 1989 for citizens living in populated points in which, in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers resolution No 1006-286 of 22 August 1986 and subsequent instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers, limited use of foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots has been established:

- an annual vacation of 30 calendar days regardless of any additional vacation for work in harmful working conditions. Here, the total length of vacation time should not exceed 42 calendar days;
- 70 calendar days prenatal time off for women;
- partially paid time off to care for children aged up to 3 years. Here, vacation pay shall be twice the amount of the grant as provided for for this purpose in current legislation;
- grants for children in low-income families in the amount of R24 monthly for each child until he/she has reached the age determined by current legislation, when the aggregate income per family member does not exceed R75 per month;
- payment of full pensions to working pensioners regardless of wages (or salary) received.

8.3. Supplemented section "B" of list No 2 for production facilities, shops, occupations, and duties involving hard working conditions in which work confers the right of a state pension under preferential conditions and in preferential amounts as confirmed by USSR Council of Ministers resolution No 134-49 subsection VII dated 12 February 1964, as follows:

"VII. Work done at populated points affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

"Workers, employees, and members of kolkhozes engaged in work at populated points at which in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers resolution No 1006-286 and subsequent instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers restrictions have been imposed on the use of foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots."

The list of occupations and duties which confers the right of a state pension under preferential conditions is confirmed by the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. The term of work that confers the right to a preferential pension is calculated from the time of the accident at the Chernobyl AES;

8.4. Adopted the proposal of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers as agreed with the USSR Ministry of Health, State Committee for Hydrometeorology, USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Procurements, and State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, during the period December 1989 through 1 January 1993 to pay to citizens living in populated points located in areas affected by radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES at which the use of milk has been partially restricted, and, if necessary, other foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots a cash grant in the amount of R15 per month for each family member (except for populated points at which by decisions of the USSR Government restrictions have been imposed on the use of foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots and at which citizens are being paid a cash grant in the amount of R30 per month per person).

The USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Food and Procurements is assigned the task, together with the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, of determining within 1 month a procedure and conditions for payment of this grant.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers should annually confirm the specific lists of populated points whose inhabitants are entitled to this grant.

The privileges envisaged in subparagraphs "b," "d," and "e" of paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned resolution (paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of section 8.2. of this resolution) are to cover the inhabitants of such populated points.

It is established that at these populated points:

—the length of annual vacation for workers is extended to 24 working days, not counting additional vacation time for work in harmful conditions. Here, the total length of vacation time should not exceed 36 calendar days;

—the duration of partially paid vacation time to care for children is extended until they attain the age of 3 years;

—children shall be kept at children's preschool establishments gratis;

8.5. Have increased by 25% all kinds of pensions and grants for nonworking pensioners and those disabled from birth living in populated points in which working citizens are paid additions to their wages as determined by the USSR Council of Ministers Instruction No 1767 dated 3 September 1986;

8.6. For families living at populated points at which in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 1006-286 of 22 August 1986 and subsequent instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers restrictions have been imposed on the use of foodstuffs produced locally and on private subsidiary plots as defined in paragraph 9 of USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU Resolution No 886 of 20 October 1989 (section 8.4. of this resolution) that include children aged up to 14 years, pregnant women, and persons for whom living in those populated points is contraindicated for medical reasons and who expressed a desire to move to a new place of residence, the procedure and conditions for the payment of cash compensation for expenses incurred in connection with the move to the new place of residence shall be as defined in paragraphs 2 and 4 of USSR Council of Ministers instructions No 912 of 24 May 1989.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers are assigned the task of providing living accommodation for these citizens at their new place of residence and giving them the necessary assistance in finding jobs (when resettlement is within the republic);

8.7 Established the following:

—that the cash grants and additions paid to citizens working at enterprises, organizations, establishments, sovkhozes [state farms], and kolkhozes and to non-working citizens with children as defined in the USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU resolution No 886 of 20 October 1989 shall be paid by the social security agencies;

—that spending to pay grants, compensation, and additions as defined by the resolution shall in 1989 come from the USSR Council of Ministers reserve fund, and in subsequent years from assets as provided for in the state budget and also the assets of the organs of state insurance (with reference to payment under the terms of compulsory and voluntary insurance).

9. To assign the BSSR Council of Ministers, BSSR Gosplan, BSSR Gossnab, BSSR Ministry of Finance, BSSR State Agroindustrial Committee, and the BSSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the executive committees of the oblast soviets of people's deputies, and other interested BSSR ministries and departments the task of continuing work in the all-union organs to insure the resolution of all matters relating to complete realization of the measures envisaged in the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995.

10. The BSSR Council of Ministers and the executive committees of the Brest, Gomel, Grodno, Minsk, and Mogilev Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies will inform the public and labor collectives about the course of realization of the state program for the cleanup in the Belorussian SSR following the accident at the Chernobyl AES during the period 1990-1995.

[Signed] N. Dementey, chairman of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[Signed] L. Syroyegina, secretary of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
26 October 1989, Minsk.

Latvian KGB Reports Attacks on Soldiers

LD1212225889 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 2100 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] State Security committee reports.

On 8 December of this year, at 1820 in Riga, a vehicle carrying soldiers crossed the intersection of Augusta Deglava Iela and Kazakova Iela. When it passed a group of young people a homemade explosive charge was thrown into the motor vehicle. In the explosion one soldier was injured. He is in the hospital.

On 9 December, at 1630, an attack was made upon a sentry at a military unit in Jekabpils Rayon. The attacker hit the sentry on the head with an axe. When the sentry lost consciousness the attacker robbed him of his submachine gun and 69 cartridges. The victim is in the hospital.

The military procuracy has begun an investigation of these events.

In order to avoid possible serious consequences, we request all inhabitants of the republic not to be indifferent, and not to behave blithely if facts become known about the illegal ownership of firearms and explosives.

Should anybody know anything about the mentioned events, we request they inform the Latvian SSR State Security Committee in Riga on telephone numbers 270325, 270325; in Jekabpils on 21151, or at the nearest militia department.

Lithuanian Nationalist Parties Examined

90UN0353A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by A. Petrov, special correspondent of TRUD: "Many-Sided Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—Cathedral Square is the center of Vilnius. Over the headquarters of "Sajudis," the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka, flies the tricolor national flag. In the windows are caricatures. Here are Stalin and Hitler. This is a copy of a British caricature of 1939 which appeared following the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Alongside is another: two hands reaching out to one another. In one, Lithuania, in the other, a moneybag. On one, a hammer and sickle, on the other, a swastika...

It is with good reason that the art of the prewar years has been resurrected and put on general display. The events associated with the pact and Lithuania's subsequent entry into the USSR are at the center of the republic's political life. They are being discussed both in the plant shops and in the Supreme Soviet. Not only the "Baltic Chain," about which the papers wrote, was devoted to the 50th anniversary of the pact. Many people's surrender of their military ID's and draft papers was timed to coincide with this date, for example. More than 150 persons announced a hunger strike. Mass protest meetings were staged in all Lithuania's major cities. Placards called the Soviet Army occupationist, and the Sejm's decision on entry into the USSR, illegal.

I shall not pass judgment on treaties of 50 years ago—much has been written about this. But the actions connected with them undoubtedly exacerbated the situation in the republic, which is acknowledged by Lithuanian members of parliament also. At the end of September, a month after all these events, Deputy A. Brazaytis spoke at the republic Supreme Soviet session as follows: "We have introduced confusion into relations between the peoples... The past should be dealt with by historians and men of letters... We politicians, however, should concern ourselves primarily with the present day." But the Supreme Soviet still recommended that its commission continue study of the documents of 50 years ago, although it had already published its findings. Why the turning to the past again and again? The answer may be found in the more than 100 papers and newssheets published by "Sajudis" and other public movements, as also in central republic publications. This is necessary, apparently, aside from all else, for...consolidating forces for the purpose of national revival.

How many parties, alliances and centers there are in the republic which have adopted the idea of national revival no one could, perhaps, say. Beneath one call for a mass meeting were 17 different names (subsequently some joker added an 18th: sword and plowshare alliance). But the Lithuanian Freedom League considers itself, perhaps, the most "consistent".

"We have not changed our views for a number of years," A. Terlyatskas, a leader of the league, told me.

He sets out his ideas simply and intelligibly: the Soviet system needs to be liquidated, and the communists should repent of their "bloody crimes"... Membership of the league has not been determined but the mass meetings and marches which it puts together are large. At the end of September Terlyatskas marched with a cross at the head of a vast column along Gediminas Avenue. Black and tricolor flags fluttered above the heads of the adults, adolescents and children who took part in the demonstration. "Stop Communism in Lithuania!" the placards said.

The democrats are another party. It is said that it has more than 2,000 members. It has ties to many overseas organizations. Some members of this party's leadership—S. Pechelyukas, I. Gelazhyus and V. Yogela—have cited the following as being among the principal aims: Lithuania's sovereignty, which, in their view, is possible only outside of the USSR.

One of the youngest parties is the Union of Tautkninki. The Lithuanian Encyclopedia calls the eponymous organization which operated in Lithuania prior to the war (and which was the governing party as of 1926) fascist. This nationalist organization numbers few members as yet, but its ranks are growing...

I have met the leaders of various parties and public movements who do not link Lithuania's future with socialism. They all acknowledge the leading role of "Sajudis"—the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka. The name itself should, it would seem, point to the aims of this organization. And "Sajudis" has indeed done much for the expansion of glasnost and the democratization of social life in the republic. For this reason it has won the trust of a large part of the Lithuanian population. This was manifested particularly at the time of the elections of USSR people's deputies. It is now they, the leaders of "Sajudis," who are calling the tune in political life, but in their speeches, numerous interviews and newspaper articles representatives of this movement are increasingly often expressing ideas far removed from perestroyka. It has reached the point of Terlyatskas starting to accuse the Sajudis people: They are using our slogans and condemning us for extremism. And Deputy A. Bagdonas observed at the republic Supreme Soviet session that the further things went, the more openly certain of the people's elect were idealizing the Lithuania of the prewar years and declaring increasingly distinctly the need for a restoration of the former system.

There are many acute political passions and arguments concerning the organizations united in the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power. They are advocating the sovereignty of Lithuania within a renewed USSR, the cohesion of the CPSU and the equality of people of all nationalities. I have been present at the "Wednesdays," on which "Yedinstvo" conducts meetings with the inhabitants of Vilnius. I noticed the age of the participants—they were over 50, in the main....

Organizations of the Interfront are disconnected, although they did form from the ranks of their representatives the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power. Prof I. Kucherov, doctor of legal sciences and a member of the committee, was charged with handing over to the republic Supreme Soviet a package of demands and with speaking at the session. Interfront representatives carried placards in front of the Supreme Soviet building in vain. The session did not examine the package of demands.

The complex processes occurring in the republic could not have failed to have been reflected in the positions of the unions. The leadership of the republic Council of Trade Unions is, it would seem to me, waiting to see in which direction the scales will tilt in the course of the political struggle. It came out in September, it is true, with a statement which condemned "Yedinstvo's" attempts to call a political strike. But no program for lowering the level of confrontation was heard in this statement.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, on the other hand, making efforts to normalize the situation in the republic, is being criticized from different sides. Even the slogan "The People's Plans are the Party's Plans" which it has adopted are not sparing it against charges of being half-baked. After all, the people themselves are split into a multitude of movements. All this, of course, has been reflected in the militancy of the republic's party organizations.

Following the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum, which confirmed the unity and indivisibility of the party, two draft Lithuanian Communist Party programs were published. There is no question of unity with the CPSU in them. A congress has been appointed for December. It will decide the kind of party the republic Communist Party is to be. Throughout the month I spent in Lithuania I constantly had a feeling of some artificiality, perhaps, of the events occurring there. And however much some leaders of "Sajudis" would like to persuade everyone that nothing special is happening in the republic and that the CPSU Central Committee is worrying to no purpose about Lithuania in the statement devoted to the Soviet Baltic, the facts indicate otherwise. National dissension is being ignored, and the opinion of the minority, about which so much concern was displayed by the Lithuanian delegation at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, is not being taken into consideration. After all, upon returning home, none of the people's elect who is a "Sajudis" member supported, say, the Poles who declared at sessions of the Shalchininkskiy and Vilnyusskiy rayon soviets their territories autonomous, and the three languages—Lithuanian, Polish and Russian—equal. Not one of the people's deputies who is a member of the Lithuanian movement for perestroyka supported the writer Yu. Baltushis, who from the rostrum of the republic Supreme Soviet appealed to "Sajudis" not to foment interethnic discord, after which incensed people with placards demanded that he leave the meeting room and explain why he had "insulted the nation." Calls for his books to be burned were heard even. It did not come to this, it is true, people confined themselves to offensive telegrams, and the books were simply thrown onto the threshold of his apartment.

With the tacit approval of the people's deputies the press has long been settling scores with V. Shved, first secretary of Vilnius' Oktyabrskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], who at a mass meeting advocated unity with the CPSU and made a negative assessment of certain of the republic's party newspapers.

Many such examples could be cited. Instances of intolerance of dissidence are simply explained: pretexts for fomenting discord may be found in the history of all peoples—if the desire is there. And it is, unfortunately. Bills also are being prepared with the active participation of "Sajudis." Some have already been passed, others are still being discussed. There is a desire to deprive the Lithuanian people in the future of union citizenship. "The Lithuanian people are the hegemon," R. Ozolas, chief editor of the newspaper VOZROZHDENIYE, maintains.

We have already seen this: both a "hegemon people" and a state which was "above all"... And if lessons are to be learned from history, it should not, I believe, be forgotten that there cannot be democracy based on the suppression of dissidence. Just as there cannot be the freedom of some at the expense of the freedom of others.

Veterans Urged To Act Against Nationalism

PM1212093389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel, Retired, A. Smetanin: "On the Offensive Rather Than on the Defensive. Notes from the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans Plenum"; venue, date not specified]

[Text] Speakers talked about the difficult and at times dramatic circumstances surrounding the solution of the nationalities question. That was the main question at the plenum which, in addition to other matters, discussed the tasks of the all-union war and labor veterans' organization stemming from the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum decisions.

Speeches by Hero of the Soviet Union K. Usenbekov from Kirghizia; G. Ushpalis from Lithuania; G. Milovanov from Belorussia; G. Udarov from Moscow; and many other plenum participants were pointed, conveying extreme concern and heartache.

G. Udarov, CPSU veteran of 65 years' standing, observed with emotion that the party has no other aide as reliable and as loyal as the war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans who make up one-fourth of voters.

Bearing in mind that the forthcoming elections of working people's deputies to union and autonomous republic supreme soviets and to local soviets will produce a very major struggle, notably on questions associated with interethnic relations, the veterans' support for the party will be really badly needed.

Of course, veterans' organizations face quite a few difficulties in this regard. Whereas "Sajudis" in Lithuania, as Comrade Ushpalis said, has its own press organs and other mass media at its disposal, the Veterans' Committee has nothing of the sort. Even the publication of the newspaper NASHI ZABOTY (the Committee's organ) has to be financed by pension rubles.

So, what are the veterans to do? One single conclusion suggests itself: to be on the offensive rather than on the defensive. To take the offensive without awaiting any instructions from the center. The poisoned seed of nationalism now spread in the public environment must not be allowed to sprout and to corrupt the life of our children and grandchildren to the benefit of irresponsible politicos and careerists now living as parasites off the economic and social difficulties.

Can this be done? From the many speakers on the nationalities question at the plenum, it is possible to single out one who described how the veterans' organizations help the party to implement the platform on the nationalities question. I mean Comrade V. Filkin, representing the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The republic's 1.2 million inhabitants include Chechens, Ingush, Russians, Ukrainians, and representatives of many other nationalities including some subjected to mass repressions during the times of Stalinism. According to Comrade Filkin's statement, however, they have not experienced any of the events that have taken or are taking place in the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldavia, and some other regions. Credit for this is due not only to party and soviet organizations, but also to public organizations including the organization of war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans.

For example, certain forces in the republic recently decided to mark Expulsion Day (meaning the expulsion of Chechens, Ingush, and other ethnic groups to Central Asia—author's note) and use this as a pretext to inflame unnecessary passions.

Communists, including of course the veterans, went to the people, explained how unnecessary the intended action was and the harm it could do the cause of perestroyka and the solution of the nationalities question, and managed to persuade people that they were right.

Similar examples were also cited at the seminar-conference held after the plenum. Interesting reports on the work of veterans' organizations to implement the CPSU platform on the nationalities question were delivered by representatives of Krasnodar Kray and of Crimean and Sakhalin Oblasts.

The plenum noted in its decision that it is necessary to preserve and strengthen the unity of the veterans' movement in the country and to struggle against any attempts to split or divide it along national or any other lines.

Special Militia Squads' Activities Described

PM2711120989 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Nov 89 p 1

[D. Andreyev feature: "Battalions and the 'Laskovyy May' Group"]

[Text] ...The strapping young guys in berets quickly jumped out of the bus, grabbing their shields and automatic weapons and made for...the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. "A hostage-taking even here?!"—I thought, stunned, slowing down, just in case, and looking for the nearest telephone to contact the editorial office.

However, it turned out that there was no need to alert the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA stenographers: I swear, I had no idea that the latest briefing was being devoted to the special-purpose militia detachments (OMON) about whom we have heard so much. The guys with the automatic weapons, shields, handcuffs, and helmets (all real, of course!) had come to show journalists their gear, partly in action....

Both the oblast and the city OMON's were set up in fall of last year. Their tasks vary. Protecting public order at mass events, in accident zones, and other emergency circumstances, cutting short or forestalling mass disturbances, and assisting in detaining armed criminals. Journalists have not yet been told how all the country's 23 OMON's operate, although a great deal has been written about the actions of their battalions and regiments in reportages from rallies and demonstrations and crime reports on clashes with racketeers.

As for the Moscow OMON, Militia Major General N. Myrikov, deputy chief of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration, gave us a detailed and accurate decription: The "special detachment" detained 23,995 lawbreakers this year, 7,696 of them at mass events not connected with rallies—at soccer matches, in the course of patrol duty, at concerts. At rallies, OMON men detained 551 people for breaches of public order (of the more than 470,000 who took part in sanctioned and unsanctioned meetings, debates, and demonstrations).

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Questions:

Question: Have the OMON's used firearms to "disperse" people?

"No, they have not," Militia Major General V. Chernoglazov, first deputy chief of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee [obkom] Main Internal Affairs Administration, replied unequivocally. "Twice an automatic weapon was used to arrest criminals (once, as a psychological means, blanks were used). Pistols were also used in a similar situation in an effort to detain a hit-and-run driver who had knocked down a militia staffer."

Question: You said that OMON's are also used to patrol shows, concerts, and so forth. Readers have telephoned to tell us that such a detachment has begun to appear at concerts of the "Laskovyy May" [Sweet May] group, which is popular among young people. Why is this?

"During 15(!) 'Laskovyy May' concerts," representatives of the Oblast Main Internal Affairs Administration explained, "in Kaliningrad, Kolomna, Serpukhov, Chekhov, Krasnogorsk, Lyubertsy, Khimki, and Podolsk, the detachment dealt with numerous instances of hooligan behavior among the audience. There were many drunks, and people prone to hooligan behavior and causing a row. In Krasnogorsk, for instance, a raging mob of some 500 people had to be pacified, and in Khimki, Lobnya, and Dolgoprudnyy it was 650 people! Many of the spectators who particularly 'distinguished' themselves were taken to militia stations. Unfortunately, fans of other rock groups and bands also tend to behave in a similar 'fashion.'"

Party School Rector on Perestroyka in CPSU

90UN0439A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 3

[Report on interview with Rector of the Moscow Higher Party School V.N. Shostakovskiy by V. Tsybulskiy: "'Democratic Transformations Will Make the Party the Undisputed Leader'"; date and location not specified]

[Text] Our dialogue today is about the issues of perestroyka and democratization in the party. Rector of the Moscow Higher Party School Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Shostakovskiy shares his ideas about the course of and prospects for party reforms.

[Tsybulskiy] The decision to convene the 28th CPSU Congress next year has merely given an extra impetus to the discussion already underway on perestroyka in the party. The "hottest spots" of debate in the party have already emerged.

[Shostakovskiy] I think that the trouble with many participants in the discussion underway is that their reflections and proposals are not preceded by attempts to analyze the condition of our society and the party on the whole taking into account both history and the reality of today. Hence the sometimes too general approach to the issues on the part of some and, conversely, the hypertrophic interest in partial issues on the part of other participants in the discussion.

First of all, we should respond to the question: Is the present condition of the party in line with the concept of a union of like-minded people as was asserted in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, in the practice of Russian social democracy and its Bolshevik wing?

To my mind, beginning with the mid-1920's, and perhaps somewhat sooner, a break began in the party with the Marxist-Leninist tradition proper in terms of its internal construction, its relationship with the state and society, as well as the transition to a rigid hierarchical model which, in the course of implementation, little remained of the original ideology of this organization itself. This was not happening merely due to subjective reasons—such were the trends of social development at that stage. With regard to the party, they were set forth by Stalin as early as 1921 in his sketches for the pamphlet "On the Political Strategy and Tactics of Russian Communists." In this work, the party was likened for the first time to the command headquarters of the proletariat, and the thesis on the party as "the order of swordbearers" operating in the Soviet state was substantiated for the first time. In turn, the implementation of this thesis brought about the party as a political organization of the new type beginning to lose its functions having cemented the command-administrative monolith with its own self.

As a result of these processes, we ended up with a particular type of communist, a type of primary organization as the basis of the party, a definite type of intraparty relations and relations between the party and our society and the state.

In the spring of this year, the MVPSh [Moscow Higher Party School] sociologists polled nonparty members about the most characteristic traits of the communists they know. The type of party member who is a diligent worker, morally attractive, and careful, but who avoids or is not capable of independent political action, having his own opinion, or criticizing the leadership turned out to be very common. This is the type which was conditioned over many decades and which continues to make its presence known under the new political conditions by its restraint, its trivial thinking and actions, and political passivity.

The extensive representation of this type in the party also affects the discussion underway before the congress. After all, many people live in keeping with the old principle: The main point is not to stand out. Deep down, casting a glance at the past, they suspect that this discussion might be a way to detect those who think differently and call them to order, put them in their place.

A certain pattern of intraparty relations which may be called minority power plays no less a role in the matter. The rank-and-file communists whose opinion was considered to be very important at the stage when the party asserted itself are powerless at present. Their opinion may be heard and ignored, it may be used to one's ends selectively proceeding from a single point of view, the one which is convenient for the conduct of a regional policy or the line of the party committee in a particular collective. A system of relations which asserts the power of the party mass is absent. Thus far, attempts to enliven and enhance the activities of at least the elected party organs by forming commissions inside have been merely palliatives due to the absence of such a system.

Of course, some latitude in the opinions of communists has been noted recently. People who think critically and appreciate the entire measure of responsibility of the party for the future of socialism have been making their presence known. However, most frequently this is the result of work of a particular elected organ, its apparatus, its first secretary. Incidentally, both the passivity of communists and their creative search continue to depend largely on the position of number one in the party organization, and on how the first secretary understands the tasks and goals of the party at present.

[Tsybulskiy] The very course of perestroyka in the party, its stages... The peaks of activity of the communists have alternated with the declines. The 19th All-Union Party Conference which has activated the entire society appears to have influenced the party itself far less. The opinion is being stated that political life in our society has been developing vigorously whereas in some party organizations it has barely moved off the stagnation point. Do you agree with this?

[Shostakovskiy] The potential of resolutions of the 19th Party Conference is considerably richer than what has appeared in the practice of party organizations by now. To a certain degree, the restrained attitude of communists toward the opportunities for perestroyka in the party is determined by the attitude toward their activities at its different stages. Things which were worked out in the party organizations prior to the 27th congress of the party—proposals on the party statute and program which were vigorously voiced both in hundreds of thousands of letters and in the forum of the congress despite not being submitted for discussion—were not evaluated and analyzed seriously. No efficient arrangement for taking into account the opinions of communists in the course of discussing party documents has been worked out.

The party apparatus has been frequently called the only culprit in this situation; however, we should take a sober view of the situation. No matter how clever and progressive an apparatus we develop it will still remain an apparatus and will fend in a certain sense for itself rather than in the interest of the broad party mass—once again, if we do not work out arrangements subordinating its interests to the interests of the party.

[Tsybulskiy] Do you think there is a danger of not advancing toward constructive solutions in the discussion on the party due to absolutely different interpretations of the goals and tasks of the party at the present stage?

[Shostakovskiy] What is a dogma? It is an idea killed by the absence of a mechanism of implementation, deprived of versatile links and prospects for development. We have just embarked on implementing the concept "man is the end in itself of socialism, of the communist movement," which was buried for all these years under the dome of dogmas expressed in the most complete form in the chapter of Stalin's "Concise Course" on dialectical and historical materialism.

Marxism may be liberated from the dogmas only by subjecting it to a critical analysis in light of the entire historical experience accumulated and the most recent data. It is necessary to do this. This is essentially in keeping with the Marxist methodology itself: The founders of Marxism never claimed that their theoretical conclusions and generalizations were complete and immovable. The conclusion that practice is the only criterion of truth has been offered by Marxism.

[Tsybulskiy] The doctrine armed us with the method. Meanwhile, we abandoned the method and made a fetish of only the conclusions drawn in the course of developing the method although, understandably, it is the method itself that is the most significant and valuable...

[Shostakovskiy] This is why we should make an objective analysis and determine what we can borrow from this doctrine today. Which of the conclusions from it made at the beginning of the path are still current? How is the method to be applied in the late 20th century and in what direction is it to be developed creatively? Only this will help us sort out seriously the issues of our history and the contemporary time.

In this regard, I would not renounce the communist perspective as easily and treat it as unceremoniously as has already become the custom in some quarters. Yes, indeed, a certain process of convergence will go on. But in which direction? Could this be the movement in the direction of capitalism as we interpret it at present? After all, our concepts of capitalism are dogmatic, and they mostly refer to capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th century; meanwhile, capitalist society has not been standing in place. It has developed, and this has happened under the influence of these very socialist ideas. Socialist, workers', and communist parties have influenced significantly the development of capitalist society by the very fact of their existence in the political arena.

From this point of view, we should take another, closer look at the communist ideal without considering it to be some kind of "transcendental dreams." Communism is a doctrine rather than a religion. We should approach it as a doctrine determining what in it corresponds to reality and what does not, what is in need of correction. We should approach it from the standpoint of serious scientific analysis of not only socialism itself but also the contemporary capitalist society which is likewise developing.

[Tsybulskiy] The experience of reforms suggests to us that it is impossible to move ahead without determining priorities among the transformations.

[Shostakovskiy] With regard to perestroyka in the party, I would consider the need to assert direct democracy in the party to be the foremost endeavor. Only after we take the first steps along this path can we begin to restructure relations between the party and the civic society.

In this matter, preparations for the 28th congress of the party and the formation of the delegate representation are the most important stage. I believe that we will make a political mistake and strike yet another blow at the authority of the party if we preserve the old multistage system of forming the representation of delegates. I will recall that Lenin resolutely came out against two-stage elections even before the revolution. Such elections to the congress could only be held under certain circumstances, when illegal work provided no other opportunity. The right to determine how to hold elections—in party electoral okrugs, in umbrella party organizations—should be given to the local committees of the party. The main point is to comply with the principles of direct democracy—direct competitive elections, discussion and evaluation of platforms, programs, and endorsements of candidates to the Central Committee by primary organizations.

I see in this prerequisites for a different quality of work of the congress than before, in keeping with the same, new wording of the statute. After all, in essence the 27th congress and its delegates did virtually no work on this document. The congress set up a commission, the latter put the draft statute to a vote, the delegates voted, and that was the end of it. The 28th congress should work on the statute and on other documents.

I expect that most varied approaches by delegates to one and the same statute are possible. However, it is exactly the congress that has to arrive at consensus resolutions of all issues in dispute. The communists will then have confidence in the congress and the documents it adopts. The people will be convinced that that **their** opinions voiced by **their** candidate were adopted by **the congress** or were not. Whether due to the composition of the congress or by virtue of particular arguments, the decision will be made by the congress itself rather than a limited number of delegates or the apparatus.

[Tsybulskiy] Does the party have experience in forming the composition of the congress in this manner, platform-based elections, discussions of alternative candidacies, variants of resolutions, draft documents?

[Shostakovskiy] The party has such experience, and its present condition makes it incumbent upon us to build on this experience. To my mind, not only platform-based elections to the congress are necessary, but probably also the determination of groups which do not claim to be isolated and have their own statute but merely embrace a community of people subscribing to particular views and approaches to party issues—a possibility which Lenin allowed even during the difficult situation in the party, when the resolution on its unity was adopted.

At present, there is a colossal range of opinions in the party regarding the party itself, there are a great many points of view on the place of the party in our society and the ways to renew it. There are communists who believe that all deformations in the party began with the 20th congress and who are convinced that we should hold the 20th VKPB [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress rather than the 28th CPSU Congress; that is, roll back history and start again. There is the diametrically opposite point of view—a profound democratic transformation of the CPSU into a party competing for power in the course of elections to the parliament, a parliamentary-type party is necessary. Between these poles, there is an extensive range of opinions on partial and general issues. Take Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Some believe that it should not only be kept, but that the items codifying the power of the party need to be added to. Others believe that it is necessary to forever omit it from the Constitution as the legal basis for the party dictate.

How can a compromise, a consensus on priority, strategic directions be established? This is what the platforms are needed for, a certain conceptual outline of particular groups in the party. Apparently, all of this is going to happen quite naturally in the course of preparations for the congress and the discussion of its program documents.

The outcome of the party discussion prior to the congress should clarify which share of the party mass subscribes to a particular idea. This will make the search for solutions easier. After all, if decisions continue to issue from the party leadership alone they will most likely be received by the congress with mistrust, they will undermine the confidence of the party mass removed from the work of the congress in its final documents and the membership of the future Central Committee. I see a profound connection between political confidence in the results of the work of the congress and the very techniques of preparing and holding it.

In this matter, a debate on the CPSU platform which the Central Committee will submit for discussion early next year not only in primary organizations, but also within the framework of the horizontal structures in the party which thus far have only been emerging could be very significant. They manifest themselves in the form of party clubs and political interest groups. I believe that the operation of these horizontal structures would be quite useful at the stage of determining the entire complex of views in the party. I believe that the party committees should not assume the role of ultimate judges in drawing a balance for this or that regional organization, select one kind of ideas, even those advocated by a majority, and block the way for other ideas. The discussion of the Central Committee platform should proceed both in the conventional manner, in party organizations, and in horizontal structures, and the results of this discussion, not necessarily unanimous, should be submitted to the Central Committee and the congress on an alternative basis.

Preparations for the congress organized in this exact manner and profound work on individual articles of the draft statute would awaken the mighty intellectual potential of the party. The statutory principles, instructions, and traditions currently in force interfere with this; they are based on principles which are frequently the opposite of those proclaimed by perestroyka and which restrict the activity of communists.

[Tsybulskiy] Let us look at the current statute, at its first and, to my mind, main chapter on the rights and duties of a party member. I am not going to dwell on the fuzziness of a majority of articles outlining the responsibilities of a communist—"to set an example," "to vigorously participate," "to master," "to strictly observe," and so on. All of this is somehow correct. However...you would agree that if such wordings were to be followed literally many people could be expelled from the party by maintaining that they do not set an example in labor or do not engage in "the unceasing struggle for peace and friendship among peoples." However, I believe that these articles are not the ones which restrict the activity of party members. In addition, they are not developed in any manner in the chapter on rights. Meanwhile, the duty of a communist to "firmly and steadfastly implement the general line and directives of the party," restrictions on the opportunity to discuss the issues of party activities only to the time prior to the adoption of a resolution have, to my mind, played a quite significant role in the assertion of fictitious unanimity and unanimous approval in the CPSU, and in reality apathy and passivity.

[Shostakovskiy] One will hardly fail to notice how declarative rather than standard-setting the articles are which circumscribe the scope of duties of a party member. They are not linked into a system, into a single entity with the rights of a communist. The combination of rights and duties was not designed so as to unchain the party member as much as possible, awaken his activity and independence. As far as the unconditional demand to carry out the directives of the party... Of course, this is a just demand. However, it is incomprehensible why a directive affecting the foundations of party life is mandatory for its member if he had no opportunity at all to participate in its adoption.

After all, such was the technique—the center adopted a resolution apart from the party mass, and for some reason the communists were obligated to carry it out. This, essentially, is the complete absence of direct democracy. If the party members had had an opportunity to take part in developing and adopting a resolution it would have been carried out differently. Even the minority which would have voted against it would have known that its opinion had been heard, and taken into account to a degree, and that it enjoyed the right to criticize the results as the resolution was carried out.

All of this necessitates the creation of a statute new in principle which guarantees direct democracy through the entire system of its provisions. There should be several draft statutes of this nature, and all of them should be discussed.

[Tsybulskiy] The influence of the experience of formation and work of new legislative organs—the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet—is seen in proposals for democratizing the party. In proposing elections to the CPSU congress, the communists refer to the procedures for forming the corps of deputies. Other analogies are apparent as well. The Supreme Soviet became truly decisive after the deputies began to work there permanently. Could it be that the same path should be followed in the party by creating elected organs made up of professional politicians?

[Shostakovskiy] Neither the plenums of party committees nor their commissions solve the problem of a working political organ no matter how democratically they are formed. An entire set of measures is necessary in order to solve this problem. In their draft statute, the scientists of the Moscow Higher Party School propose to delineate the functions of secretariats and bureaus of party committees. The secretariat should consist of functionaries elected to their positions but not belonging to the bureau of the party committee. The secretariat manages the apparatus under the control and in keeping with the decisions of the bureau. Incidentally, switching to such a status of the secretariat will help in determining the fate of many first secretaries of party committees—splendid organizers, economic functionaries, managers but nonetheless people who developed as party functionaries in the period when party committees kept far away from real politics.

The bureau of the party committee should assume an entirely different format and functions. In our opinion, it should be a collegium reporting to the party organization and the plenum. Its members become professional politicians, they are relieved of their previous responsibilities for the entire term or for some period of time. The bureau of a party organization may be headed by its chairman. He may be elected for the entire term of service of the bureau or be on rotation. Commissions made up of the members of the plenum, likewise relieved from their previous jobs for the period of work in the commissions, may be set up at the bureau. Rotation is possible both in the bureau and in the commissions. I believe it is abundantly clear that the membership of the bureau and the plenum are selected by all party organizations from among the candidates on a competitive basis proceeding from their programs, as a result of electoral struggle.

I believe that this very model of operation of party committees with a greater range of variants for local party organizations takes us back to the type of collective leadership which existed in the party under Lenin.

The apparatus becomes a hired employee of the electoral collegium; the latter is composed of politicians reporting to the party mass. In our draft statute, we propose to make a similar principle of formation the main organizational principle in the party from its lower echelons on up to the Central Committee and the Politburo inclusive. In this case, the functions of the general secretary will once again become what they were in the Central Committee of the pre-Stalin period. He will be a functionary elected by, but not a member of, the Politburo who heads its executive organ, the apparatus. In turn, the Politburo will become a collective organ headed by the chairman elected for the entire term office or rotated in from among the Politburo members.

[Tsybulskiy] Could you offer a prediction of the development of events?

[Shostakovskiy] Predictions have one peculiarity—it is easier to say what is going to happen 100 years from now than it is to predict the events in the coming year or month; you always run the risk of being confined to the scope of your own ideas and misconceptions and the inadequate interpretation of processes underway.

I believe that if renewal takes the path of serious and profound democratic changes the party will reinforce its prestige substantially and will become the undisputed political leader of our society. If we restrict ourselves to half-measures and do not commit to profound democratic transformations the departure of a quite active segment of communists from the party to the most varied social structures is quite probable, including communists dedicated to the idea of socialism and the communist perspective. They will be disappointed by this turn of events and will lose faith in the ability of the party to act as an organization developing and managing itself by drawing on the energy of the party masses. This would be extremely dangerous. In this case, the development of events in keeping with the Polish model would be in store for us.

Essentially the same may be said concerning the immediate perspective, the course of preparations for the congress. If we do not act in keeping with the old patterns, on the principle of dividing the party into "us" and "them," if we look for a way out in taking public opinion into account optimally in both restructuring the party and mutual relations with the new political structures, the party will be able to reinforce its role in society as early as in the course of the preparations for the congress.

Leninism Seen Offering Lessons for Today

PM1212160189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Dec 89 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Article under the rubric "Name in History" by Professor V. Baranov of Gorkiy State University: "Truth of Lenin, Truth of Life"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] In newspapers and magazines and among workers and students one can increasingly often hear the questions: What is the point and aim of perestroyka, where are we going, what results do we intend to achieve on its difficult paths? In our view, it is impossible to answer these questions correctly without turning to Lenin's concept of socialism, bearing in mind the historic experience and realities of the present day. That is why there is increased interest in V.I. Lenin's life and in the theoretical provisions of Leninism. Unfortunately, in a number of articles (PRAVDA has already written about them) people try to seek a source in Marxist history for the blatant distortions of socialist ideas committed during the personality cult years and for the mistakes made by certain major politicians. This does not illuminate the quest for the truth—on the contrary, it complicates it and is sometimes very closely related to a desire for various kinds of sensations, "exposures," and unrealistic thinking.

In this regard many of our readers believe that the science of party history has a duty to conduct more persistent and consistent work to analyze the materials linked with Lenin's activities. We need to be bolder in exposing blatant juggling with the facts and conjecture, and to discuss the leader of the revolution in a deeper, more vivid, and more accurate way. Responding to readers' requests, we are publishing comments by a scholar in which the writer attempts to correlate prevailing views of Lenin with the problems of perestroyka and considers the way in which we read and understand Lenin's works.

It is now no longer any secret that for many a long year the image of the "captain of the earth" reached us in canonized form. All the sharp corners in his works and moral make-up were carefully rounded off. Something akin to "beatification" took place, even though Lenin himself fiercely opposed it. He took umbrage at the get-well wishes sent him during his illness, stating: They'll be saying prayers for me next!

How many politicians have had their heads turned by the praise of toadies... In the wake of Stalin's cult other "minor cults" emerged in our country. And it was clear even to a child that the subject of the "worship" was by no means worthy of it, and that the huge propaganda machine glorifying, for instance, a high-ranking, bemedaled collector of foreign cars was not beneficial. Whereas under Stalin the people, who did not know the full scale of his lawlessness, still believed him and fell for the illusion, in the Brezhnev "era" all faith was lost. Careerists flourished. All this had nothing to do with Lenin or Leninism.

When Gorkiy sincerely praised the leader, Lenin became indignant. He hand-wrote the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee Politburo resolution on M. Gorkiy's articles in the journal KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL: They contain "not only nothing that is communist, but a great deal that is anticommunist."

Did we think through this document and relate it to the dramatic events which preceded it? As is well known, in 1917-1918 M. Gorkiy conducted a polemic with the Bolsheviks on the fate of culture under the revolution, sometimes giving his articles the uncompromising acuteness of a lampoon. Thus, he claimed that the leader from the Smolnyy was conducting a highly dangerous experiment on Russia and its people.

And yet it was not criticism but immoderate praise that angered Lenin. He saw this praise as undervaluing the role of the people's masses in history and overvaluing the role of outstanding individuals. He accurately predicted the consequences this could entail.

Stalin's attitude to art and its role in society's life was the complete opposite: He turned it into one of the ways of extolling his personality. In a 1 August 1931 letter to Ye. Yaroslavskiy, who had evinced a willingness to write his biography, Stalin resolved: "I am against it. I do not think the time has yet come for a biography." Yet in January 1932 through an agent he supplied Gorkiy with materials for a biography. That was the kind of author he wanted! Subsequently, Stalin instituted a prize in his own name and personally ratified the winners. Even

Lenin's most zealous opponents, retaining the minimum of objectivity, cannot imagine him doing anything of the kind.

It was spring 1919. "Petrograd was dying of hunger." Lenin spoke at a workers' rally 13 March. What did people expect from a leader's speech in a crisis? Calls for patience? Promises of help? Reassurance? An eyewitness recalls: "I remember that he started his speech by saying that the country was experiencing an 'unprecedented famine.'" "He gave it to us straight." "...He frankly told us that we had nothing, that the government had been forced to halt railroad passenger traffic to release diesel locomotives for grain shipments, and that we were threatened by a terrible and catastrophic famine..." "These words were startling and awe-inspiring... We thought that such things would only be discussed in small and reliable party circles. But he talked about them with terrifying directness, without concealing or hiding our desperate position..."

Lenin rejected the existence of two types of truth: one for the masses and another for official use. He constantly repeated that the people must know everything and do everything consciously.

But what subsequently happened in practice? Lenin's fearlessness, his uncompromising approach to reality, and his desire to tell the masses the whole truth was directly supplanted by a kind of psychology of reassurance. If things were going really badly in some area and the situation needed rectification, the aktiv would be assembled with the agenda "On the further improvement of..." Window-dressing, disinformation, and plain lying prevailed.

And so cowardice led to a situation in which, when it was not subject to bureaucratic regimentation, reality inexorably developed negative tendencies. We were told: Take it easy, comrades, there's nothing to worry about; you shouldn't generalize. There's no need to lay it on thick.

But Lenin wasn't afraid of laying it on thick! Because doing so led not to debilitating fear among the masses but, on the contrary, to a mobilization of forces. Faith in the limitless creative potential of the people's masses motivated to indulge in historic creativity is the foundation of all Lenin's sociological constructs. This was the source of his immense power as a politician. But the laws of dialectics are inexorable: That was the source of his drama.

Marxism confirmed the idea of the people's decisive role in history. When the center of the revolutionary movement shifted to Russia, Lenin reached the conclusion that the soviets born in the fires of the 1905 revolution were a form of genuine people's power. The idea that the people themselves could run the country was founded on his own experience of contact with participants in political circles. Who were these people? He called them "conscious workers." The proletarian elite, the flower of the working class. The most capable and talented representatives of that class, they soaked up like a sponge every word of revolutionary theoretical thought. Lenin enjoyed talking with them.

Unfortunately, after the revolution life brought the leader face to face with a tough reality. Apart from the conscious workers—those whom he was used to dealing with—workers entered the arena who were not conscious neough. And workers who were not conscious at all. In addition, there were the many millions of peasants...

Banking on a revolution in which the people would play the decisive role, the social democrats geared themselves to the people as the "bearer of the idea of democracy," to use Saltykov-Shchedrin's expression. But when the revolution triumphed a historical people came to power and brought with them not just vivid good sense but dark prejudice, not only strength but weakness, not only discipline but downright anarchy.

Under the real conditions of post-October Russia the idea of the masses' participation in administration and state building were often interpreted in a simplistic and popularized fashion. Why did we need professors in gold-rimmed glasses? Let them leave the country while the going's good. We could manage on our own.

Yet the real intelligentsia both in the capital and particularly in the provinces and the countryside (teachers, doctors, surveyors, statisticians) had long been concerned not about their own special narrow class privileges but above all about the people's welfare. So, in my view, we were wrong to automatically assert from our early schooldays that they were "terribly remote from the people." This phrase is far more appropriate for those who beautified apartment blocks with the slogan "The people and the party are united" but never did anything to consolidate forces or help the people.

Let's imagine Lenin's position for a moment. A genius treats his surroundings in two ways. Either he predominantly has an impression of his own exceptional nature, then assumes the aura of a chosen one, falls prey to an elitist complex, and rises up above the "mob." That is the aristocratic version of genius. Or a genius is so brimful of spiritual and intellectual powers that he is incapable of storing them within himself and automatically projects them onto those around him, mentally bestowing on people the merits which he himself has in abundance.

Lenin embodied the second version to an unprecedented extent, and it was no accident that within the party he was sometimes called the "poet of mankind's remaking." We would agree that by no means every cook could run a state, but the state in turn should be such as to allow anyone—provided they have the necessary attributes and abilities—to rise to any position and represent the interests of all society.

History is full of paradoxes. On the eve of the October Revolution capitalism was called not just a historically doomed social formation (Marxism had reached that conclusion far earlier), but also a rotten formation—that is, lacking the ability to be dynamic or engage in social self-regulation. Bleak reality forces us to admit that capitalism was able to draw the necessary conclusions from the experience of the 20th century and the worldwide social upheavals that followed in the wake of Great October, and it built its social production taking account of the latest demands of the time. While, conversely, our country, which had brought about the revolution, suffered for decades from a severely hierarchical, antidynamic, administrative-edict system. It is this system that perestroyka is designed to smash.

We are assured that the people support perestroyka and that perestroyka has no enemies apart from bureaucratism. But just what is bureaucratism as an official phenomenon? It is more of a integral system of actions aimed at replacing real work with the semblance of work for the least expenditure of personal effort and with the greatest personal profit.

Who does not remember: "I would gnaw away at bureaucracy like a wolf." Well, real bureaucrats—which we have in abundance—would gnaw away at perestroyka like wolves, if they were guaranteed that there was no risk involved. That is why they couldn't care less, as the saying goes, provided they have their apartments, incomes, dachas with built-in sauna, trips abroad, fine clothes, and so forth...

Lenin put it bluntly: "Our worst internal enemies are bureaucrats. They are Communists in responsible (which then become irresponsible) Soviet posts and who enjoy universal respect as conscientious people."

Had we thought about this merciless description of Lenin's before, we might not have put the party in the position of having lost the people's confidence.

What was Lenin's principle of party building? That the party, as a social organism, should be open. Yet it was increasingly turned into an inward-looking social structure with its own strictly defined hierarchy, nomenklatura, and various ritual "aktivs" which actually served, at least at local level, as a forum for entirely unnecessary self-justification and arch expressions of devotion to the center. The idea was that, if the party is the leading force, all impetus should come from above.

As is well known, Ilich repeatedly made resolute demands for the party's actions to be monitored by nonparty people. "The soviets should be invigorated, nonparty people should be involved, and nonparty people should check the work of party members..."

Those combating bureaucratism in practice cannot fail to see the resistance that greets real, tough checks on how things are done. A kind of "bureaucratic banditry, particularly if practiced by shadowy elements who attach themselves to the party..." takes shape (this sounds entirely up-to-date, doesn't it?). It was for this reason that, when abuses by certain leading Moscow Communists came to light with regard to housing and their desire to cover up a real assessment of their behavior by "playing up to inspection commissions," Lenin exclaimed: "This is the height of shame and infamy: A party in power protecting its 'own' scoundrels!!"

Today too there is plenty of talk about combating bureaucratism. But can the "worst of enemies" be dispatched with mere words? We need resolute action—an all-out offensive, if you like. Let's be blunt: Bureaucrats are taking pot shots at perestroyka from their well-concealed hiding places. They decide to reinstate discredited administrative-edict methods. And, conversely, when the crime wave is inexorably on the rise, they talk about the need to urgently humanize criminal law and adopt a caring and paternal attitude to those who break into our apartments and kill, rape, and steal.

That is why it is interesting to know Lenin's attitude to criminals. Our enemies have endlessly claimed that he and the Bolsheviks misused force. Regrettably, the lack of hard-and-fast laws was often compensated for with a very free interpretation of "revolutionary expediency." But Ilich's constant attention to the strengthening of socialist legality is also well known. Lenin's courage lies in the fact that he considered it his duty to openly recognize the futility of a civil war forced on us by circumstance and based on the enforced policy of war communism, and to proclaim the transition to a directly opposite economic management system—the New Economic Policy.

At the same time, when discussing force and the extremes associated with its use, we should not forget the other side of the coin. Lenin emphasized that the chastising sword of revolution should overtake not only its direct enemies, but also those embarking on the path of rebirth [sentence as published].

Unfortunately, during the years of stagnation the thrust of criminal legislation in our country was fundamentally misdirected. People were often punished for dissidence—that is, for something to which people are fully entitled. Sham liberalism flourished where justice ought to have operated resolutely and ruthlessly.

There can probably be no two opinions about the growth of crime in society: No leniency should be shown toward bandits and recidivists who murder and rape under aggravated circumstances. A genuine rule-of-law state, on whose building we have embarked, must ensure a peaceful life for its citizens with all the means at its disposal.

Rereading these notes, I can see how fragmented they are. There is a great deal more which I would like to say in describing the contradictions of the period directly linked with the name of Lenin. Clearly, he too did not imagine the mass of difficulties that would have to be encountered.

And yet I cannot agree with those who strive to pin all subsequent mistakes and the shame of the administrative-edict system directly on Lenin. Of course, for certain purposes it is possible to pick out individual judgments or phrases, but serious analysts must view Lenin's teaching in their entirety and full depth.

Nor can I agree with those who, on the contrary, believe that Lenin has little to offer us in our questing today, claiming that the gap in historical and socioeconomic conditions is too wide. Yes, above all, we must think for ourselves. But is it worth casting doubt on the calls to revive the Leninist principles of approach to life? The power of his ideas is very very great. If, of course, we are not scared to embrace Lenin's ideas in their real form.

Report on Local Self-Management Draft Law

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[Report from N.A. Pivovarov, chairman of the committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for questions of the work of soviets of people's deputies and the development of management and self-management, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 October 1989]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies!

Today the committee for questions of the work of soviets of people's deputies and the development of management and self-management is submitting the USSR draft law "On General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Business in the USSR," whose adoption is being awaited by practically the entire country, and especially more than 50,000 local soviets and 2 million of their people's deputies.

Many loud and authoritative words have also been spoken previously about the local organs of authority. We all witnessed the adoption of many decrees for increasing the role of the soviets. But not a single one of them was fully implemented—and mainly because they did not envision a mechanism for real power for the soviets, and because declarative wishes like "they can enlist funds," "they must be concerned," "they must actively participate," "they have the right to make suggestions for draft laws," and the like, of course, do not produce any real power.

These decrees included administrative-pressure methods of leadership of the soviets, while by their nature the soviets are organs of broad democracy and glasnost.

Daily life suggests to us that the only basis of real power are the principles of self-management and economic accountability [khozraschet]. In order to solve all problems of the labor and livelihood of the population, the soviets must have the necessary material and financial means at their disposal.

But today the powerlessness of the local organs of state power, especially at the lower levels, is an obvious fact which has long been known. In matters large and small the soviets have been materially dependent on the ministries and departments and the enterprises and organizations located on their territory. And yet it is known that "the person who pays the piper calls the tune."

The soviets as a system of power organs have ended up secondary not only to the party committees but also to the economic organizations.

The enterprises, while they are the city-forming base, have not yet become the source of development and social building of cities and worker settlements. This has led to a paradox that is obvious to everyone: The more industrially developed the territory is, the poorer its social sphere. But this is just one side of the matter. What is the position of the soviet on whose territory there are no enterprises at all?

The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that almost none of the large decisions regarding the socioeconomic development of the regions have been reinforced by any real measures for strengthening the economic base of the soviets.

The budgets of the soviets were lifeless. Thus, at the present time all local budgets comprise less than 15 percent of the volume of the USSR state budget, and the budgets of the rural soviets—0.8 percent. And this is at a time when one-third of the country's population is living on the territories of 44,000 rural soviets. This is what explains the loss of about 100,000 rural population points in the past 15 years alone. Things have reached a point where in certain republics practically the only item of expenditures from rural budgets has been expenditures for maintaining staff workers of the rural ispolkoms [executive committees], which today number an average of only 2-5 people, and "poverty, as we know, subdues even the wise man."

In practice many rural soviets have become appendages of the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], which are unable to make decisions about any issue of local life of any significance. Their authority, including regarding questions of land ownership, is purely declarative. This is why in a number of places there have been discussions of the expediency of retaining the rural soviets.

The residual principle for financing and material support for social problems that has developed in the country has been reflected especially sharply in the lower organs of power, emphasizing the central organs' attitude toward them as secondary. Decisions for the creation of normal conditions for the work of the ispolkoms of rural soviets have not been implemented for 2 decades. More than one-third of these soviets are located in unsuitable, frequently dilapidated premises. We are not even solving such problems as providing them with typewriters, not to mention transportation, office equipment, and so forth.

The very principle of the formation of local budgets has been turned upside down. Payments exacted on the territory go into the higher budgets and some of them are then distributed, frequently in an undifferentiated way, throughout the same territories. And half of the entire sum of the income tax from the population generally sifts down and is dissolved in the overall volume of the union budget, and only about one-third reaches the budgets of the cities, rayons, and rural soviets.

Hence the saying: "bow and scrape in Tula, but look for results in Moscow." Instead of looking for possibilities of earning funds, the local organs must expend their energies on "scaring up" these funds in Moscow and the republic capitals.

It would seem that the simplest thing would be to leave the fines—especially for the unsanitary condition of the cities and villages, pollution of the environment, and administrative legal violations—in the local budget and spend them for these same purposes in these same cities and rayons.

I shall give an example: The New York city budget annually receives more than 177 million dollars just from parking tickets, and in Hong Kong, as has been reported on our television, more than half of the milkmaids are supported from fines from sanitary violations that come into the budget.

But in our country the local soviets and ispolkoms frequently have to assume the role of beggars in order to solve their daily problems when it comes to landscaping, water supply, construction, and repair of social and cultural facilities, and so forth. The situation is especially bad in rural soviets of suburban zones, where practically all the adult population work at city enterprises that have nothing to do with providing facilities for the population points where their workers work. Many cities under rayon jurisdiction are in a pathetic, one might say impoverished, condition.

Today it is also obvious that the principle of democratic centralism in the system of the soviets of people's deputies long ago degenerated into centralism and a dictatorship of the higher soviets, ministries, and departments, which in a number of cases has even been reinforced by legislation. We have ended up with a situation about which they say "we have power but no will."

The local soviets have been deprived of real levers for influencing the results of the economic activity of the enterprises and organizations located on their territories and are not able to block the realization of narrow selfish departmental interests which sometimes undermine not only the basis of the life of the population but also the belief in the principles proclaimed by the USSR Constitution to the effect that "all power in the USSR belongs to the people. The people exercise state power through the soviets of people's deputies, which comprise the political basis of the USSR. All other state organs are under the control of and answerable to the soviets of people's deputies." It has been written correctly and nothing better is needed. But it is a pity that this is not the way everything is in practice.

Comrades!

I hope enough has been said to again draw your attention to how little power the local power organs have with respect to a number of problems. Recent events in the Kuzbass and the Donbass, as well as other regions where as a result of strikes the leaders of individual local power organs have actually been fired, show once again the critical need for immediate adoption of principally new legislative decisions that reflect the will of the people and provide full power for the soviets of people's deputies.

The USSR draft law proposed by the USSR Council of Ministers, "On the General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Economy," is, in our view, undoubtedly a significant step forward on the path of reinterpreting the role and significance of local power organs.

The committee fully supports the basic goals in the draft, which are directed toward:

—the achievement of high social activity of the population through the full-fledged system of self-management organs that is being formed while providing for the leading role of the local soviets;

—the creation of an effective mechanism for management of the regional economy, including the utilization of the principles of economic accountability which orient the local self-management organs toward the development of the local economy and draw territorial reserves and resources into economic circulation;

—the provision of reliable guarantees of the exercise of the authority of local self-management and the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

The draft law submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers contains the basis for solving these problems. Distributed to all USSR people's deputies, presidiums of supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics, and ispolkoms of kray and oblast soviets, it laid a basis for a collective search for the optimal ways of solving crucial problems.

But the members of our committee have concentrated their attention not on the draft submitted by the government but on its weak spots. This means that the draft contains shortcomings of a conceptual nature and a number of its formulations are declarative and not concrete. The draft law regulates in too much detail the relations in the sphere of local self-management, and the competence of the union and autonomous republics is unjustifiably limited. It does not formulate precisely enough of many fundamental concepts such as local self-management, the economic basis of local self-management, and local economy.

In our view, the provision concerning the independence of the local budget should be stated more simply. In order to provide for the complete authority of the soviets it will be necessary to consider the question of including in the budgets of the local soviets firmly fixed sources of income and delimiting the sources for the formation of budgets of soviets at various levels.

It is necessary to include in the draft the legal mechanism that guarantees protection of the interests of the territory and economic sanctions in the event of violation of the rules of ecological safety. To this end the committee has asked all the USSR people's deputies to send in their proposals. At the present time we have received and analyzed hundreds of proposals that have come in from USSR people's deputies, republic and local soviet organs, scientific collectives, and voter associations. Here are four volumes and this is just what has come in from the deputies.

The draft law developed by the committee leads logically to the initial text, expressing above all the conceptual concretization of the law's main goal.

Here we have proceeded from the idea that if we embark upon an in-depth treatment of the entire democratic mechanism, we must first of all have a clear idea of the entire process of the transfer of power to the soviets in the local areas and the formation of local self-management in stable forms, and see all the guarantees that must be created in order for the power of the soviets and local self-management to become a reality and the most important features of the democratic organization of the society of renewed socialism. It is time to get rid of the idea that it is possible to provide for full power for the local soviets without simultaneously laying the path to local self-management, which is an organic combination of all forms of representative and direct democracy.

One must say directly that the desire to consider any manifestations of direct democracy as merely an appendage of the power organs, as something nonbinding and secondary, still exists in the center and in the republics and local areas. This is essentially nothing other than opposition to democratic restructuring of social relations in the territories. We need fully-empowered soviets in the cities and villages, and only a "living force" can give them power according to the Leninist idea.

The citizens living in the lower territorial units declare themselves to be this force. It is a matter of supporting and encouraging their organization into territorial collectives that are called upon to become the social basis for rural and urban self-management. The most important issues of the development of the corresponding territory can be turned over to be decided by these collectives in their meetings and also through local referendums. With the formation of collectives of the territories, naturally, the role and responsibility of the rural and city soviets as the basic units of local self-management will also increase.

The solutions to the most important problems of effective self-management will require principally new approaches—the creation of conditions for the formation of a reliable material and technical base for it. We are speaking primarily about a new understanding of the local budget as the financial basis for the entire system of local self-management within the framework of the rural soviets, the village, and the city, and not just the local soviet. World practice convinces us that the most expedient way of forming this budget is for all economic organizations and citizens to pay the corresponding state and local taxes into it.

Historically we have had a different practice and this might be why today our rural and urban populated areas frequently look so poverty-stricken and the life of the people is so poorly arranged. If the taxes not only from the enterprises, but also those paid by the citizens were to go mainly into the local budget, people would know that the condition of their homes, streets, and cities would depend on the results of their labor, that they were supporting the apparatus that serves them. Then the requirements for themselves and the demands on the apparatus would be different.

But our line is somewhat crooked. Taxes from the population go into the budget, production is financed from it, and then we wanted to take from production the same money for the development of the territory.

The territorial collectives should have an economic interest in all local affairs. But appeals alone will not create it. Therefore, suggestions to give these collectives the opportunity to have their own property seem justified. They could own objects of local management and financial means created as a result of the labor and contributions of the citizens and the voluntary participation of labor collectives and social organizations.

The formation of local self-management in the lower territorial units, naturally, will also require a revaluation of the role of such large administrative-territorial units as the rayon, oblast, and kray. Above all, it will be necessary to reject the previous leadership of the lower soviet organs by the higher ones while retaining the legislatively established economic base in the interaction of the soviets. Otherwise local self-management can be suppressed by any higher instances before it is even born.

The essence of the matter consists in that the higher management units have been created on the initiative and by a decision of the lower ones in order to delegate "above" only the functions that the "lower levels" need but cannot perform effectively. Only with this approach will the administrative-command apparatus really be in the service of the people.

If we do not protect the interests of the territories, and this means the interests of all Soviet citizens and any higher offices, regardless of their level, and if we do not give local self-management the proper political-legal status and a mechanism for effective management, we shall not be able to solve the problem of restoration of real democracy in the local areas. Without firm legislative guarantees, and above all constitutional ones, this new unit of our social life will not occupy a worthy position in the political system. "The law on the limits of the rights of local self-management units," noted V.I. Lenin, "should be issued by the central parliament...No other policy can be imagined." Today, Comrade USSR people's deputies, this is our task. And we must do everything possible so that the law "On the General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Economy in the USSR" will be an effective instrument for further democratization of social life. By virtue of its content, it should be an act that will not allow "correction" in the ministries and other organs and would create real conditions for expressing and accounting for all healthy social interests.

We in the committee have tried to study the available materials from foreign practice. Today the principles of decentralization of power and strengthening local organs of management and self-management are typical of the majority of developed countries of the world.

Foreign practice shows that almost everywhere—whether it be Finland, Switzerland, England, or France, China, the Netherlands, or Italy—processes of expansion of the competence of the communes, districts, regions, provinces, cantons, and areas in solving their internal problems, increasing the role of public regional institutions, and increasing the attention paid to the economies of the territories are either completed or underway. Decentralization has become the basic direction of the new stage of the regional policy of many countries in the late seventies and the early eighties.

Take, for example, France, where local management is completely under the leadership of the central government. In 1982 they adopted the law "On the Rights and Freedoms of the Communes, Departments, and Regions," and in 1983 with an additional law they determined the principles and procedure for dividing up the authority between the local organs and the state.

Today, after we have also studied the experience in draft law activity with respect to problems of self-management of the union republics, we have a better understanding of the requirements for a unionwide law being created with the status of "General Principles."

The concept of this law (and this is the general opinion of the committee), it seems to us, is the following:

1. The rights of local self-management should be granted to the community of residents (the territorial collective) and be realized through the representative organs and other organs of local self-management and, if necessary, through local referendums. The elective organs themselves determine their own structure and work procedure and are fully autonomous in adopting any decisions within their competence. Only those that violate the laws can be overridden.

2. The leadership of the new formations can be provided exclusively by the law. Here the management organs of the local level act not as higher organs but in the role of coordinators when carrying out tasks that go beyond the capabilities of individual cities, rayons, or population points and also—because they have specialists on their staffs—in the role of organizations that render services and perform functions for general state management.

3. It is necessary to provide an economic base for the self-management system. It is suggested that we create a local economy comprised of the collective property of the population, the territory, and their formations. Then the system of financial regulation should stimulate private economic and entrepreneurial activity of local self-management organs.

Life has suggested to us that we need not be afraid of expanding the authority of local self-management in seeking funds for the social development of the territories. We should be afraid of only one thing: that the dictatorship of the authority does not shift from the currently existing offices to the offices of the local soviets.

This, briefly, is what guided our committee in presenting for your consideration the new text of the draft law which was developed as a result of analysis and generalization of all the suggestions that came in from the USSR people's deputies and the local areas and accounting for the experience of other states.

And so, what are the concrete features of the proposed reaction?

Above all, the consistent assertion of the thesis that the draft law is indeed the general basis for the organization of local self-management and the local economy and the recognition of the sovereign rights of the union and autonomous republics to determine their own forms and methods of solving the majority of problems related to the organization of local self-management and local economy. The proposed draft retains those provisions (the number of articles has been reduced from 29 to 19) which require truly common approaches. This is coordinated with the suggestions of USSR people's deputies Comrades V.N. Lopatin, I.V. Prudnikov, S.L. Kharif, A.K. Osipov, and a number of others, as well as the opinions of the Association of Siberian Cities and the social-legal section of the city political discussion club of the city of Ulyanovsk.

The committee has approached the concept of the system of local self-management from principally new positions. Life itself demands a radical expansion of the range of subjects included in this system. It is our deep conviction that today the concept of the system of local self-management unites both local soviets of people's deputies and labor collectives, social organizations, associations, formations, and divisions of citizens, and organs of social territorial self-management that provide the necessary conditions for each USSR citizen to exercise his constitutional right to participate in the management of state and social affairs. The draft gives a new interpretation of the norm on the boundaries within which local self-management is exercised.

In the proposed draft the independence of the soviets of people's deputies of various levels within the competence established for them by legislation is reinforced as one of the basic principles of local self-management. This means the recognition of the sovereignty of local self-management of one level with respect to another, and the legislators, the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics, should protect the lower organs of self-management from the dictatorship of the higher ones.

The draft being proposed to members of the USSR Supreme Soviet presents the concept of the economic base of local self-management in a broader and more general form . We assume that the economic base of local self-management should be comprised of natural resources (land, minerals, water, forests, air space), the property of the subjects conducting economic activity on the corresponding territory, and also the property of citizens living on the given territory.

What has been said does not mean that the land, the water, and the property of enterprises and citizens should simply and unequivocally be transferred to the local self-management. We are speaking only about the fact that the economic base of local self-management is formed from all kinds of property on the given territory from which the local budgets or nonbudget funds receive various kinds of payments.

The draft introduces a new concept—territorial collectives. These are socialist self-managed communities with their own competence and independent responsibility which provide for solving socioeconomic, political, and cultural problems on the basis of a combination of local and national interests.

The proposed draft gives a different interpretation of the local economy. It pertains to the collective property of the population of the territory (property of the territorial collective) which the local soviets have the right to dispose of. In our opinion, power that belongs to the people should be based on property belonging to them and should have a real material base.

It is suggested that the property of the territorial collective should be formed from property turned over free of charge by the state and other subjects and also from property created and acquired by the local soviet and other organs of local self-management.

In our opinion, the provision to the effect that the economic relations of the local soviets with the enterprises and organizations not included in the local economy are arranged on a contractual basis is important. These should be partner relations based on economic principles and not power pressure.

Essential changes have been made in the section "The Financial Basis for Local Self-Management." An attempt has been made to include here legal norms which would guarantee the local self- management organs normal independent economic activity for satisfying the demands of the population in keeping with the principles of economic accountability. These aspirations are contained, for example, in the proposals of the USSR people's deputies V.G. Kovalev, G.A. Razbivnaya, I.A. Tolstoukhov, S.G. Shapkhayev, and the ispolkoms of the Novgorod, Kemerovo, Vinnitsa, Kurgana, Omsk, Penza, and a number of other kray and oblast soviets.

We deliberately decided on a significant concretization in this section, which is superfluous in the law but justified in the draft which is brought up for presentation under the conditions of the lack of an effective law in the taxation system.

We wanted to show what we were striving for and which paths, in our opinion, would lead to a real strengthening of the material-financial base of the soviets.

The second reading of the law will be after the adoption of the law on taxation, and then the excessive concretization will disappear from our draft.

The draft reinforces the idea that the local soviets independently develop and approve their budgets and, in the interests of local self-management, determine their minimum, and that the budgets of the soviets of various levels are independent and higher organs are not allowed to interfere in the process of the development and approval of the budgets by the local soviets.

The committee considers the norm for full deduction of income tax from workers and employees living on the territory of the local soviet to be of principal importance. In our opinion, only such a measure will help to raise many cities, villages, and rural soviets with poorly developed economic potentials to a higher level.

We suggest removing any kinds of regulations regarding expenditures from local budgets, assuming that the local soviets have the right to spend their budget funds independently and establish the amounts of expenditures on maintaining the management staff, increments to salaries and wage rates of workers of this staff, and also those of institutions of public education, public health, culture, physical culture and sports, and social security.

Comrade deputies, during the course of the discussion of the fourth section of the draft of the USSR Council of Ministers, "Basic Authority of Local Self-Management Organs in Economic and Sociocultural Activity," the committee came to the conclusion that the law about "general principles..." does not have the right to regulate in such detail the activity of local self- management organs in questions of socioeconomic development. Therefore, the edition of the draft law offered for your attention, as you have noticed, does not include this section. Certain of its norms that are worthy of attention are included in other sections. This statement of the question agrees with the suggestions of deputies P.M. Talanchuk, E.E. Savisaar, V.V. Guliy, A.A. Viktorovich, and others, as well as the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The section "Guarantees of Local Self-Management" is presented somewhat differently. In our opinion, essential guarantees should be such norms as:

—no question of the creation or transformation of economic and social objects on the corresponding territory may be decided without the agreement of the local soviet;

—if a decision of the local soviet of people's deputies contradicts the law, only the court has the right to override it. It seems that this norm will contribute to strengthening socialist legality.

At the same time we must say that because of the complexity and the principles involved in the problems raised in the draft law and the numerous, contradictory, and sometimes diametrically opposed proposals, we have not yet managed to work out all of its provisions. We have not yet found a final answer to the question of the limits of the regulation of local self-management of the USSR, the delimitation of the competence of local self-management at its various levels, and the interrelations between state management organs and local self-management organs, nor have we managed to provide the necessary guarantees in forming a strong material and financial base for local self-management.

The draft contains no final working out of the mechanisms for dealing with these issues. This is natural since their final resolution depends on how they are presented in the laws on property, land, taxation, the socialist enterprise, leasing, and general principles of leadership of the economy and the social sphere in union republics.

Comrade deputies!

Today our committee has submitted to you a draft which is perhaps somewhat laconic in form and which is not absolutely legally pure with respect to individual formulations, but, it seems to us, is conceptually progressive in its essence. And we see this as the main thing. The main thing, in our opinion, is its direction toward a radical restructuring of the work of the soviets and a complete reinterpretation of the role, possibilities, and functions of all organs of local self-management.

We understand that in the proposed draft we are practically speaking about a breakdown of the existing budget system, taxation system, and concepts of ownership. In our opinion, this is inevitable if we really want to enter on the path of self-management of the people. On the threshold of the elections to the local soviets of people's deputies this is important since the local power organs must be formed taking into account the principally new legal and economic role they will have to assume in society in keeping with the USSR law, "On General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Economy in the USSR."

Comrade deputies!

We also hope that you will take into account the approaches included in the draft when discussing and developing the drafts listed above. I shall list them again. They are the laws on property, land, taxation, the socialist enterprise, leasing, and general principles of leadership of the economy and the social sphere in the union republics. Here the most correct in our view would be to adopt all seven of these laws, including the one we proposed, in a single package and introduce them all at the same time.

Thank you for your attention.

More on Zaykov, Prokofyev Moscow Press Conference

90UN0389A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Nov 89 p 1

[Report by G. Drugoveyko, V. Yevseyev and A. Morozov on Moscow Gorkom press conference: "Contributing to the Implementation of What Has Been Planned"]

[Text] The theater of the gorkom [city party committee], where press conferences are usually held, was filled almost to overflowing. The meetings of leaders of the Moscow Gorkom with journalists have now become an inalienable part of the life of the capital's party organization, but the present one was, nonetheless, unusual. It was held literally hot on the heels of the Moscow Gorkom plenum which had just been held and which had examined, in the language of protocol, an organizational matter.

Still fresh in the memory are the years when reports of personnel changes published without comment and detail, as a rule, were an excuse for various rumors and gossip. But the times are changing. Yesterday everyone could have read in the papers a detailed account of the progress of the plenum. Nonetheless, questions, of course, remained. Understandably, for it was, after all, a question of the replacement of a key figure for the capital—the first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom. This explains the higher-than-usual interest of journalists of central and Moscow publications, the factory-plant press and radio and television in yesterday's press conference.

All secretaries of the Moscow Gorkom—Yu.A. Prokofyev, N.M. Andreyanova, V.K. Belyaninov, Yu.S. Karabasov and V.I. Kuznetsov—and T.P. Arkhipova, chairman of the Moscow City Party Organization KRK [Auditing Commission] had come to the meeting with representatives of the media. A surprise for many people was the appearance in the hall of L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. And this fact also testifies to the unusual nature of the meeting. It is not often that journalists have been afforded an opportunity to put their questions not only to the person who has assumed the new office but also to the person who worked here before him—the two communists whose names are today undoubtedly the most popular in Muscovites' conversations.

The press conference was opened by Moscow Gorkom Secretary Yu.S. Karabasov. He informed the journalists in detail about the gorkom plenum which had been held the day before. Without repeating what has already been carried in the press, we shall quote merely the many interesting, evidently, "procedural details" which Yu.S. Karabasov reported.

As is known, there were two nominations on the list for the secret ballot at the plenum—Yu.A. Prokofyev, second secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, and A.V. Rudakov, first secretary of the Kalininskiy Raykom. Some 150 gorkom members took part in the ballot. One hundred and forty-four voting slips were considered valid. Some 124 votes were cast for, 20 against Yu.A. Prokofyev, and 16, 128 against A.V. Rudakov.

Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, then spoke at the press conference. His speech resembled least of all a posturing "king's speech." Concentrating attention on the problems which confront the Moscow city party organization and the entire capital, Yu.A. Prokofyev emphasized that we now have to switch from the period of working up programs to a period of their implementation.

Here are the main directions requiring, in Yu.A. Prokofyev's opinion, paramount attention:

- the consolidation of all positive forces supporting perestroyka;
- a change in the city's investment policy in the direction of the social sphere;
- decentralization of management of the municipal economy and the development of local self-management;
- preparation for the upcoming elections to the local soviets ("it is not important **by whom** a candidate for deputy is nominated, it is important **who** is nominated," Yu.A. Prokofyev observed);
- perestroyka in the party itself ("the principle of democratic centralism has long been implemented with the emphasis on 'centralism.' The emphasis should now be put on its democratization").

L.N. Zaykov member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who spoke at the press conference, congratulated Yu.A. Prokofyev on his election to the responsible office and wished him and all communists of the capital success in the realization of the programs which have been drawn up.

Anticipating the journalists' questions, L.N. Zaykov spoke about his new job in the USSR Defense Council. "I worked in the defense industry for 36 years," he said, "and progressed from mechanic's apprentice to general director of a large association and was in charge of defense issues as secretary of the party Central Committee. And if the Central Committee has now deemed it necessary to concentrate my attention in this area of work, I will give my all to justify the high trust."

And the first of the journalists' questions at the press conference was put to L.N. Zaykov. A representative of radio broadcasting sought his opinion on whether it was expedient or not, following Leningraders' example, to unite the Moscow city and oblast party committees. Of course, the Moscow region, L.N. Zaykov observed, is a single whole. Both Muscovites and inhabitants of the oblast have many problems in common. But as of the present the base for such a merger has not been prepared.

Our newspaper was interested in Yu.A. Prokofyev's position on questions connected with the forthcoming elections to the local soviets of people's deputies and the republic soviet and also with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress. The communists are putting forward specific proposals, specifically, the election of delegates to the congress by party district by direct secret ballot on an alternative basis, regardless of the rank of the candidate. Several versions are being worked out in the Moscow Gorkom currently, Yu.A. Prokofyev explained, and one of these drafts provides for elections by party district. As far as the elections to the soviets are concerned, the city party organization is approaching these by taking into consideration the experience of the March elections and analyzing the mistakes and miscalculations which, as frankly acknowledged, were made by the gorkom. The main mistake, Yu.A. Prokofyev emphasized, was the fact that the gorkom and the party organizations failed to take into consideration the actual influence of the informal political associations and frequently remained aloof from the election struggle or reduced it to a confrontation with the opponents. The Moscow Gorkom is approaching the new elections from new standpoints, considering it necessary to consolidate the efforts of all the city's democratic forces.

And what if the rank and file communist or nonparty person or simply a resident of the city wishes to express his opinion to the gorkom first secretary directly? Will he be received? MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA deemed it essential to ask this question, inter alia. As Yu.A. Prokofyev replied, he always received Muscovites twice a month and would, naturally, continue to do so.

The newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI was interested in how often the gorkom first secretary intended holding a press conference, whether stenographic accounts of plenums of the gorkom and sessions of its bureau would be published in the press and what the gorkom's attitude toward current sociological studies was.

Answering these questions, Yu.A. Prokofyev said that press conferences in the Moscow Gorkom would be held, as before, no less frequently than once a month. He also advocated the maximum publicity in the coverage of bureau sessions and gorkom plenums.

In this connection L.N. Zaykov offered to think about the expediency of the free dissemination at "Soyuzpechat" newsstands of a Moscow Gorkom news bulletin which covered in detail the work of the city party organization.

Concerning the question of sociological studies, Yu.A. Prokofyev informed those present of the decision to create the Moscow State Institute for Public Opinion, among whose founders would be, aside from the gorkom, a whole number of organizations: the Moscow City Soviet, the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] City Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

An employee of VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA observed that the party debate was proceeding very unevenly. In his opinion, the discussion on the party would be more interesting were party officials, Moscow Gorkom secretaries included, to take a more active part in it.

Responding to this suggestion, Yu.S. Karabasov observed that the party debate was being conducted not only in the press but also during the gorkom secretaries' numerous meetings with the communists and labor outfits of Moscow's rayons. But, obviously, more frequent articles by leaders of the Moscow party organizations in the papers and television appearances would undoubtedly impart extra seriousness and substance to the debate.

A representative of the USSR Journalists Union expressed the hope that the Moscow Gorkom's doors might always be open to the press. Responding to this comment, L.N. Zaykov observed that no one was denied a working meeting and that this cooperation was useful and should be supported.

A correspondent of the journal POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE inquired after Yu.A. Prokofyev's attitude toward the communists who were taking part in the work of the informal organizations. The United Workers Front or the Moscow People's Front, for example.

The first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom is quite certain that the party's attitude toward such communists depends on the positions held and defended by the CPSU member who participates in the activity of any public organization. The party is implementing perestroyka together with all of society. The communists are on the same road as all those who adhere to the viewpoint of the renewal and improvement of socialism.

Slyunkov Addresses CPSU Commission Session

PM1312093189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "On the Basis of Deepening Reform. Session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Socioeconomic Policy Questions"]

[Text] The problems of the further deepening of radical economic reform and the basic approaches to the formulation of the 13th 5-Year Plan were discussed 8 December at the latest session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Socioeconomic Policy Questions which took place under the chairmanship of N.N. Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Taking part in the session were Comrade Yu.D. Maslyukov, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, and USSR Council of Minsters Deputy Chairmen L.I. Abalkin and S.A. Sitaryan.

Opening the session, N.N. Slyunkov stressed that the situation in the national economy remains extraordinarily complex. In connection with the fact that state influence on ensuring that national economic proportions are maintained has been weakened, complications have arisen above all in the consumer market and in the sphere of finance and money circulation.

The existing difficulties can be overcome only through the acceleration of the economic reform and close coordination between the plans for 1990 and the coming 5-year period and the radical transformations in the economic mechanism. The ways and methods of resolving pressing problems were discussed in detail by the economic community at the All-Union Scientific-and-Practical Conference on Economic Reform.

An extensive system of measures has been submitted by the government in the report to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. When discussing these questions, it is very important to analyze comprehensively the efficiency of the proposed measures and their effectiveness, feasibility, and time-scale. It would be expedient to discuss thoroughly those spheres of the reform which can produce returns within the near future.

The session was addressed by S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU]; V.G. Afonin, first secretary of the Kuybyshev CPSU Oblast Committee [obkom]; A.A. Malofeyev, first secretary of the Minsk CPSU Obkom; Ye.A. Yeliseyev, first secretary of the Kabarda-Balkar CPSU Obkom; Ye.A. Brakov, director general of the Moscow "ZIL" production association; A.G. Melnikov, first secretary of the Kemerovo CPSU Obkom; Ya.P. Pogrebnyak, first secretary of the Lvov CPSU Obkom; P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gossnab]; and V.Ya. Khodyrev, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet Executive Committee.

The commission members discussed comprehensively the government report to the Second Congress of People's Deputies on measures to improve the economy, stages of the economic reform, and basic approaches to the elaboration of the 13th 5-Year Plan. The commission backed the main provisions of the report.

At the same time, a number of specific proposals were submitted on ways to get the country's economy out of its present state and improve the situation in the consumer market and proposals were also submitted on the mechanism for implementing the economic reform objectives set forth in the Government report.

The speakers proposed specific ways to accelerate the economic reform and stressed the need to complete as soon as possible the elaboration of an integrated system of measures to ensure its further development, defining the stages of and deadlines for the implementation of these measures. For this, it is necessary to elaborate in depth the mechanisms for the implementation of each of the reform's objectives and to organize the work of central economic departments to ensure their consistent translation into reality. It was emphasized that it is necessary to bring into play the enterprises' economic accountability mechanism as soon as possible.

Special attention was paid at the session to 1990, the year which, in the opinion of the speakers, is to be a year of exceptional measures to stabilize the economy. All efforts must be channeled into normalizing the situation in the consumer market with minimum delay. Measures to achieve the 1990 plan indicators for increased output of consumer goods and services were discussed.

A number of speakers noted that at many enterprises there are not enough raw and other materials to ensure the fulfillment of the set targets. It is necessary, they stressed, to seek new ways and sources of obtaining additional resources.

The session participants expressed alarm in connection with the continued growth of the population's monetary incomes, which by far exceed the increase in the production of consumer goods and services. The effectiveness of diverse measures to ensure a closer correlation between the working people's incomes and production results was discussed.

It was noted that maintaining the old system of prices and price formation is holding back the progress of the economic reform and the creation of the socialist market. The practice of unjustified payments into economic incentives funds continues, and exchanges between republics are not equivalent.

It was noted at the session that material and technical supplies to the national economy are deteriorating. USSR Gossnab organs have failed to elaborate effective ways of switching to wholesale trade of production means. Specific proposals were submitted to enable enterprises to expand freely their sales of output and also sales of output to consumers via material and technical supply organs without funds or quotas.

It was stressed that an important component of the economic reform will be the switch to self-financing and self-management of all union and autonomous republics, krays, and oblasts as of 1991. It was pointed out during the debate that the effectiveness of this measure will depend largely on the nature of the mutual relations between republic and local organs on the one hand and production collectives on the other. The preservation of administrative command methods of enterprise leadership at these levels of management would run counter to the principles of reform.

The main task of the 13th 5-Year Plan is the saturation of the consumer market. This calls for a more detailed elaboration of structural and investment policy, which must be geared to the preferential development of sectors which work to meet the Soviet people's requirements.

At the same time, it was stressed that it is necessary to elaborate in greater detail measures to tie the growth of the population's incomes to the end results of their work and labor productivity growth. This is particularly important in connection with the upcoming great expenditure for pension increases, longer leave, and the implementation of other major social measures.

It was pointed out at the session that relatively steep targets are planned in enhancing management efficiency. It is planned to drastically cut the material intensiveness of social production and the energy and metal intensiveness of national income. In terms of their stringency, these targets exceed the actual results achieved in the 12th 5-Year Plan by almost 100%. The debate participants noted that in order to meet these targets an efficient economic mechanism and an extensive program of practical measures are necessary.

The session participants made a number of suggestions to improve investment policy. It was noted in particular that it is necessary to adopt decisive measures to ensure the application of economic levers to steer capital construction toward the practical enhancement of the effectiveness of investments, to ensure a reduction in the time needed for construction to normative limits, and to curb investment demand.

As a monitoring exercise, progress in implementing the commission's instructions relating to questions of enhancing the effectiveness of capital investments and improving the economic mechanism in construction was reviewed. The USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan] and the USSR State Committee for Construction [Gosstroy] are instructed to take into account the proposals sumitted at the session during the finalization of the draft USSR Council of Ministers provisions on restructuring the economic mechanism and on the retention of cadres in the construction industry, and also in the draft plan for the 13th 5-year period.

Vorontsov Discusses Environmental Protection

90US0252A Moscow POISK in Russian No 28 9-15 Nov 89 pp 4-5

[Report on interview with newly-appointed Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR Goskompriroda and doctor of biological sciences, by POISK special correspondent Mikhail Dubrovskiy: "The Vorontsov Defense"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Our special correspondent Mikhail Dubrovskiy has talked to the new chairman of the USSR Goskompriroda [State Environmental Protection Committee], the first non-party member minister in the union government, Doctor of Biological Sciences Nikolay Vorontsov.

[Dubrovskiy] Your position at present resembles very much the situation in which Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin is now finding himself. As a major scientist-economist, he criticized the government on the issues of economic management extensively and persistently in his time. At present, he is a member of the government, just as you are. Now he often draws the fire of criticism himself. Do you, Nikolay Nikolayevich, find it complicated to be a captain of this huge committee and map out its strategy without having experience in this kind of work?

[Vorontsov] The analogy is not very precise. I never criticized the Goskompriroda for the simple reason that our paths never crossed from the moment this department was born until the time I received the appointment. For as long as I was an active scientist, not one person from this organization approached me. This is particularly interesting because I am associated with the issues of environmental protection not only as a scientist-zoologist and genetics specialist, but I also belong to three scientific societies concerned with the issues of ecology.

[Dubrovskiy] Thus far you have a dual personality of a scientist and an apparatus functionary. Does one interfere with the other? After all, the style of work and the mentality are different.

[Vorontsov] The Goskompriroda has several different tasks. As its chairman I should give advice to our president, prime minister, and the government on the utilization and protection of nature. Ecological monitoring is the second task. However, along with these everyday tasks, we have to set forth a strategy for utilizing nature.

What do they usually mean by environmental protection in our country? Some kind of resuscitation of the environment. This is like reducing the entire medical science to an ambulance service. Isn't this absurd? However, these very tasks are usually considered central to environmental protection plans. Considerable funds are allocated for these tasks to be accomplished, but they are not spent. Certainly, we must improve the filters of dust-scrubbing and gas-filtering equipment and treat waste waters. However, thus far we have not had the main point, the ideology of resource husbandry, the definition of ecological capacity, biospheric and geographic approaches. We robbed Peter to pay Paul. There is no argument, we have to do this. However, not just this!

[Dubrovskiy] Therefore, you are facing the task of developing a new ideology of the system. Is it clear to you at present?

[Vorontsov] Yes, in its general outline. First of all, we should overcome our technocratic attitude toward nature. Until very recently nature was just one of the resources for us, and an "inexhaustible" one at that. Say, there are coal deposits in the Donbass. There are Krivoy Rog ores nearby. So let us build up the iron and steel industry there based on the Donetsk coal, regardless of whether the land and the people will bear it. At present we have an ecological disaster zone in the southeast of the Ukraine.

We have dammed the Volga with uncounted GES [hydroelectric power stations] without making calculations to any serious extent. Why have not the Americans undertaken a similar endeavor? It would have been easy for them to put similar dams across their rivers of the lowlands, the Mississippi and Missouri. Don't they need electricity? Perhaps the point is that in the United States the land has masters whereas in our country it belongs to the state—that is, to nobody. Notions such as the ecological capacity of an area were not used at all until recently! We treated the land without mercy, giving no thought to the consequences, and in general we were too late to offer it protection. The measures planned in the preliminary draft of the long-range program for curing the ecological situation until 2005 cannot stand up to any criticism.

Here is an example. The air pollution situation is the most dangerous in the southeast of the Ukraine. The situation in Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, areas of the Donbass, Voroshilovgrad Oblast, and especially in Mariupol and Krivoy Rog, is catastrophic. For example, statistics for Krivoy Rog are as follows—1,290,000 tons of emissions a year. It was expected to reduce them to 1 million by 1995, to 800,000 tons by the year 2000, and to 700,000 tons by 2005. This means that we are planning almost the same level of gaseous pollution in Krivoy Rog in 2005 that we have in Mariupol at present—785,000 tons a year! If we cannot clean up perceptibly the atmosphere of Krivoy Rog it may, perhaps, be more honest to tell the residents so. Will we really have to ship in shift labor to the Ukraine?

We must look for a way out of this situation. I talked about this with First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers Ye. Kachalovskiy. He listened politely and responded that this issue can only be resolved in Moscow. I met with the minister of metallurgy right away. However, he had the plan for 1989 and 1990 on his mind rather than this.

It is necessary to change our thinking. The Goskomprroda has already completed preparing the Environmental Protection Law. It has already been cleared by the Ministry of Justice. We are now submitting it for the first inspections to the USSR Council of Ministers and the Committee for Ecology of the Supreme Soviet. We hope that this law will take effect as soon as the end of next year following a public discussion for which we will definitely submit it. Do you know what the centerpiece of the law is? The primacy of ecology over economics, of the interests of citizens over the interests of departments, which are frequently passed off as the interests of the entire people. I would like to emphasize one more essential provision delineating the rights of the union and the republics in the sphere of environmental protection. It provides for setting all-union ceilings for the concentration of pollutants. A republic may tighten these standards but cannot liberalize them!

[Dubrovskiy] You would agree that apart from the law the state committee needs realistic methods of influencing the ministries...

[Vorontsov] To this end, all functions of state monitoring of the condition of the environment need to be transferred to the Goskompriroda. Meanwhile, they still have not been transferred to us! Of course, the work of the agrarian complex of the country is impossible without land registration. However, why does this complex control the condition of the soil rather than us? The USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology] headed by the highly-skilled specialist Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Yu. Izrael is not surrendering to us the monitoring service (condition of the air basin, etc.). Izrael says approximately the following: You send a request to us, and we will respond...

Here is yet another episode involving the Minrybkhoz [Ministry of Fishing Industry]. This ministry has had monstrous violations under its belt since the times of Minister A. Ishkov. It studies the resources itself using its institutes, sets its own plan, fishes itself, and monitors itself. I recall a speech by our leading ichthyologist Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. Svetovidov in 1968: "Previously, the Minrybkhoz caught the fish of 'school age.' Now they have finished fishing 'day care centers' and are switching to fishing 'nurseries.'" This kind of "self-monitoring" makes it possible for the Minrybkhoz leadership to justify reductions in the grey mullet population in the Black Sea by the ecological situation which is deteriorating there. Indeed, it is alarming, but rapacious overfishing is the main reason. After all, the fish resources have been depleted catastrophically due to overfishing even in the Barents Sea, where the environmental-protection situation is much better. Where have the cod, capelin, halibut, and navaga gone?

[Dubrovskiy] However, along with the "ordinary" organizations which you have to monitor there is also an "extraordinary" one. I mean the military. It is exempt from control to this day.

[Vorontsov] The previous special position of the Ministry of Defense will certainly change in the new political and international environment. The situation is quite absurd. Any military facility of any consequence is visible from the satellites. It is necessary to release and strictly delineate geographically all locations of previous nuclear explosions on the ground and in the atmosphere and the dynamics of radioactivity changes in order to site enterprises rationally and guarantee the safety of the populace. We are forced to use the data of foreign scientists; meanwhile, we are interested primarily in the Trans-Volga area, Kazakhstan, and Novaya Zemlya. While not justifying the experimental explosions of nuclear weapons (my article "On the Biological Influence of Nuclear Explosions" was published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA as long ago as 1957!), I should note that the radioactive effect of the Chernobyl explosion has exceeded many times over the effect of all detonations of nuclear weapons combined. The Ministry of Defense was not to blame for the Chernobyl catastrophe. Moreover, it was exactly the army, the soldiers and officers that had to do the most difficult part of the job while cleaning up after the accident.

Going back to the Armed Forces and environmental protection, at present our Vladivostok Division is forced to engage in "military operations" against the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet and its commander personally. Over there, they have collected a lot of material on the oil pollution of the sea and on dumping by the ships at sea. Apparently, everybody is on our side—the kray party committee and the kray executive committee. However, the commander of the Red-Banner Pacific Fleet does not take orders from anyone. I have sent a letter to the minister of defense. We are waiting for a response and, mainly, for results. After all, it is the same nature for both the civilians and the military.

[Dubrovskiy] Do you see a realistic way to make the Goskompriroda independent of the ministries?

[Vorontsov] There has been much talk about the presumed need to make the Goskompriroda chairman a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and then, supposedly, all problems will take care of themselves. Incidentally, Academician A. Yanshin wrote about this in POISK, and a couple days ago the writer S. Zalygin wrote this in PRAVDA. However, what will it do for us? Frankly, I am a quite inexperienced minister. So, should I become an even more inexperienced deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers? As it were, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov already has 12 deputies. I do not think it is feasible to become the 13th deputy. He simply will not have time for me. Personally, I have six deputies of my own, and I do not get to see some of them for a week at a time. No, it is better to remain under the supervision of V. Doguzhiyev, deputy prime minister for emergencies. "Only" four committees, including ours, report to him. It is easier that way, after all.

Certainly, the operation of the Goskompriroda should ideally be absolutely autonomous. However, this has yet to be ensured, despite the existing resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of

Ministers, which says, black on white: transfer all functions of monitoring the condition of the environment to the USSR Goskompriroda. Executing this is one of our most immediate tasks.

[Dubrovskiy] It appears to me that strict environmental protection legislation could solve many of your problems. It would give the committee powerful economic levers. Our scientist-ecologists have long been talking about implementing the principle "he who pollutes pays" in our economy. It has long been doing the job efficiently in Western countries.

[Vorontsov] It will be in effect in our country as well from 1991 on. Fees are envisaged for the "standard" environmental pollution, as well as fines for above-the-norm emissions which it has been resolved to impose on enterprises polluting the environment. How to use the tremendous funds paid in to us is another issue. I am convinced that they should be used not only to finance the monitoring, improve ecologically pure technologies, and cure the situation in various troubled areas of the country. Along with this, they should be used for rewarding specific enterprises and people who have been complying with our requirements in an exemplary manner, who have commissioned efficient waste treatment systems and resource-efficient technologies ahead of schedule. We should do this so that the people feel that creation of the Goskompriroda organization has brought about improvements in their life rather than the other way around. However, it would be naive to expect quick results.

[Dubrovskiy] The Goskompriroda was set up at the time the staff of other departments was cut. It is not surprising that many apparatchiks rather than ecological specialists ended up in it. Are you concerned about it?

[Vorontsov] Certainly I am. On the other hand, however, I am a scientist not conversant in the secrets of ministerial work, in the departmental tug-of-war. This is why I will need aids and advisers from the ranks of the apparatus for as long as the current state structure exists. I would like to note that I worked for 7.5 years in the apparatus, and I was the learned secretary of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences for biological sciences, and at the same time headed a laboratory in the Institute of Cytology and Genetics.

I do not think that "apparatchik" is a foul word. The issue should be raised in a slightly different manner: Employees should bring real benefits to the cause they serve. If they think that theirs are cushy jobs, if they are going to go easy on their former colleagues, if an enterprise director can get such officials to sign any statement favorable for him, then they must be tossed out mercilessly. If one wants to work and is capable of learning the basics of ecological literacy, retraining courses will be open for such people soon, and I will cooperate with them with pleasure.

I am not going to recruit staff on the basis of questionnaire particulars. I recently met the chairman of our Kamchatka Division. He is a man whose heart is in his job. I am not going to look into his file in the personnel department in order to find out whether he is a scientist or an apparatchik.

Of course, I will primarily count on specialists. Indeed, they are few in our organization. Who do we need? Geobotanists, soil scientists, geographers, zoologists, geologists, marine biologists, economists, lawyers, specialists on subsurface water protection, electrical engineers, nuclear scientists, production engineers... Perhaps, I forgot some group. We expect to set up a scientific-technical council of the Goskompriroda with their participation and draft to it our most knowledgeable scientists, and not just one or two but a lot of them.

[Dubrovskiy] Won't this be an excessively cumbersome structure?

[Vorontsov] Look at the tasks we are facing! Let us, for example, take the ecological mapping of territories, which thus far virtually has not been done in our country, the actual creation of a series of ecological maps of our country that will reflect all of its resources, the methods of their utilization, as well as all enterprises. It is not that the enterprises should just be marked—it is important to know which exact resources the plants and factories use, whether they harm nature, and what the migration of emissions through the hydrological and soil systems is....

Meanwhile, 450 people in the Goskompriroda apparatus are all we have to work with. Do you know how many people there are in a similar ministry in the FRG? Six hundred people, not counting the ministries of respective lands. Sergey Petrovich Kapitsa told me that in Singapore, one of the ecologically purest countries of the world, the building of the Ministry of Environmental Protection is a skyscraper 22 floors tall. Over there the ministry was set up in 1972, and in our country in 1988. Do you know what the size of the territory of Singapore is compared to ours? The European segment of the USSR alone is equal in area to all of Western Europe, where each state has its own ministry of environmental protection with a number of employees no smaller than here.

Meanwhile—this is laughable—there are only two computers at our disposal. We cannot even equip them with the personnel department so that they would not handle forms but would put together a bank of data on which specialists do which research in which areas. This is priceless information! However, we do not even have it, to say nothing of the data banks on resources and pollution.

It has become somewhat easier since republic and oblast environmental protection committees were created. They have just started their operation. We will also set up such councils there. However, we are running into difficulties that are hard to overcome. For example, major centers such as Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Riga, Tallinn, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok have extensive scientific potential. What about Tyumen Oblast, however? The territory is tremendous, pollution is monstrous, but the scientific resources are insignificant.

[Dubrovskiy] Do you fear that in light of the current complicated ethnic problems the republic committees will be in it for their own ecological gain? Do you fear an "ecological war" between the republics?

[Vorontsov] This is a quite probable danger. Let us say one republic cuts over its runoff-retaining forests adjacent to the border and mudflows hit another republic. Here is a more specific example. By now Belorussia has lost about a quarter of the arable land due to Chernobyl. If it takes up the draining of the swamps now, the rivers of the Ukraine and the Baltic area will be deprived of their water balance.

I agree that a republic should have sovereign rights to the soil, and to a considerable degree to the forests. However, when it comes to the runoff-retaining function of forests, I begin to think hard. What about such rights with regard to rivers?

It is logical for Latvia, for example, to have the entire Lielupe River, which begins and ends in its territory. However, when they tell me that it should have the same rights to the Daugava, which they call Zapadnaya Dvina in the other republic, I begin to have doubts.

Indeed, we have set up republic environmental protection committees. Interregional, interrepublic groups of specialists at the USSR Goskompriroda come next. We have no right to disperse information. It is our responsibility to know the situation as a whole and have an opportunity to influence it. For example, let there be a group of experts who know everything on the Baltic Sea region, which includes all of the Baltic area, some of Leningrad Oblast, Karelia, Belorussia, Kaliningrad Oblast, and some of the Upper Volga Basin. If we do not set up this group, what are we to do: Solicit information from each region on the situation they have? As a result, we will have to piece together a huge mosaic with uncertain results.

[Dubrovskiy] Sometimes one gets the impression that our ecological troubles are not associated with the economic system that allows the ministries to rape nature, but rather with common ecological illiteracy. After all, a plant manager incapable of understanding that waste treatment facilities are a necessity is not a malefactor but a person who was not taught the fundamentals of ecological awareness in his time.

[Vorontsov] You are right. Comprehensive ecological education is necessary. A course of ecological basics in schools is necessary. However, where are we to get specialists? I doubt whether a regular biology teacher is up to it. This means that ecological classes must be offered in colleges, in absolutely all of them. The curriculum has to be different—one kind in a petroleum industry college, another in an agricultural one, and yet another in a teacher's college. However, they will not produce the desired effect if they are not preceded by a general biology course. After all, no college in our country offers a course on the strength of materials without physics and mathematics! This is what we are going to settle with the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education G. Yagodin.

The birth of the Goskompriroda was more than 30 years late. The scientist-ecologists raised the issue of establishing the committee as early as 1955. Therefore, we have to take care of everything all at once—of the ideology of the system, and along with this, say, of how to give our employees an opportunity to join lengthy expeditions. After all, to this day they go on business trips as is done in the ministries.

Briefly about financing. Total expenditures for environmental protection in 1989 amount to 9.9 billion rubles, and in the United States $80 billion. The budgetary allocation for the entire USSR Goskompriroda organization is 20 million rubles in 1989, and for the Environmental Protection Agency $12 billion. Within our organization 5.5 million rubles are allocated for scientific research, and in the agency, $450 million. For 1990 the allocation is $500 million. Thus far our plans provide for the previous level. So here is the accounting...

[Dubrovskiy] However, you also had another option—not to accept the government offer. Incidentally, this is what several major scientists who received such offers did. Meanwhile, you agreed. Why?

[Vorontsov] I don't know. Why did I fight Lysenkoism in my time, though I could work in my profession as a zoologist rather than a genetics specialist? Because I could not do otherwise. It was my habit of getting involved in a fight, though, frankly, I do not like fighting much. However, I cannot stand by and watch when four people attack one...

I agreed because I felt ashamed for our great country.

Baklanov on Defense Sector Conversion

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[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov by A. Pokrovskiy: "Everything Begins With Man"; date, place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Pokrovskiy] Oleg Dmitriyevich, there is probably no one in our country who does not pin great hopes on the results of the perestroyka processes in our economic organism. However, the following attitude to renewal can be seen in the speeches and articles of certain specialists: Let's adopt good laws, they claim, and all the troubles besetting our economy will simply disappear...

[Baklanov] And we can sit back and relax? In my opinion, this is precisely the most problematic posture. After all, if you adopt it, it means you are out of the mainstream of life. But seriously, perestroyka is aimed precisely at unfettering people's initiative. And the basis of success is not only economic laws, but also people's attitude to their work. It is appropriate to recall here that the idea of perestroyka put forward by the party was preceded by the concept of "new thinking." And the perestroyka of thinking is a much more complex and subtle matter than mastering the highest of technology.

Let us recall that until recently social freeloading was fostered and strengthened, an attitude which seemed actually to justify a half-hearted attitude to work. And we are finding out that it is not that easy to overcome this freeloading mentality.

Here is a recent example. When M.S. Gorbachev at the recent student forum mentioned the question of increasing student grants, his audience immediately responded with applause, although it had not reacted earlier when he mentioned no less important issues. I am by no means trying to say that our young people are characterized by inertia. However, the question does exist: Do we not pamper them too much, do we not encourage freeloading attitudes among them. It will do no harm here to take a closer look at how in good worker families and abroad young people are taught to make an effort, to use their brain, to make their contribution, small initially, but increasing with time... Unquestionably, this is how future leaders both in industry and science are reared. The main thing is that there are quite a few such people in our country, and it is necessary to support them in every way. I was able to see this for myself once again during my recent visit to Zelenograd where young people are coming forward with most interesting proposals to improve regional management, proposals which are in keeping with the spirit of the times.

I believe that instilling new thinking is the key issue in perestroyka. Whatever we focus on, be it the national economy or the draft laws with which our conversation began, they are lifeless without the animating influence of human labor.

[Pokrovskiy] Your close interest in the human factor as CPSU Central Committee secretary is understandable. However, before taking up this post, you worked for a long time in the economic sphere...

[Baklanov] Are you trying to say that economic work and party work are "two very different matters"? It is an interesting question and it needs to be investigated. Therefore I hope you will not think it immodest of me if I mention certain details relating to my biography. I consider myself to have been involved in party work since 1953—that is when I joined the party while working as an installation worker at a defense plant in Kharkov. In that wonderful collective, in constant contact with people in my team, shift, and workshop I gained the necessary experience of life. There my belief strengthened that it is impossible to rely on equipment alone, without knowing the people, their character and thoughts. Back in those days I came to the conclusion that if an economic manager does not make use of party methods in working with people, and a party official does not understand the economic aspect of the work they do, they both resemble a man standing on one leg. He needs "crutches."

What kind of cruches are these? It is not difficult to guess—it is the command style of leadership. In any case, I am convinced that one of the causes of the emergence of the administrative-command system was the incompetence or, to be more accurate, the semicompetence of a number of leaders—both economic managers and party officials.

I do not understand how it is possible to engage in party work without knowing, for instance, the production process at the enterprise in question. Or how it is possible to be working within this process without understanding why you are doing it. After all, an engineer is above all the creator of new equipment who must have some idea how what he is creating fits in with relations between people. And there is something else. When I see a person who is not a party member but who devotes himself entirely to people and fights for the right cause, I regard him as more than just a good specialist. Even as a nonparty person he is a Communist for me.

[Pokrovskiy] Continuing the human theme, I would like to ask you what impact the new thinking has had on the consciousness of defense industry workers and their assessment of their place in our changing world?

[Baklanov] First of all, let us agree that defense industry workers are not some kind of special category of people. We have excellent collectives in agriculture, construction, and industry, too. It is once again a question of the human factor here. If, for instance, at a collective farm a sensible chairman and the party committee have managed to rally people, given them the chance to show what they can do, and ensured skillful use of machinery—progress will be made.

The same applies in the defense industry. Only here there is a sharper focus on this feature. This is understandable because exactingness and responsibility in this sphere are higher. After all, any normal person understands that as a result of imperfections in military hardware for which he is to blame, he himself, his near and dear ones, and a lot of other people may come to grief. At the same time everyone is aware that our most valuable asset is freedom. Unfortunately, in the present-day imperfect world freedom cannot be assured without reliable defense, for the time being, in any case. The new thinking is now paving the way toward new heights of civilization, but this takes time. Our age is changing the approach to arms as an economic category alone.

The world has reached a point where the prevailing natural balance (energy balance, genetic balance) could be disrupted through the current achievements in scientific and technical progress. And what is more, disrupted in such a way as to bring about the destruction of all mankind. It has now become a question of life or death. In other words, this question has developed from an economic question into a paramount political question. I want to stress that these ideas have been expressed in the past too. However, the essence of the present-day situation lies in new thinking at the level of state policy, as M.S. Gorbachev has said from the UN rostrum. It is necessary to switch from confrontation to the quest for solutions where weapons will not be used.

[Pokrovskiy] Clearly, it was these fundamental approaches to the problems of the country's defense which have made it possible to place the process of conversion on a practical footing?

[Baklanov] You are right, we have deemed it possible to take this step, but let me remind you that the depth and pace of conversion do not depend on us alone. The **principle of reciprocity** must be observed here. Our people and indeed the whole world must clearly understand that we will not agree to unilateral disarmament. True, it is possible to take a step or two on one's own, but we have a right to expect a response.

What is the current state of affairs as regards this matter? We have cut our defense budget from R76 billion to R70 billion in 1990. The United States intends to spend $305 billion for the same purpose and this sum has a tendency to grow. It is true that U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney recently announced that he is examining the possibility of appreciably cutting the military budget over the next 3 years. Please God, as the saying goes.

I must also mention that the Conservative government in Britain does not intend to give up its nuclear weapons, and a number of other states are seeking to acquire them. All this has to be borne in mind. The solution is once again dictated by the new thinking—dialogue instead of confrontation, because a third world war, should it break out, would be mankind's last. It has been Communists, it has been a socialist country which raised the appreciation of this circumstance to the rank of state policy.

[Pokorovskiy] ...And we have resolutely embarked on the road of conversion. What does this mean for the country in economic terms?

[Baklanov] This is both technically and socially a complex problem. Let us examine it from various angles. First, the depth of conversion. If we take the most extreme situation conceivable—ending the production of all types of arms and their sales to the army, the saving over 1 year would total some R30 billion. A substantial sum, of course, but not big enough to stop up all the "holes" in the economy, as some people have claimed. I would like to emphasize that the main point is not the redistribution of available resources but the implementation of the economic reform and the application of the achievements of scientific and technical progress. Thus the full depth of conversion is in the region of R30 billion. By the way, allow me to remind you that the official figure for national economic losses is around R36 billion.

Nonetheless the "holes" have to be plugged. And defense industry workers have come forward with an initiative. As you know, the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances was abolished 2 years ago... And defense sectors have stepped into the breach. I am not trying to say that they came, they saw, they conquered. But I can say with conviction that they have tackled this task in earnest, involving major associations and appointing general designers for the different spheres. Summing up it is possible to say that defense industry workers have embarked on the production of equipment for the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade, public catering, and medical sectors. In addition, the following task has been set as regards consumer goods—to produce per ruble of wage fund R1.20 rather than 90 kopeks worth of goods in 1990. That is an appreciable difference. People—consumers, you and I—ought to be able to feel this. In general it ought to be noted that the defense complex used to produce 40 percent of goods for the national economy and 60 percent of defense goods. Now the correlation is 50 to 50, and in the 13th 5-Year Plan it will be 60 to 40.

The second question is the speed of the conversion. It is understandable that a reorientation of an industry to the production of new types of goods cannot be carried out overnight. Calculations reveal the following picture. At our leading enterprises 20-30 percent of total capacity goes into the preparation of new production. This lays the groundwork for flexible restructuring where 2-3 years are needed to master the output of major, sophisticated goods.

However, there are also enterprises where the preparation of new production takes up only 6-8 percent of capacities and the remaining expenditure goes into mass-producing the same old goods. Such "companies" need 5-7 years for reorientation—for which, frankly speaking, they are in no hurry.

However that may be, the switch to new production always calls for retooling and hence considerable outlays. Where are these means to come form? The only way is to earn them. It has to be borne in mind that conversion is no cornucopia, it is not the economy's milch cow; but it does not sponge on the economy either. It is an important element in the efforts to improve the economic situation.

Now about the social aspect. Conversion affects the lives of tens of thousands of people. This is understandable. Take a mature man—he is used to his job, and suddenly he is asked to retrain. This takes money, and time, and effort. But above all it is necessary to proceed with caution; from the human angle, I would say. Here the role of party organizations must be up to the mark.

[Pokrovskiy] Will we not in the course of the reorientation lose the high scientific and technical standard for which the defense industry is famous?

[Baklanov] You have reminded me of an encounter at one of our aviation plants. An engineer—a woman incidentally, a young mother—was complaining that the builders of modern aircraft were allegedly being pushed to produce baby strollers. I inspected that "production facility." A shop consisting of two rooms, and people, practically "on their knees" as production workers put it, were manually assembling those very strollers—an awful spectacle.

Is this perhaps how a powerful intellectual center should tackle a task? In my opinion it is above all necessary for the collective to grasp the importance of the new social demand, then the preparation for it will be appropriate, and the necessary attention will be paid to the consumer. Incidentally, the aircraft builders are setting a good example. In a number of cities they have opened "Antey" stores which are selling the new goods. The same thing is happening in the radio industry. The sectors have established their own trade outlets.

It is necessary to clarify one more detail: Conversion means the beginning of the production of a number of goods which formerly were simply not produced in our country.

Sometimes you get to hear views like this one: Skilled defense industry workers are tackling the production of sausage-making lines and textile, knitwear, and footwear factory equipment. Anyone could produce that...

However, few people know that it is a question of equipment of a higher standard of precision. This is the standard which our machines, assemblies, and production lines failed to attain in the past.

And what good was it when the output of poor goods was being increased, the output of goods which were then stockpiled at warehouses. Have we not set ourselves the task in restructuring our national economy to gear it to people's needs?

Consequently, the solution of this task must also be approached from different positions. Only first-class equipment is worth producing in bulk. It is not worth spending effort, time, and money on anything less. Are defense industry workers capable of creating such equipment and mastering its series production? Yes, they are. I believe that the main contribution of the sectors of the defense complex to the solution of the national program is improving people's quality of life. In other words, we have diverted part of the defense capacities to a front where our main battle is currently being waged, the battle against social problems. We must win it.

There is also another sphere which must not, under any circumstances, be forgotten. The sectors of the complex must step up their efforts in creating equipment which they have traditionally supplied to the national economy. Passenger aircraft, for instance. It is no secret that a number of Aeroflot machines are inferior to the latest foreign analogues in terms of their economic specifications. And even they are in short supply.

However, our aircraft builders have not been wasting their time. There have already been reports of flight trials of the latest-generation passenger aircraft—the wide-bodied Il-96-300 and Tu-204. I will not describe their technical excellence in detail since they are in no way inferior to the world's best airliners. It is enough to stress that passenger comforts were the priority in these aircraft. This is the latest step toward a new quality of service.

This concept is now adhered to by all who are implementing society's most important social orders.

[Pokrovskiy] But will that not lead to multiprofile production in certain sectors?

[Baklanov] Why should we be afraid of that? The experience of major foreign firms, for instance, shows that they are capable not only of producing the most sophisticated weapons but also sanitary ware, pots and pans—and even running restaurants. This, incidentally, does not just serve to satisfy consumers' needs, but also ensures a comfortable future for the owners of these firms when the level of militarization is lowered. This has to be seriously considered. Our country took care to maintain high scientific and technical standards in the defense industry and these standards will now benefit Soviet people.

Such enterprises already exist. Let me remind you that videorecorders, diverse radio equipment, television sets, washing machines, refrigerators, and many other sophisticated goods are produced mainly by the defense sectors. And one of their main tasks now is to "share" with purely civilian sectors the scientific and technical potential they have built up. The path toward this has been cleared, but unfortunately the innovations are not always willingly taken up and sometimes they are rejected out of hand. These too are problems connected with the human factor and the pace of implementation of the economic reform.

[Pokrovskiy] In this case I would like to ask: Are these approaches not likely to affect the basic output of the defense industry?

[Baklanov] Here we must rely on the principle of defensive sufficiency and enhancement of the standard of output. Putting it crudely, rather than a hundred aircraft we need ten, but of a higher quality. Or let me put it this way: With the creation of the Energiya system we have acquired the capability of placing heavy communication platforms weighing up to 18 tonnes in geostationary orbit. In these circumstances it is impossible, figuratively speaking, to maintain communications on telegraph poles. With the help of space facilities we can meet our needs for communication channels in the most rational way.

The Buran launched with the help of the selfsame Energiya is capable of extending the life of the different types of satellite, and we now have some 150 of them in operation: navigation and meteorological satellites, satellites used for prospecting for various minerals, and so forth. Not to mention the other opportunities offered by cosmonautics, such as the production of new semiconductor materials and drugs, and ecological monitoring. Generally speaking, space technology is the fulcrum of which Archimedes was dreaming...

[Pokrovskiy] Of late, however, there has been a lot of talk about "space excesses"...

[Baklanov] I will be frank: In my opinion to cut one ruble from space research means to incur tenfold losses. In the United States, for instance, every dollar invested in space technology produces returns of $15. Without going into details, I would like to note that space should be viewed as man's new habitat which, thanks to its unique qualities, is providing right now and will increasingly provide in the future an opportunity for civilized existence. In general it can be claimed unequivocally that, just as it is impossible to shut off America, it is impossible to "shut off" space.

[Pokrovskiy] But then perhaps our space program should be publicized, provided that it exists, of course. In which case many questions based on misunderstanding would disappear...

[Baklanov] Naturally, such a program does exist. And I believe that information about it should be published, also with the help of your newspaper. This problem is important above all because without its solution we simply do not have a future. It is necessary for our people to understand this well. However, this is a topic for a separate extensive discussion.

[Pokrovskiy] And the last question, Oleg Dmitriyevich. How do you see the future of our defense industry?

[Baklanov] What can I tell you? The gunboat policy has always led the world into an impasse. Our age of new thinking on the other hand makes possible what even recently appeared quite inconceivable. The Soviet-U.S. meeting at Malta brought hope that reason and good will will triumph and that the specter of a global catastrophy hanging over mankind will vanish. Much hard work is necessary to achieve this, however.

Economic

Economist Envisages 'Radical' Reform 'Next Year'

LD1112134989 Moscow TASS in English 1335 GMT 11 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 11 TASS—All changes made in the Soviet economy so far have been purely cosmetic. Radical economic reform starts only next year, said Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Economic reform Pavel Bunich. Meeting newsmen today, he said next year will see the entry into force of two laws which are, in his opinion, a key to economic changes. These are the laws on leasing and the economic independence of the Baltic republics, passed by the Soviet parliament at its recent session.

Leasing in Soviet conditions, academician Bunich said, is a way of turning the larger part of state property into collective [as received].

Bunich believes that, at a most pessimistic estimate, 20 per cent of state enterprises will switch over to leasing during the coming three years. He is convinced that the economic potential for leasing amounts to 60 per cent of the USSR's state property.

State enterprises and facilites will be leased through a system of bidding. Such enterprises, paying taxes and leasing fees to the state, will begin to increase their production potential which will become the property of the labour collective. Subsequently nothing will prevent the collectives from buying out the state's share and making it collective property.

The state enterprise will thus become by its very nature essentially a cooperative, which will amount to a revolution in social relations.

Bunich said that preparation of the law on property has quite progressed, but not far enough to place it on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR tomorrow, as some deputies demand.

This, Bunich said emphatically, is too crucial a document for the country to adopt it incomplete.

Of the serious problems, Buncih mentioned the market disruption. With the goods being chased by five times more money. Among the factors whipping up the consumer demand and spawning "gone-beserk" money, the academician mentioned people's fear of a price reform.

He is convinced that the reform may be tried only after the market has calmed down somewhat. The calming down and liquidation of money "gone Beserk" will, in his opinion, be assisted by converting large defence capacities to turning out consumer goods and sales of apartments and securities, although the coming two or three years will not be enough to do away with the huge ruble overhang. This will be possible only when the economy begins operating on the basis of new economic mechanisms.

For the moment, however, one cannot do without administrative measures to defend the consumer, especially those less fortunately placed. Administrative measures, however, are ad hoc and the government's strategy is to switch over to the new economic methods.

Government To Issue Debentures for 'Social Needs'

LD1312102189 Moscow TASS in English 0954 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 13 TASS—The Soviet Government has decided to issue 10 billion roubles worth of debentures of state purposive loans for exchange in 1990. The loans will be repaid with durable goods in 1993 the GOVERNMENT HERALD [PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK] reports today.

The money obtained through debentures' sales will go to the union budget to satisfy pressing social needs.

The loan is to solve a dual task: provide for a fuller satisfacation of needs for durable goods and help balance the incomes and spending of the population.

Debentures will be sold on a voluntary basis to employees of enterprises, organisations and offices by branches of the Soviet saving bank. One will have to pay for the debentures in full at the time of the purchase.

In 1993, the debenture holder will receive at a shop a durable good, indicated on the debenture. If he wishes he may be paid with the debenture's face value.

Ground Fiber-Optic System To Transit USSR

90UI0197A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 4

[TASS report: "A Transcontinental Communications Line"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Communications, the West Company of the United States, and a number of other international companies in electronic communications are planning to create a corporation that will engage in the development of a fiber-optics communications system linking Japan and Europe across USSR territory. The new line should be an element in a global communications channel round the earth.

The main participants in the project include KDD (Japan), STET (Italy), British Telecom (Great Britain), OTC (Australia), BSTO and "Telekom" (Denmark), and Bundespost (FRG).

It has been calculated that realization of the project will take 3 to 5 years and cost about half a million dollars. A cable will cross the territory of the Soviet Union and will have underground connections with Denmark, Italy and Japan. It will form the most extensive ground fiber-optics system in the world. When it goes into operation it will satisfy the growing demand for communications throughput capacity between countries of the Pacific basin and Europe. Together with satellite communications systems, the fiber-optics system will make it possible to satisfy market demand for telephone, facsimile and data transmission services between countries and continents. The system will also make it possible to establish communications across great distances within the Soviet Union between cities located along its route.

The corporation will start on the installation and operation of the system after agreement has been reached on the structure of the work needed and appropriate government permission has been received. To this end the main participants are continuing their consultations with their own governments. They hope that installation of the line can begin in the latter half of 1990.

Safety Expert Discusses Industrial Accidents

PM2011151689 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Nov 89 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Candidate of Technical Sciences M. Beschastnov, chief engineer at the Administration for Supervision in the Chemical, Petrochemical, and Petroleum Refining Industry of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine Supervision, by N. Gogol: "In the Tracks of Disasters: 'Foolproofing'"—date, place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are Gogol introduction]

[Text] Believing in fate is naive, but convenient. Suffering at the whim of fate is not so humiliating and painful as suffering because of someone's stupidity and slovenliness. Oh, that salutary belief in fate!

One important official who arrived at the Sumgait "Orgsintez" Association soon after an accident there stated: "I am used to walking a knife-edge, and I am ready to start up production in the state of readiness that exists." Something similar was probably said, to themselves if not aloud, by the leader of construction work at the Ionava "Azotas" Production Association when he handed over the plant with substantial deviations from the design, and the person who authorized the commissioning of the Ufa section of pipeline, closing his eyes to the patent technological defects.... The "agents of fate" risk their portfolios at most, and it is you and I who walk the knife-edge.

Bold fools, cowardly wise men, and how to protect ourselves against the tyranny of badly controlled and monitored technologies were the subject of my talk with Candidate of Technical Sciences M. Beschastnov, chief engineer at the Administration for Supervision in the Chemical, Petrochemical, and Petroleum Refining Industry of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine Supervision.

[Gogol] Mikhail Vasilyevich, in your books and monographs you talk about expanding the technosphere and write about the global consequences of the accumulation of considerable energies in limited areas. These thoughts sound rather detached coming from a man who has for two decades been, so to speak, a first-hand witness of technological expansion. Most of your missions have been to the still smoldering ashes of ravaged enterprises and shops, when bodies still lie beneath heaps of warped metal. How do you combine this detachment with your difficult human experience?

[Beschastnov] Of course, you can never get used to disaster, to human grief. They affect me in the same way now as they did 20 years ago. But when I arrive on the scene of yet another accident, I have to suppress my emotions in order efficiently and promptly to fulfill my duties—to assess the situation, uncover the causes of the incident, and help to formulate ways of eliminating the consequences of the accident.

You mentioned just now the expansion of the technosphere. Perhaps it is a mistake to assess in such a negative way a process that is inevitable and necessary for social progress and for improving everyone's living conditions. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the unthinking growth of energy-oriented systems can lead, frankly, to disastrous consequences.

Here are just a few examples from the history of "disasters of the century." The 1973 accident in Chicago, when as a result of explosions and fires at a printing ink plant, the enterprise was completely destroyed and personnel died. The 1976 accident at a chemical plant in the Italian city of Seveso: The discharge of dioxin contaminated a vast area and some 7,000 lethal doses of the gas found their way into the air. Or a more recent event—the accident at a liquefied hydrocarbons store in Mexico City in 1984. On that occasion more than 500 people were killed and 7,000 injured as a result of explosions and fires.

In our own industry there has been devastation of a similar nature and on a similar scale at 15 enterprises at various times. In the last 18 years there have been more than 150 serious accidents each of which could have become a disaster as a result of chain reactions.

[Gogol] The public was not informed about many of them—and that is another aspect of the ugly face of our recent past: People who were killed at their workplace were buried in secret like production waste. But the publicized recent events—and I am talking first and foremost about the disaster in Bashkiria, which killed about 1,000 people—clearly suggest that instead of shaking our heads at what happens abroad, we would do better to put our own house in order.

[Beschastnov] You are right. We must put our own house in order. But you cannot just sweep aside the lessons of the past, whether at home or elsewhere. Academician V. Legasov once pointed out that by channeling all our efforts into the specific source of trouble, we eventually close the breach, but then a new event inevitably occurs in another sphere or another place.

Incidentally, foreign experience (both negative and positive) is of purely practical interest to us, too. The heavy chemical industry sprang up in our country 15-20 years later than in the West. When we were only just beginning to develop this sphere, they had already suffered some blows.... Another result of this time lag is that we received many chemical industry assemblies through imports, and the majority of technologies were introduced with the participation of foreign firms. Their experience is therefore potentially our experience, too.

[Gogol] Does that mean that the things that blow up or burn over here are "theirs?" What is the reason for this: Do we buy things that are not the best, or do we use what we buy badly?

[Beschastnov] Both, and a third thing, too.... I will come to the third thing in a moment. But first, an example; food for thought, so to speak. In 1974, when there was an accidental discharge at the Nypro plant in the city of Flixborough in England, a cyclohexane vapor cloud exploded. This resulted in deaths, destruction, and damage to thousands of homes within a 5km radius of the enterprise. This accident echoed throughout the world, and it, too, incidentally, was added to the list of "disasters of the century." But this is the remarkable thing. In that same year a contract was signed with the English, and the very same assemblies were installed at a whole series of enterprises in our country, with the help of foreign firms!

The result was not slow to follow. In 1978 an assembly at the "Kuybyshevazot" Production Association blew up in similar circumstances, causing destruction on a similar scale. Today similar technological units are in operation at other plants in dangerous conditions.

[Gogol] I can imagine the reaction your story will prompt in people who have read this far! But when the deal was concluded, surely there was some reasoning behind the decision?

[Beschastnov] Unfortunately, when such decisions are made, the opinion of experts is quite often ignored or pushed into the background. Paramount significance is attached to that sacred foreign currency, which, as you know, we never have enough of. The logic goes roughly like this: Be as cunning as possible in order to get more and pay less.

[Gogol] "Less" means human lives, a polluted environment, the health of our children and grandchildren?

[Beschastnov] In general we have a rather bizarre relationship with our Western partners. On the one hand, we lay claim to equal business relations and serious scientific cooperation, in particular in the sphere of work safety at enterprises. On the other hand, we behave like someone who boasts: "I can take care of myself."

For some decades an international association for public safety has been in existence at the International Labor Organization. The association regularly holds symposiums and conferences and actively discusses contemporary problems of ensuring safety in production and a very wide range of associated questions. Membership of the association, which has, incidentally, an international section for the prevention of accidents and illness in the chemical industry, guarantees receipt of the latest information on safety techniques in various sectors of production and enables one to be au fait with the ideas that currently control the world.... Our country has no representative in this association.

[Gogol] —? [as published]

[Beschastnov] It is the same old explanation—the currency is not available to pay the membership dues. But if you compare this relatively small sum with the losses we sustain because of elementary technological ignorance, the difference is enormous. I think the people who have the right to make the decision simply underestimate the significance of such cooperation.

[Gogol] I think we have dealt with the question of what is bought from abroad and how. Now let us go on to the question of how we use what we buy.

[Beschastnov] First I must say that the greater part of the equipment we import consists of reliable assemblies that meet all the necessary criteria. But once we have acquired the technology and allocated a site for construction of the plant.... Here I am coming to the "third" point we mentioned before—the question of putting the plan for the future production facility into action.

For those who have forgotten about the events in Ionava, which were widely covered in the press, let me remind you that on that occasion, because of damage to a huge ammonia tank, thousands of tonnes of the toxic substance were released into the air, forming a cloud with an area of some 10 square kilometers and about 80 meters thick. Seven people died, but the losses could have been hundreds of times greater if the wind had been blowing toward the city.... Well, when the expert report was produced, it emerged that when the assembly was built, major deviations from the design occurred.

The load-bearing slab under the tank should have been monolithic ferroconcrete 700 mm thick, but they made it 400 mm thick. As a result the slab bent like a dinner plate! The protection around the assembly—a ferroconcrete "vessel"—was not connected to the base by a shared framework: They built it in the way they usually build an apartment block. As if that was not enough, some rationalizer, in order to save materials, proposed making the "vessel" thinner, so they did it! Tell me, pray, where does such bungling come from? Where does such rampant stupidity come from?

Personally I would like to abolish the concept of rationalizers, at least in the chemical industry. If you do something sensible, useful for the enterprise, you get a bonus. But a whole army of "smart alecks" has sprung up, who think about nothing but where and how to cut or curtail something—contrary to technology and in the face of common sense.

Another example is the damage to the pipeline and the vapor cloud explosion in Bashkiria. Throughout the world such pipelines are equipped with remote control systems which, in the event of an accident, automatically shut off a given section of the pipeline in a matter of seconds. The narrower the pipe and the shorter the section, the more rapidly the automatic device comes into action.

On the section in question, there was no such system at all. Furthermore the diameter of the pipe, instead of the 400 mm that is customary worldwide, was 700 mm. With such a pipe the cutoff units should be no more than 500 meters apart, but they were at a distance of... 10 km! What was the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises thinking of when it constructed this "unique" pipeline?

[Gogol] We have arrived unwittingly at what is usually called the "human factor." Whichever component you look at—the purchase of a plant, its construction, its operation—all the threads lead to the person who does the job, the specific individual.

[Beschastnov] I am profoundly convinced that everything depends on what conditions a person is placed in, what is demanded of him, and what incentives are offered for the fulfillment of what is required.

Say we build an enterprise. Everything there is new and shiny, it is the very latest equipment—a pleasure to work with. And a worker's salary is R180, give or take.... For that kind of money, wild horses would not drag people to work even at the most modern chemical enterprise. The main contingent in the sector consists of people with low levels of skills who do not have sufficient knowledge to service modern equipment. Yet you are talking about production units that are potentially highly dangerous: In some regions where industry is concentrated, chemical products amounting to tens of billions of lethal doses are stockpiled. Nearby there are apartment blocks, schools, kindergartens....

I hope the workers in chemical sectors will not take offense, but at any potentially dangerous production facility in the West, there is such a thing as so-called "foolproofing:" The manufacturing process is controlled by an automated system which itself "protects" the unit against breakdowns or erroneous decisions, and switches off the process in the event of a possible danger. People are people, they make mistakes.... In our country, the number of systems like that can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Furthermore, the instructions that are drawn up in case of unforeseen situations—and they sometimes run to hundreds of pages—not infrequently mislead people and put them in an impossible position. For instance, the instructions may say that in the event of an accident such-and-such a device must be shut off. On paper, it is fine. But in reality, in order to reach this device you need a ladder, and as a rule no ladder is to be found in a stressful situation. Someone risks his life to try to shut off the danger zone.... In general, in theory "safety technology" exists, but in practice....

Sometimes people are not even told that the substance they are working with is explosive. That happened at "Akrikhina," near Moscow. A poll carried out after the accident showed that people who had been working on an assembly close to the critical temperature for 15 years or so did not have the slightest inkling that the nitrogenous mass that was forming could explode. It did. The force of the explosion, in TNT equivalent, was on the order of four tonnes. Everyone who was working at that production unit was killed.

[Gogol] You mentioned the TNT equivalent of the explosion, but I think every accident also has its moral equivalent.... I will never forget the words that a certain minister, not without self-satisfaction, was fond of repeating: "Our remarkable workers, displaying courage and selflessness, throw themselves into the flames and die in eliminating the accident...."

[Beschastnov] An ex-minister, fortunately. But the problem you touched on is indeed very important, and it exists. We have somehow imperceptibly raised a whole cohort of "captains of industry" for whom the individual, his fate, and even his life are abstract concepts. Where does this spiritual dullness come from?

Under the existing procedure, immediately after an accident a special team is set up to overcome it, and they are supposed to analyze what happened and plan measures to restore production. If everything is going up in smoke, the team will be in session. Recently there was an explosion at a chemical plant in Guryev. Six people died, mainly workers aged 18-20, recent graduates from the vocational and technical school. The wreckage has yet to be cleared away, bodies are lying under the stones, but the team is already in session. Do you think they are discussing how to get people out from under the wreckage faster—in case someone is still alive—and how to bury the dead? Nothing of the kind. The commission is wracking its brains over how to start up production as quickly as possible so as not to fail to meet the annual plan.

I will never forget something that happened many years ago. It was in Siberia. A timber chemical plant, the main workplace for the inhabitants of the adjacent settlement, was entirely destroyed by an explosion and fire. I was walking around the ruins, when suddenly a guy came up to me, no longer young, evidently a hard worker. Later I learned that friends and relatives of his had died here. He was silent for a moment, and then he said: "There is nowhere to work now." That was all, and he went away. But what distress there was in his voice!

Later, in the building where the accident team—yes, another of those notorious teams—was sitting, when it had already spent many hours outlining various "measures," I was stopped in the corridor by an old woman: "Son, who should I turn to? My daughter worked here, she is dead. She was all I had. Who should I speak to?..." She spoke without any bitterness—helplessly. I admit I exploded then. I went into the room where they were sitting—all the local bosses were there: You are going on and on about iron, I said, and the people cannot get to you, have you thought about them, talked to them, explained what happened, what lies in store for them?!

Everyone needs human contact, especially in a crisis. Let us return to Guryev. While the team of "high-powered scientists" was behind closed doors deciding the enterprise's fate, the workers, without waiting for a response from the bosses, convened the labor collective council, and there they did not beat about the bush. But the worrying thing was this—they started forming conjectures and talking about things like sabotage. The commission chairman should have gone to a session of the council, talked with people and explained the cause of the accident, but, can you imagine, he refused! Was he afraid? Or was he unsure of his own competence, unsure that he could give clear, well reasoned answers?

So in the end I went to see the workers. I spoke to them for a couple of hours. I do not know whether I managed to win their complete trust—people were so highly charged, but in the event the atmosphere calmed down and they moved on from meetings to action.

[Gogol] Mikhail Vasilyevich, is not this incompetence one reason why the investigations into even trifling accidents can drag on for months?

[Beschastnov] You know, I would not want to lump everything together. There are situations where, without a prolonged, painstaking study of all the circumstances of what happened, you can make a mistake and get things wrong. Each case requires a detailed study.

[Gogol] I agree, but here is something surprising and worrying. The accident at Ionava took place in March—the report on the investigation was not signed until July, although, judging by the specialists' initial assessments that appeared in the press, the picture was comparatively clear there. The disaster in Bashkiria happened in June. The land will soon be under snow, but the state commission is still at work. Yet when a military fighter plane of ours crashed at the recent air show in Le Bourget, the expert assessment was published on the 3d or 4th day after the event. Yet the experts' task was probably at least as complex.... I will not conceal the fact that some of our readers express the opinion that such long-drawn-out investigations of many accidents only benefit those who are to blame for the tragedies, who seek to evade responsibility at all costs.

[Beschastnov] You have touched on a key aspect of the problem. Indeed, the most important task for commissions investigating the circumstances of a given incident is to discover who is to blame. Therefore it is not uncommon for veritable battles to be fought at these sessions, the aim of which is to shift the blame for what happened from oneself. In principle, it is not difficult to find the culprits. It is more difficult to eliminate the main cause of an actual or possible accident.

For instance, we built an ammonia pipeline from Kuybyshev to Odessa. The first in the country. We learned from the Americans. Every pipe was inspected. The route was clearly mapped out. There is an inspectors' service, there is a reliable automation system. So my heart does not bleed over this pipeline!

Another example. We have a great many problems on the railroads with explosive freight, in particular liquid chlorine. Yet another incident occurs, and of course, they blame the little man, the switchman or someone like that. Perhaps they even punish the stationmaster. Has justice triumphed? But what if you were to look at it this way: Should we be transporting liquid chlorine at all?

Every month some 100,000 tonnes of liquid chlorine is transported in railroad tank cars over a distance of around 3,000 km. The TNT equivalent of this freight is many thousands of kilograms and vast areas are at risk of pollution. But the whole problem is that someone, some time, sited a plant wrongly and calculated the capacities for consumption of the substance incorrectly. So should something be done to rectify matters? No, it is easier to look for the little man and take criminal proceedings against someone who often only survived himself by a miracle.

Who, I wonder, needs that kind of justice, who needs these commissions? No, unless we review the very system of investigating accidents and adopt an impartial and rigorous scientific approach based on the interests of the cause and not, if you will forgive me, on fear for one's own skin, we will not be able to achieve an improvement in the safety situation in the chemical industry.

[Gogol] I am reminded again of the Le Bourget episode. The international commission that studied what happened was doubtless impartial and had no fear of any sanctions against it. And what happened? Not only was the high reputation of our aviation technology saved, since it turned out not to have been at fault; in fact, its reputation was strengthened.

[Beschastnov] You would not think there was any need to prove that we know how to work, and to work well. Even in conditions that are, frankly, extreme. I remember one instance. The head of a firm we bought some equipment from 20 years ago came to one of our plants. He looked, and could not believe his eyes: How did you manage to go on working on these assemblies for so many years without replacing anything?

This was not, of course, because of our great wealth. But on the other hand, sometimes our "economical" approach causes us far greater losses than if we had not tried to squeeze out the extra kopek at a given moment.

Generally speaking, industrial accidents are extremely costly, and that is something we are not very well informed about. The fact is that calculations of losses are often carried out—to put it mildly—imprecisely. Thus, an explosion at the "Groznefteorgsintez" Association damaged a manufacturing unit at a large petroleum refining production complex; the unit was out of action for about a month, as a result of which the state lost R16 million. Yet the official calculations put the damage caused by the accident at R130,000. What did they count, the cost of the unit? What about the rest? One is constantly coming across conjuring tricks like that, designed to create the semblance of prosperity. According to my calculations, losses from accidents in the chemical industry are 200 times greater than the official figures! Who are we fooling?

It seems to me that we cannot go on without totally eradicating the narrow departmental approach in the investigation of accidents and generally raising the consciousness and competence of experts. A profound reinterpretation of not only the political and economic realities, but also the technological realities of our time is a priority task.

[Gogol] I am sure you are right. But the evolution of consciousness is not, after all, a rapid process. What can and must be done even today to make our life a little safer?

[Beschastnov] In the next year or two we should take a good look at all our production units that have a high energy potential. It is necessary to determine clearly: This enterprise is obsolete and for a whole string of reasons, including ecological factors, should be closed; that one needs its equipment replaced; at this one, everything is fine—in general, we need a serious inspection of our existing production units.

This work should, of course, be done thoughtfully, so as not to disrupt existing economic relations. But at the same time one cannot tolerate a situation where the potentially dangerous manufacturing facilities that are in operation today in the chemical and petrochemical industry are only 20 percent equipped with remote systems for the localization of accidents, while the corresponding figure in petroleum refining is only 4 percent. Priority attention should be devoted to these features.

Cadre retraining should take place on approximately the same time scale. Every worker in the modern chemical industry should have an accurate knowledge not only of the conditions for operating a particular assembly, but also of the possible problems and ways of overcoming them. To this end it is necessary to draw up sensible, not merely formal, plans for the elimination of accidents, and instructions that do not consist of 1,000 pages, as they do today, but ones that you can work with every day. The country already has 27 centers for retraining chemical industry specialists, which I hope will play a useful part.

Another thing. Whole components of our chemical manufacturing complex need replacing or renewing. Naturally, this will take a long time. Here it is important to observe the principle of a comprehensive approach, so that each operation and process has reliable control and warning systems. That is, to build things up from "A" to

"Z," without "rationalizing" or economizing on the means of ensuring industrial safety.

Finally, it is necessary to radically change our attitude to cadres, to those who service our heavy chemical industry. Compare an operator at a modern chemical enterprise with, say, a pilot in civil aviation. The level of training, and, incidentally, the material assessment of their labor, are not comparable. Yet each of them have in their hands the lives of hundreds of people, or even perhaps, for the first of them, thousands. It is important to realize that not only the chemical workers, but every one of us, you and I, have an interest in improving the cadres in the chemical industry.

[Gogol] Hemingway, in his novel "For Whom the Bell Tolls," has these words: "Safety is knowing how to turn aside from danger." A good thought, but you notice that the writer saw no need to embellish it with brilliant epithets or similes like "walking a knife-edge." Why not, do you think?

[Beschastnov] I think it was because he knew what real danger is. Therefore he understood the value of not only words, but also human lives and, incidentally, human dignity. We should remember this moral concept more often.

Scientific

'Soyuz TM-8' Moved From Kvant to Basic Module

LD1212111789 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Rena Kuznetsova:

The Soyuz TM-8 cargo spacecraft was today successfully moved from the Kvant astrophysical module to the transfer compartment of the basic module of the manned orbital complex Mir.

The operation was carried by the Mission Control Centre with due regard for the further provision of the station with the necessary materials and equipment that are periodically delivered to orbit by Progress automatic spacecraft.

The third-generation orbital station Mir in its design and technical equipment considerably surpasses its predecessors—Salyut stations.

The Mir is fitted out with a new docking system with six docking assemblies and constitutes a basic module for the construction of a versatile permanently functioning manned orbital complex with specialised orbital modules of scientific and economic purpose.

The basic module has six docking assemblies, two of which—axial—are used for the docking of spaceships and research modules while the four lateral ones are intended for the permanent positioning of research modules.

The Mir complex will have a total of five specialised modules and its mass will amount to 130 tons.

Important operations to dock the Kvant-2 module, the mass of which is 20 tons, with the orbital complex Mir, and then to move the module to its permanent working place were carried out on December 6 and 8.

With the addition of the Kvant-2 module to the orbital complex, the living and working conditions of the cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov became more comfortable in their "two-storey orbital home", staff at the Mission Control Centre told TASS.

Previously they also had all the necessary conditions for living and working and for sports exercises. This time they have received an installation for the production of oxygen and regeneration of water.

Scientists point out that the specialised module has considerably expanded resources for research and experiments for the benefit of various branches of the Soviet economy.

Mishandling of Chernobyl Cleanup Criticized

90UN0325A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Oct 89 43 pp 6-7

[Article by Vasil Yakovenko, member of the Commission on Ecology of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, member of the Governing Presidium of the Belorussian Ecological Union, and chairman of the Belorussian Union of Writers journalists section: "Land of Nuclear Fear: Belorussia"]

[Text] The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station [AES] resulted in the greatest (after the Great Patriotic War) misfortune for the Belorussian people, and equally for the inhabitants of a number of regions in Russia and the Ukraine. The real danger required protective measures and the evacuation of the population from a 30-kilometer zone, as the result of which a mass resettlement of radiation victims started and refugees appeared—one reason for comparing this tragic event of life with war. But the "front" was indistinct and was sensed locally only by a metallic taste in the mouth.

The fact that there has been a constant concealment of the unprecedented, insidious, and universal misfortune from the people themselves and neglect of their health has been seen quite clearly from the first days of the tragedy.

Fearing that the uncompromising and explosive truth at the time of the accident at the Chernobyl AES would be bad for the spirit of the people, the Ministry of Health of the BSSR [Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] and the Minsk city executive council [gorispolkom] in the person of their leaders and sanitation physicians did nothing to guard the population of the capital against the effects of the radioactive cloud.

The secrecy in this irreparable misfortune is increasing the misfortune many times over.

In March 1987 a group of specialists from the USSR State Agroindustrial Committee, the Belorussian State Agroindustrial Committee, and the BSSR Ministry of Health submitted a proposal to the USSR Council of Ministers to halt agricultural production and resettle the people from zones with a level of contamination greater than 40 curies per square kilometer. These proposals, however, were rejected by the chairman of the government commission for the cleanup after the Chernobyl accident, B.Ye. Shcherbina. He classified as secret information about the levels of radioactive contamination at particular populated points where maximum permissible levels were being exceeded.

The "secrecy" made it possible even for some high-ranking officials to remain uninformed. "I know nothing" was a convenient way to exist. But existing in ignorance, like inaction, becomes a crime for particular individuals who thus relieve themselves of the trust of the people.

In 1989, for example, when he was chairman of the BSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, G.S. Tarazevich visited Krasnopolskiy, Cherikovskiy, and certain other rayons in Mogilev Oblast. With his pockets stuffed with memoranda, requests, and appeals, Tarazevich promised to investigate the situation within two weeks and to help—he swore this. However, he did nothing. He answered none of the numerous applications.

The instructions issued by the USSR Ministry of Health Main Administration on 26 June 1986 and published in the weekly NEDELYA (No 30, 1989) testify to the policy of inhuman and maleficent concealment of key information by the medical people. Evidently it is thanks just to similar instructions, orders, and arrangements reflecting the "policy" of the leading center that today workers in the apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Health and the BSSR Ministry of Health are able to deny the obvious. As, for example, the Deputy Minister of health and and USSR chief state sanitation medical officer, A.I. Kondrusev; the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and Director of the USSR Ministry of Health's Institute of Biophysics, L.A. Ilin, and his former deputy, Doctor of Technical Sciences K.I. Gordeyev; the Chief of the USSR Ministry of Health's Department of Radiation Medicine, V. Redkin; the Director of the BSSR Ministry of Health's Institute of Radiation Medicine, Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences V.A. Matyukhin; and the former chief state sanitation physician of the BSSR, V.N. Buryak, who have repeatedly, verbally, and in writing, publicly claimed that work on the cleanup of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, just like living and working in a zone contaminated with radionuclides, is a threat to no one. "Analysis of the data obtained as a result of medical examinations and outpatient observation of people living in these regions conducted by the USSR Ministry of Health," reports the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau and member of the government commission, V. Maryn, in answer to an inquiry from a deputy, "indicates that no diseases associated with the effects of radiation have been recorded among the population of in the monitored areas." Let me quote from another document: "The BSSR Ministry of Health reports that according to its information, and also according to data from world scientific literature and experience, the levels of radiation being recorded in a number of rayons in Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts cannot affect people's health" (a letter from V.N. Buryak to the BSSR Ministry of Education dated 4 April 1989). This opinion of a man who occupies an official post and is giving his blessing to children—schoolchildren and students—and who is engaged in field work in a contaminated zone, agrees neither with world experience nor with the data provided by Soviet specialists. The facts indicate otherwise.

The Director of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences All-Union Hematology Scientific Center, A.I. Vorobyev, reports to the Gomel Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] that "of four patients with acute leukemia who were admitted to the center's clinic from Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts (one adult and three children), in two the radiation dose was, according to chromosome analysis, 50 and 30 rads respectively. Moreover, in a woman who died from acute leukemia, the leukemic cells contained the chromosomal marker typical of radiation damage. Here we have a certificate from the Kiev Oblispolkom Internal Affairs Department, published by the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (No 31 dated 30 July 1989): "Fifty-seven associates have suffered from radiation sickness, and 4,750 from autonomic vascular dystonia, and in 1,500 there has been an exacerbation of chronic diseases of the respiratory organs, the cardiovascular system, and the gastrointestinal tract."

The damage that has been done to the population of Belorussia by radiation is described just as eloquently in a certificate issued and passed to the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee by scientific leaders from dozens of scientific research institutes in the republic (dated 24 April 1989). Let me quote some excerpts from it:

"Studies of the overall incidence of disease have established that in most regions being observed there has typically been a general increase in the incidence of somatic disease among the adult population and children during the period since 1986.... In 1988, compared to the period before the accident, the average incidence of disease among the adult population in the monitored rayons of Gomel Oblast has risen by a factor of 2.4 to 2.8; for Mogilev Oblast the figure is a factor of 1.8 to 2.2; the figures for the incidence of disease among children are an increase by a factor of 4.1 to 4.9 in the rayons being monitored in Gomel Oblast, and a factor of 3.5 to 4 in Mogilev Oblast."

"In studies of the immune system, in a significant proportion of those investigated a change was found in the indicators of immunity, testifying to a lowering of the indicators and the emergence of the preconditions for the formation of autonomic pathologies. Significant changes have been found in the genetic apparatus of lymphocytes and bone marrow in the adult population and in children."

It has been established that the indicators for primary disability in workers and employees in the 11 rayons of Gomel Oblast where the level of contamination is being monitored rose from 40.3 per 10,000 workers and employees in 1985 to 47.7 in 1988."

Practice shows the catastrophic changes in the physical conditions and sense of well-being in the population living in contaminated territories, and the dynamics of the increase in pathological deviations from the norm, primarily in children, of which physicians in the local treatment centers are becoming increasingly convinced. According to reports from Narodichskiy Rayon in Zhitomir Oblast, "there has been a sharp increase in the number of diseases of the eye in adults and children. Whereas in 1984 a total of 24 people suffered from cataracts, in the first quarter of this year alone there have been 195. A steady increase is being observed of anemia in children." (NEDELYA No 30, 1989). In general, in the contaminated oblasts of Belorussia there is a deterioration in the qualitative hematologic values, the genetic system is suffering, and the number of malformed fetuses is increasing, which must all lead to a weakening of intellectual and physical powers, mass "radiation AIDS," and degradation of the entire people, particularly if one takes into account the dispersal in various ways, deliberate and unintentional, of dangerous radionuclide dust throughout the republic.

For just with the connivance and encouragement of the sanitation service these kinds of things can happen:

—construction and commissioning of decontamination stations along the roads in the Gomel area, in which millions of rubles have been invested, have been frozen;

—equipment (tractors, cars, combine harvesters, and so forth) written off because of serious contamination and earmarked for destruction, have been taken piecemeal from Braginskiy, Khoynikskiy, and other contaminated rayons to relatively clean or clean areas adjacent to them;

—to this day the refrigeration rooms at meat combines have been stuffed with "dirty" 1986-vintage carcasses, and tens of thousands of tons of this dangerous meat has been put in food as an additive;

—dirty fodder, including concentrated feeds and hay, has been taken from the resettlement zones to neighboring villages and rayons in Gomel Oblast;

—instructions from the BSSR State Agroindustrial Committee notwithstanding, on orders from the Gomel Oblast agroindustrial committee (No 138 dated 23 April 1987), land in the resettlement zone in Braginskiy, Khoynikskiy, and Narovlyanskiy Rayons withdrawn and given over to the Goszemzapas [state fallow land authorities] has been sown with crops using the shift method using resources from virtually all rayons in the oblast; farm specialists have been receiving fabulous bonuses for the harvests from this land—up to six or eight months of their salaries;

—the rayon procurement offices have enclosed themselves in barbed-wire entanglements and waving rags, thanks to which the procurement plans have been doubled, and the administration is warming its hands on this;

—"dirty" cattle are being grazed and fattened in clean areas, and because of this more and more land is becoming contaminated through their dung;

—"dirty" milk is returned from processing to the farms to feed calves;

—radionuclide-contaminated produce, and also turf blocks, firewood, lumber, and timber materials, are still being massed produced and processed, and marketed both within the republic and beyond;

—schoolchildren are being recruited for the forest plantations in the resettlement zone;

—the *"Guide for Carrying on Agriculture under Conditions of Radioactive Contamination"* approved by the USSR State Agroindustrial Committee (1988) is not being observed both with respect to the section banning agricultural production on territories with a radiation level greater than 80 curies per square kilometer (for example, agriculture was still being carried on in 1989 in Krasnopolskiy and other rayons), and with respect to the withdrawal of arable land with a radiation level of more than 40 curies per square kilometer from the crop rotation; in Vetkovskiy Rayon, for example, according to local radiologists the "guide" was received only a year after it was adopted.

Incidentally, as far back as 29 August 1987 the Belorussian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee issued order No 28, which strictly banned "the planning of crop production for food on land with a level of more than 40 curies per square kilometer of cesium 137." The order has been ignored by specialists in the oblasts and rayons.

In some areas the local leadership is getting not unsubstantial bonuses for "decontamination," thus astonishing the people since decontamination is being done mainly by the military. To the point, account padding is widespread in carrying out decontamination; it takes little to do but costs dearly. The monthly payments for each serviceman alone come to R500. Total spending on this generally empty business will amount to hundreds of millions, if not billions of rubles.

Since the accident, government "decisions" have repeatedly been issued about the resettlement of the inhabitants of Lomachi in Khoynikskiy Rayon located on territory with a contamination level of 63 curies per square kilometer for cesium, and 2.63 curies for strontium. But people are still living there. Four years later inhabitants have not been resettled from villages where the radiation level is as high as the level in the 30-kilometer zone or even above it for nuclides of cesium, strontium, and plutonium in the soil, thus grossly and malefficiently violating the rules for radiation protection of the population. The republic government commission has essentially limited itself to a statement (protocol No 17/7 of 15 July 1987) that "four rural populated points have been found (Chudyany and Malinovka in Cherikovskiy Rayon and Gatskovichi and Novoyelnya in Krasnopolskiy Rayon) where the content of cesium 137 in the soil from the average sample exceeds 100 curies per square kilometer, while in nine rural populated points (Gorodok, Gotovets, Zavodok, and Dubrovka in Krasnopolskiy Rayon, Osovets, Novomalinovka, and Kamenka in Cherikovskiy Rayon, Aleksandrovka in Klimovichskiy Rayon, and the settlement of Leninskiy in Kostyukovichskiy Rayon) samples have exceeded that level."

Moreover, at populated points known to hold out no prospects for people living there, new construction has been started and opened as, for example, a major livestock complex and residential settlement near the village of Vysokiy Borok in Krasnopolskiy Rayon, the Mayskiy residential settlement in Cherikovskiy Rayon, a land improvement system in the village of Bartoomeyevka in Vetkovskiy Rayon, and social and cultural projects in the village of Strelchevo in Khoynikskiy Rayon.

Construction has continued on some projects even after the belated ban on this construction issued by the BSSR Council of Ministers. There is obvious irresponsibility and inattention to people and to concern for the radiation protection of the population. In one oblast alone—Mogilev Oblast—more than R200 million have been invested in construction in the zone where contamination is greater than 40 curies per square kilometer. Among others, the projects built include schools (as proof of the great concern of the fathers of the fatherland for their children), but the children just cannot go there. For Gomel Oblast the figures for spending on worthless construction will probably be even more impressive. It is the same for contaminated areas in the Ukraine and Russia. In Narodichskiy Rayon alone R105 million have been invested in new construction, mainly in the zone of strict monitoring. Many new residential settlements for those resettled in Gomel Oblast, as, incidentally, in Bryansk and Chernigov Oblasts, have again been built in contaminated localities; the blame here lies primarily with the sanitation service and the USSR chief state sanitation medical officer, A.I. Kondrusev.

A letter from Belorussian SSR Minister of Health V.S. Ulashchik addressed to V.G. Yevtuk in the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers (No 1095/04-4 of 13 July 1989) contains curious recommendations. Verbatim:

"1. Resettlement of inhabitants to new places to live should ensure compliance with one of the basic principles of radiation protection (Radiation Safety Standards 76/87)—lowering the received dose of radiation to the lowest possible level.

"2. Conditions should be created at the new place of residence allowing the lifting of all restrictions on the normal tenor of life for the rural inhabitant introduced in connection with the radiation factor (diet, regime for labor and leisure, and so forth).

"3. Foodstuffs produced on private subsidiary plots (particularly milk and meat) should meet sanitation standards.

"The level of contamination of a territory at which these requirements can be met should be less than one curie per square kilometer."

Question: Where were the previous and present ministers and their deputies—Savchenko, Ulashchik, Kondrusev, Buryak, and others—before June 1989, since the Radiation Safety Standards existed even earlier, since before 1987 the radiation standards were even stricter; why were they not used?

Here other questions arise: What guided the USSR Ministry of Health when in 1987 it issued an instruction according to which the population of our country found itself virtually in the same position as specialists in the nuclear profession with respect to radiation standards? It was precisely this sleight of hand that enabled the USSR Ministry of Health to transfer the population of contaminated areas in Gomel, Mogilev, Brest, and Minsk Oblasts in the BSSR, Bryansk, Orel, and other oblasts in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts in the Ukrainian SSR to a position of the so-called limited part of the population (category B). The changes in the Radiation Safety Standards were made in an offhand manner as if they were not significant. But the insidiousness of these changes lies in the fact that the radiation standard is now applied to the entire population. In accordance with the 35-REM "concept of living without restrictions on contaminated land" drawn up under the leadership of Academician Ilin, a blow is struck at future generations. For people who remain in contaminated areas and constantly eat foodstuffs that are subject to radioactive contamination find themselves in conditions that are worse than specialists or "individual persons in the population" during short-term radiation.

Academician Ilin and his associates drew up, and on 22 November 1988 USSR Chief State Sanitation Medical Officer A.I. Kondrusev approved the "Maximum Individual Lifetime Dose," while, according to the ideas of world science there can in general be no harmless limits for irradiation. According to the logic of the thing, and according to my conviction, the "limit" invented by cunning people from science is inhuman and unacceptable and at variance with radiation protection. It permits hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people in the BSSR, RSFSR, and Ukrainian SSR to be unjustifiably irradiated with impunity. Suffice it to say that the "limit" proposed by a politicized pro-Ilin science and supported by the chief state sanitation medical officer of the USSR, A.I. Kondrusev, has enabled the latter (a letter of 18 August 1989 to the chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers, M.V. Kovalev) to give permission to resettle the village of Soboli in Braginskiy Rayon where radioactive contamination is high: 25 curies per square kilometers for cesium, 2.4 curies for strontium, and at least 0.01 curies for plutonium!

The people's misfortune arising from the Chernobyl catastrophe is being made worse by the deliberate actions and tricks of those who should be acting directly and uncompromisingly to protect their interests. As Academician Vorobyev remarked in that same letter to the Gomel Oblispolkom, the resettlement of people from contaminated territory three or four years after the catastrophe "reflects only one thing; namely, that no matter what words may be said or what explanations may be offered, the initial calculations of possible doses were wrong."

There is another factor. Despite the instructions of the USSR Ministry of Health (1986), no unified register of persons receiving doses of external and internal radiation as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES has been compiled for the country. For this reason alone, information on the medical and biological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe has been eroded and mixed in every possible way and is too fragmented to use.

Everyone knows how patient the Belorussians are, but in the last 3 and ½ years their vote of confidence for highly placed persons responsible for the "cleanup" following the explosion of the radioactive volcano has dried up. A bureaucratic administration has been thinking not so much about protecting people from the radiation, but rather about how to protect and even increase production on the unfortunate land, and it still is.

By the third anniversary of the Chernobyl accident the commission led first by A.A. Petrov and then by V.G. Yevtukh and N.I. Demente has reached an impasse in the matter of radiation protection for the people: By then, outside the boundaries of the 30-kilometer zone not one key question concerning the further life of the people had been resolved. It must be said that much of the responsibility for the state of affairs in the contaminated zones of the three republics was born by the government commission led formerly by B.Ye. Shcherbina. In June, at the 11th Session of the BSSR Supreme Soviet, V.G. Yevtukh stated in his report that the main result of three years of work on the "cleanup" was that "it has been possible to protect people's health and guaranteed them against disease." These words are pharisaism of the first water.

A new stage in the "cleanup" in Belorussia started in the spring of 1989—with alarming statements from the public and from journalists and writers and scientists who had undertaken at their own initiative to unmask the hypocrisy in matters concerning Chernobyl and establish a more radical approach to providing radiation protection for the population.

Documents issued since the accident that have come to my attention enable me to assert that in all the complicated years of the age of Chernobyl, the real defenders of our people have been primarily the Belorussian scientists. True, not all of them, like Nesterenko, have been able to leap immediately to the defense because many of them started their investigation of this great misfortune from scratch. But still, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences under the leadership of V.P. Platonov has been able in a short time to rally honest and uncompromising researchers who are concerned for the fate of the people and nation. They include specialists in various disciplines and of various rank, including A.V. Stepanenko, Ye.F. Konoplya, E.I. Zborovskiy, I.N. Nikitchenko, I.I. Lishtvan, Ye.P. Petrayev, M.V. Pavlova.... The civic stance assumed by the Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee (and leader of the agroindustrial commission for Chernobyl), Ye.F. Sukhoruk, evokes profound respect. But here it is necessary to note that the correct actions taken by the Belorussian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee have often been slurred over by individual workers in the party apparatus. A pity!

Nevertheless, the secretary of the Mogilev party obkom [oblast committee], V.S. Leonov, and the oblispolkom deputy chairman, V.M. Ivanov, have during the last year made great efforts to correct the situation in the Mogilev area, and the oblispolkom chairman in Gomel Oblast, A.A. Grakhovskiy, has carried a great burden in organizing evacuation work and other work since the accident. But, of course, their possibilities have been limited, and there is much that they have been unable to do. They have been unable to determine the course of events at other levels and in other spheres. As a result, time has been lost in resettling people to clean areas. Four years of delays have brought the population many sad disillusionments in their lives and in the activity of the state apparatus, and have caused mass sickness, even if it is not radiation sickness. These are the real results of the barbed wire!

Because of their negligent attitude toward their obligations by titled physicians at the time when the radioactive cloud formed above the Chernobyl AES and was spread by the wind, not even iodine preventive steps were taken for the population of adjacent regions. This is the result: 1.5 million people (including 160,000 young children) received an internal dose of radiation in the thyroid, and for 50,000 children the dose was 30 to 100 REM, and for 27,000 the dose was 100 REM and higher. As a result 37 thyroid diseases have now been recorded in 37 percent of the children. This is the price of the leaders' negligence and the trusteeship of sanitation medicine. It is probable that under the burden of the facts—that is, the constantly growing amount of information about the baneful effects of radiation among the population in the affected areas—already in 1987 the results of scientific studies conducted by the Institute of Biophysics in the zone of radioactive contamination were classified, and—it must be said, by evil intent—part of the very important studies by the institute on the effects of ionizing radiation on children's health was halted.

I believe the time has now come for the people and their law enforcement organs to hold the persons involved in the "cleanup following the Chernobyl accident" responsible, to hold them responsible for the continued and deliberate concealment of the real situation in the areas of radiation damage, for their indifference and negligence in protecting what is most valuable— the health of citizens—and for having thus harmed the people, for the pseudoscientific compilations and "concepts" with elements of juggling and dirty tricks about being able to live freely in contaminated territory, and for the abuse of official positions and the waste of hundreds of millions of state assets on construction in places where it was absurd right from the start.

The people and the nation cannot flourish without action by the institutions of justice.

From the Editor.

V. Yakovenko's article is based on the open letter he wrote and sent to USSR Procurator General A.Ya. Sukharev and Belorussian SSR Procurator General G.S. Tarnavskiy demanding that criminal proceedings be instituted against officials whose actions during the "cleanup after the Chernobyl accident" have been and are criminal and capable of resulting in serious consequences for the people. The submission made by the well-known Belorussian political commentator to the procuracy is supported by a large group of USSR people's deputies, including writers A. Adamovich, Ch. Aytmatov, V. Belov, V. Bykov, I. Drutse, Ya. Peters, V. Rasputin, Yu. Chernicheno, Yu. Shcherbak, and V. Yavorivskiy.

Military

Zaykov Addresses All-Army Officers Assembly

PM1112132189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Dec 89 First Edition pp 1-2

[Report by special correspondents Colonel G. Miranovich, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Vladykin, Lieutenant Colonel I. Yesyutin, Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich, and Major S. Kusher on 7 December speeches at first day of All-Army Officers Assembly: "The Times Demand New Approaches"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] L.N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, who was attending the meeting, took the floor.

I believe that every one of us is satisfied with the very fact that a glorious Russian Army tradition—the Officers Assembly—has been revived, he said. Indeed, Comrades, it is necessary to revive good traditions.

An earnest discussion is taking place at the All-Army Officers Assembly—a party-based discussion of the officer's honor, of service, of the instilling of order, discipline, and organization. You can tell that officers of the USSR Armed Forces support their cause and feel great responsibility for the homeland, to the people. This can be felt in every speech. Perestroyka is taking place in the Army and Navy and, to judge from the ardent speeches being made here, is proceeding intensively, albeit in a complex way.

Many of the speakers are concerned about how to combine one-man command and democracy today. This really is a new problem. But, first, no one has taken away from officers the right to one-man command. It is another matter that it must be used within the limits and the framework of the present military regulations. Second, democracy means, above all, respect for people and for discipline and order. An indissoluble unity exists between these indicators. Yes, different people serve in the Armed Forces today, and the contingent of draftees has changed, and this has to be taken into account. Of course, it has become far more complex for officers to work under the new conditions.

Another topic being aired here is the question of an officer's honor. Let us state bluntly that this concept, which has been lost somewhat, and to no purpose, must be enhanced in every possible way. An officer of the Soviet Armed Forces must be a synonym for courage, nobility, and lofty culture.

For certain comrades, concern creeps in: Will the process of reducing the Armed Forces and armaments not harm the security of the country and of our allies? The talks on Malta showed that the new political thinking is gathering momentum and becoming a reality of our days. Under these conditions, while reducing military spending and destroying certain types of arms, it is necessary to constantly maintain the state's high defense capability. This is the purport of our defensive doctrine. For this, it is necessary to adopt only modern combat hardware whose accuracy characteristics are an order higher and, most importantly, it must fall into the hands of highly educated officers and Army and Navy servicemen. This means that sensible, skillful, and economical use must be made of the funds allocated by the people.

In this connection perfectly just complaints have been made against those sectors of industry which supply the troops with hardware and arms. Laggardness is all the more inadmissible here under conditions of the conversion which has begun. This positive process is designed to help to increase production of civilian output, but, on the other hand, it will require of the Ministry of Defense, above all, as the chief client, the ability to manage the zzallocated funds sensibly and efficiently. Proper order still does not exist in this matter.

Perestroyka has brought to the forefront the person with his concerns and aspirations, L.N. Zaykov emphasized. This applies in full to those who perform difficult service, guarding the Soviet people's peaceful labor. It is necessary to ensure the social protection of the officer corps—our commanders must have normal living conditions both during service and after discharge into the reserve. The government is now examining the draft of a new statute submitted on the CPSU Central Committee's initiative on the procedure for recording and improving the housing conditions of servicemen who have been transferred to the reserve, for today, as you know, the plainly obsolete 1964 statute, which contains certain restrictions on registration in a number of cities, still applies. Officers will be permitted to return to the place from which they were drafted. How can it be otherwise? If someone joined the Army from Moscow, he must return to Moscow. And thus in all regions.

Incidentally, while reducing expenditure on defense, it is planned to channel a certain part of it to the Armed Forces, especially for resolving questions such as housing and the social sphere.

I wish to assure you, Comrades, that all the questions raised here will be examined carefully in the USSR Defense Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Main Political Directorate, as well as by those ministries and departments which they concern.

L.N. Zaykov answered numerous questions from participants in the All-Army Officers Assembly.

Informals Promote Draft Evasion in Latvia

90UM0109A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 1 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Zaitsev: "'Playing' With the Law, or Who Is Boycotting the Fall Draft into the Soviet Army"]

[Text] Ilgvars Mezhsargs, draftee from Bauskiy Rayon, sent his conscript's registration card and a letter to the Military Commissariat of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. In the letter, he claims that an act of international law, the Geneva Convention of 1949, "gives me as a citizen of an occupied country the right to refuse to serve in the occupation troops of the Soviet Union."

One small fact: The letter is really a preprinted form. You only have to fill in your first and last name, your address, and the number of the military card which you are returning. The idea behind this is simple: It is doubtful that any of the young fellows would decide to check on the authenticity of provisions of an international act with such an impressive title. The main thing is to make it sound good.

Many informal radical organizations lately unfolded an extensive anti-Army campaign. They set up pickets of rayon and city military commissariats; they appeal to the Supreme Soviet and to the people of Latvia to boycott the autumn draft.

The People's Front of Latvia did not stay away from it either. Its second congress which met in early October adopted Resolution No 5. That resolution demands that the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR "immediately suspend the orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR on the 1989 autumn draft for active military duty." The Supreme Soviet should also adopt without delay a law on the alternative military service.

These are the intricate conditions of the autumn draft in the republic. A TASS correspondent asked the military commissar of the Latvian SSR, Major General Ya.B. Dudu, to comment on the situation.

"The existing tension is the direct result of the anti-Army campaign that was unleashed in the republic. Even at the session of the Committee for Youth Affairs under the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, some people spoke in support of the boycott. However, in the end the deputies denounced this action.

To date, seven draftees have refused to serve in the Army, regarding whom measures are being taken according to our laws. Their cases have been handed over to the procuracy. Law is law, and nobody can take liberties with it.

The problem is that some young people are rather confused in their minds as a result of mass propaganda. For instance, they insist on total demilitarization of the Baltic area, but at the same time they demand the recreation of the national and territorial military unit: the 43rd Latvian Guards Rifle Division. They talk about boycotting the draft, but they also want privileges for young Latvians who enroll in military schools.

There are problems in the Army too, as well as difficulties and negative phenomena which we are trying to erase. We have to look into every case separately and talk it over with the soldiers and officers. But to speak ill of and villify everything in the Army is the same as to claim that "all Latvians are no good" or "all Russians are no good." And that does not happen.

Our officers are doing a lot to normalize the atmosphere concerning the draft. Together with the Pribaltiyskiy Military District Command, we have conducted open houses in military units, meetings with soldiers' mothers, and meetings of Latvian soldiers with the conscripts.

For the first time in our republic we had representatives of the community in the recruiting committees working together with their officials. Among them were members of the People's Front, the Movement for National Independence of Latvia, Interfront, and the Women's League. Many of them thought that recruiting committees are some kind of a rigid mechanism which aims to put pressure on the draftees, threaten and scare them. But in a couple of days the "inspectors" lost their steam and stopped visiting us: They could not find anything interesting for themselves.

I constantly meet with the draftees at the collecting point and I am convinced that the vast majority of them have a very clear understanding of their constitutional duty.

Ilgvars Mezhsargs put at 5 rubles the value of his letter to the military commissariat which had his conscript's card inside. But those who slipped him the form for the "letter" apparently did not intend to inform either the young man or his parents or other men of the same age that he might pay a penalty. According to an article of the Latvian SSR criminal code, evading the draft to serve in the USSR military forces is punishable by a prison term of up to 3 years. Is this not too great a price to pay for a 5-ruble letter?

DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum Held 4 Dec

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[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel G. Lisenkov: "Plenum of the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy Central Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday's plenum of the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] Central Committee analyzed the course of perestroyka in defense society organizations and determined measures to further improve mass defense work. The report was delivered by Colonel General N.N. Kotlovtsev, chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee.

The delegates had an extensive discussion of the question of DOSAAF organizations' participation in the elections to republic and local soviets. The plenum ended with examination of an organizational matter. Major General D.N. Kuznetsov was elected first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and Colonel A.Ya. Shcherbakov was elected deputy chairman.

Senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Defense Ministry, and Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate participated in the plenum's work.